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Part I: Making Religion

Introduction
Among the few things that unite microstates like Andorra and Luxembourg with
superpowers like China and India is their legal personality under international
law, their complicated relationship with religion and their obligation to report
on their human rights record to the United Nations (UN). This book tells the
story of how these states—and virtually every other state in the world—have re-
ported on their legal relationship with religion to four UN human rights commit-
tees from 1993 to 2013, and how the committees have responded to their report-
ing.While the committees under scrutiny are entities created under the rules and
regulations of international law, this book offers an external view of their work,
from outside law and the rules of legal interpretation: The selection of research
questions, theoretical approaches, methods and data are not primarily guided by
a concern with the legal scope of the recommendations issued by the commit-
tees, but with the fundamental ambiguity, at times disconnect, between ap-
proaches to religion among legal professionals, policymakers and scholars,
and a conviction that examining the relations between these approaches could
generate new and important insights.
Despite the strictly non-legal nature of this approach, the book has been
written in order to be relevant to readers from both legal and non-legal back-
grounds: how religion is approached, employed and negotiated legally is inextri-
cably linked with its application in wider society, as the vocabulary and taxon-
omies of dominant social actors inevitably influence the legislative and legal
process—and vice versa. What concepts, doctrines, practices and issues are rec-
ognized as “religious” in and around the legal process has wide-ranging effects
for individuals, organizations and society at large. Hence, a non-legal examina-
tion of how religion is handled in the legal process concerns legal and non-legal
readerships alike.
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1 The United Nations and Religion
Officially, the United Nations does not “do” religion: there is no formal legal in-
strument, specialized program or political entity within the organization that
deals with religion as its primary objective. Nevertheless, when the UN Intellec-
tual History Project (UNIHP) submitted its halfway report in 2005, the project
leaders summarized a priority list for the issues where new thinking and re-
search was urgently required and the United Nations should be encouraged to
do “more creative work”. On the very top of that list, the authors placed “The
growing divide between the Islamic world and the West—with attention to the
political, cultural, religious, and development dimensions” (Jolly, Emmerij and
Weiss 2005: 61).
Measured with the metrics of the UNIHP, under which international organi-
zations should be evaluated according to “the quality and relevance of the policy
ideas they put forward” (Emmerij 2007: 39), the efforts of the UN to deal with a
perceived divide between the Islamic world and the West and its multidimen-
sional origins and consequences has unequivocally failed, as the world organi-
zation has been unable to influence or mend this relationship in any meaningful
manner. This shortcoming can, at least in part, be attributed to one of the other
key findings of the project: The failure to distinguish between the different levels
of the organization, and to what extent they are responsible for desirable out-
comes (Weiss, Carayannis and Jolly 2009: 138). What is regularly called “the”
United Nations is in reality an entity with at least three different organizational
levels, consisting of (1) forums for decision-making, (2) international secretariats
and specialized programs, and (3) a broad and increasingly influential group of
independent experts and actors in international civil society.
Although individual agencies have slowly started crafting guidelines for
their interaction with religious actors, none of these organizational levels have
established procedures to deal comprehensively with religion/s or their influence
on global governance.¹ Fashioned to respond to the primary objectives of the UN
listed in the Charter—peace, development, human rights and self-determination
—this organizational structure is ill-equipped to deal with challenges that tran-
scend and depart from these objectives. This lack of attention to issues beyond
the original motives of the organization also influenced the work of the
UNIHP. While the project documented a variety of important contributions of
 For examples of actors at the “second” UN who have started dealing more actively with reli-
gion, see chapter 3.3.2.
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the UN within its core objectives,² it left the influence of the world organization
on other key issues in global governance, like religion, unexamined.
1.1 From Islam and the West to State, Law and Religion
This book examines the range of approaches to religion at one specific section of
the UN from 1993 to 2013, thereby offering a response to the call from the team
behind the UNIHP that the UN be encouraged to do more creative work on the
“growing divide” between the Islamic world and the West. It seeks to provide
such a response in four steps. First, this chapter interrogates the problem formu-
lation offered by the UNIHP, arguing that challenges faced by the UN in relation
to religion are not limited to a failure to engage the divide between the Islamic
world and the West, but are indicative of larger systemic and pervasive challeng-
es arising from the way religion is approached and governed at the international
level. Second, it maps how the different organizational levels of the UN has ap-
proached the subject matter of religion more broadly over the course of their ex-
istence, including an appraisal of the approaches to religion inherited from pre-
cursors like the League of Nations. Third, and drawing on original archival
research, it introduces and examines how four human rights committees located
at the intersection between the three organizational levels of the UN have ap-
proached religion in their monitoring practice from 1993 to 2013, identifying pat-
terns of similarity and difference.³ Fourth, it examines these patterns in greater
detail by contextualizing them within larger scholarly conversations on the rela-
tionship between law and religion.
Surveying the events of the first decade of the 2000s, the emphasis in the
midway report from the UNIHP on a growing divide between “the Islamic
world and the West” is understandable, as the tumultuous world events involv-
ing Islam, Muslims and “the West” during the project period could hardly fail to
register on the radar of a project dedicated to an intellectual history of the UN.
The “Global War on Terror” dominated the decade, as sanctions, wars, addition-
al terror attacks and heated rhetoric about the incapability of Muslims to accept
 See the project website at http://www.unhistory.org/ (Accessed 31.08.2016).
 Some of the archival material examined in chapters 4–7 have been subject to more limited
analyses in two previous publications: Årsheim, Helge. 2016. “Secularist Suspicion and Legal
Pluralism at the United Nations.” Religion and Human Rights 11 (2): 166–188 and Årsheim,
Helge. 2018 [in press]. “Legalities unbound? Assessing the role of religion and legal pluralism
at four UN human rights committees.” Religion, State and Society 46(3).
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democratic values, whether at home or abroad, increasingly dominated news
headlines and rose to the top of global political agendas.
In the midst of these controversies, the UN responded not with the “creative
work” envisioned by the UNIHP, but by reifying and exacerbating the idea that
there is indeed an existential divide between “the Islamic world” and “the West”.
Early in the decade, the World Conference against Racism (2001) in Durban de-
scended into chaos as NGOs, bureaucrats and state representatives quarreled
over the Palestinian question and anti-Semitism, with the leading diplomatic
representative of the U.S. government describing statements at the conference
as “the worst manifestations of anti-Semitism since World War II” (Petrova
2010: 130). According to the representative, “the (…) attitude that sought to
turn Durban into an anti-Israeli carnival also led to the horrific terrorist attacks
in New York and Washington only two days after the conference closed” (Lantos
2002: 50), intimating a direct link between anti-Semitism and terrorism conduct-
ed in the name of Islam. The controversial Durban Declaration and Programme
of Action adopted at the conference has since reverberated in the work of the UN
on the links between discrimination on racial and religious grounds.
In 2004, Spanish premier José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero used the UN General
Assembly as his pulpit when he invoked the cultural diversity of Spanish history
and the ability of the Spanish people to move on from the painful experiences of
terrorism before proposing the creation of “an Alliance of Civilizations between
the Western and the Arab and Muslim worlds”, in order to “prevent hatred and
incomprehension” from building a new wall reminiscent of the Cold War sepa-
ration of Europe.⁴ The Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) began work in 2006, and
was swiftly taken hostage by the anti-terrorism agendas of the UN, the EU and
the US, all of which cited the AoC as a “helpful instrument” in the fight against
terrorism (Lachmann 2011: 191), reinforcing the idea that there is a civilizational
war afoot.
Also in 2004, the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance submitted a report to
the Commission on Human Rights entitled Defamation of Religions and Global
Efforts to Combat Racism: anti-Semitism, Christianophobia and Islamophobia.⁵
In his recommendations, the rapporteur stressed
the increasing intertwining of race, ethnicity, culture and religion and, in this context, the
rise of anti-Semitism, Christianophobia and Islamophobia. The Commission is thus invited
 The United Nations Webcasts: http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/statements/spaeng040921.
pdf. (accessed 14.04. 2016).
 E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.4, 2004.
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to draw the urgent attention of member States to the dynamic of the clash of cultures, civ-
ilizations and religions generated by these developments, in particular in the current con-
text of the predominance of efforts to combat terrorism.
Following the cartoon controversy of 2005/2006, the rapporteur released an ad-
ditional report on the correlation between racism and religious intolerance, en-
titled Situation of Muslims and Arab peoples in various parts of the world.⁶ In
this follow-up report, the rapporteur observed that the central theme in discrim-
ination and violence against Muslims and Arab people across the world was
“hostility towards Islam—the religion itself and believers”, perpetuating the
idea of a widening chasm opening up between Islam and Muslims on the one
side, and a less clearly defined “West” on the other.
While these scattered examples show how UN actors seem to have done little
else than confirming the existence and seriousness of a perceived civilizational
conflict between Islam and the West, they also amply illustrate the problems
with assigning particular tasks to “the UN”. No single entity can direct what hap-
pens at world conferences like the one in Durban, in subsidiary bodies created at
the initiative of member states like the AoC or in the reports of individually ap-
pointed special rapporteurs. Indeed, by challenging the UN to do more creative
work without assigning this task to any specific part of a multilevel organization
with 193 member states, 40 specialized programs, 28 ongoing peace operations
and 44 000 employees around the world,⁷ the UNIHP team reproduced their own
concern that one of the main challenges facing the UN is the frequent failure to
distinguish between the different levels of the UN and their responsibility for de-
sirable outcomes (see above). Adding insult to injury, the very idea that any or-
ganization could possibly take upon itself to address “[t]he growing divide be-
tween the Islamic world and the West—with attention to the political, cultural,
religious, and development dimensions” seems to rest on an idealized vision
of what the UN is and what it can accomplish.
1.2 The United Nations and World Peace
The idea that the United Nations, or some section of it, should take on the re-
sponsibility to heal an envisaged divide between different civilizational blocks
is not a recent one, but hardwired into the DNA of the organization. Relying
 E/CN.4/2006/17, 2006.
 Figures retrieved from United Nations Careers, at https://careers.un.org/lbw/home.aspx?
viewtype=VD, (accessed 14.04.2016).
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on concepts and ideas derived from proposals for organizations maintaining
“perpetual peace” spanning several centuries,⁸ key actors in the foundation of
the UN linked the mission of the world organization with eternal struggles to cre-
ate robust structures that would secure peaceful planetary coexistence. Jan
Smuts, South African premier and key architect behind the preamble to the
UN Charter, observed that the creation of the UN came at a time when the
hour had struck for the human race, and “[m]ankind has arrived at the crisis
of its fate, the fate of its future as a civilized world” (Mazower 2009: 28). The
fight against Nazism during the war had been in defense of “eternal values
which sustain the spirit of man in its upward struggle toward the light” (Mazow-
er 2009: 29).
Above all, this spiritual, civilizational struggle would be resolved by recourse
to human rights, whose formulation in the preamble to the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights (1948) was derived from the “inherent dignity” of all members
of the human family. Proclaiming the rights in the declaration as “a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”, the preamble echoed
earlier sentiments among statesmen and international lawyers relying on a
more or less explicit “standard of civilization”, a notoriously slippery require-
ment under which
the European law of ʻcivilizedʼ Christian nations was established as the guiding principle as
to whether a nation was ʻcivilizedʼ, ʻbarbarousʼ, or ʻsavageʼ, thus determining its admissibil-
ity or exclusion from European international society. In order to meet the requisite ʻstan-
dard of civilizationʼ and be admitted to the family of international law-abiding nations,
non-European societies were required to organise themselves in a manner that would be
immediately recognisable by European states as reflecting their own standards of socio-po-
litical organisation. (Bowden 2005: 19)
According to this line of thinking, a stable international order under which dif-
ferent nations could engage in peaceful relationships depended on the imple-
mentation of a common standard of achievement to which all peoples should
strive.
Among the items in the list of requirements for states to adhere to the stan-
dard, none were considered more important than law: As the primary tool of
modern, enlightened statecraft, the redeeming qualities of the creation and im-
plementation of a legal system modeled on European legal traditions could
 The idea of a coalition of states coming together to create binding legal obligations on one
another to secure friendly relations for all eternity was authoritatively hammered out by Imma-
nuel Kant in the essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (1795). For an overview of dif-
ferent models of such projects, see Archibugi 1992.
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hardly be overestimated in an era when law increasingly came to be seen as a
positive science furthering the development of mankind. While the main legal
tool employed under the standard of civilization was the unequal treaty systems
developed between European and non-European states during the 19th century,
the standard was also faithfully reproduced as the legal basis for the decoloni-
zation overseen by the Covenant of the League of Nations, whose article 22 man-
dated that the tutelage of recently independent territories “inhabited by peoples
not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the mod-
ern world” should be offered to more advanced nations, seeing as the “well-
being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization”
(see chapter 2).
Although the idea that civilizations are hierarchically ordered was not as
clearly stated at the foundation of the UN, the question of “trusteeship” was
among the major tasks attributed to the world organization. Chapters XII and
XIII of the UN Charter are dedicated in their entirety to the creation of this sys-
tem, under which the UN Trusteeship Council was given the task of overseeing
the gradual dismantling of the mandates established under the League.
Among the key objectives of the system was the obligation in article 76 of the
Charter, “to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage
recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world”, establishing the
clear correlation between the concepts of trusteeships and human rights.
While the Trusteeship Council was practically made obsolete with the inde-
pendence of Palau in 1994 as the last territory under its oversight, discussions on
the legitimacy and applicability of the human rights provisions enshrined in the
UDHR as “a common standard of humankind” have been ongoing with varying
degrees of intensity from 1948 and up to the present. Across these dispersed
human rights debates, the possibility or desirability of civilizational rapproche-
ment has been a recurring theme, as authors have questioned whether human
rights can be considered a new standard of civilization (Donnelly 1998: 16),
whether the “metaphor” and “grand narrative” of human rights ask states in
the “Third World (…) to follow a particular script of history” (Mutua 2001:
243), or whether “Asian” (Myers 2011: 48–49) or “Islamic” (Mayer 1994: 402) val-
ues can be reconciled with the rules and provisions of the international system
of human rights law.
Exceeding these other debates in prominence and after-effects, however, the
publication of the essay “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Affairs in 1993 by
Samuel P. Huntington offered a grand narrative for the conceptualization of civ-
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ilizational conflict and strife as a potential outcome of the end of the Cold War
stalemate.⁹ Huntington’s approach directly linked “civilizations” and “religions”,
as he divided the world into “seven or eight” major civilizations, whose most im-
portant dividing issue was religion (Huntington 1993: 25). Only a year later, José
Casanova published his influential book Public Religions in the Modern World,
whose central thesis was the “deprivatization” of religion, under which religious
movements and organizations across the world were “refusing to accept the mar-
ginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of sec-
ularization had reserved for them” (Casanova 1994: 5).
Both of these publications have been widely discussed and hotly contested.
They tapped into and helped provide a vocabulary and a framework for the anal-
ysis of the much lauded re-emergence, comeback, resurgence, or simply return of
religion to the public sphere, from a purported, yet rarely specifically defined
exile or absence. Among the variety of indicators marshalled in the following
years to sustain the claims of a decisive comeback, the terrorist attacks against
the U.S. on September 11, 2001 is in a class of its own, after which Robert O. Keo-
hane flatly observed that all theories of international relations were “relentlessly
secular with respect to motivation”, having ignored the impact of religion despite
the role of “religious fervor” in “world-shaking political movements” (Keohane
2002: 272). The 9/11 event also contributed to the “religious turn” in the thinking
of Jürgen Habermas, who one month after the attacks delivered the address
“Faith and Knowledge”, in which he observed that Western society, in order to
avoid the specter of a clash of civilizations, must keep in mind that its own “di-
alectics of secularization” had not yet come to a close, in order to better under-
stand the “miscarrying” of secularization in other parts of the world (Habermas
2005: 328).
1.3 The United Nations and the “Return” of Religion
Although religion has no place in the UN Charter beyond the principle of non-
discrimination, the widely touted “return of religion” that has increasingly
been diagnosed since at least the turn of the millennium has provided links be-
tween religion and most primary objectives of the UN listed in the Charter. Ac-
cording to proponents of different versions of the comeback narrative, religion
 Although Huntington’s essay was by far the most influential, the ideas underpinning it were
formulated by Bernard Lewis in an article published in The Atlantic in 1990 with the ominous
title “The Roots of Muslim Rage”. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-
roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/ (accessed 19.08.2016).
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influences peace, human rights and development in unequal measures, influen-
ces that have allegedly been woefully under-researched in the “secularist” past
of the social sciences. Religion, on this reading, is often implicated in conflicts
because religious convictions contain “sources of danger”, including but not lim-
ited to their focus on absolute and unconditional validity, which in turn can lead
to intolerance, over-zealous proselytization, increased aggressiveness and the
willingness to use violence and the legitimization of abuses of power and viola-
tions of human rights (Haynes 2009: 53). These challenges notwithstanding,
other authors have pointed to the potential of religion/s and religious actors
to contribute to peacebuilding, partly due to their important social role in
many conflict zones around the world, partly due to aspects inherent to the cen-
tral tenets of their doctrines (Hertog 2010: xvi).
The correlation between religion/s and human rights, while integral to the
human rights enterprise from the very start of its modern inception, has partic-
ularly been highlighted in recent years. Authors have pointed to the necessity of
a religious component for discussions on the morality of human rights (Perry
2007: 12), but have also cautioned that religion can be “a formidable force for
and against human rights” (Juviler 1999: 3). This latter point has become the
linchpin and battleground in much of the recent literature on the specific
human right to religious freedom, whose promotion and contestation frequently
relies on engagement with “good” religion and suppression of “bad” religion
(Hurd 2015: 22–37). Echoing this concern with the ambivalence of religion as
a social force, authors within development studies have called for the increased
engagement of religious actors in development work (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011:
52), while others have questioned just what exactly sets religious actors apart
from other, purportedly “secular” actors in development (Barnett 2012: 177).
Despite these recent linkages between the core objectives of the UN and the
perceived “return” of religion, the literature on religion and the UN is still in its
infancy. The research presented in this book was undertaken from 2010 to 2014, a
timeframe under which the research landscape on religion and the UN was going
through some of its first, hesitant steps. While several works on the role of the
UN in the creation of a human right to the freedom of religion or belief have
been written in earlier decades,¹⁰ the role of religion in the work of the other sec-
tions of the UN has only gained traction in later years.
This incipient literature has so far largely revolved around the role of reli-
gious organizations. Recent studies have examined the increasingly assertive
role of religious NGOs at the United Nations. Josef Boehle has stressed the
 See Claydon 1972, Sullivan 1988 and Dickson 1995.
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vital role of religious NGOs in promoting and realizing the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals, pointing to the need to overcome the epistemic boundaries separat-
ing religious and secular communities in order to work together to reach com-
mon goals (Boehle 2010: 295). Marie Juul Petersen, in her assessment of
religious NGOs working with the UN, has pointed to the relative underrepresen-
tation of Muslim NGOs relative to those of other “world religions” and the com-
plex interweaving of religious doctrines with the work of NGOs,while also stress-
ing the importance of the progressive/conservative political axis as sometimes
more important than the distinctions between religious and non-religious
NGOs (Petersen 2010).
Jeremy Carrette, writing about the role of Quakers at the UN, has highlighted
the “paradox of globalization”, under which religious NGOs are caught in the
general tension between the actual hegemony and apparent plurality driven
by global actors like the UN. Viewed in this perspective, the proliferation of reli-
gious NGOs at the UN over the last decades has had little effect in terms of cre-
ating true pluralism, instead reproducing entrenched divisions in global civil so-
ciety (Carrette 2013: 46–47). Karsten Lehmann, in providing a general overview
of religion at the UN and religious NGOs in particular, has emphasized how these
organizations have changed their internal structures to become more efficient at
the UN, while also stressing the importance of different religious doctrines to the
kinds of activism pursued by NGOs emanating from religious traditions (Leh-
mann 2015: 2937).
Taken together, these recent writings reflect the empirical reality of organ-
ized religions staking their claims on the world stage in a way not previously
seen. While this increase may theoretically be related to the so-called “return”
of religion to the public sphere, it is certainly also a subset of the increase in
civil society engagement with the United Nations more generally, as documented
in the UNIHP as the incipient “third UN” (see above). The increased engagement
of religious NGOs with the UN has been characterized by Azza Karam as partner-
ships between the UN and the “world of religion” (Karam 2010: 462). According
to Karam, these partnerships have become increasingly normalized both within
religious organizations and within the UN itself, in particular through its speci-
alized programs (Karam 2010: 463–4).
This book takes a different approach. Rather than examining the relation-
ship between the UN and religion/s, either in overarching or more specific insti-
tutional terms, it examines how different actors within the UN system have iden-
tified and approached religion/s in the course of their work, whether in their
doctrinal, social or organizational forms. As such, it adopts a conceptual ap-
proach that is methodologically related to works like Human Rights at the UN.
The Political History of Universal Justice by Sarah Zaidi and Roger Normand
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(2008) and published as part of the UNIHP, and The United Nations Democracy
Agenda—A Conceptual History by Kirsten Haack (2011). Like human rights and
democracy, I contend that religion in the international sphere in general and
at the UN in particular constitutes an “essentially contested concept” (Haack
2011: 13), whose scope and content can only be accessed through a combination
of etymological and genealogical investigation furnished with a reflexive engage-
ment with empirical data (see chapter 2).¹¹
The claim that religion constitutes an essentially contested concept at the
UN does not undermine the veracity of the existing literature on religion at
the UN. Rather, it represents a difference in the subject matter under scrutiny
and the objective of the research effort.Whereas the existing literature primarily
seeks to disentangle, map or influence the ways in which religious freedom is
protected and how different types of religious organizations interact with the
various levels of the UN, the present study examines the ways in which actors
in the UN system generate concepts and definitions of religion in their work—
how they do so, what patterns of religion these efforts create, and how these pat-
terns correspond with the larger scholarly enterprise of law and religion. As
such, under scrutiny here is not how religion/s and their institutions interact
with the UN, but rather the approaches to religion within the United Nations.
Similarly, the objective is not to influence how religion is construed, but to
map its typical forms and connect them with the existing scholarly literature.
1.4 Making Religion at the United Nations
Despite recent attention to the UN and religion in the academic literature, there
has been no concerted attempt to examine this relationship from a critical and
constructivist perspective. More specifically, scholars have paid little attention
to how different levels of the UN approach religion in the interpretation and ex-
ecution of their mandates.Whether religion/s are conceived of as beliefs or prac-
 This is a different approach to the original notion of essentially contested concepts, which
was coined by Walter B. Gallie in a paper published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
in 1956. According to Gallie, essentially contested concepts are recognized by seven distinctive
features, all of which denote specific qualities inherent to such concepts, the main distinctive
feature being criterion VI, that all participants in a conversation about essentially contested con-
cepts recognize the authority of a more or less clearly enunciated archetype,whose replication is
available through several different avenues. Among his key exemplars of essentially contested
concepts, Gallie considered the participation in a particular religion to be satisfy most “nearly
perfectly” his conditions (Gallie 1956: 180).
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tices, clusters of formal or informal institutions or powerful social forces is often
opaque and under-examined in the policies, programs and guidelines created by
UN entities. This lack of attention is not only surprising given the tortuous inter-
pretational history of the term and concept of “religion”, but potentially damag-
ing to the all-important translation and deployment of key concepts in the work
of the UN on the ground.
As all the levels of the UN increasingly engage “the world of religion”, it is
more important than ever that the rationale and methodology driving this en-
gagement is made openly and specifically. If UN specialized programs and agen-
cies promote the increased collaboration with religious actors to achieve their
goals, they should publicize their reasons for doing so, what actors are being tar-
geted, and for what reasons. Likewise, if the UN General Assembly, the Human
Rights Council or a Special Rapporteur advise greater interreligious dialogue, the
protection of religious sites or increased religious education, they should be
challenged to explicate which religious traditions that should be involved,
through which religious organizations representing which constituencies in
order to reach which specific, attainable goals. This level of precision is required
for all other dominant concepts of international governance, from the fight
against poverty and war and to the spread of democracy and the protection of
the environment. There is no reason why religion should be treated otherwise.
As such, demanding greater clarity and accountability from the ways in which
UN actors approach religion does not amount to exoticization or differential
treatment of religion as a “special case”, but is rather a call for international ac-
tors to start re-examining and revisiting the claims and charges they make in the
name of or in relation to religion/s.
The importance of demanding this precision through re-examination, trans-
lation or “vernacularization” of how terms are applied and understood at the
global level in order to create a better fit with local conditions is obviously
not exclusive to religion, and has also been examined for a range of other con-
cepts. As documented in the work of legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry, the
conceptual journey from international conferences and seminars and down to
the work of state agencies and NGOs trying to bring about changes in the lives
of ordinary people can be an arduous one, involving heightened risks of distor-
tion for less specific concepts created at the international level (Merry 2006: 219–
220).Writing on the emergence of global and local discourses on women’s rights,
Merry has pointed to a range of different conceptions of the role of “culture” in
these discourses, a concept that has consistently been demonized (Merry 2003a:
60). She has shown how this discussion has evolved through transactions be-
tween scholars from a pretended “outside”, at intergovernmental and state levels
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in powerful positions from “above”, and among the marginalized and in grass-
roots activist groups from “below”, over the course of the last decades.
In this book, I examine how these processes play out in relation to religion,
with a particular emphasis on how actors within the UN system approach the
concept differently relative to their roles within the organization. Unlike some
scholars of religion, notably Timothy Fitzgerald (2000; 2011), Russell T. McCutch-
eon (1997; 2001; 2014) and Daniel Dubuisson (2003), I contend that there is noth-
ing special that sets religion apart as a topic of academic analysis, and that this
general point can be expanded to numerous other topics; while there are obvi-
ous challenges to the translation of “folk categories” that have independent ex-
istences and modes of interpretation beyond the academy into analytical catego-
ries, as pointed out by Saler (2000), Clark (2003) and Murphy (2006), I see no
reason why religion is distinct in this respect from other essentially contested
concepts, like art, politics or law, all of which could and should be subjected
to similar forms of investigation. Numerous academic disciplines engage religion
as one of their central categories, and a broad and varied body of scholarship
has proposed different approaches to establish the content and applicability of
the term.
1.5 Religion at the United Nations Human Rights Treaty
Bodies
Heeding the call of the UNIHP to appreciate and engage the distinctions between
the different organizational levels of the United Nations, this book zooms in on
one specific group of committees located at the intersection between the politi-
cal, bureaucratic and activist levels of the UN. In operation since the early 1970s,
the human rights treaty body system was created to monitor the implementation
of the core human rights treaties negotiated under the auspices of the UN, from
the adoption of the UDHR and up to the present. Monitoring treaties negotiated
at the first, political level of the UN, serviced by international civil servants from
the second UN and composed of independent experts drawn from the third, aux-
iliary level of the UN, their central location at the nexus between the different
levels of the UN system and their frequent engagement with actors at the
other levels make the treaty bodies ideal for an analysis of how different actors
at the UN approach religion.
Treaty bodies entertain a broad engagement with legal provisions on reli-
gion, and religious doctrines, practices and organizations play key roles in
their monitoring efforts. In their “concluding observations”, issued after the re-
view of states’ reports, the treaty bodies offer comparable views of what religion
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is and can be, and how states can and should handle religion in their domestic
legal systems. The treaty bodies review numerous state reports on the implemen-
tation of their provisions every year, generating a large body of views of the na-
ture and role of religion in society.
The production of written material under the treaty body system is consider-
able.¹² In order to make the analysis as comprehensive as possible in terms of
geographical and chronological scope, the discourse under close examination
is limited to the “concluding observations” issued by the committees, i.e. their
published views of the implementation process described by each state party
in their periodic reports. Furthermore, the examination is limited to observations
issued between 1993 and 2013 by four human rights committees¹³ that enjoy
wide ratification¹⁴ and frequently approach religion. Limiting the discourse
under examination to concluding observations entails a reduction of textual ma-
terial from the 100 000s to approximately 12 000 pages,¹⁵ issued at the conclu-
sion of 208 sessions.
 The total output of the committees is beyond the scope of this volume. Although the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reviewed its first report as early as 1970, it
was not until the early 1990s that the treaty bodies consolidated their monitoring practice
into a set format, with similar and comparable documentation emanating from each review.
The committee monitoring the Convention on the Rights of the Child held its first review session
in 1993, and the online documentation system of the United Nations is presently (2016) complete
from 1993. Hence, in order to make a comparable analysis feasible, no treaty-related document
from prior to 01.01.1993 has been reviewed, apart from their inclusion and assessment in sec-
ondary literature cited. In order to include all relevant material available at the time of comple-
tion, the final date for inclusion of treaty-related documents in the analysis has been set to 31.12.
2013.
 Although the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights occasionally considers re-
ligion in its practice, I have decided to leave it out of the present analysis because of a relative
scarcity of data.
 At present (2016), the number of states that have ratified the conventions in question are as
follows: The International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: 177; The In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 168; The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women: 189; The Convention on the Rights of the Child: 196.
 Sessions typically last for 2 to 3 weeks, and are convened two or three times a year, depend-
ing on the committee in question. Committees review different numbers of states in each ses-
sion. The sessions covered in the analysis are for the HRC the 47th through the 109th session,
for CERD the 42nd through the 83rd session, for the CEDAW committee the 12th through the 56th
session, and for the CRC committee the 3rd through the 64th session. Page number totals for
each committee vary dramatically, from approximately 1300 for the HRC, to more than 5700
for the committee monitoring the CRC. While the CRC committee has issued concluding obser-
vations from the start, the other committees switched gradually from a mixture of summary re-
cords and short observations to the full concluding observations format. The HRC switched at its
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In order to compensate for this dramatic reduction, additional documenta-
tion has been consulted to shed light on particularly important review sessions.
Reducing the scope of the analysis from virtually everything to the concluding
observations weakens the potential for ethnographic thick description,¹⁶ but
sharpens the legal relevance of the analysis, as concluding observations are
the only documents issued by the committees during the review process that
can be said to impose anything resembling legal obligations on states (O’Flaher-
ty 2006: 32–37). Concluding observations have initially been examined and sort-
ed by searching for the frequency and patterns of application of “religion” and
its derivatives,¹⁷ and terms associated with religion in the legal instruments
monitored by the committees. New search terms have been added incrementally
as they have appeared in juxtaposition with the initially selected terms. The cor-
pus has been reviewed using digital analytical tools,¹⁸ in order to identify further
trends and patterns of relevance.
While the dissertation upon which this book is based was organized accord-
ing to cross-cutting themes that have occurred throughout the work of the treaty
bodies,¹⁹ this subdivision has been replaced by a committee-specific structure in
the present volume.²⁰ Although a theme-based structure had the advantage of
presenting each theme from a variety of perspectives and vantage points, it
missed the many and pervasive overlaps and continuities with which each com-
mittee approaches different themes. A committee-based approach also has the
added advantage of connecting more clearly to the distinct rights movements
50th session in 1994, and CERD at its 48th session in 1996. The CEDAW committee switched at its
13th session in 1994, but kept short summary records from the proceedings as part of its conclud-
ing observations until its 34th session in 2006.
 Ponterotto identifies five essential components to “thick description”, including (1) accurate
descriptions and interpretations of social actors within the appropriate context for the social ac-
tion under analysis; (2) capturing the thoughts, emotions and web of social interaction among
observed participants in their operating context; (3) assigning motivations and intentions to par-
ticipating social actors; (4) a description of the context that approaches verisimilitude [lit. the
appearance of being real], and (5) the promotion of “thick interpretation” of the above actions,
leading to “thick meaning” (Ponterotto 2006: 542–543). Of all these dimensions, only (1) and (4)
would be applicable to the analysis performed in this dissertation.
 “religions”, “religious”, “religiosity”.
 Primarily iAnnotate for iPad, Adobe Acrobat XI Pro and the online analysis tool voyant-tool-
s.org.
 These themes recur throughout chapters 4–7, and are also explored further in chapter 8.
 This restructuring was met with important and constructive criticism from an anonymous
reviewer, to which I am sincerely grateful. While I found the decision to keep the committee-
based structure difficult, I believe and hope that the coherence and argument of each chapter
is better preserved by this structure.
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from which each committee has sprung and to which it is in constant conversa-
tion and contact, allowing a deeper engagement with each committee as an
“epistemic community” of its own, developing its own institutional and concep-
tual horizon. Moreover, the sheer complexity and scale of the empirical data
under analysis entails that the identification of coherent, cross-cutting themes
that can be compared across all the committees will always be partial and in-
complete, to the point where the themes risk becoming too general and overarch-
ing to say anything meaningful.
The in-depth analyses provided in chapters 4–7 follow a common structure:
After a general introduction to the material provisions on religion and views of
religion within the rights movements behind each human rights treaty and its
monitoring body, the analysis proceeds to map the supplemental documentation
published by each treaty body on religion. This documentation spans from their
general recommendations on the interpretation of their provisions and the re-
porting guidelines issued to states, to their decisions on religion under their in-
dividual complaints mechanisms. Followed by a brief summary of how religion
is approached in these surrounding documents, the patterns in how each treaty
body has approached religion in its concluding observations from 1993 to 2013
are reviewed and examined. In chapter 8, the interconnections between these
patterns are explored further.
While there is a rich body of scholarship on the origin, content, scope and
dominant interpretations of the internationally recognized right to the freedom
of religion or belief,²¹ I do not attempt here to provide an assessment of the
legal merits of this scholarship, or of any of the other ways in which religion
is employed in the international human rights discourse or in domestic, statuto-
ry law. As such, I do not offer a perspective on the interpretation of what the law
“actually says” (de lege lata), nor do I offer a recommendation of what the law
should be (de lege ferenda). This puts great distance between my approach and
the legal profession, but also from scholars composing, combining and assessing
global surveys on the relation between law and religion, which tend to empha-
size the scope and de facto efficiency of regulations of religion, but offer few re-
flections on their understanding of the term and concept of religion.²²
 See in particular Ahdar and Leigh (2013), Lerner (2012), Hertzke (2012), Scolnicov (2010),
Temperman (2010), Danchin (2008b), Plesner (2008), Langlaude (2007), Taylor (2005), Lind-
holm, Durham and Tahzib-Lie (2004), Gunn (2003), Evans (1997), Dickson (1995), Tahzib
(1996), Sullivan (1988), Clark (1978), Neff (1977) and Claydon (1972).
 The Religion and Public Life Project at the US Pew Research Centre is a case in point; in con-
secutive reports on restrictions of religion worldwide starting in 2009, the center has document-
ed a yearly increase in social hostilities caused by restrictions on religion, identifying a “rising
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tide of restrictions” in their 2012 report, announcing in the title of its 2014 report that “Religious
Hostilities Reach Six-Year High”. The definition of religion applied in the measurement of such
restrictions is listed in Appendix 1 to the very first report, “Global Restrictions on Religion”
(2009), which draws its methodology from the 2006 article “International Religion Indexes: Gov-
ernment Regulation, Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion” (Grim and Finke
2006), where the following definition of the term “religion” is offered, with no rationale, discus-
sion or clarification for why it is apt for the measurement of restrictions on religion: “we define
religion as explanations of existence based on supernatural assumptions that include state-
ments about the nature and workings of the supernatural and about ultimate meaning (Grim
and Finke 2006: 6). This definition is also reiterated in the later work of one of the authors
(Finke 2013: 3) on the restrictions of religion worldwide. There is no way to assess how the au-
thors operationalize this definition in their measurements of government or social restrictions or
favoritism of religion because they offer no explanation, and because it is a definition of the
term that is entirely focused on the minds of adherents, raising serious methodological ques-
tions concerning their identification. As such, it is not only far removed from my approach,
but also from the definitions of religion employed by international monitoring bodies like the
UN Human Rights Committee (see chapter 5). See Merry 2011 for a critical account of human
rights indexes more generally.
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2 Making Religion
This is not a book about religion, but about religion-making. As such, it does not
purport to say anything about the “real” substances, uses, roles or contents of
religion/s, however one chooses to interpret that word, term or concept. Rather,
it seeks to examine how a range of actors within a highly specialized segment of
international law approach and apply religion and concepts commonly linked to
it in order to achieve the specific tasks that have been assigned to them. The es-
sentially contested nature of religion (see chapter 1), as long recognized within
the academic study of religion, invalidates clear-cut definitions or solutions to
what religion as such is or can be, beyond the scope of carefully limited case
studies, such as the one presented in this book. This chapter explores in closer
detail the notion of religion-making, which informs the specific approach to how
religion is being “made” by actors at the UN in this book. This chapter briefly
explains where the term and concept of religion-making comes from, what co-
nundrums it seeks to answer, and what related approaches it relies on.
The idea that religion/s are constructed or “made” in discourse is derived
from the “critical turn” in religious studies.¹ Drawing on insights from social an-
thropology, sociology, political science, postcolonial studies and literature stud-
ies, the critical approach is strongly heterogeneous, only held together by its
shared dismissal of a simplified “religion-secular binary” and its attendant an-
tagonism towards the broad variety of claims made inside and outside the acad-
emy in the name of “religion” as a unified and singular concept. Uniting this
criticism is a refusal to accept “religion” and “the secular” as signifying stable
concepts between which particular relations can be developed. Scholars within
this approach have launched a variety of theoretical and methodological criti-
cisms highlighting the instability of religion, the secular and, hence, their inter-
relationship. Central to this criticism is a set of epistemological challenges posed
to the “religion-secular binary”
It is a critique of the modern practice of classifying ‘religious’ as against ‘secular’ domains
as though these categories are part of the order of things. It is a critique of the religion-sec-
ular binary and its function in sustaining the myths of modernity. It is a claim that such a
classificatory practice is itself ideological. By classifying a specific range of theorized prac-
tices as religions, faiths or spiritualities, it thereby exiles them and simultaneously con-
structs the domain of the secular in accordance with natural reason. (Fitzgerald 2011: 8)
 “Critique” and “criticism” are concepts that come with a lot of baggage (Koselleck 1988; Asad
et.al 2009; Mas 2012). I use it here merely in a heuristic fashion, to distinguish it from the “phe-
nomenological” approach frequently associated with Mircea Eliade.
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Although this programmatic statement by Timothy Fitzgerald would hardly be
supported by all those who have launched critiques of the coherence of the re-
ligion-secular binary, many of which came before the “critical turn”, it neverthe-
less encapsulates a number of important dimensions within this approach: First,
it links present classifications of religion and secularity to what some scholars
perceive as the “myth” of modernity, intimating a correlation between this
myth and the ways in which modern nation states enforce order and compart-
mentalization more generally. This corresponds to the underlying premise of
the increased “formatting” of religion by modern nation states identified by Oliv-
ier Roy (2010) and criticized by Talal Asad (1999), and the validity of an “evolu-
tionary” perspective where “law” has gradually evolved from a “religious” ori-
gin.²
Second, Fitzgerald’s statement emphasizes that classification is never neu-
tral, but always serves one ideological need or other, inevitably charging the de-
ployment of religion and secularity with dangers or benefits relative to the ideo-
logical formation in question. This criticism highlights the power relations and
ideological dimensions that work to place different religions in broad, sweeping
categories where they are perceived to be either “good” or “bad” (Hurd 2012:
947–948). Third, Fitzgerald points to the propensity of much theorizing on reli-
gion and secularity to equate the latter with natural reason, exiling the former to
an outsider position, influenced by irrational superstition. This criticism engages
the claims by secularists who tend to equate belief with irrationality and secular-
ity with enlightened, rational common sense (Zucca 2012). Fitzgerald’s broad-
based criticism relies on a range of theoretical developments, from the rise of
critical theory, post-structuralism and postmodernism, to deconstruction and
 An evolutionary perspective on law and religion posits law as the result of a continuous, lin-
ear secularization of essentially religious rules. According to this perspective, the resulting body
of law relies on religious roots for its structure, key concepts and methods. The idea that law
somehow still does, or should, contain a kernel of religious elements, enjoys considerable sup-
port. In the scholarly community, this support is particularly associated with the legacy of one of
the first scholars to explicitly address the issue of law and religion in combination, Harold J. Ber-
man of Emory University, Atlanta. Publishing extensively on the topic (see The Interaction of Law
and Religion (1974), Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983),
Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion (1993), Law and Revolution II: The Impact
of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (2006)), his main contribution to
a further understanding of law and religion was to provide what John Witte Jr. and Frank Alex-
ander have later called a binocular view of law and religion; one that takes into consideration
not only the ways in which law approaches religion, but also how religion appropriates law
(Witte and Alexander 2008: 1).
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the linguistic turn in the human and social sciences (Clark 2004; Saler 2000;
Flood 1999).
In order to move beyond the established binaries and knowledge regimes of
modernity, under which religion and secularity are framed as structural oppo-
sites, Arvind-Pal S. Mandair and Markus Dressler have suggested that theorizing
on religion cannot be resolved by recent appeals to “post-secularity”:³
…the postsecular move as made by prominent philosophers, theologians and theorists of
religion cannot be restricted to its identification of the mutually imbricated natures of re-
ligion and the secular but, more importantly, (…) it continues to bring into play one of
the key aspects of the secularization thesis, namely, the concept of religion as a cultural
universal—that religion exists everywhere (…) [U]nless it incorporates a move beyond the
presumption that religion is a cultural universal, the very idea of a post- of secularism ap-
pears to be a chimera. It means little more than a return to Christian thought disguised as
the postsecular. (Dressler and Mandair 2011: 11)
Exposing the foundational, but often unexamined claim underpinning large-
scale theories on the secular, secularity, secularism and secularization—that re-
ligion, despite local variations, is essentially a cultural universal that exists ev-
erywhere—Dressler and Mandair seek to pull the rug from under the feet of
the post-secular, exposing it as “disguised Christian thought”. Hence their sug-
gestion that the analysis of concepts like religion and the secular are not ad-
vanced by appeals to the post-secular, but can only be performed within a
post-secular-religious frame of reference in which the shifting borders of religion
and secularity are constantly re-examined. This is not to say that religion or the
secular should or can be abandoned and jettisoned as analytical concepts. Rath-
er, the call for a post-secular-religious frame stresses the need to move beyond
approaches that do not sufficiently discuss these foundational concepts and
how they interact with one another.
The proposal of Dressler and Mandair to move beyond the religion-secular
binary by directing the attention to the means of their production is thoroughly
 While the term post-secular long predates 2001, Jürgen Habermas’ inclusion of the term to di-
agnose the state of affairs in the Western world one month after the September 11 terrorist at-
tacks on the U.S.A. instantly sparked a debate on the term in German, and later international
sociology (Boy 2011). The immediate question in the ensuing debate concerned whether a
“shift” from secularity to post-secularity had taken place, and if so, what the new condition en-
tailed, a question that is still very much unresolved (Bader 2012: 5). Although the early debate
was mainly limited to political philosophy, sociology and theology, it has since gained traction
in numerous other fields that deal with the interface of law, religion and society, including but
not limited to anthropology (Fountain 2013), law (Calo 2011), international relations (Rees 2014,
Wilson 2014), educational studies (Hotam and Wexler 2014) and women’s studies (Smiet 2014).
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informed by postcolonial perspectives, emphasizing the impact of Western uni-
versalism in the ordering of different religions in a teleological, developmental
schema derived from their degree of similarity to Western forms of gradually se-
cularized religiosity (Dressler and Mandair 2011: 13). A particular strength of the
approach is its outright dismissal of the world religions template implicit in
most, if not all, conceptions of the post-secular, with the claim that these cate-
gories have been imposed and enforced upon a variety of local beliefs and prac-
tices as “religious” through the knowledge regimes of colonialism, a claim that
has significant support in other research.⁴
Also unlike the majority of theorists contesting the viability of a religion-sec-
ular binary, Dressler and Mandair suggest a program for empirical research
drawn from these critical perspectives and based on their notion of religion-mak-
ing (Dressler and Mandair 2011: 21). Religion-making, conceived of as a heuristic
tool to move beyond the confines of a taken-for-granted religion-secular binary
in the analysis of how religion comes to be constituted in society, has three
broad dimensions: one from above, from positions of power; another from
below, from subgroups in society drawing on religionist discourses; and a
third from a pretended outside, in the form of scholarly discourses that provide
legitimacy for the former two by reproducing and normalizing the religion-secu-
lar binary (Dressler and Mandair 2011: 21).
By providing a deconstructive perspective that incorporates the processes of
distinguishing religion and the secular at different levels in society, the notion of
religion-making is sensitive towards power relations, underscoring the impor-
tance of incorporating the relative power matrix involved in any discursive act
 The claim that religion is a Western term and category that has been imposed on other tradi-
tions, beliefs and practices according to their degree of similarity with Abrahamic faiths is well
documented in a number of works, notably Peter Almond’s The British Discovery of Buddhism
(1988), on how sentiments in Victorian England were responsible for the shaping of how we un-
derstand Buddhism today; Talal Asad’s important historical work on the Western bias in anthro-
pological theories of religion, Genealogies of Religion (1993); David Chidester’s analysis of the
concept of religion at the colonial frontier in southern Africa, where the concept shifted in con-
tent relative to the level of conflict between colonial administrations and the indigenous popu-
lation in Savage Systems (1996); Richard King’s study of how colonial administrators in India
used the category to establish and maintain order, in Orientalism and Religion. Postcolonial
Theory, India and ‘The Mystic East’ (1999), and Tomoko Masuzawa’s The Invention of World Re-
ligions: Or How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (2005), the
defining overview of how the idea that there is such a class of things as world religions evolved
gradually as the scientific study of religion came into being at the heyday of European colonial
enterprises in the middle to late 19th century.
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of “making” religion. Furthermore, religion-making adds a relational dimension
to theorizing on religion and the secular by emphasizing the interconnectedness
between religion-making from above, below and outside, exposing the mutually
reinforcing bonds between powerful, institutionalized authorities, smaller sub-
groups in society and actors in the scholarly community that work to reinforce
and reproduce distinctions between religion and secularity. Finally, religion-
making contests the naturalness of the religion-secular binary by carefully exam-
ining where this distinction comes from within each specialized discourse.While
neither of these analytical dimensions of religion-making are unique to Dressler
and Mandair,⁵ their juxtaposition provides a novel overview of how actors take
part in religion-making processes relative to the power vested in their positions
in society.
While religion-making represents a fruitful take on the specific problematic
arising out of discussions of the post-secular, it also draws on a range of pre-ex-
isting theoretical approaches to the problems associated with religion and the
secular as cultural universals and their constitution at the juncture of different
discourses. Besides the obvious debt owed to the writings of Michel Foucault
on genealogy and discourse, and, in particular, Talal Asad on the concept of re-
ligion and the development of distinct formations of the secular (debts which
Dressler and Mandair concede), the concept of religion-making connects to
more recent work that propose related approaches to the analysis of religion,
but also to other social phenomena and their multidimensional constitution
from above, below and outside positions of power.
Over the course of the last two decades, sociologist Peter Beyer has devel-
oped a theory of religion as a global social system modeled on a specifically
Christian template. The key argument in Beyer’s writings is that a global social
system for religion based on the binary distinction between salvation and dam-
nation central to Christian thought and practice has developed over the course of
the last century. However, as the category has spread, it has also taken on local-
ized meanings, amalgamating with embedded concepts in other languages and
cultural systems, resulting in a myriad of “glocalized” religious sub-systems that
relate in very different ways to the constituent binary distinction of the global
system for religion (Beyer 1998, 2006). Hence, whereas the original conception
of religion was disseminated from a privileged position of power, various proc-
 For an additional call for the need for research on religion-making from above, see Hurd 2012;
for religion-making from below, see Comaroff 2009, for religion-making from a pretended out-
side, see McCutcheon 1997.
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esses of religion-making from below and outside have gradually evolved as re-
sponses to this imposition, drawing on local resources and surroundings.
These global and glocal systems for religion do not exist in isolation, how-
ever, but constantly interact with other social subsystems that view religion quite
differently, relative to their respective binary codes. The different logics of these
subsystems and their correspondingly different views of religion mirror the tri-
partite division of religion-making from above, below and outside:
The different [scientific, and theological and ‘official’] perspectives and their different ra-
tionales make it clear that, on the one hand, conceptions of religion are diverse and inca-
pable of being reduced to a common denominator; and yet, on the other hand, any one of
them can operate in a universally applicable fashion without representing any greater de-
gree of distortion than anything else human societies count as knowledge. How we con-
ceive of religion depends on the social context or purpose we have for doing this. (Beyer
2003: 157)
Hence, Beyer’s theory incorporates the differences between religion-making both
at a global level, where the content of religion is determined by geopolitical
shifts in the balance of power, and at a local/glocal level where the religion-mak-
ing conducted from below interacts with numerous other different social sys-
tems, providing entirely different borders and duties for religion.⁶ Beyer’s theory
is strongly inspired by the systems theory developed by Niklas Luhmann, but is
more sensitive to the role of power relations in shaping the content of the reli-
gious subsystem, for instance in colonial settings (Beyer 2006), a consideration
mostly absent from Luhmann’s post-humanist writings (Luhmann 1995, 2013).
In a different, but related vein, religious studies scholar Thomas Tweed
(Tweed 2005, 2006) has pointed to the importance of situating and contextualiz-
ing the separation of religion from its surroundings, pointing to the fundamental
differences between lexical distinctions, taking the ordinary usage of terms as a
marker of differentiation; real definitions, offering sets of theoretical proposi-
tions about the nature of religion that can be empirically tested; and stipulative
approaches,which more or less arbitrarily assign particular meanings to the con-
cept of religion (Tweed 2005: 256–257).⁷ This tripartite division of definitional
strategies highlights the importance of recognizing not only the methods for dis-
tinguishing religion from its surroundings, but the purposes of such distinctions.
Furthermore, it serves as an important reminder of the possibility of contradic-
 For a more focused exploration of how this process plays out “on the ground”, see Presler
(1983).
 Tweed’s divisions are strongly inspired by Robert Baird’s Category Formation and the History
of Religions (1971).
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tory, yet co-existing methods of identifying religion: While a lexical and a real
approach to religion may reach very different conclusions on the form and con-
tent of religion, neither invalidates the other—rather, their differences point to
the importance of the demanding exercise of clearly stating the origins and pur-
poses of distinguishing religion from its surroundings (Tweed 2005: 263, see
chapter 1).⁸ Tweed’s approach resonates with similar views on the contextual
constraints to defining and approaching religion offered by Beckford (2003),
Woodhead (2011) and Wilson (2014). Importantly, this process is not exclusive
to religion, as other categories, including law, politics and the state are also
under constant negotiation globally in ways that closely resemble that of reli-
gion-making, as actors from above, below or beyond positions of power wrestle
for control of their contents and applications.⁹
Finally, religion-making is also akin to discourse theory, which is premised
on the same ambiguous and reflexive relationship between practical analysis
and the objects such analysis is set to investigate, in particular in the field of re-
ligious studies:
…for the study of religion as a specialized area of research discursive approaches have im-
plications that need to be made explicit. To begin with, religion completely loses its status
of being something sui generis. Rather, discursive approaches study the very claim that “re-
ligion is sui generis” as part of a discourse on religion that has formed under identifiable
historical circumstances and that has materialized in university institutions and scholarly
programs, in turn stabilizing and legitimizing the attributed meaning of religion as sui gen-
eris. (von Stuckrad 2013: 16; emphasis in the original)
Religion-making, then, can be considered one of several possible approaches to
a discursive study of religion that share a basic dismissal of the sui generis nature
of religion, the very invocation of which becomes part of the subject matter avail-
able for analysis. Religion-making seeks to destabilize the naturalness of religion
 This also connects to Jonathan Z. Smiths claim in the book chapter “Religion, Religions, Re-
ligious” (1998), quoted in Tweed’s article, that the multiple available ways in which to define
religion should be seen as a simple fact, not a problem (Smith 1998: 281).
 In a similar vein, sociologists Bruce Carruthers and Terence Halliday have examined how ac-
tors on different levels of international society have handled the management of large-scale
bankruptcies and their consequences: While the shape and content of insolvency rules are ne-
gotiated at the intergovernmental level, the impact of these rules on the creation and enforce-
ment of domestic law depend on a variety of factors, ranging from the location of a country
in a “global matrix of power”, combined with its cultural and social distance from the norm-pro-
ducing, intergovernmental center (Carruthers and Halliday 2006: 523).
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in discourse, questioning the mechanisms and consequences of taken-for-grant-
ed applications of religion (Dressler and Mandair 2011: 21).
In this way, religion-making is epistemologically over-determined, in the
sense that it questions the very viability of the constitutive category under anal-
ysis, emphasizing the examination of the forms and conditions under which the
category comes into being (Andersen 2003: XII). As such, religion-making does
not constitute a methodology, as it does not prescribe particular rules for its im-
plementation, nor does it accept the pre-existence of a precise object for exami-
nation or claim that true knowledge about such an object can be achieved. Rath-
er, it conforms more readily to what Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen has labeled an
“analytical strategy”, by turning the observations of others into the primary
unit of analysis (Andersen 2003: XIII). The notion of religion-making stresses
the incomplete nature of any discursive act of identifying and approaching reli-
gion, as the process of singling out this, rather than that as religion will be de-
cisively affected by the observer’s position above, below or outside power.
Although the application of religion-making as a discursive analytical ap-
proach does not constitute a methodology as such, it does impose several con-
ditions on what research designs may be derived from it: Religion-making is a
concept-driven approach, thus it requires a reflexive and critical engagement
with the concept under analysis, with a particular emphasis on the gray zones
between the concept and its surroundings (Goertz 2006: 35). Accordingly, iden-
tifying how religion is applied in discourse presupposes a conception of what re-
ligion is that goes beyond the mere term, necessitating the recognition of asso-
ciated terms and concepts that are related to religion in discourse, and may be
used interchangeably with it, in order to show “affinities and differences be-
tween representations in order to demonstrate whether they belong to the
same discourse” (Neumann 2009: 62). Arriving at such a conception of religion,
however, is premised on a secondary condition imposed by the application of re-
ligion-making: determining the scope of the discourse under analysis. Such a de-
termination requires close scrutiny of the particular field at hand, in order to
identify its particularities in terms of participants, addressees, intended reader-
ship, genres and relations to other discourses (Neumann 2009: 65–70). In the
next chapter, I will address this last condition first, by tracing the religion-mak-
ing of actors in international law throughout the 20th century, thereby gradually
developing the scope of the discourse under further scrutiny in part II of this
book.
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3 Making Religion in International Law
The United Nations is many things, but it is first and foremost a creation of in-
ternational law. Its origins, purposes and capacities are explicated in the UN
Charter, negotiated in San Francisco in 1945, as the dust from the Second
World War had just barely begun to settle. The inception of the UN, while histor-
ically significant, was not unprecedented in its magnitude, nor could it ignore
developments within international law that preceded it. In order to better
grasp the ways in which the UN has approached religion from its creation and
up to the present, this chapter first provides a brief look at its major antecedents
and their takes on religion in the history of international law, before moving on
to the specific work of the UN from the 1940s and up to the present.
At the very basic level, international law implies “the existence of several in-
dependent entities, which meet each other on the level of equality and which are
willing to engage in peaceful relations rather than being in a permanent state of
war with each other” (Wolfrum 2006: 4).¹ The sources, content and application of
rules regulating these relations have a long and complex history, as formalized
relations between independent entities have been common since the beginning
of recorded time (Neff 2010: 4). The historical trajectory of international law is
commonly subdivided into the several epochs, starting with examinations of
the relations between political entities in ancient times and the Middle Ages,
moving on to the classical age of international law following the Westphalian
settlements in 1648 and the post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe from 1815, con-
cluding with the settlements following each of the two world wars of the 20th
century.² Throughout these epochs, religion has primarily been approached in
two ways: as a basic building block in the normative foundations of international
legal regulation (Bederman 2002: 85), and, especially since the settlements of
Augsburg and Westphalia, as an object to be regulated according to the dictates
of sovereign political actors (Philpott 1999: 580–581). What united the religion-
making of these widely dispersed epochs was the exclusive dictate of the terms
 International law is commonly given very varied definitions. See Onuma 2000, Koskenniemi
2001, Evans and Janis 2004, Janis 2008, Bederman 2008 or Neff 2010 for a small selection of
alternate definitions of international law. The debate is not new (see Williams 1945: 146), nor
is it likely to subside.
 While periodizations of this sort are necessarily reductionist and strongly Eurocentric, so is
the entire vocabulary and most theories of international law, whose very creation and purpose
can be viewed as instruments of colonial subjugation and suppression (Anghie 2006: 394), a sit-
uation historians of international law have only recently begun offering critical perspectives on
(Koskenniemi 2011: 170). The periodization is drawn from Neff 2010.
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and procedures of international law from “above”, by elites in powerful posi-
tions.
The peace negotiations following the world wars changed the rigidity of this
system fundamentally, as they inaugurated the recognition of non-state interna-
tional organizations as prominent actors in international law, opening up the
regulation of religion at the international level to new inputs, both from
“below” and “outside” positions of power: The formation of the League of Na-
tions in 1919 created an entirely new institutional framework and venue for
the conduct of international affairs, where the input from scientific communities
and civil society was actively solicited, although not always heeded (Charnovitz
2006: 357). Following the end of the Second World War, the formation of the
United Nations expanded and formalized this triangulation through the multilay-
ered structure of the organization, including the creation of specialized pro-
grams and increased points of contact for members of civil society. Additionally,
the paramount role of human rights ascribed to the work of the world organiza-
tion in the UN Charter, especially since the end of the Cold War and the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991, has made the UN one of the primary manufacturers
in the industry of religion-making at the international level, although not limited
to the legal sphere (see chapter 3.3).³
The creation of the League and the UN are important antecedents to the
present approaches to religion in international law because they offered two dif-
ferent approaches to religion and the legal management of religious pluralism:
one collective, portraying religion primarily as a group identity marker, the
other individualist, viewing religion as a matter of personal beliefs and convic-
tions. In the following, I will go more in-depth on both of these approaches
and their impact on how religion is approached at the UN today.
3.1 The League of Nations
The creation of the League of Nations was an extension of the foreign policy ob-
jectives of US president Woodrow Wilson, whose involvement in the “Great War”
was driven by his desire to forge a new kind of world, “fit and safe to live in”,
formulated in his Fourteen Points address in January 1918 (Neff 2005: 287). As
a subset of its general peacekeeping purposes, the League sought to manage
 While the Cold War has commonly been construed as an ideological battle beyond religious
allegiances, recent research suggests that religion played a major role in the bloc formations,
particularly as a key component of the “American Way of Life” (Kirby 2013a; 2013b).
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the perceived threats to stability and world order represented by religious plural-
ism. It did so by creating a set of treaties governing the treatment of minorities,
and by establishing a “mandate system”, to provide order and stability in states
created as the successors to the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman em-
pires at the conclusion of the First World War (Matz 2005: 54).
The minority treaties were negotiated between the League and Eastern Euro-
pean successor states to the Ottoman Empire in order to prevent intergroup hos-
tilities following the collapse of this multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire,
thereby also encouraging the self-identification of minorities as minorities (Ma-
zower 1997: 51). Whereas imperial administrations prior to the 19th century fre-
quently accepted, even cherished the notion of religious and other differences
between communities within their borders (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 12), the
rise of the nation-state in the early 19th century fostered an evolutionary ideal
of assimilating minorities into unified nation-states.While this process was con-
sidered to move smoothly on its own within the borders of the victors of the war,
other, less civilized states were considered to be in need of assistance:
…the Great Powers were happy to interfere in the internal affairs of “new” states but al-
lowed no meddling in their own affairs. This supremely paternalistic stance assumed
that “civilized” states such as those in Western Europe had evolved procedures to facilitate
the assimilation of minorities that did not yet exist in “immature states” (Mazower 1997: 53).
The underlying premise of this interference was that assimilation “into the civi-
lized life of the nation” was not only possible, but also desirable; that minorities
were disruptive to social order and should eventually be assimilated (ibid.).
Where the minority treaties only implied a certain hierarchy of states in the
new world order through this paternalistic stance, the creation of a mandate sys-
tem was explicitly founded on such a hierarchy, epitomized in the much cited
article 22 of the Versailles treaty of 1919, where states and territories were includ-
ed in the system because they were inhabited by “peoples not yet able to stand
by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”. The hier-
archical notion was complete, with a subdivision of territories into A-, B- and
C-mandates,where the scope of the tutelage of advanced nations differed relative
to the territories’ perceived level of development. The mandate system was an at-
tempt by the League to come to terms with territories formerly under colonial ad-
ministration by one of the three disbanded empires, while simultaneously tread-
ing carefully enough not to disrupt any of the still existing US, French and British
imperial structures. The mandate system represents a curious bridge between
colonialism and decolonization, employing the language of both, by providing
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limited recognition in combination with trusteeship (Matz 2005: 89, Rajagopal
2003: 71).
Common to the minority treaties and the mandate system was the creation of
extra-territorial protective measures for religious freedom: all states included in
these schemes were required to create legal safeguards for religion in some form,
although no such requirement was levelled by the League towards the victors of
WWI, as this was considered a potential breach of the victor’s sovereignty (Ma-
zower 1997: 52, Mahmood 2012: 429), demonstrating the bonds between sover-
eignty and level of civilization in this period of time (Matz 2005: 60), significant-
ly compromising the League’s universalist pretentions. The extent of this
imbalance was most strikingly illustrated upon the negotiations of the League
Charter, when U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s proposal to include religious
freedom in the document was amended by the Japanese delegate, Baron Makino,
who suggested an expanded paragraph that would put all states on equal terms,
resulting in the outright dismissal of the proposal (Fink 1995: 198).
The creation of the minority treaties and the mandate system were primarily
instances of religion-making from above, where statesmen, diplomats and inter-
national civil servants came together in order to lay out the basic architecture of
the international system for years to come, and worked out the role of religion as
part of this process. Religion-making at the League was governed by the dubious
concept of a “standard of civilization”, which until the early 20th century had
been co-extensive with the spread of Christianity, legitimizing colonial enterpris-
es and foreign intervention, while simultaneously denying membership in the in-
ternational community to non-civilized, i.e. non-Christian peoples (Gong 1984:
238; Matz 2005: 63).
The test for whether non-Christian states were considered worthy of some
form of recognition according to this standard was their ability to grant autono-
my and provide adequate protection of Westerners residing in their territories,
under a system of “capitulations” (Danchin 2008b: 510, Bowden 2005: 20). In
order to gain full membership in the Family of Nations, prospect states were
forced to expand the capitulation offered to foreign nationals to encompass
their entire populations, forcing major overhauls of their legal systems in
order to safeguard “dignity, property, and freedom of travel, commerce, and re-
ligion, and (…) a court system that comprised codes, published laws, and legal
guarantees” (Anghie 1999: 48), requirements that became institutionalized under
the minority and mandate systems overseen by the League.
While the religion-making of the League was mainly conducted from above,
it also received input from below and outside, i.e. from non-state actors and the
academy. According to Steve Charnovitz, the Paris Peace Conference (PPC) in
1919 “should be recognized as the fount for the idea that state practice would
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accept NGO participation in international organizations” (Charnovitz 2003: 60).
As the first genuinely international conference, the five month PPC was an op-
portunity for a broad range of interest groups seeking to influence the assembled
diplomatic missions at a venue that was considered more open to such influence
than domestic political structures. While access to deliberations was severely
limited, four pressure groups in particular influenced the proceedings: labor un-
ions, Jewish and Zionist organizations, women’s groups and the American Red
Cross (Charnovitz 2003: 63). Of these groups, the Jewish and Zionist organiza-
tions were the best organized, and influenced the religion-making of the League
directly by presenting the grievances of Jewish minority communities in Europe-
an states and their need for protection under the minority treaties (Charnovitz
2003: 66, Mazower 1997: 50).
The influence of religion-making from the outside, i.e. the scientific com-
munity, also came into its own for the first time at this conference (Nielson
1992: 228).While scholarly fields dedicated to religion were largely in their infan-
cy, other scientific fields contributed decisively to the formation of the minority
treaties and the mandate system. This influence was chiefly wielded through the
work of The Inquiry, an ad hoc committee established by U.S. president Wood-
row Wilson in 1917 in order to determine policy issues at the forthcoming
peace conference (Crampton 2007: 225).
The Inquiry was first and foremost a geographical research group, set with
the task of creating clearly recognizable lines of nationality for the new states in
Europe and beyond in order to avoid new conflicts. At the PPC, members of The
Inquiry sat on territorial commissions deciding where to draw the lines on the
new maps of Europe, Asia and Africa. While an important part of this boun-
dary-making was to localize and consider the utility of natural, topographical
boundaries such as rivers and mountains, a key part of the work of The Inquiry
was to establish “ethnographic units” of territory, that could bring conflicts and
territorial claims to an end (Crampton 2007: 234). In this process, religion and
“the local sense of nationality” were key features in determining ideal borders,
based on fieldwork conducted by Inquiry members (Crampton 2007: 235). Histor-
ians in The Inquiry supported the arguments of the Arab majority for a Syrian
mandate including Palestine and Lebanon over Zionist claims derived from his-
toric rights and religion (Nielson 1992: 248).
Accordingly, whereas post-war settlements prior to the League had exclusive-
ly been conducted from above, the terms of international treaties and the desig-
nations of new borders necessitated by the breakup of the old Empires after
WW1 were decisively influenced by non-state actors below and outside the
state level, effectively revolutionizing the conduct of international affairs. De-
spite this influence, the triangular relationship between different modes of reli-
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gion-making at the League of Nations tilted strongly towards the impact of reli-
gion-making from above: States still exerted decisive influence on the broader
construction of religion in the minority treaties and mandate system, confirming
Saba Mahmood’s contention that the international law on religious freedom from
its inception has been informed by “the exercise of sovereign power, regional
and national security, and the inequality of geopolitical power relations” (Mah-
mood 2012: 429), rather than the Wilsonian ideal of spreading tolerance. Despite
the modest input from NGOs and academics, however, the negotiations at the
PPC represent an important first demonstration of the increasingly triangular re-
lationship between religion-making from above, below and outside: For the first
time, the realpolitik formerly conducted by lawyers, statesmen and diplomats re-
ceived input from an increasingly important scientific community and an incip-
ient civil society forming around emerging issues of global concern.
While the religion promoted and protected under the mandate system was a
modified extension of the constitutional ideal of freedom of individual con-
science developed by Western states in the 19th century (McDougal, Lasswell
and Chen 1976: 881), the religion of the minority treaties was more collective
in nature, recognizing distinct religious communities and safeguarding their
equality on par with majority populations. Put differently, the mandate system
was created to bring underdeveloped territories into the family of civilized na-
tions, where the protection of religious freedom was a basic requirement,
while the minority treaties were more utilitarian, seeking to harmonize tensions
between sub-state populations in already somewhat developed nations. While
the long-term goals of the former barely got off from the ground before the sys-
tem was dismantled, the failure of the latter was illustrated by its complete in-
ability to protect minorities in the interwar years and during WWII (Mazower
2004: 387).
The resulting conceptions of religion in the legal instruments fashioned by
the League of Nations mirror the key compromise at the heart of the organiza-
tion, between the acceptance of the developed, homogenous nation-state as
the norm in international relations on the one hand, and the acknowledgement
that something had to be done with the underdeveloped territories and residual
minorities that were left out of the myriad national projects emanating from the
Great War on the other (Mazower 1997: 51). As a key ingredient, both in the idea
of the enlightened, civilized nation-state and in the self-identification of minor-
ities left out from national projects, religion became a concern both to the man-
date system and the minority treaties.
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3.2 The United Nations
With the formation of the United Nations in the wake of WWII, religion-making
in international law changed considerably. The mandate system was abandoned
in favor of the trusteeship system of the UN, where the importance of gradually
attaining self-determination was more pronounced than at the League and the
latter’s emphasis on development and the sacred trust of civilization was some-
what downplayed (Matz 2005: 87). In the UN Charter and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR), the rights of religious and other minorities were
nowhere to be found, due to the resistance from Western states with sizeable col-
onial possessions and considerable problems with minorities in their own do-
mestic politics, to recognize groups as rights-holders (Mazower 2004: 389; Lerner
2000: 910).
Compared to the Paris Peace Conference, the deliberations leading up to the
creation of the UN featured more significant contributions from civil society and
the scholarly community: NGOs and individual activists were the second largest
contingent at the San Francisco conference where the UN was created, outnum-
bering state officials two to one (Normand and Zaidi 2008: 125).While their direct
influence at the conference was limited by Great Power rivalry, Jewish and Chris-
tian groups in particular lobbied for an express recognition of human rights with
considerable success (Normand and Zaidi 2008: 128). Decisively, the Charter of
the new organization pledged the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to
make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organiza-
tions, starting a long-lasting and rapidly expanding consociation with interna-
tional civil society, with the number of NGOs accorded consultative status by
ECOSOC presently (2016) standing at 4189.⁴
During the negotiations on the UN Charter at the San Francisco conference
in 1945, the demands from representatives from civil society that human rights
should be a core part of the new organization were met, albeit in the form of
vague and permissive, rather than clear and mandatory provisions on human
rights in the Charter. Decisively, the Charter tasked the General Assembly with
the initiation of studies and recommendations to promote international cooper-
ation in the field of human rights in article 13,⁵ and ECOSOC with the creation of
 The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, NGO Branch: Basic Facts
about NGO Status, http://csonet.org/?menu=100 (accessed 27.07.2016).
 Article 13 reads: “1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations
for the purpose of: a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging
the progressive development of international law and its codification; b. promoting international
co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in
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a commission for the promotion of human rights in article 68,⁶ explicitly inviting
input from the scientific community while delegating the business of standard-
setting to a political body of state representatives. These articles prepared the in-
stitutional ground for the UN in the post-war era to formalize the triangular proc-
ess of religion-making as a subset of the organization’s human rights work,
where studies commissioned from above by the UNGA and the activities of the
Human Rights Commission and UN staffers working from outside the political
process provided venues for input from the scholarly community and civil soci-
ety below and outside the UN, particularly through major global conferences on
pressing human rights issues.
The evolution of human rights as a major policy objective at the UN has been
dominated by two parallel processes: the development of international stand-
ards, and monitoring and assistance in the implementation of these standards.
While the former has been overseen by the exclusively state-run Commission
(since 2006 Council) on Human Rights (CHR), the latter has mainly fallen to a
string of committees of independent experts set to monitor the various human
rights treaties adopted over the years. Additionally, the CHR and its Sub-Commis-
sion has commissioned a series of independent studies on pressing human
rights issues, and appointed a rapidly increasing number of Special Rapporteurs
and working groups mandated to report regularly on various themes.⁷ Finally,
with the creation of the post and office of a High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) in the wake of the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights
in 1993, the UN received a center of gravity for its human rights activities, coor-
dinating the erstwhile dispersed activities in the field. Parallel to the institution-
al development of human rights entities at the UN, a rising number of human
rights NGOs have been granted consultative status, enabling them to influence
decision-making at major conferences, directly to specialized agencies and rap-
porteurs, and by submitting supplementary shadow reports to the committees
set to monitor human rights treaties (see below).
the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion. 2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General
Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) above are set forth in Chapters
IX and X.”
 Article 68 reads: “The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic
and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may
be required for the performance of its functions.”
 For an overview of the current special procedures of the Human Rights Council, see http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx (accessed 23.08.2016).
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3.2.1 Standard-Setting
The concepts of religion in the international legal framework created by the Unit-
ed Nations depart significantly from those of the League in several respects:
First, article 18 of the UDHR expanded and generalized the provisions of the
mandate system concerning the freedom of religion, thought, belief and con-
science to be valid for all members of the UN. Hence, whereas the mandate sys-
tem only required the protection of the freedom of religion or belief in less de-
veloped states, the UN universalized the concept to become valid for all
regardless of developmental level. The notion of the freedom of religion or belief
is not only protected in article 18 of the UDHR,⁸ but also in article 18 of the
ICCPR,⁹ the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief and numerous other legal in-
struments.¹⁰ As such, it is by far the most developed and far-reaching concept of
 Article 18 of the UDHR reads in full: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”
 Article 18 of the ICCPR reads in full: “1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or pri-
vate, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one
shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to
the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable,
legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with
their own convictions.”
 A/RES/36/55. Parallel to the process of creating binding provisions from the UDHR, several
of the numerous treaties adopted by the international community in the early post-war decades
contained provisions on religion. Most prominent among these are the Genocide Convention
(1948) article 2, protecting religious groups, the Geneva Convention III (1949) articles 34–37
on the religious rights and status of chaplains among prisoners of war, the Geneva Convention
IV (1949) article 27 (1), which safeguards the respect for civilians’ religious convictions and prac-
tices in times of war, the Refugee Convention (1951) articles 1, 2, 4 and 33, on religious grounds of
persecution, non-discrimination on religious grounds among refugees, their practice of religion
and their right to non-refoulement if at risk for their religious origin, ILO Convention no. 111 on
discrimination in employment and occupation (1958) on non-discrimination in the labour mar-
ket, and the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960) articles 1, 2 and 5,
dealing with non-discrimination in education, the purpose of interreligious friendship in educa-
tion and the role of parents’ religious and moral convictions. Neither of these are among the core
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religion developed by any UN entity. The protection offered by the right is not
limited to traditional definitions of religion, and does not require legal systems,
whether international or domestic, to decide on the merits of one religion over
another.¹¹
The expansive nature of the norm thus provides an unequivocal answer in
the negative to the overarching question in all dealings with religion in political
or legal contexts: whether religion is a special, set apart, sui generis concept that
requires particular attention and protection over other concerns.¹² Religion, ac-
cording to this norm, is just one subset of an expansive range of protected beliefs
that can be subjectively held without any form of state interference (Lerner 2012:
5, Taylor 2005: 204).While the inclusion of terms like manifestation, observance,
belief and conscience are drawn from, and therefore clearly favor certain reli-
gious traditions to the exclusion of others, the body set with the task of monitor-
ing the right, the Human Rights Committee, has long maintained and protected
an expansive understanding of “belief”, as outlined in its 22nd general com-
ment,¹³ as has the Special Rapporteur on the freedom of religion or belief.¹⁴ Al-
though article 18 has been interpreted to create certain limited collective rights
human rights treaties as defined by the OHCHR and international scholarship, and most have
drafting histories and instruments of implementation and monitoring distinct from the treaties
adopted to give effect to the provisions of the UDHR, and an examination of these instruments
would be beyond the scope of the present analysis. See Lerner 2012 for an overview of these in-
struments and their limited engagement with the core human rights treaties.
 This is not limited to the international level, but is also evident in the practice of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where religion was expanded to include non-religious be-
liefs long ago (Taylor 2005). Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is
modeled on article 18 of the UDHR, with only minor differences, confronting the court with a
conception of religion that is so wide it risks challenging virtually every area of law (Pearson
2013: 580). This potential for conflict has led the court to develop a cautious practice, where
states are allowed a considerable margin of appreciation, i.e. autonomy, in article 9 cases (ibid.).
 There is a vibrant discussion of this issue in domestic law, in particular in the US, see Sul-
livan 2005, Eisgruber and Sager 2010 and Schwartzman 2013. This discussion is paralleled by a
strikingly similar debate internal to religious studies, concerning the applicability of religion as
an analytical term.While the latter debate has been simmering since the early 1900s, it reached
a temporary climax around the turn of the millennium, when authors like Timothy Fitzgerald
(2000) and Daniel Dubuisson (2003) called for a complete abandonment of the term for schol-
arly purposes. See also chapter 1.
 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 1993.
 From the inception of the Special Rapporteur mandate in 1986, every consecutive rapporteur
has supported and reiterated an expansive understanding of the content of “religion or belief”
See the website of the Special Rapporteur for more information on the office and the interpre-
tation of its mandate: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/FreedomReli
gionIndex.aspx (accessed 23.08.2016).
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for religious groups and communities (Taylor 2005), the identification of religion
remains tied to the nexus between a forum internum, composed of certain sin-
cerely held beliefs, and a forum externum, enumerating the potential manifesta-
tions inspired by these beliefs that can be accepted in the public sphere.¹⁵
Second, the UDHR abandoned religious and other minorities as rights-bear-
ing entities, whose protections under the minority treaties were replaced by a
general clause in article 2¹⁶ on non-discrimination, valid for all regardless of
group affiliation. This turn was not specific to religion, but part of the general
individualization of international law represented by the UDHR (Slaughter and
Burke-White 2002: 13). The departure from the League conception of religion
as a potential identity marker at the UN was illustrated when the General Assem-
bly discussed how to respond to a series of Anti-Semitic incidents in Europe in
the late 1950s. Starting as an effort to adopt a binding treaty that would prohibit
both racial and religious intolerance, negotiations were quickly deadlocked over
the issue of religious discrimination, leading to new negotiations over separate
instruments, one covering racial discrimination, the other religious discrimina-
tion.Whereas support for the fight against racial discrimination was massive, en-
suring the rapid adoption of the ICERD (1965), the infighting over religious dis-
crimination brought the process to a grinding halt, with the non-binding 1981
Declaration as the hitherto only material result.
Following the adoption (1966) and entry into force (1976) of the twin Cove-
nants on Social and Political and Economic, Social and Cultural rights that
turned the majority of the provisions of the UDHR into binding legal obliga-
tions,¹⁷ the notion of religion as a feature of the identity of minorities was rein-
troduced to the international legal framework through article 27 of the ICCPR,
which required that:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
 The nexus between the forum internum and the forum externum is largely taken for granted
in present theorizing on the freedom of religion or belief. However, see Evans 2014 for a prob-
lematization of this nexus.
 Article 2 of the UDHR reads: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore,
no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of
the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”
 For the drafting history of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, see Normand and Zaidi 2008.
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group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their
own language.
Nevertheless, research by Nazila Ghanea indicates that religious minorities have
largely been excluded from this reintroduction, because they fail to be covered
by the general mechanisms and procedures offered by the minority framework,
as the “30 year question mark” over minority rights that elapsed at the UN be-
tween the UDHR and the ICCPR made all questions concerning discrimination
against religious minorities part of the freedom of religion or belief umbrella
in international human rights work, a tendency she contends is still in force, de-
spite the adoption of later instruments like the 1992 declaration on the rights of
minorities (Ghanea 2012: 61).¹⁸ Hence, although the recognition of religion as an
identity marker was tangentially reintroduced through the inclusion of minority
rights in the ICCPR and later instruments, the conception of religion as a legal
category recognized by the identification of personally held beliefs and their
manifestations remains dominant in international law. Despite scattered discus-
sions on the possibility of resuscitating the draft convention on religious discrim-
ination that was developed in the 1960s, and the botched attempt to adopt “com-
plementary standards” to the ICERD in order to prevent the “defamation of
religions” (see chapter 4), there is little evidence that any further instruments
will be adopted in the foreseeable future.
Following the adoption of the non-binding 1981 declaration on religious in-
tolerance, international standard-setting in the field of human rights on religion
has largely come to a halt.While religion features in the 1992 declaration on mi-
norities and the programs of action from the world conferences on human rights
(Vienna 1993), for gender equality and the empowerment of women (Beijing
1995) and against racism (Durban 2001), these documents are not binding,
and have done little to affect the ways in which religion is approached at the UN.
3.2.2 Implementation and Monitoring
Compared to the dominance of states at the Paris Peace Conference, religion-
making within the UN has evolved into a truly multidimensional process, as ac-
tors from above, below and outside have become vital and necessary partners,
both to the political entities negotiating binding legal instruments, and to the
 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguis-
tic Minorities (A/RES/47/135), 1992.
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numerous committees set to monitor their implementation. With the advent of
the UN, the League conception of religion as a domestic concern with varying de-
grees of international regulation was replaced by a universalist conception of re-
ligion that eschewed minorities as rights holders, but sought to disseminate the
narrower concept of religion as primarily constituted by beliefs at a global scale.
The idea of universal standards applicable everywhere opened up a new space
for the participation of actors beyond the state level to participate in the global
conversation on the freedom of religion or belief, as NGOs, consultancies, re-
search centers and individual experts have increasingly taken their places at
the tables of UN entities dealing with the standard-setting, implementation
and monitoring of religious freedom.
Whereas the League recognized considerable local differences in the regula-
tion of religion, the UN conception of religion was explicitly founded on the idea
that religion is a “cultural universal that exist everywhere” (see chapter 2), and
eligible for the same level of protection regardless of local conditions, generating
vibrant discussions on the perceived fit between a universalist, norm-creating
center and local levels set with the task of implementation. Hence, whereas
the substantive content of religion in international law seems to be somewhat
clarified, its realization in state practice on the ground has always been contro-
versial and contested, and the increasing involvement of non-state actors has
served to further complicate the role of religion in the monitoring and implemen-
tation of international law. Increasingly, turning the principles of international
law into realities on the ground is a cooperative effort where international organ-
izations and institutions, NGOs and individual experts and academics partici-
pate, offering alternative visions and correctives to state practice. The principal
arena for the interaction between these different international actors is the Unit-
ed Nations and its extensive institutional framework for the protection of human
rights, notably the Human Rights Council (formerly the Commission on Human
Rights) and the human rights treaty body system.
3.2.2.1 The Human Rights Council
Although human rights have increasingly become “mainstreamed” as a universal
concern to all entities across the UN system, the primary actor set to monitor the
practical implementation of the international legal framework on human rights
is the Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures, in particular, but not
limited to the role of the Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Be-
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lief,¹⁹ whose mandate was created by CHR resolution in 1986.²⁰ The system with
special procedures to which the rapporteur belongs is the successor to the string
of ad hoc rapporteurs appointed by the CHR’s Sub-Commission on the Preven-
tion of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, the lowest tier of the
UN human rights hierarchy, created to fill some of the gaps in the protection
of minorities in the UDHR (Normand and Zaidi 2008: 249; Weissbrodt 1986:
695). The special rapporteurs have been characterized variously as the crown
jewels, frontline human rights troops or hands of the CHR by commentators; act-
ing simultaneously as human rights activists, rallying points for human rights,
international diplomats, academics and government advisers (Subedi 2011:
203, 212), mandate holders face enormous challenges in their work.
Among the ad hoc rapporteurs appointed by the CHR, two early mandate-
holders have been important both to the interpretation of the mandate as special
rapporteur and to the conceptualization of the freedom of religion or belief as a
foundational human right. First, Arcot Krishnaswami submitted his Study of Dis-
crimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices to the Sub-Commis-
sion in 1960.²¹ The comprehensive study, based on a review of the legislation
on religion in 86 country monographs assembled by Krishnaswami and his sec-
retariat, includes a list of 16 principles for legislation on the topic of religion and
belief, especially on the topic of acceptable manifestations, which would later
become the backbone of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (van Boven
1991: 438). Significantly, whereas the Krishnaswami study was primarily dedicat-
ed to religious discrimination, his approach to the matter was thoroughly in-
fused by the individual conception of religion introduced by the UDHR article
18, as he observed that “each religion or belief makes different demands on
 In particular, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimina-
tion, xenophobia and related intolerance (E/CN.4/RES/1993/20, 1993) has engaged religion as
a feature of racial discrimination on numerous occasions, including through a joint report
with the then Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir, on the “def-
amation of religions” (A/HRC/2/3, 2006). Additionally, the special rapporteurs on minority
rights, indigenous peoples, violence against women, terrorism, freedom of opinion and expres-
sion and cultural rights have engaged religion to some degree.
 The mandate was originally entitled Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance (E/CN.4/
RES/1986/20, 1986), but the title was changed by the CHR in 2000 (E/CN.4/RES/2000/33). For
a consideration of the origin and significance of the mandate, see Weissbrodt 1986. For a broad-
er assessment of the ways in which the different mandate-holders have approached religion, see
Årsheim 2016a.
 E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, 1960.
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its followers”, advising against a mechanic application of the principle of equal-
ity that does not recognize the nature of these demands.²²
In his study, Krishnswami observed at the very outset: “In view of the diffi-
culty of defining ‘religion’, the term ‘religion or belief ’ is used in this study to in-
clude, in addition to various theistic creeds, such other beliefs as agnosticism,
free thought, atheism and rationalism”.²³ Despite this broad-based assertion,
the study is primarily dedicated to the various interactions of states with a
small handful of “world religions”—i.e., Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Islam,
and Christianity, the latter intermittently subdivided into Protestantism, Ortho-
doxy, and Catholicism. The study briefly summarizes the history of legal regula-
tions of religion or belief at domestic and international levels before explicating
the different dimensions of the freedom of religion or belief protected by the
UDHR, providing numerous examples of how states and world religions have in-
teracted across the different dimensions outlined in this right.
Concluding his study, Krishnaswami observed that it was “relatively easy” to
analyze the situation in the world today, which was characterized by a more fa-
vorable trend towards equality of treatment of religions and beliefs, and their fol-
lowers. This change of affairs was due in no small part to “a change in attitude”
among the followers of a number of religions or beliefs, which were less inclined
than in earlier times to consider themselves to hold the only repositories of
truth.²⁴ Hence, while Krishnaswami embraced a broad concept of religion at
the beginning of his study, the brunt of his work chronicled the development
of a fairly narrow selection of world religions towards increased acceptance of
other religions or beliefs, effectively attributing the tolerant attitudes he identi-
fied to internal changes within religious traditions.
 E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1: 15, 1960. The split between religious discrimination and minority
protection was reaffirmed in 1971, when the Sub-Commission, in the wake of the adoption of
the ICCPR, found it necessary to appoint Francesco Capotorti as special rapporteur set to prepare
his Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities to com-
plement Krishnaswami’s work. Capotorti’s work was submitted in 1979 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/
Rev.1), and is widely considered to have provided the authoritative interpretation of the scope
of article 27 of the ICCPR, defining minorities as “A group numerically inferior to the rest of
the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members—being nationals of
the State—possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest
of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving
their culture, traditions, religion or language” (E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1: 568, 1979) (Yupsanis
2009: 249).
 E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1: 1, 1960.
 E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1: 55, 1960.
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Second, Elizabeth Odio Benito completed her Study on current dimensions
of the problems of intolerance and of discrimination on the grounds of religion
or belief in 1986.²⁵ Benito stressed that the addition of “intolerance” to her man-
date implied a broader approach to religious discrimination than that covered by
Krishnaswami, encompassing discrimination within or between religions, be-
tween individuals or groups, and between the state and religious groups.²⁶ On
the nature of religion, she observed that
Like Mr. Krishnaswami, she has refrained from attempting to define “religion”, since the
meaning of the word is generally well understood by all. Nevertheless, it is perhaps useful
to point out that “religion” can be described as “an explanation of the meaning of life and
how to live accordingly”. Every religion has at least a creed, a code of action, and a cult.
Further, she has avoided any attempt to describe or evaluate any particular religion or be-
lief or any religious institution.Where she has used the term “Church”, it is not intended to
refer to a particular religion or belief, but only to a stable and institutionalized organization
or community of believers having an administration, a clerical hierarchy, a fixed body of
beliefs and practices and an established form of ritual.²⁷
Hence, although her mandate significantly expanded the scope of discriminatory
actions, she maintained a view of religion that was mainly intellectual, firmly
anchored in the nexus between a forum internum (a creed) and the forum exter-
num (a cult), indicating its continued isolation from the minority approach to re-
ligion as a feature of identity outlined by special rapporteur on minority rights
Francesco Capotorti nearly ten years earlier.²⁸
Whereas Krishnaswami ended his study on a positive note, observing an in-
creasing trend towards tolerance and reconciliation among the largest religions
in the world, Benito pointed out that this hope had been shattered while her
predecessor finished his report, as “serious manifestations of intolerance”
swept over Europe in 1960,²⁹ preparing the ground for the adoption of the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1965. Moving
on to the present situation, Benito painted a no less worrying picture of present
manifestations of intolerance on the grounds of religion or belief, ending her re-
port with a recommendation that work on a binding convention on the freedom
of religion or belief should be a priority for the CHR, and that the topic should
 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26, 1986.
 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26: 18, 1986.
 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26: 19, 1986.
 See Francesco Capotorti: Study of the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Lin-
guistic Minorities (E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1), 1979.
 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26: 8, 1986.
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become a regular agenda item for the commission, featuring information on the
protection of this right gathered from all over the world.
The resulting mandate adopted in 1986 drew on the work of Krishnaswami
and Benito, and set the rapporteur with the task to monitor the implementation
of the 1981 declaration. While the original mandate was fairly narrow, the activ-
ities of successive mandate-holders have helped expand its scope gradually, as
the CHR (replaced in 2006 by the Human Rights Council) has approved new
working methods and more clearly formulated recommendations to states. Man-
date-holders are typically lawyers, academics or former human rights activists,
and as such represent a perspective from the outside, situated at the third, aux-
iliary level of the UN. Drawing on information from governments, non-govern-
mental and other sources, the rapporteur makes country visits and composes
thematic and annual reports on the state of the freedom of religion and belief,
complete with recommendations to state parties (Evans 2006: 78).
The broad, thematic scope of the mandate was laid out in full in the Special
Rapporteur’s Digest of Freedom of Religion or Belief,³⁰ a document compiled by
then rapporteur Asma Jahangir in order to aid individual petitioners in structur-
ing their complaints to her office regarding violations of their freedom of religion
or belief. The framework for communications in the Digest features a five-tier
subdivision of religious freedom and surrounding issues (fig. 1), and is a useful
source to identify the reigning understanding of the right as it has been devel-
oped by successive mandate-holders.
The first tier covers the combination of the internal and external dimensions
of religious freedom, i.e. the right to adopt or change one’s belief and the right
not to be coerced on the one hand, and the scope of acceptable manifestations of
religion on the other hand, minutely described according to the 1981 declaration
and general comment no. 22 of the Human Rights Committee,³¹ which is the au-
thoritative interpretation of the ICCPR article 18 (see chapter 5). The second tier
covers discrimination based on religion or belief, which also covers the issue of
state religions, in cases where such arrangements result in the discrimination of
other religions. The right to non-discrimination frequently interacts with the ex-
ercise of religious freedom, and is derived from the combined provisions of the
ICCPR, the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Unlike the right to
freedom of religion or belief, the right to non-discrimination primarily construes
religion as a dimension to identity.
 E/CN.4/2006/5, Annex, 2006.
 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 1993.
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The third tier of the framework covers vulnerable groups and draws on pro-
visions from the ICCPR, the CRC, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and numerous other international
instruments. Vulnerable groups, in particular women, children, minorities, refu-
gees and prisoners, are first and foremost relevant to the freedom of religion or
belief because of the prevalence of issues reported to the special rapporteur
where religious doctrines, concepts or practices are invoked to the detriment
of these groups and their rights. Like the right to non-discrimination, the preca-
rious situation of vulnerable groups is only rarely tied to individual freedom of
belief and its manifestations.
The fourth tier is strongly related to the third, and concerns the intersection
of the freedom of religion and belief with other human rights, i.e. issues where
the invocation of religious freedom can result in the violation of the civil and po-
litical rights of others, such as the right to the freedom of expression, the right to
life and the right not to be tortured, all of which are derived from provisions in
the ICCPR, with smaller contributions from CEDAW and other instruments. The
intersection of religious freedom with other rights draws a clear line between ac-
Figure 1 (Image: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights)
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ceptable and unacceptable manifestations. Finally, the fifth tier concerns cross-
cutting issues, such as the range of acceptable limitations to religious freedom,
derogation and technical legislative issues drawn from the ICCPR, the CRC and
CEDAW.
The present mandate of the special rapporteur³² situates the mandate-holder
at a vantage point at the intersection between different levels of religion-making,
tasked with the interpretation of international norms, the compatibility of state
behavior with such norms, and a variety of different sources weighing in on the
nature of that compatibility. While different mandate-holders have emphasized
different aspects of religious freedom (Evans 2006: 85), all have drawn upon a
variety of sources, from state officials and civil servants, to specialized UN pro-
grams, NGOs and academics.
In a thematic report on the protection of religious minorities, the former spe-
cial rapporteur Heiner Bielefeldt confirmed the split between religious belief and
identity in his observation on the special nature of religious minorities viz. other
minorities due to the dominance of article 18 of the ICCPR:
In the context of human rights, the identity of a person or a group must always be defined
in respect of the self-understanding of the human beings concerned, which can be very di-
verse and may also change over time.While generally applying to different (ethnic, linguis-
tic, etc.) categories of identity, this principle of respecting every person’s self-understanding
is even more pronounced when it comes to defining religious or belief identities, since the
development of such identities relates to the human right to freedom of thought, con-
science, religion or belief.
(…)
Measures used to promote the identity of a specific religious minority always presuppose
respect for the freedom of religion or belief of all of its members. Thus, the question of
how they wish to exercise their human rights remains the personal decision of each indi-
vidual. Strictly speaking, this means that the State cannot “guarantee” the long-term devel-
opment or identity of a particular religious minority. Instead,what the State can and should
do is create favourable conditions for persons belonging to religious minorities to ensure
that they can take their faith-related affairs in their own hands in order to preserve and fur-
ther develop their religious community life and identity.³³
Hence, the obligation on states to perpetuate the existence of religious minorities
required by article 27 of the ICCPR³⁴ and the solidarity criterion in Capotorti’s
 A/HRC/RES/22/20, 2013.
 A/HRC/22/51: 23–24, 2012.
 With his observation on the lacking obligation on states to guarantee the long-term survival
of religious minorities, Bielefeldt comes close to directly contradicting the Human Rights Com-
mittee, which observes in its general comment no. 23 on the interpretation of article 27 that “The
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definition of minorities³⁵ were both effectively overturned by Bielefeldt, whose
approach to the notion of religious minorities required that the primary task
of the state is to ensure respect for the freedom of religion or belief of each in-
dividual member to freely choose whether he or she wishes to self-identify with
the minority in question.³⁶
This view reflects the dominant approach by academic commentators on the
freedom of religion or belief, which is commonly construed separately from the
consideration of religion as an identity trait of minorities: Dickson (1995), Tahzib
(1996), Taylor (2005), Scolnicov (2010) and Lerner (2000; 2012) all consider the
freedom of religion or belief to be synonymous with the mandate of the special
rapporteur, with issues like non-discrimination, vulnerable groups and intersect-
ing rights introduced only as secondary concerns. Major international human
rights NGOs like Amnesty International³⁷ adopt similar views, as do the NGO
Committee on Freedom of Religion or Belief,³⁸ and smaller, issue-specific organ-
izations like Forum18³⁹ and The Tandem Project,⁴⁰ signaling a strong interna-
tional consensus on what the right to freedom of religion or belief is meant to
cover among actors from below, at the third level of the UN.
In addition to its special procedures, the Human Rights Council also over-
sees the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a peer-review mechanism under
which the complete human rights record of every member state of the UN is re-
Committee concludes that article 27 relates to rights whose protection imposes specific obliga-
tions on States parties. The protection of these rights is directed to ensure the survival and con-
tinued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned,
thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole. Accordingly, the Committee observes that
these rights must be protected as such and should not be confused with other personal rights
conferred on one and all under the Covenant” (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5: 9, 1994).
 See above.
 The embeddedness of Bielefeldt’s conception of minorities as self-determined by their be-
liefs is displayed in his conclusion, where he repeatedly refers to “religious or belief minorities”
(A/HRC/22/51: 58–59, 2012).
 Amnesty International was founded in the newspaper article The Forgotten Prisoners, pub-
lished in The Observer on May 28th 1961, where Peter Berenson launched the “Appeal for Amnes-
ty 1961” campaign, explicitly targeting prisoners of conscience, drawing upon articles 18 and 19
of the UDHR and ICCPR http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/history, (accessed 31.08. 2016)
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/1961/may/28/fromthearchive.theguardian (accessed 31.08.
2016).
 The Committee has been active since 1991, works to promote the freedom of religion and be-
lief at the United Nations, and currently (2016) has 32 member organizations, mainly drawn from
religious groups. http://unforb.wordpress.com/resources/ (accessed 31.08.2016).
 http://www.forum18.org/forum18.php (accessed 31.08.2016).
 http://www.tandemproject.com/ (accessed 31.08.2016).
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viewed by the 47 member states of the council in an interactive process where all
UN member states can take part in the discussions. Each review is based on re-
ports submitted by the state in question, by NGOs and by the specialized agen-
cies of the UN. Following an interactive dialogue, the council issues a report on
the outcome of the review, listing issues raised by members of the council and
responses from the state under review. Under the system, every state is reviewed
every fourth year, and at the time of writing (2016), the system,which was started
in 2008, has just finished its second cycle of reviews.While issues relating to re-
ligion, religious discrimination and the freedom of religion or belief have seen
significant increases from the first to the second cycle of reviews, they still con-
stitute a very small proportion of the issues raised during the reviews, trailing
significantly behind larger issues like international law, gender equality and
the rights of children (Årsheim 2016b).
3.2.2.2 The Treaty Body System
In addition to the role of the Human Rights Council and its different mecha-
nisms, the other major system for the monitoring of human rights implementa-
tion at the United Nations is the treaty body system, under which committees of
individually appointed experts review periodic state reports on the implementa-
tion of a broad array of legal instruments.
The practice of reviewing periodic state reports to monitor compliance with
the obligations of human rights treaties appeared first in the constitution of the
International Labor Organization in 1919, and was later picked up by the Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN in the 1950s, before it became
the bedrock of monitoring human rights treaties when ICERD was adopted in
1965 (Kretzmer 2008). After a cautious start in the 1970s, when recommendations
and criticism were largely absent and committees interpreted their duties quite
differently, the reporting procedures have matured into a coherent system, and
since the early 1990s, when the UN went through a major institutional overhaul,
the procedures of the treaty bodies have become more or less uniform (Stoll
2008).
Treaty bodies decide their own rules of procedure, issue their own separate
guidelines for how states should report on the implementation of their obliga-
tions, and regularly issue “general comments” on their own interpretation of
the provisions in their instruments Within this system (see fig. 2),⁴¹ reports are
 Unless otherwise indicated, the information on the reporting system is derived from the
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submitted at a periodicity set by the treaty in question, and are reviewed in meet-
ings open to the public where state delegations interact with committee mem-
bers. Prior to the meeting, committees present states with lists of issues of par-
ticular concern to be dealt with in the meeting. States have the opportunity to
submit replies to the lists beforehand. Several treaty bodies host preparatory
meetings where NGOs can present particular issues. Additionally, all treaty bod-
ies receive numerous shadow reports written by NGOs on state compliance with
the provisions in question, and, increasingly, they receive information from UN
agencies working in the country. Individual committee members are also free to
seek out independent information on their own. Committee members are elected
Figure 2 (Image: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights)
OHCHR’s fact sheet on the treaty system (Fact Sheet No. 30/Rev.1) http://www.ohchr.org/Docu
ments/Publications/FactSheet30Rev1.pdf (accessed 31.08. 2016).
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among state parties, who nominate their own nationals to serve as independent
experts. Rules and criteria for membership vary for each committee, and are
specified in the instrument each committee is set to monitor.⁴² While the back-
ground of committee members varies, the majority tend to have a legal back-
ground (Mechlem 2009: 917).
During the meeting with the state party, the conversation between committee
members and the state delegation is directed by the committee’s elected chair-
person for the session. Following an introduction from the state delegation,
the conversation is structured according to the list of issues, and the different
clusters of rights that represent particular difficulties in the implementation of
the treaty in question. Following the meeting, the committee holds a closed ses-
sion where it discusses the issues raised, before drafting and adopting a text con-
taining concluding observations, with views and recommendations on positive
and negative aspects, and recommendations to the state party. In particularly
problematic cases, committees have various follow-up procedures to monitor
that states comply with their recommendations.
Treaty bodies are compromises that illustrate the core paradox at the foun-
dation of international human rights law, caught in the deadlock between the
dissemination of universal rules and the parochialisms of domestic jurisdiction.
Incapable of delivering binding decisions and verdicts, treaty bodies are left with
issuing stern suggestions and recommendations on domestic legal arrange-
ments. The legal effect of their recommendations is disputed (Keller and Ulfstein
2012: 3, Mechlem 2009: 909), and elements of their practice have been labelled
“quasi-judicial” (Henrard 2011: 392, Pejic 1997: 684), although their legal signifi-
cance has been confirmed by references to their opinions in international and
domestic legal decisions (Buergenthal 2006: 789).
Several studies have been instigated to review the process and suggest im-
provements, both procedurally and substantively. Studies by long-time human
rights scholar Philip Alston in 1989,⁴³ 1993⁴⁴ and 1997⁴⁵ concluded that the sys-
tem would ultimately need to be reformed and streamlined, suggestions that
were reinforced by the findings of Anne Bayefsky,who in her 2001 report⁴⁶ claim-
ed the system was in urgent and permanent crisis. Since then, a large number of
meetings have been held and concept papers created at the bureaucratic and




 The UN Human Rights System: Universality at the Crossroads (2001).
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NGO levels of the UN, with no substantial changes appearing on the horizon.⁴⁷
Several new treaty bodies have been created, increasing reporting burdens
and overlapping monitoring activities.⁴⁸
Despite the problems attendant to the monitoring procedure, there are indi-
cations that the existence and increased ratification of human rights treaties
have a real and concrete impact on state behavior. In a study commissioned par-
allel to Bayefsky’s scathing critique, Heyns and Viljoen (2001) found strong indi-
cations that states alter legal frameworks and policies to come in line with treaty
provisions, although motivations for ratifying were found to be utterly pragmat-
ic: Such alterations did not primarily happen due to the recommendations issued
by treaty bodies, but were rather based on states’ impressions of the need to
show commitment to human rights at the international arena to secure their
own standing on other issues (Heyns and Viljoen 2001: 535).
The vagueness of treaty obligations, which tend to leave considerable room
for interpretation, has led each treaty body to develop its own interpretative
practice. Over the course of their history, human rights committees have ap-
proached the concept of religion differently, relative to the categories of rights
they have been set to monitor, the political climate that shaped their competence
and powers, their connections with the scholarly and NGO community and their
standing in international law more generally.
The ways in which the treaty bodies approach religion is strongly influenced
by their location within the UN system. Treaty bodies are situated at the juncture
between the first, political UN that has decided their membership and negotiated
the treaties they monitor, the second, bureaucratic UN that staffs their meetings,
drafts their reports and provides background information on the states under re-
view, and the third, activist UN that lobbies their meetings, hosts side events on
the rights they monitor and provide shadow reports for their reviews. From these
very different actors, the treaty bodies receive inputs and suggestions on how to
deal with religion from above, outside and below. Before moving on to the ways
 For a recent update on the reform process and earlier reports and proposals, see Strengthen-
ing the United Nations human rights treaty body system. A report by the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights (A/66/860, 2012). For continuous updates on this comprehensive
process, see the OHCHR website: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRTD/Pages/TBStrength
ening.aspx (accessed 31.08.2016).
 Since the turn of the century, The Committee on Migrant Workers (2004), The Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2009) and The Committee on Enforced Disappearances
(2011) have been added to the roster. Additionally, the optional protocol on the Convention
against Torture created a Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture, which started work in
2007, bringing the total number of enforcement mechanisms to 10.
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in which the treaty bodies have balanced these inputs in their review efforts, I
will take a closer look at the dominant approaches to religion within each of
the different levels of the organization.
3.3 Religion at the Three Levels of the United Nations
As the UN Intellectual History Project documented (see chapter 1), the United Na-
tions has grown to become a multidimensional organization that has decisively
influenced research, policymaking, development efforts, scientific cooperation
and disaster relief through an increasingly complex institutional evolution
with unique, global reach. Significantly, the UNIHP documented how the UN
has been influential not only in material, measurable terms, but also in more in-
direct and implicit ways, by framing global concerns in new and instructive
ways: In its final report, the project team identified the increased tendency to
see peace, development and human rights⁴⁹ as interconnected issues that have
to be addressed together as one of the most important conceptual innovations
of the UN (Jolly, Emmerij and Weiss 2005: 7– 11).
Additionally, the project documented how numerous shortcomings at the
traditional (political and bureaucratic) levels of the UN were increasingly ad-
dressed and engaged by non-governmental actors, to the point where it has be-
come possible to distinguish between three different levels of decision-making at
the UN (Weiss 2009: 8–9): The first level is composed of the political arenas for
states, more concretely bodies created by the UN Charter like the UN General As-
sembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council. This is the
“original” UN; a society of states joined together to work for world peace. The
second level contains specialized agencies, which, although they are directed
by UN member states, are staffed by specialists according to the technical re-
quirements of the agency. Agencies at this level include the Bretton Woods or-
ganizations (the IMF and the World Bank), the World Health Organization
(WHO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations
Populations Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) and many others, which have been the operational
 These are three of the four “pillars” of the UN. The fourth pillar, the independence and self-
determination of states, was largely considered a success with the rapid decolonization of the
1960s, but has since descended into relative chaos, as issues concerning the exact nature of sov-
ereignty and the scope of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect have increasingly become
contentious political issues, in particular in the decades following the end of the Cold War (Jolly,
Emmerij and Weiss 2005: 12).
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arms of the UN since the early years. The third level, which has become gradually
more important over the last decades, consists of non-governmental organiza-
tions, independent experts, consultants and others who are commissioned by
the UN or seek to influence its operations. Examples of actors within the third
UN are human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, independent experts appointed by the Secretary General or
other offices within the UN, and special task forces and commissions established
to meet particular challenges, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC).
The organizational levels of the UN enjoy expansive interchanges in the cre-
ation and maintenance of ideas, programs and policies to promote the core ob-
jectives of the organization. In these interchanges, the three levels of the UN re-
semble the three levels of religion-making identified by Dressler and Mandair
(2011, see chapter 2); the political level of the first UN largely conducts its oper-
ations, whether relating to religion or to other concepts, from above, from posi-
tions of power and authority. At the second UN, however, actors largely see their
role as outside power relations, performing technical tasks that frame categories
like religion in instrumental and heuristic terms. At the third UN, NGOs, inde-
pendent experts and working groups tend to represent the marginalized from
below, framing issues in terms of justice and reparations, approaching religion
and other issues as part of their struggles for increased equality. In the following,
I will go more in-depth on these different levels of the UN, and how they have
approached religion, and thereby become engaged in their very own modes of
religion-making.
3.3.1 Religion-Making at the First UN
At the first, political level of the UN,where states negotiate the future direction of
the organization and its specialized branches, religion is primarily approached
as a universal, yet unspecified human value worthy of protection. Debates in
the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council tend to turn religions
into parts of our universal, shared heritage, and whenever states present agen-
das relating to religion at political organs, it is in the shape of resolutions calling
for the protection of religious sites,⁵⁰ the promotion of religious and cultural un-
derstanding, harmony and cooperation,⁵¹ combating the “defamation” of reli-
 A/RES/55/254, 2001 and A/HRC/RES/6/19, 2007.
 A/RES/58/128, 2003 and A/RES/65/5, 2011.
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gions⁵² (see also below) and promoting human rights through a “better under-
standing of traditional values of humankind”,⁵³ in a specialized language that
has evolved into something resembling a United Nations civil religion, composed
of a generic cross-section of features drawn from major religious traditions.⁵⁴ The
terms of reference and ways in which state representatives at the UN talk about
religion as a generalized, universal and entirely abstract concept resembles the
traits identified by Robert Bellah in US American presidential inaugural address-
es in his seminal 1967 article “Civil Religion in America”, where he also enter-
tained the possibility of such an international conception of civil religion to em-
anate from the UN (1967: 18).
However, the civil religion of the first UN, much in the same way as the civil
religion of the U.S.A. identified by Bellah, “is being used and has been used as a
cloak for petty interests and ugly passions” (Bellah 1967: 18–19), as states dress
up utilitarian political claims in the language of serene, peaceful religiosity. Res-
olutions on religious sites conveniently leave out conflicting views of the owner-
ship and custodianship of particular places (Levi and Kocher 2012); resolutions
on the protection against the defamation of religions suppress the freedom of
opinion and expression (Langer 2010), while resolutions promoting the tradition-
al values of humankind discredit the status of LGBT rights (Wilkinson 2014). Sit-
uated at the helm of the world organization, the religion-making at the first UN is
decisively conducted from above, from states in positions of power that empha-
size the harmonizing and conciliatory aspects of religion, largely in order to fur-
ther their own political agendas.
3.3.2 Religion-Making at the Second UN
The bureaucratic, intermediate level of the UN, on the other hand, is set with the
difficult task of converting the lofty targets set by states at the political level into
concrete policy measures on the ground. Relative to their area of work, virtually
every part of the UN bureaucracy encounters and deals with religion in some
shape or form. To international civil servants working at the UN secretariat,
the specialized programs and agencies, however, the religion in question only
becomes visible and relevant whenever it interferes with the primary objectives
 A/RES/60/150, 2005 and A/HRC/RES/4/9, 2007.
 A/HRC/16/L.6, 2011.
 Incidentally, activists have proposed that the normative instruments of the UN itself, as a
force for the creation of global peace, could and should be construed as a form of civil religion
(Porsdam 2012).
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of each agency. Hence, whereas a debate on whether or not female genital mu-
tilation (FGM) is religious, and how this may affect its abolition would be highly
controversial at the political level of the UN, the World Health Organization
(WHO) flatly informs that “Though no religious scripts prescribe the practice,
practitioners often believe the practice has religious support”.⁵⁵
Having severed religious connotations to FGM, the fact sheet goes on to iden-
tify its cultural origins, begging the question of where to draw the line between
these concepts, a line the WHO seems to be confident drawing from the outside,
despite practitioners’ belief that the practice has religious support. Engaging the
issue of mental health in emergencies, on the other hand, the WHO has stressed
the significance of creating “religious places” in refugee camps in order to re-es-
tablish normal cultural and religious events like grieving rituals.⁵⁶ In yet another
context, the WHO encourages and praises the decisive influence of faith-based
organizations in fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic.⁵⁷ Religion, in the work of
the WHO, comes in many shapes and forms, and its identification cannot be sep-
arated from the primary objectives of the organization in the field of health care.
Another major UN agency, The United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), has shown a similarly pragmatic and instrumentalist approach to reli-
gion through its collaboration with the Alliance of Religions and Conservation
(ARC) since 2009. After regular events dedicated to the potential of religious or-
ganizations to help realizing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and
their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the ARC and the
UNDP have overseen the commitment of more than 50 “faith action plans”,
under which a broad range of religious organizations have pledged to work to-
wards long-term environmental aims, drawing on the key tenets of their faiths.⁵⁸
The religion-related work of the agency has grown to the point where it has
found the need for a dedicated publication with Guidelines on Engaging with
Faith-based Organizations and Religious Leaders (2014).⁵⁹ The guidelines stress
the social importance and near universal presence of faith-based organizations
(FBOs) and religious leaders, and the potential to improve the implementation
 WHO Fact sheet No 241 (February 2012).
 Mental Health in Emergencies (WHO/MSD/MER/03.01), 2003.
 Press release 08.02. 2007 following the launch of the report Appreciating assets: mapping,
understanding, translating and engaging religious health assets in Zambia and Lesotho.
 Alliance of Religions and Conservation. Projects: ARC-UN: Long Term Commitments for a Liv-
ing Planet. http://www.arcworld.org/projects.asp?projectID=47 (accessed 01.08.2016).
 United Nations Development Program. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/docu
ments/partners/2014_UNDP_Guidelines-on-Engaging-with-FBOs-and-Religious-Leaders_EN.pdf
(accessed 01.08. 2016).
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of development projects through the careful and considered engagement with re-
ligious communities. To the UNDP, the role of religion seems mostly to be stra-
tegic and instrumental, as it seeks to utilize the strong social role of religious
communities in order to implement its provisions in the area of development.
Similar initiatives to engage FBOs have been launched by the World Bank.⁶⁰
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), for its part, has engaged extensively with religious actors for decades.
In 1994, the organization organized a meeting entitled The Contribution by Reli-
gions to the Culture of Peace, whose participants adopted a declaration on the
conference topic, stressing the need for religious co-operation in order to fight
increasing armed conflicts and violence, poverty, social injustice and structures
of oppression.⁶¹ The organization also runs its own interreligious dialogue initia-
tive,
…stressing the reciprocal interactions and influences between, on the one hand, religions,
spiritual and humanistic traditions, and on the other, the need to promote understanding
between them in order to challenge ignorance and prejudices and foster mutual respect.⁶²
Increasingly, UNESCO has also engaged with the growing concern for the preser-
vation of religious and sacred sites, as part of its overall cultural conservation
work. This effort was initiated during the 2010 United Nations year for the rap-
prochement of cultures, which led to the adoption of a Statement on the Protec-
tion of Religious Properties within the Framework of the World Heritage Conven-
tion, a legal instrument overseen by UNESCO. To appreciate the particular
characteristics of these sites, the organization has launched a UNESCO Initiative
on Heritage of Religious Interest, in order to better appreciate the specific con-
servation challenges represented by structures and areas considered to be reli-
 See the comprehensive online conference materials from the 2015 World Bank conference on
Religion and Sustainable Development, http://jliflc.com/conferences/religion-sustainable-devel
opment-building-partnerships-to-end-extreme-poverty/ (accessed 01.08.2016). See also Marshall
and van Saanen 2007.
 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Declaration on the Role of
Religion in the Promotion of a Culture of Peace. http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/re
ligion.pdf (accessed 31.08.2016).
 Website: Interreligious Dialogue | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ-
ization http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/dialogue/intercultural-dialogue/inter
religious-dialogue/ (accessed 31.08.2016).
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giously or otherwise spiritually significant.⁶³ Unlike the pragmatic approaches to
religion favored by the World Bank and the UNDP, UNESCO has approached re-
ligion largely from a civilizational, holistic and doctrinal perspective, drawing on
its broad engagement with different aspects of culture to better grasp the role of
religion to its work.
Combining these different approaches, the United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA) has also started working with religious actors, with a particular empha-
sis on the role of religious doctrines and the social power of religious actors in
the provision of birth control and other issues relevant to women’s health.⁶⁴ Like
the UNDP, the organization has developed its own guidelines for how to deal
with FBOs as “cultural agents”, in order to create “conducive sociocultural envi-
ronments” and to consolidate partnerships for population and development.⁶⁵
Additionally, the agency hosts the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Engaging
Faith-based Organizations for Development, co-ordinating the work with FBOs
across the UN agencies working with development-related issues, mapping out
the terrain for interactions between development work and religious actors.⁶⁶
Across the specialized programs and agencies of the UN, religion-making
takes place from self-proclaimed outsider positions, a good distance away
from the lofty targets of the political level. Unbridled by the constraints of inter-
national diplomacy and policymaking, actors at the second level of the UN have
developed a strongly contextual approach to religion, under which the aspects,
content and role of religions, their doctrines, adherents and organizations are re-
lied upon and engaged in unequal measures. The various agencies have devel-
oped their approaches in concert with their surrounding fields of operation,
rather than their immediate UN context: whereas the WHO has approached reli-
 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. UNESCO Initiative on Her-
itage of Religious Interest. http://whc.unesco.org/en/religious-sacred-heritage/ (accessed 01.08.
2016).
 See in particular United Nations Population Fund: Publications. Religion, Women’s Health
and Rights: Points of Contention and Paths of Opportunities (2015). http://www.unfpa.org/pub
lications/religion-womens-health-and-rights?page=8 (accessed 01.08.2016) and United Nations
Population Fund: Publications. Women, Faith and Human Rights (2016), http://www.unfpa.
org/publications/women-faith-and-human-rights (accessed 01.08.2016).
 United Nations Population Fund. Guidelines for Engaging Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs)
as Agents of Change. http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/fbo_engagement.pdf
(accessed 01.08. 2016).
 See United Nations Population Fund: Publications. Realizing the Faith Dividend (2015).
http://www.unfpa.org/publications/realizing-faith-dividend (accessed 01.08.2016) and United
Nations Population Fund: Publications. Religion and Development post-2015 (2015). http://
www.unfpa.org/publications/religion-and-development-post-2015 (accessed 01.08.2016).
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gion much in the same way as others in the field of healthcare, the UNDP has
developed its approach to religion in close relationship with other international
organizations working for development and capacity-building. As such, their
common location at the second level of the UN is no guarantee for a similar ap-
proach to religion—to some extent, the ways in which the agencies deal with re-
ligion displays an opposite trend, as they develop their work in relationships
well beyond the world organization.
3.3.3 Religion-Making at the Third UN
At the recently identified third level of the UN, non-governmental organizations
and individual experts have had a significant impact on the other levels, from
the inclusion of human rights in the UN Charter via the creation of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights (1993) and to the continuous review of human rights
at all levels of the organization (Gaer 1995). International movements working
with a broad range of issues have a long history of evolution outside state control
(Charnovitz 1997), and continue to push their agendas through to the conclusion
of major international agreements.⁶⁷ Representing perspectives free from state
control, a strong and increasing role for the third UN represents a vital input
to the state-centric organization, and an alternative route for grassroots activism
to be heard. Standing on the outside looking in, actors at the third level work
from below and are free to handle the issue of religion as they see fit in their in-
teractions with UN agencies and political branches.
Actors at the third level of the UN engage in “advocacy, research, policy anal-
ysis and idea mongering” (Weiss, Carayannis and Jolly 2009: 123). Working from
a contextual approach to religion akin to that of the second level, actors at the
third UN develop their work in close interaction with the rights movements, con-
stituencies and fields of expertise they seek to represent. As such, the third level
acts as a conduit between the UN and the world outside it, providing the organ-
ization with much needed input from below the levels of political and bureau-
cratic discourse.
Unlike the first and second levels, whose composition and competencies are
closely circumscribed by international treaties and rules of procedure, the third
UN is a “free-flowing network”, whose membership, strategies, goals and modes
of interaction with the other levels shifts continuously, thereby evading clear-cut
 A particularly strong case in point is the 1997 convention on the ban on landmines, which
was pushed through by the NGO umbrella International Campaign to Ban Landmines.
58 3 Making Religion in International Law
examination and analysis (Weiss, Carayannis and Jolly 2009: 125). Nevertheless,
the influence of a third UN composed of actors clearly distinct from the political
and bureaucratic levels of the organization can be discerned upon closer scruti-
ny of specific, recurring themes like religion-making. Some of the most influen-
tial ideas of and approaches to religion within the organization have been devel-
oped by actors from below the formal structures of the UN. These inputs range
from the reports submitted by special rapporteurs on religious discrimination
and the freedom of religion or belief from the early 1960s and up to the present
(see above) and the shadow reports provided by NGOs to the human rights mon-
itoring overseen by the Human Rights Council and the UN treaty bodies (see
below), and to the participation of NGOs and individual experts in conferences
on pressing global issues, in particular the landmark conferences on human
rights (Vienna 1993), women’s rights (Beijing 1995) and racism (Durban 2001).
Given the large number of actors from different backgrounds working at the
third UN, no singular approach to religion has been developed at this level. Rath-
er, the third UN brings the sheer variety of available approaches to religion to
bear on the operations of the other levels by presenting additional, alternative
or conflicting views to the table. The evolution of the UN into three institutional
levels and modes of operation has created a complex, multi-dimensional mode
of religion-making at the organization,where the content of the term is relative to
the author and surroundings of its deployment: what delegates at the General
Assembly mean when they speak about religion is simply something different
from the religion facing the ground operations of specialized agencies, the cam-
paigns launched by NGOs or the reports written by independent academics.
The rise of a third level where NGOs and individual experts can influence
policy and bureaucracy is not exclusive to the UN, nor is it particularly recent:
from the 18th century onwards, private individuals and organizations have had
gradually more audible voices in the shaping and execution of rules and policies
at different levels of governance. Similar influences are legion in domestic pol-
itics, can be traced at other international bodies like the EU, the OSCE and
ASEAN, and have only accelerated over the last decades as a byproduct of the
communications revolution.Where petitions to local, regional and global politi-
cal bodies and agencies used to be a cumbersome, specialized affair only avail-
able to very limited segments of the population with the requisite know-how and
resources at their disposal, the last decades have seen a dramatic lowering of the
bar for participation and a subsequent mushrooming of participation from civil
society.
The rise of the third level of the UN, while fully in line with the intentions of
the founders of the UN, who admitted wide participation of NGOs within the
framework of the organization, is not without ambiguities or paradoxes. Individ-
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uals serving as experts or within NGOs seeking to influence the UN frequently
have backgrounds from the political or bureaucratic levels of the organization
or from higher echelons of politics or bureaucracies in member states or other
powerful interest groups with vested political interests in shaping the work of
the organization. This background, while sometimes necessary due to the level
of technical specialization on global issues, blurs the lines between policymak-
ing, bureaucracy and activism in civil society.
Adding to the complexity of the notion of a third UN, some NGOs have un-
clear ties to their domestic governments, spawning the notion of the “Govern-
ment NGO”, or GONGO. The rise of GONGOs has mainly been detected at the
Human Rights Council, where the aggressive posture of some states towards criti-
cism against their human rights record has been complemented by a set of NGOs
whose agendas and views are indistinguishable from that of their home state.
Among the many challenges facing the problem with GONGOs, the composition
of the committee that reviews applications for accreditation for NGOs is among
the most pressing: The ECOSOC Committee on NGOs is composed of representa-
tives from 19 member states elected on the basis of equitable geographical rep-
resentation, a composition that prepares the ground for repeated infighting
along the same lines as the other political levels of the UN. While this problem
has been pointed out in the past (de Frouville 2008: 114–115), it is unlikely to go
away any time soon, as reform of the political bodies of the UN has proved ex-
ceptionally complex.
3.4 Multi-Dimensional Religion-Making in International Law
After more than a century of international political organization premised on the
participation of actors above, outside and below positions of power, the multidi-
mensional nature of international governance has become commonplace. While
the final say in the process of standard-setting in human rights is still firmly in
the hands of political actors working from above, the monitoring and implemen-
tation of these standards has increasingly become a collaborative process featur-
ing participants from different positions of governance and all the organizational
levels of the United Nations.
Approaching religion has not commonly been among the regular features of
actors involved in international governance, which have been more focused on
the traditional topics of international law, ranging from questions of sovereignty,
peace and security, to trade, the provision of development aid, concerns for the
environment and the promotion of the rule of law. Although numerous religious
organizations have long provided strong and vocal involvement across many of
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these issues, the ways in which actors in international governance have ap-
proached religion more generally—what dimensions of the concept they empha-
size and what modes of interaction they prescribe—has not received sufficient
attention. With the rise of human rights as the “lingua franca of global moral
thought” (Ignatieff 2000: 320) and the concurrent claims concerning the “return”
of religion (see chapter 1), the ways in which international human rights actors
approach religion should become subject to greater scrutiny. Although a handful
of studies on the notion of religion in the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights have appeared over the last decades,⁶⁸ actors at the universal
level have so far received little attention,⁶⁹ with most studies favoring a rights-
based approach rather than a more conceptually sensitive analysis.⁷⁰
While these studies provide crucial insights into the protection offered for
the freedom of religion or belief and other related rights, they provide little in-
formation about how the different institutions involved in the monitoring of
human rights approach religion in more general terms: whether they see religion
as a positive or negative social force, whether they are more concerned with the
doctrinal, ritual or legal aspects of religious traditions, or the organizations and
entities based on a more or less clearly established religious ethos. Whether
these entities favor the non-committal approach to religion at the first UN, the
utilitarian approaches at the second UN or the plethora of approaches present
at the third UN, or a mixture of all of the above has so far not been properly ex-
amined. Put differently, the present scholarship on the approaches to religion
within international human rights monitoring bodies generally does not examine
how these bodies deal with the multiple concepts of religion in their work be-
yond strictly defined legal norms—in particular the notion of “lived religion”—
how people live out their religious identities beyond the scripts laid down for
them by international law.
Elsewhere, I have examined the approaches to religion at the procedures es-
tablished by the Human Rights Council (Årsheim 2016a, Årsheim 2016b), docu-
menting how consecutive special rapporteurs on the freedom of religion or belief
and NGOs petitioning the UPR process on the freedom of religion or belief have
approached the concept of religion in their work. The special rapporteurs have
 See Bhuta 2014, Moyn 2014, Peroni 2014.
 Notable exceptions include José Lindgren Alves on religion at CERD (2008), Martin Scheinin
on the freedom of religion or belief at the Human Rights Committee, Doudou Diéne on the free-
dom of religion or belief at UNESCO, Theo van Boven on the freedom of religion or belief at the
Human Rights Commisssion (all in Lindholm et al 2004) and Michael Addo on religion and cul-
ture at the committee monitoring CEDAW (2010).
 See note 20.
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chafed at the narrowness of their mandate and the complexities of disentangling
religious discrimination from other types of discrimination (Årsheim 2016a: 313),
demonstrating the translational difficulties experienced by individual experts
from below or outside the UN working to “vernacularize” the rules and provi-
sions developed by political actors at the first UN. NGOs petitioning the UPR,
on the other hand, have struggled to establish the necessary fit between the
plight of groups and individuals they document on the ground and the interna-
tional normative framework, frequently failing to escape the tendencies of faith-
based groups to emphasize the misery experienced of their own and to portray
their agonies in theological categories as martyrs or heroes (Årsheim 2016b: 88).
The remainder of this book examines the approaches to religion at the other
major human rights monitoring system overseen by the UN: the treaty body sys-
tem. The work of four treaty bodies will be explored from a variety of perspec-
tives: After a brief introduction to their legislative history, I move on to discuss
the legal provisions on religion of each treaty, and how religion has been ap-
proached by the treaty bodies in their general comments, their individual com-
plaints procedures and their reporting guidelines. After a brief summary of
which approaches to religion dominate in these documents, I assess how each
treaty body has approached religion in the concluding observations they have
issued following their reviews of state reports from 1993 to 2013. In order to
paint a more detailed picture of the ways in which the reviews are conducted,
summary records from the interactive meetings between treaty bodies and states
parties are also examined for the most dominant themes of each treaty body. In
chapter 8, I explore cross-cutting themes and connect them with different schol-
arly perspectives on religion.
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Part II: Monitoring Religion

Introduction
Like the special rapporteurs and the NGOs petitioning the UPR, human rights
treaty bodies are parts of the third UN. Like special rapporteurs, members of
the treaty bodies are appointed in their individual capacities by UN member
states in order to oversee the successful implementation of legal norms devel-
oped at the political level. Also like special rapporteurs, the treaty bodies are fre-
quently petitioned by NGOs and approached by specialized agencies and pro-
grams from the second UN seeking to monitor and influence how they do
their work. Despite these similarities, there are some important differences as
well. Treaty bodies are not created by resolutions negotiated at the political bod-
ies of the UN, but by the ratification of binding international treaties. As such,
they are part of a large system of international bodies set to interpret treaties
under international law, and are bound to follow the principles of treaty inter-
pretation laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Mech-
lem 2009: 909). Their terms of operation are not limited in time, and their com-
petences are strictly defined in the treaties they are set to monitor. The provisions
of their treaties vary considerably, from the handful of substantive articles out-
lined in the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion (1965) to the broad number of rights listed in the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (1989), as does the level of engagement from states parties and civil
society.
Concluding observations issued by treaty bodies constitute a complex sub-
ject matter. In his review of the treaty body system in 1997, Philip Alston recom-
mended that the quality of concluding observations should be improved in terms
of “clarity, degree of detail, level of accuracy and specificity”.¹ Michael O’Flah-
erty has pointed to the tendency among treaty bodies to issue observations that
do not sufficiently reflect the meetings with states parties, include excessive non-
treaty-related recommendations, do not provide sufficient connections between
concerns and recommendations, and do not sufficiently prioritize between dif-
ferent recommendations, nor dedicate enough attention to the follow-up of pre-
vious observations (O’Flaherty 2006: 51–52). Additionally, treaty bodies fre-
quently issue concluding observations with no reference to specific treaty
provisions, bundle several different provisions together, and recommend vague
and imprecise measures to bring domestic practices in line with the instruments
they are set to monitor. On some themes, the committees monitoring the CRC and
 E/CN.4/1997/74: 109, 1997. Cited in O’Flaherty 2006.
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CEDAW have created standardized responses that are issued verbatim to several
states (see chapters 6 and 7).
Taken together, these factors complicate the systematic examination of con-
cluding observations, which tend to evade simple and clear-cut categorizations.
Starting from the assumption that any application of “religion” or related terms
can shed light on how each committee approaches religion, I have identified all
uses of these terms for each committee, before parsing the assembled data into
larger themes and subthemes. Along the way, observations that merely list the
terms as parts of legal obligations or mention the terms in passing have been
left out from the final analysis. Likewise, themes that are only mentioned spor-
adically have not been included in the overall assessments presented below, ex-
cept in instances where they directly influence larger themes. Some concluding
observations that contain particularly lengthy discussions of religion and asso-
ciated terms have been included several times in the examination of different
themes. Both the top-level collection of data and their later subdivisions have
been guided by the specific analytical interests and perspectives laid out in
chapters 1–3. Other subdivisions could undoubtedly have been used on the
same material, generating different themes and perspectives. Nevertheless, I
maintain that chapters 4–7 represent broader trends in how the treaty bodies
have approached religion in their monitoring practice from 1993 to 2013.
Recognizing that committees and states frequently use the term “religion” in-
terchangeably with other terms, I have expanded the number of terms associated
with the concept of religion in the analysis, including the names of distinct tra-
ditions like Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism, and a range of phe-
nomena that have been identified as “religious” in the discourse, like rituals,
temples, mosques, churches, gods and spirits, and particular political or legal
issues that engage religion, like secularism, theocracy, Sharia and Canon law.
This expansion has been applied selectively, drawing on my pre-existing back-
ground knowledge and familiarity with the discourse: For example, documenta-
tion concerning Thailand is more likely to feature terms like Buddhism and mon-
astery than secularism or Baha’i, whereas the situation is exactly the reverse in
documentation concerning Tunisia. The systematization of the resulting data has
been conducted manually, using digitized searches for terms associated with the
concept of religion. Over the course of the analysis, I have gradually assembled a
list of terms that has been expanded incrementally in order to help identify the
different deployments of the concept of religion in the discourse.²
 The list is divided between terms that are applied interchangeably or in relation to religion or
any of its derivatives (religions, religious, religiosity) within the discourse, i.e. in legal materials,
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The frequency with which the selected terms have been used by the commit-
tees during the time period in question does not in itself indicate anything about
the patterns in their religion-making: Singular concluding observations can men-
tion religion numerous times without adding much information about how the
committees view the concept, whereas concluding observations that only employ
the term once may offer several insights into the rationale behind the religion-
making of the committees. Hence, I do not examine the prevalence with which
“religion” or any other term on the list appears.³ Similarly, I do not review the
prevalence of singular states, because their inclusion in the discourse is relative
to the number of instruments they have ratified and the frequency of their report-
ing, which is highly erratic.⁴ To the extent that I quantify findings, I do so in
terms of highlighting the prevalence of particular, broad themes in specific geo-
graphical regions or over fairly distinct periods of time.
and terms that have been added incrementally. The former includes article 18 of the Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), which associates religion with belief, thought,
conscience, worship, observance, practice, teaching and moral. The Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) addi-
tionally associates religion with the terms conviction, profess, tolerance, spirit, rites, customs,
ceremony and precept. General comment no. 22 of the HRC on article 18 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.4, 1993) additionally associates religion with adherence, ritual, dietary, priests, seminaries,
atheistic, congregations, convert, non-religious, ethics, traditions, faiths, blasphemous and con-
scientious objection. Terms that have been added incrementally include: secular, sacred, holy,
god, deity, ancestral, venerate, denomination, divine, theological, celestial, theist, monastery,
monk, nun, myth, pray, sect, cult, saint, creed, church, Christian, Catholic, Protestant, Lutheran,
Orthodox, Bible, canon, Jew, Jehova, Judaism, Muslim, Islam, headscarf, mosque, Koran, talibé,
madras, Sharia, veil, burka, niqab, Buddhism, Hinduism, temple, Zoroastrian, shaman, animist,
Baha’i, sorcery, witchcraft. All terms have been asterisked in order to capture their derivative
terms, e.g. the term secular has been searched for as secul*, in order to capture secularity, sec-
ularism, secularization and secularized as well.
 Such a consideration would entail an acceptance that every deployment of religion or any of
the associated terms in the discourse would be equally important in mapping the religion-mak-
ing of the committees. Such an acceptance runs counter to the theoretical framework that in-
forms this book, as it would not problematize the underpinnings of the religion-secular binary.
 Most states have several reports pending, and most committees have a considerable backlog
of unexamined reports. At the time of writing, the number of overdue reports for each committee
run to 66 for the HRC, 100 for CERD, 54 for the committee monitoring CEDAW, and 51 for the CRC.
Approximately half of these reports are overdue by five years or more. See http://tbinternet.
ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/LateReporting.aspx for an updated overview. (accessed
31.08. 2016).
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4 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination
4.1 Introduction
Cradled from protracted drafting debates in the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), the ECOSOC and the GA in the early 1960s over whether recent outbreaks
of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe were to be met with a convention against in-
tolerance based on race, religion, or both (see chapter 3), the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the
treaty establishing CERD, was adopted on the 21st of December 1965.¹ CERD start-
ed work on the 19th of January, 1970, thereby inaugurating the monitoring mech-
anism. The treaty dedicates articles 8–25 to the structure, procedures and com-
petences of the committee and the interpretation of these measures by the
committee have been authoritative for most treaty bodies following in the
wake of CERD. Although there are differences between treaty measures govern-
ing the structure of the other treaty bodies, the main framework and precedents
set by CERD have largely given direction to the entire monitoring machinery.
The text of the convention mentions religion twice. The preamble reiterates
that the UN Charter pledges every member to take joint and separate action
…for the achievement of one of the purposes of the Organization, which is to promote and
encourage universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all, without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion
While the preamble faithfully reproduces the language of articles 1(3),² 13(1), 55³
and 76⁴ of the UN Charter in enumerating disallowed distinctions, it is consider-
 After years of failed proposals, a related declaration on the elimination of intolerance and dis-
crimination based on religion was finally adopted in 1981. A convention on the issue has yet to
appear, and presently does not seem likely in the near future. See Tahzib 1996 for a thorough
review on the legislative issues pertaining to this declaration, and arguments for why a binding
convention seems unlikely.
 Article 1(3) reads in full: “To achieve international co-operation in solving international prob-
lems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion.”
 Article 55 reads in full: “With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
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ably more narrow than article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), in which political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status were also included. In articles 1–7 of the convention, in
which substantial provisions are enumerated, sex and language do not appear,
while the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is listed in article 5
(d) (vii) as one of 12 civil rights that should be guaranteed to everyone, without
distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin.⁵
higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress
and development; solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems;
and international cultural and educational cooperation; and universal respect for, and observ-
ance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion.”
 Article 76 reads in full: “The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the
Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be: to further
international peace and security; to promote the political, economic, social, and educational ad-
vancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards
self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each
territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may
be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement; to encourage respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,
and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and to ensure
equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Na-
tions and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice,
without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of
Article 80.”
 Article 5 reads in full: “In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2
of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in
all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or na-
tional or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following
rights: (a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering
justice; (b) The right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily
harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual group or institution; (c) Po-
litical rights, in particular the right to participate in elections-to vote and to stand for election-on
the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the con-
duct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service; (d) Other civil
rights, in particular: (i) The right to freedom of movement and residence within the border of
the State; (ii) The right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s country;
(iii) The right to nationality; (iv) The right to marriage and choice of spouse; (v) The right to own
property alone as well as in association with others; (vi) The right to inherit; (vii) The right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; (viii) The right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion; (ix) The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; (e) Economic, social and
cultural rights, in particular: (i) The rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and
favourable conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal
work, to just and favourable remuneration; (ii) The right to form and join trade unions; (iii)
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All the material provisions of ICERD, articles 1–7, are dedicated to the elim-
ination of discrimination. Additionally, the committee has published general
comments on the rights of indigenous peoples and Roma⁶ signaling its under-
standing of ICERD as an instrument that can be applied to promote the rights
of specific minority communities that have historically experienced abuse and
differential treatment, despite their omission from the instrument (see below).⁷
ICERD features a far more restrictive catalogue of prohibited grounds for discrim-
ination than the other committees. The prohibited grounds are listed in article 1
(1): “In this Convention, the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinc-
tion, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or na-
tional or ethnic origin”.
Despite the intentional omission of religion from the list of prohibited
grounds in the convention, the committee has increasingly engaged religion in
its monitoring practice, a development that can be traced in part to the influence
of the program of action from the Durban World Conference Against Racism
(2001) and its insistence on the interrelationship between different identities
in discrimination.⁸ Additionally, the terrorist attacks against the United States
The right to housing; (iv) The right to public health, medical care, social security and social serv-
ices; (v) The right to education and training; (vi) The right to equal participation in cultural ac-
tivities (f) The right of access to any place or service intended for use by the general public, such
as transport hotels, restaurants, cafes, theatres and parks.”
 See General recommendation XXIII on the rights of indigenous peoples (1997), General recom-
mendation XXVII on discrimination against Roma (2000).
 Additionally, the committee has specified the scope of its provisions by publishing General
recommendation XI on non-citizens (1993), General recommendation XXV on gender-related di-
mensions of racial discrimination (2000), General recommendation XXX on discrimination
against non-citizens (2005) and General recommendation No. 34 on Racial discrimination
against people of African descent (CERD/C/GC/34, 2011). None of these recommendations con-
cern specific minorities.
 See A/CONF.189/12: 59, 60, 67, 2002. The increased attention towards religion at the Durban
conference and its successor, the Durban Review Conference (2009), must be considered against
the backdrop of the various attempts by member states from the Organization of Islamic Coop-
eration (OIC) to prevent “defamation of religion”, first presented to the UN Commission on
Human Rights in a resolution drafted by Pakistan in 1999 under the title “defamation of
Islam” (E/CN.4/1999/L.40), then expanded to cover “religion” more generally, and annually
floored at different UN fora with increasing support, culminating in its adoption at the
Human Rights Council in 2007 (A/HRC/RES/4/9), before waning in support in successive
years (Leo, Gaer and Cassidy 2010: 771). The concept of defamation has been met with consid-
erable resistance from actors at the second and third levels of the UN, arguing that the concept
has no clear addressee, that it can serve as a front for blasphemy laws, and could prevent legit-
imate critique of religious traditions, with the report by High Commissioner on Human Rights
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in September 2001 sparked increased acts of intolerance against Muslims, and
allegations of such acts, or “Islamophobia”, on a global scale (Sheridan 2006:
330), highlighting the nexus between different grounds of discrimination, and
the troublesome lacuna in ICERD since its separation from religion as a prohib-
ited ground for discrimination during the drafting process in the 1960s.
The process to implement the Durban program can be seen as an attempt to
rejoin racial and religious discrimination as parts of the same problematic, and
led to the establishment by the Human Rights Council of an “Ad Hoc Committee”
on the possibility of creating “complementary standards” to cover all related
grounds for discrimination.⁹ The committee paid special attention to the nexus
between racial and religious discrimination, an issue it found presently “not ad-
equately addressed” under international law, recommending that CERD dedicate
a general recommendation on the issue,¹⁰ but stopping short of recommending
the creation of a new legal instrument on the subject (Berry 2011: 437). Since the
establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, CERD has commented far more fre-
quently on the nexus between religion and race, gradually expanding its man-
date to keep abreast with the changing nature of discrimination.
This engagement with religion has led to increased attention toward the po-
tential for multiple or “intersectional” discrimination that conjoins the material
provisions of the convention with religion. The concluding observations of the
committee on religion have primarily been based on an expansive reading of ar-
ticle 1(1), pointing to the intersectionality of race, ethnicity and religion. In this
way, the committee has increasingly blurred the spurious borders between racial,
ethnic and religious identity, to the point where it has effectively expanded the
scope of article 1(1) of ICERD to cover virtually every form of religious discrimi-
nation, because such discrimination by its very nature is considered to be insep-
arable from racial or ethnic dimensions.
By emphasizing the complex relationship between religious, racial and eth-
nic grounds for discrimination, the committee has fortified its view of religion as
primarily an issue of identity, signaling its distance from an approach to religion
as an individual elective. Additionally, however, the committee has also ad-
dressed religion with reference to article 5(d) (vii), which prohibits racial discrim-
ination in the enjoyment of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. One
of the key questions for the committee, then, is how to distinguish between in-
(A/HRC/9/7, 2008) and a joint statement by the special rapporteurs for religious freedom, for
freedom of opinion and expression and for racism in 2009 as high-water marks (Berry 2011: 438).
 A/HRC/RES/1/5, 2006. See also chapter 1.
 A/HRC/AC.1/1/CRP.4, 2008.
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stances of discrimination based on religion that violate article 1(1) and instances
that violate article 5(d) (vii) (see below).
In much the same way as the other committees, CERD has increasingly been
brought into contact with the role of religious organizations and the influence of
non-state forms of law, including religious law. The committee has also engaged
with the role of the doctrines and practices of minorities and indigenous peo-
ples, including the expression of their spiritual and religious identities. CERD ap-
proaches the social impact of religion on the implementation of ICERD in line
with its more general view of religion in society, as a marker for identity and
group membership, a view that has led the committee to a somewhat different
approach than that of the other committees. In particular, the committee has
consistently promoted the rights of indigenous peoples to enjoy their cultural
and religious traditions, and has shown considerable willingness to recognize
non-state forms of law in order to achieve “substantive equality” for minority
and indigenous groups.
4.2 General Recommendations
CERD has issued 35 general recommendations (GR). While more than half of
these statements deal with procedural issues, the rest provide authoritative inter-
pretations of single articles and crosscutting themes. Of these, most are brief, re-
iterating treaty articles and urging states to include more substantial information
in their reporting. In GR 20,¹¹ CERD specified that the civil rights enumerated in
article 5, including the freedom of religion, do not constitute an exhaustive list,
and that the article in itself does not create these rights, but assumes their exis-
tence and recognition. Furthermore, it called upon states parties to report on the
12 listed rights one by one, a request that has been mostly ignored by states. Dur-
ing the same session, the committee also adopted GR 21 on the right to self-de-
termination,¹² although this right is not part of the convention.¹³ The rationale for
the recommendation is laid out in the first paragraph, in which it is stated that
“The Committee notes that ethnic or religious groups or minorities frequently
refer to the right to self-determination as a basis for an alleged right to seces-
sion.” In paragraph 5, the committee points out that all governments, as part
 A/51/18, Annex VIII, 1996.
 A/51/18, Annex VIII, 1996.
 The question of self-determination has been a concern for the human rights movement since
its inception. See Moyn 2010 for a critical account of the relation between the anti-colonial
movement pressing for increased self-determination, and the larger human rights enterprise.
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of their recognition of the principle of self-determination, must respect the fun-
damental human rights of peoples, hinting at an expansion of the distinctions
prohibited by the convention:
In order to respect fully the rights of all peoples within a State, Governments are again
called upon to adhere to and implement fully the international human rights instruments
and in particular the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. Concern for the protection of individual rights without discrimination on
racial, ethnic, tribal, religious or other grounds must guide the policies of Governments.
Followed by a reiteration of the contents of article 2¹⁴ of the convention, outlin-
ing policies and legislative efforts states parties must put into effect, the above
passage suggests that religion may also be included in the list of prohibited dis-
tinctions outlined in article 1(1) of the convention.
In GR 32 (2009) on the meaning of special measures, the committee elabo-
rated on this position, observing that the grounds of discrimination in article 1
“are extended in practice by the notion of “intersectionality” whereby the Com-
mittee addresses situations of double or multiple discrimination—such as dis-
crimination on grounds of gender or religion—when discrimination on such a
ground appears to exist in combination with a ground or grounds listed in article
 Article 2 reads in full: “1. States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pur-
sue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in
all its forms and promoting understanding among all races, and, to this end: (a) Each State Party
undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of
persons or institutions and to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national
and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation; (b) Each State Party undertakes not to
sponsor, defend or support racial discrimination by any persons or organizations; (c) Each
State Party shall take effective measures to review governmental, national and local policies,
and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating
or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists; (d) Each State Party shall prohibit
and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstan-
ces, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization; (e) Each State Party undertakes
to encourage, where appropriate, integrationist multiracial organizations and movements and
other means of eliminating barriers between races, and to discourage anything which tends
to strengthen racial division. 2. States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take,
in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to
them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights
and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case en tail as a con sequence the main-
tenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which
they were taken have been achieved.
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1 of the Convention”.¹⁵ While this observation established the relevance of reli-
gion to the interpretation of article 1 of ICERD, it did nothing to alter the ambi-
guity of religion as a ground for discrimination, as it affirmed the necessity of a
combination with grounds listed in the convention in order for religion to fall
within the remit of the convention. The content and application of intersection-
ality, coined in the literature on violence against minority women in the early
1990s (Crenshaw 1991), is contested (Davis 2008), and its introduction into the
vocabulary of CERD has unclear consequences (see below).
In GR 35 on hate speech (2013),¹⁶ the committee confirmed this expansive
approach to article 1 in its comment on the nexus between race and religion:
In the light of the principle of intersectionality, and bearing in mind that “criticism of reli-
gious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine or tenets of faith” should not be prohib-
ited or punished, the Committee’s attention has also been engaged by hate speech targeting
persons belonging to certain ethnic groups who profess or practice a religion different from
the majority, including expressions of Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and other similar man-
ifestations of hatred against ethno-religious groups.
This passage represents a departure from former recommendations issued by the
committee on the interpretation of hate speech in article 4.¹⁷ The recommenda-
tion entails that the definition of racist hate speech, which states are obliged to
prohibit by legislation, may not be limited to the criteria listed in the convention,
but should also include persons belonging to certain ethnic minority groups who
profess a religion different from the majority. The passage also expands the ap-
plicability of “intersectionality” as a principle in the interpretation of the treaty
from article 1 to article 4. Finally, the singling out of two specific “ethno-religious
groups” as particularly exposed to hate speech begs the question of what consti-
tutes such groups, and whether the list is exhaustive (see below).
4.3 Individual Communications
Upon declarations by states parties, the committee is competent under article
14¹⁸ to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of indi-
 CERD/C/GC/32: 7, 2009.
 CERD/C/GC/35: 6, 2013.
 See GR 7, A/40/18: 120, 1985 and GR 15, A/48/18: 114, 1993.
 Article 14 reads in full: “A State Party may at any time declare that it recognizes the compe-
tence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of
individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that State Party of
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viduals claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the rights of the conven-
tion, and to make suggestions and recommendations on the issues raised. In
communications 36 and 37 against Denmark,¹⁹ the committee explicitly com-
mented on the scope of religious discrimination under the convention. Although
the facts of the cases were different, the arguments of the state party, the peti-
tioners and the committee were largely identical: Both communications were
lodged by Muslims who claimed that statements by Danish politicians constitut-
ed Islamophobia, which had manifested itself as a form of racism in many Euro-
any of the rights set forth in this Convention. No communication shall be received by the Com-
mittee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. 2. Any State Party
which makes a declaration as provided for in paragraph I of this article may establish or indicate
a body within its national legal order which shall be competent to receive and consider petitions
from individuals and groups of individuals within its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a
violation of any of the rights set forth in this Convention and who have exhausted other avail-
able local remedies. 3. A declaration made in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article and the
name of anybody established or indicated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article shall be
deposited by the State Party concerned with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who
shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at
any time by notification to the Secretary-General, but such a withdrawal shall not affect commu-
nications pending before the Committee. 4. A register of petitions shall be kept by the body es-
tablished or indicated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, and certified copies of the
register shall be filed annually through appropriate channels with the Secretary-General on the
understanding that the contents shall not be publicly disclosed. 5. In the event of failure to ob-
tain satisfaction from the body established or indicated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this
article, the petitioner shall have the right to communicate the matter to the Committee within six
months. 6. (a) The Committee shall confidentially bring any communication referred to it to the
attention of the State Party alleged to be violating any provision of this Convention, but the iden-
tity of the individual or groups of individuals concerned shall not be revealed without his or
their express consent. The Committee shall not receive anonymous communications; (b) Within
three months, the receiving State shall submit to the Committee written explanations or state-
ments clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State. 7.
(a) The Committee shall consider communications in the light of all information made available
to it by the State Party concerned and by the petitioner. The Committee shall not consider any
communication from a petitioner unless it has ascertained that the petitioner has exhausted all
available domestic remedies. However, this shall not be the rule where the application of the
remedies is unreasonably prolonged; (b) The Committee shall forward its suggestions and rec-
ommendations, if any, to the State Party concerned and to the petitioner; 8. The Committee
shall include in its annual report a summary of such communications and, where appropriate,
a summary of the explanations and statements of the States Parties concerned and of its own
suggestions and recommendations. 9. The Committee shall be competent to exercise the func-
tions provided for in this article only when at least ten States Parties to this Convention are
bound by declarations in accordance with paragraph I of this article.
 CERD/C/71/D/36/2006 and CERD/C/71/D/37/2006, 2007.
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pean countries, including Denmark. While the state party claimed that neither
communication fell within the scope of the convention, as the statements did
not concern persons of a particular “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic
origin” within the meaning of article 1 of the convention, it simultaneously con-
ceded that communication 36 could possibly fall “to some degree” within the
scope of the convention, as it set up a conflict between “the Danes” and immi-
grants more generally.
In identical decisions, the committee found both communications inadmis-
sible on the grounds that no specific national or ethnic groups were directly tar-
geted. After noting the heterogeneity of Danish Muslims, the decisions clarified
the interrelationship of religion and race, as viewed by the committee:
The Committee recognizes the importance of the interface between race and religion and
considers that it would be competent to consider a claim of “double” discrimination on
the basis of religion and another ground specifically provided for in article 1 of the Conven-
tion, including national or ethnic origin. However, this is not the case in the current peti-
tion, which exclusively relates to discrimination on religious grounds. The Committee re-
calls that the Convention does not cover discrimination based on religion alone, and
that Islam is not a religion practiced solely by a particular group, which could otherwise
be identified by its “race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin.”²⁰
The committee quoted the preparatory works of the convention, and pointed out
that the Third Committee of the General Assembly had explicitly rejected the pro-
posal to combine racial and religious intolerance in a single instrument.
4.4 Reporting Guidelines
In its treaty-specific reporting guidelines,²¹ CERD emphasizes the general need
for information on the nature and scope of adopted legislation for each article,
supplied with information on mechanisms monitoring the implementation of the
right, disaggregated data relevant to the particular right, and specific, detailed
information on particular problems and factors preventing full implementation.
These general requirements are followed by article-specific requirements.
Under the reporting requirements for article 5(d) (vii), the guidelines stress
the possible intersectionality of racial and religious discrimination, particularly
the possibly discriminatory consequences for members of religious communities
 CERD/C/71/D/36 & CERD/C/71/D/37: 6.3, 2006.
 CERD/C/2007/1, 2008.
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resulting from anti-terrorism measures.²² The guidelines urge states to be partic-
ularly attentive to complex forms of disadvantage in which racial discrimination
is mixed with other causes, including religion.
For participation in the CERD reporting process, the International Movement
against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR)²³ has published exten-
sive guidelines for NGOs (IMADR 2011). These guidelines fill in the picture of
each article with references to the comments published by the committee. Addi-
tionally, the IMADR provides references to concluding observations issued by the
committee, giving an up to date view of where the committee stands on specific
issues. Under article 1 (racial discrimination), the guide lists the numerous forms
of multiple discrimination addressed by the committee, commenting on the “not
always simple task” of drawing the line between ethnic/national origin and re-
ligion (IMADR 2011: 7), but stopping short of recommending a particular ap-
proach to this problem for NGOs.
4.5 The Religion of CERD
Taken together, the general recommendations, jurisprudence and reporting
guidelines issued by CERD indicate an increased willingness to incorporate reli-
gion into its practice as a recognized ground for discrimination. However, the
tenor of the preparatory works and the wording of the substantial articles of
ICERD in which religion is expressly left out, effectively prevents the committee
from considering religion unless it has an ethnic or racial component (Ghanea
2013: 947; Thornberry 2010: 114). Consequently, the religion of CERD is decidedly
different from the individual conception of religion as primarily recognized by
belief that has dominated international law since the adoption of the UDHR
and still colonizes the international protection of religious minorities (Ghanea
2012: 61).
The religion of CERD is not primarily an individual elective (although it can
also be this according to article 5(d) (vii)), but an identity marker that may con-
verge with racial or ethnic characteristics of individuals or groups, composing an
“ethno-religious” identity that can be particularly vulnerable to various forms of
discrimination. In this way, the religion of CERD has commonalities with the re-
ligion of the League minority treaties and the interpretation of the minority con-
 CERD/C/2007/1: 10, 2008.
 The IMADR was founded in 1988, and is a global network of individuals and minority groups
with a broad mandate stretching well beyond the influence of the UN. http://imadr.org/about/
(accessed 23.05. 2016).
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cept suggested by minority rights rapporteur Francesco Capotorti, in which the
primary emphasis is to prevent discrimination and differential treatment of par-
ticular groups in society for their shared identity, origins or traditions.
The relevance and prevalence of religion in the monitoring practice of CERD
has been noted by several authors, albeit from different approaches. To José
Lindgren Alves, a Brazilian former diplomat and member of the committee,
the main takeaway from the “religious turn” in the monitoring practice of
CERD is that in a “world of growing entanglement of people and phenomena”,
it is vital for the committee to address “the aggravated, mixed nature of racism
and racial discrimination”, while being watchful of “misuses” of religious beliefs
and the freedom of religion to violate “other equally fundamental human rights”
(Alves 2008: 977), the latter primarily exemplified by the freedom of expression.
Patrick Thornberry, a law professor and former member of the committee, has
stressed the “ethnic” component necessary for CERD to address religious dis-
crimination, and the inadequacy of construing religion as a “choice” and there-
fore distinct from race and other “natural” inheritances in cases of discrimina-
tion (Thornberry 2010: 102, 114– 15). The importance of seeing the
interconnection between racial and religious discrimination was also empha-
sized by Thornberry in the meeting with Iran during its 2010 review (see below).
In a related vein, human rights scholar Nazila Ghanea has emphasized the
“profound implications” of an “intersectional” approach to experiences of dis-
crimination, where the “other status” of victims of discrimination must be con-
sidered, despite not being covered by ICERD (2013: 944) (see below). However,
Ghanea dismisses the much stronger claim by fellow human rights scholar Ste-
phanie Berry, who maintains that for Muslims in Western Europe, all discrimina-
tion constitutes indirect racial discrimination, as it is “not possible to derive
where an ethnic practice ends and a religious one begins” (Berry 2011: 444). Ac-
cording to Ghanea, this would be overstating the case, as no such general view
can be derived without sufficient attention to each individual case of discrimina-
tion (Ghanea 2013: 951).
Somewhat surprisingly, there has been fairly little focus in the literature on
how CERD views the relationship between religion and its mandate in the actual
monitoring practice of the committee,with authors focusing primarily on the pol-
icy processes, the convention text, the individual communications procedure and
the general recommendations issued by the committee. This is particularly sur-
prising given the considerable attention dedicated by the committee to a broad
variety of interactions between race and religion, including but not limited to all
the issues addressed in the earlier literature on the subject.
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4.6 Approaches to Religion in the Monitoring Practice of
CERD, 1993–2013
4.6.1 Minorities and Discrimination
The by far most frequently recurring theme in the practice of CERD on the rele-
vance of religion to its mandate is the interconnected issue of minority rights and
discrimination, both of which incorporate a racial or other component covered
by ICERD, but also frequently involving religion in some way or form. CERD
first addressed these issues in a series of observations issued to states with size-
able indigenous communities starting with the review of Ecuador in 1993. During
this review, one committee member pointed to inconsistencies between the civil
rights of indigenous populations, which were limited to conscience and religion,
whereas international instruments, including ICERD, also safeguarded beliefs,
questioning whether indigenous people in Ecuador had freedom of belief, or
only of conscience and religion.²⁴ Another member followed up this line of argu-
ment, commenting on the relocation of indigenous peoples due to industrial de-
velopment more generally, and observing that he had been in contact with Hopi
Indians who had refused to allow subsoil exploration of their reservation be-
cause “their religion prohibited such exploration”, preferring to stay poor rather
than contravene that prohibition.²⁵ A third member of the committee pointed to
the “mystical link” between indigenous groups and their land, a link that should
be preserved by positive discrimination.²⁶
Ironing out these fairly different approaches to the religious rights of indig-
enous peoples in Ecuador in its concluding observations, the committee recom-
mended that any economic exploitation in the Amazon region of Ecuador should
be undertaken only after considering the interests of the indigenous communi-
ties, “in the preservation of their identity”, thereby evading the issue of religious
discrimination and the scope of article 5 entirely, opting for an article 1(1) anal-
ysis instead.²⁷
Reviewing Mexico in 1995, a different aspect of the religious rights of minor-
ities arose, as a member of the state delegation explained that gathering data on
the composition of the population asked for by the committee was complex, be-
cause it would be discriminatory to classify people on account of race, ethnicity
 CERD/C/SR.971: 96–97 Garvalov, 1993.
 CERD/C/SR.972: 18 Wolfrum, 1993.
 CERD/C/SR.972: 28 Shahi, 1993.
 A/48/18: 145, 1993.
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or religion.²⁸ By way of response, one member of the committee observed that
criteria for classification did not necessarily exclude one another, as group cohe-
sion could easily be both ethnic and religious, observing that many people who
identified as Muslim could be atheists, something that also applied to Sikhs and
Jews.²⁹ Reiterating the refusal of Mexican authorities to subdivide its population
on the basis of minority traits, the state delegate explained that indigenous peo-
ples in Mexico were not considered to be minorities, but rather “formed the
whole basis and essence of the nation”, as most Mexicans were of mixed
race.³⁰ Ignoring these protests, which arguably struck at the core of the commit-
tee’s monitoring task, the concluding observations of the committee expressed
its “serious concerns” with the marginalization of the indigenous populations
in Mexico stemming from “the impact of the civilizational encounter”, and the
unwillingness of Mexican authorities to recognize that such marginalization
could be categorized as racial discrimination covered by the convention. To
amend the situation, the committee recommended the “harmonization [of] indig-
enous customs with the positive legal order”, and the development of indicators
to evaluate the policies enacted to help indigenous communities.³¹
Reviewing Guatemala in 1997 and Costa Rica in 1999, members of the com-
mittee reiterated their concerns with the fundamental attachment to land among
indigenous populations. During the meeting with Guatemala, members of the
committee stressed the entrenched nature of this attachment, which constituted
“an essential part of their identity”,³² and was their sole means and source of
existence, “unknown to the population of European origin”.³³ Similarly, during
the meeting with Costa Rica, members of the committee emphasized the impor-
tance of land for the subsistence and cultural identity of the indigenous popula-
tion.³⁴ Both states received concluding observations that stressed “the impor-
tance that land holds for indigenous peoples and their spiritual and cultural
identity”, and were urged to ensure a fair and equitable distribution of land.³⁵
The committee’s official stance on indigenous populations was further spel-
led out in its general recommendation no. 23 (1997), where it emphasized the im-
 CERD/C/SR.1104: 7, 1995 (translation from the French original).
 CERD/C/SR.1104: 48 Banton, 1995 (translation from the French original).
 CERD/C/SR.1105: 30, 1995.
 A/50/18: 380, 382, 388, 389, 1995.
 CERD/C/SR.1191: 22 Wolfrum, 1997.
 CERD/C/SR.1191: 24 Chigovera, 1997.
 CERD/C/SR.1321: 48 Yutzis, 1999.
 See A/52/18: 93, 1997 & A/54/18: 202, 1999. These concerns were reiterated in the concluding
observations following the 2006 review of Guatemala (CERD/C/GTM/CO/11: 18, 2006).
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portance of indigenous peoples’ right to “practice and revitalize their cultural
traditions and customs” and “own, develop, control and use their communal
lands, territories and resources”.³⁶ In its review of Chile in 1999, the committee
drew explicitly on this perspective, commending the setting up of a judicial sys-
tem for the trial of members of indigenous communities that recognized custom
as a mode of proof. Responding to a question from the committee on what exact-
ly this entailed,³⁷ the state delegation explained that custom could be used as an
“excusing or attenuating circumstance” in criminal cases and a means of concil-
iation for the resolution of land disputes.³⁸ Following the review, the committee
published a set of concluding observations where it applauded “the setting up of
a special judicial system for the indigenous population which recognizes custom
as a mode of proof and which allows for legal conciliation of, in particular, land
disputes”.³⁹ To CERD, the establishment of a “special judicial system” was not
only acceptable, but actively welcomed as a tool to accommodate the needs of
the indigenous population—needs that “in particular”, but not exclusively, relate
to land disputes. Similar views of the necessity of legal acknowledgment of tra-
ditional indigenous authorities has been repeatedly expressed to Guatemala,⁴⁰
Mexico,⁴¹ Ecuador,⁴² Namibia,⁴³ Fiji,⁴⁴ Colombia,⁴⁵ Australia⁴⁶ and Cameroon.⁴⁷
The views on indigeneity expressed by the committee in these observations
indicate that the committee considered indigenous peoples to be minority
groups with specific rights derived from their “mythical” relation to their land,
which was constitutive to their identity, a view also expressed in its general rec-
ommendation on indigenous peoples. These views have been repeatedly reiterat-
ed over the course of the 2000s.⁴⁸ Additionally, however, the early observations
 A/52/18, annex V, 1997.
 CERD/C/SR.1346: 25 Ferrero Costa, 1999.
 CERD/C/SR.1347: 19, 1999.
 A/54/18: 369, 1999.
 CERD/C/GTM/CO/12– 13: 8, 2010.
 CERD/C/MEX/CO/15: 8, 2006.
 CERD/C/ECU/CO/19: 12, 2008 and CERD/C/ECU/CO/20–22: 19, 2012.
 The observations issued to Namibia also expressed concern with the potential for ethnic dis-
crimination inherent to customary law (CERD/C/NAM/CO/12: 11, 18, 2008).
 CERD/C/FJI/CO/17: 10, 2008.
 CERD/C/COL/CO/14: 21, 2009.
 CERD/C/AUS/CO/15– 17: 20, 2010.
 CERD/C/CMR/CO/15– 18: 17, 2010.
 See the concluding observations issued to Argentina (CERD/C/65/CO/1: 16, 2004), Saint Lucia
(A/59/18: 450, 2004), Laos (CERD/C/LAO/CO/15: 17– 18, 2005), United States of America (CERD/C/
USA/CO/6: 29, 2008) and The Philippines (CERD/C/PHL/CO/20: 25, 2009).
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issued by the committee also give indications of the unclear borders between the
different grounds for discrimination monitored by the committee, as individual
members problematized the relation between racial discrimination and religion
during the meetings with Ecuador and Mexico.
Parallel to its focus on the conditions for indigenous peoples, the committee
directed its attention in the latter half of the 1990s towards the borderlines be-
tween its provisions on non-discrimination and religion in more general
terms: Reviewing Cyprus in 1995, one member of the committee warned the
state party against anti-discrimination legislation that related to instances of dis-
crimination that were based on either racial, ethnic or religious grounds, as it
could be hard to prove that only one of these grounds caused the discriminatory
act, which were often motivated by different issues.⁴⁹ Several members of the
committee also questioned the origins and effects of the subdivision of religions
in the report submitted by the state party, where the population had been parsed
into Orthodox and Muslim communities, in addition to Maronite, Armenian and
“Latin” communities.⁵⁰
Responding to these questions, the Cypriot delegation referred to the “im-
posed constitution” of the Zurich-London Agreements of 1960, which was a con-
dition for the independence of the state party, and which mandated the recogni-
tion of the religious communities in question.⁵¹ In its concluding observations,
the committee expressed its views on the subdivision of the Cypriot population
into religious communities:
The Committee has taken note of the information provided in paragraphs 21 to 24 of the
report which make reference to religious groups and the rights accorded to them by the
Constitution. Although the Committee would have preferred to refer to them as ethnic
groups, it is fully aware that the respective constitutional provisions of Cyprus are based
upon international agreement which are not within the power of the Cyprus Government
to amend.⁵²
Issuing this observation, the committee effectively challenged the viability of the
provisions on religious communities in the Cypriot constitution, suggesting that
the communities recognized as “religious” by the state party could, in fact,
equally well be defined by their shared ethnicity, whose differential treatment
would therefore be within the scope of ICERD. Similar concerns with the rigidity
 CERD/C/SR.1077: 29 Rechetov, 53 Banton, 64 Yutzis, 1995.
 CERD/C/SR.1077: 33 Rechetov, 39 Aboul Nasr, 45 de Gouttes, 49 Chigovera, 52 Lechuga Hevia,
57 Shahi, 1995.
 CERD/C/SR.1077: 42, 1995.
 A/50/18: 75, 1995.
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of religious markers imposed by colonial powers and peace treaties as the sole
criterion for the recognition of minorities have been expressed by the committee
following the reviews of Lebanon,⁵³ Greece⁵⁴ and Turkey,⁵⁵ all of whose legal rec-
ognition of different religious communities date back to the settlements follow-
ing World War 1.
Reviewing China in 1996, the committee encountered a different approach to
the role of history in the determination of religious rights. During the meeting
with the state party, members of the committee invoked article 5(d) (vii) to ad-
dress the issue of minorities that were effectively prohibited from exercising
their rights to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, accusing the
state party of interfering with the election of the Panchen Lama⁵⁶ in Tibet, and
suppressing the freedom of religion among ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang prov-
ince.⁵⁷ The state delegation observed that the election of the Panchen Lama,
in which Chinese authorities had recently participated, had taken place as
part of an ancient ritual dating back to the 13th century, and the governmental
representation at the ceremony was merely a historical convention, not a politi-
cal act.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the Chinese delegation observed that it was “not accept-
able” that China should be urged to reverse its policies on the basis of informa-
tion gathered by the committee, as some of that information was provided by
groups financed to conduct separatist activities.⁵⁹
In its concluding observations, the committee pointed out that “a distinctive
religion is essential to the identity of several minority nationalities”, and ex-
pressed its concern with the right to freedom of religion of ethnic minorities in
the Muslim parts of Xinjang and in Tibet.⁶⁰ Similar concerns were expressed fol-
lowing the 2001⁶¹ and 2009 reviews of China, although the latter set of conclud-
ing observations framed the issue of the freedom of religion for ethnic minorities
 A/53/18: 172, 180, 1998. Concerns with this system were also expressed following the 2004
review of the state party (CERD/C/64/CO/3: 10, 2004).
 CERD/C/GRC/CO/16–19: 8–9, 2009.
 CERD/C/TUR/CO/3: 12, 2009.
 According to the Encyclopedia of Buddhism, the institution of the Panchen Lamas are ‘the
second most powerful religious and secular figures in Tibet, after the Dalai Lamas. The word
pan is a short form of the Sanskrit word paṇḍita (scholar), and chen is a Tibetan word that
means “great” (Sparham 2003: 629).
 CERD/C/SR.1163: 56 Garvalov, 62/65 Sadiq Ali, CERD/C/SR.1164: 7 de Gouttes, 31 van Boven,
1996.
 CERD/C/SR.1164: 48, 1996.
 CERD/C/SR.1164: 55, 1996.
 A/51/18: 404, 1996.
 A/56/18: 244, 2001.
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somewhat differently, urging the state party to take into account the “intersec-
tionality” between ethnicity and religion (see below).⁶² Similar observations re-
garding racial or ethnic discrimination that violates the right to freedom of reli-
gion or belief of minority ethnic groups under article 5(d) (vii) have been issued
to Saudi Arabia⁶³ and Viet Nam.⁶⁴
Reviewing Pakistan in 1997, the committee was faced by a state delegation
offering active resistance to its growing interest in questions relating to religious
discrimination:
Although it had been noted from previous discussions with the Committee that the ques-
tion of religious minorities was not considered to be strictly within the purview of the Con-
vention, information had been provided on religious minorities since they were the only
“minorities” in Pakistan.⁶⁵
Committee members questioned the viability of legal regulations that only recog-
nized religious minorities, observing the strong links between religion and eth-
nicity.⁶⁶ The Pakistani response re-rehearsed a variation of the historical argu-
ment employed by Cyprus above, as the delegation observed that the tribal
areas were a remnant from British colonial rule, where the inhabitants were
not ethnically or linguistically different, leaving religion as the distinctive mark-
er.⁶⁷ Concluding the session, one committee member alluded to the challenges of
distinguishing between religious and ethnic minorities, observing that the
drafters of the convention “had been unable to foresee all the problems which
might arise from its implementation”, but the review of Pakistan had been val-
uable in defining the area of responsibility further.⁶⁸
In its concluding observations, the committee conceded that religious minor-
ities “as such” did not fall under the scope of the convention, but noted that “re-
ligious differences may coincide with ethnic differences”, and therefore appreci-
ated the various measures adopted by the state party for the promotion and
 CERD/C/CHN/CO/10– 13: 20, 2009.
 CERD/C/62/CO/8: 15, 2003.
 A/56/18: 420, 2001. Similar concerns were expressed following the 2012 review of Viet Nam
(CERD/C/VNM/CO/10– 14: 16, 2012).
 CERD/C/SR.1198: 3, 1997.
 CERD/C/SR.1198: 35/36 Zou Deci, 52 van Boven, 1997.
 CERD/C/SR.1199: 16, 1997.
 CERD/C/SR.1199: 31 Banton, 1997. These recommendations were reiterated and linked to “in-
tersectionality” and expanded with references to the lacking protection of religious freedom
under article 5(d) (vii) of the ICERD in the subsequent review of Pakistan in 2009 (CERD/C/
PAK/CO/20: 10, 18, 19, 2009).
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protection of religious minority rights. Additionally, however, it expressed its
worries over ethnic, linguistic or racial groups that remained unprotected, sug-
gesting that they should also be recognized as minorities,⁶⁹ concerns that have
later been expressed in concluding observations to Lebanon⁷⁰ and the United
Arab Emirates, both of which primarily protect religious minorities.⁷¹
Following the review of Pakistan, CERD has issued numerous concluding ob-
servations that address the plight of religious minorities,⁷² alternating between
the precarious situation of specific religious minority groups and the narrow cat-
egories of minorities recognized in the legal framework, or a combination of
both.⁷³ In these observations, the committee has stuck to the rule it established
for itself in the concluding observations issued to Georgia in 2007, when it pro-
claimed that “Religious questions are of relevance to the Committee when they
are linked with issues of ethnicity and racial discrimination”.⁷⁴
Throughout these observations, the committee has called upon states to ad-
dress the interrelationship between the criteria recognized by the convention, as
well as surrounding criteria like religious affiliation in the fight against stereo-
types, the prevention of hate speech, the recognition of “ethno-religious” minor-
 A/52/18: 181, 187, 200, 1997.
 A/53/18: 172, 1998.
 CERD/C/ARE/CO/17: 12, 2009.
 Prior to the Pakistan review, the eligibility of religious groups for protection under the con-
vention was not discussed in any greater depth—nevertheless, the committee issued observa-
tions on the protection of vulnerable religious minorities to Croatia (A/50/18: 176, 1995), Hungary
(A/51/18: 116, 1996) and the United Kingdom (A/51/18: 230, 1996) in the middle of the 1990s.
 Such observations have been issued to The Philippines (A/52/18: 428–429, 1997), Denmark
(CERD/C/60/CO/5: 16, 2002), Canada (A/57/18: 338, 2002), Switzerland (CERD/C/60/CO/14: 9,
2002), Belgium (CERD/C/60/CO/2: 20, 2002), Fiji (CERD/C/62/CO/3: 23, 2003), Iran (A/58/18:
428, 2003), Poland (CERD/C/62/CO/6: 10, 2003, similar concerns were raised following the
2009 review of Poland, CERD/C/POL/CO/19: 7, 2009), The Netherlands (CERD/C/64/CO/7: 10,
2004), Spain (CERD/C/ESP/CO/18–20: 14, 2011), Luxembourg (CERD/C/LUX/CO/13: 13, 2005),
Australia (CERD/C/AUS/CO/14: 13, 2005, these concerns were reiterated by the committee follow-
ing the 2010 review of Australia CERD/C/AUS/CO/15– 17: 14, 2010), Ukraine (CERD/C/UKR/CO/18:
8, 2007), Russia (CERD/C/RUS/CO/19: 16, 2008, related concerns were expressed by the commit-
tee following the 2013 review of Russia CERD/C/RUS/CO/20–22: 14, 2013), Germany (CERD/C/
DEU/CO/18: 18, 2008), The United States of America (CERD/C/USA/CO/6: 14, 2008), Greece
(CERD/C/GRC/CO/16– 19: 14, 2009), Tunisia (CERD/C/TUN/CO/19: 13, 2009), Turkey (CERD/C/
TUR/CO/3: 13, 2009), The Maldives (CERD/C/MDV/CO/5– 12: 10, 2011), Moldova (CERD/C/MDA/
CO/8–9: 14, 2011), Italy (CERD/C/ITA/CO/16– 18: 19, 2012), Turkmenistan (CERD/C/TKM/CO/
6–7: 10, 2012), Lao People’s Republic (CERD/C/LAO/CO/16– 18: 14, 2012), Israel (CERD/C/ISR/
CO/14– 16: 14, 2012), Thailand (CERD/C/THA/CO/1–3: 20, 2012) and New Zealand (CERD/C/
NZL/CO/18–20: 10, 2013).
 CERD/C/GEO/CO/3: 18, 2007.
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ities, and the preservation of the “religious specificities” of minorities.What con-
stitutes “religion” as an additional criterion in the identification and prevention
of discrimination is, however, uncertain: Whereas the intersections between the
convention and the rights of indigenous peoples, Roma, non-citizens, people of
African descent and the gender dimensions of racial discrimination have been
clarified through the adoption of general recommendations (see above), the
role of religion in racial discrimination has not been the topic of such a recom-
mendation to date, rendering the criteria for its recognition and the scope of its
protection obscure.
Illustrating the entrenched nature of the interconnections between race and
religion in its practice, particularly from the 2000s onwards, the committee has
issued several concluding observations where it has addressed this connection
as the “intersectionality” of religion and ethnicity, a concept it has also included
in its reporting guidelines (see above). The committee first employed this term
following the review of the United Kingdom in 2003, where it noted that the
state party recognized the intersectionality of racial and religious discrimination
illustrated by the prohibition of discrimination on ethnic grounds against Sikh
and Jewish communities, recommending the expansion of this prohibition to
cover other immigrant religious communities.⁷⁵ Following the consecutive review
of the United Kingdom in 2011, the committee recommended a further expansion
of the concept in order to address the intersectionality of sectarianism and rac-
ism in Northern Ireland, indicating that it viewed the applicability of the term to
go well beyond the concerns of immigrant communities.⁷⁶
Reviewing Nigeria in 2005, one committee member observed that the state
party experienced “intersections of race, ethnicity, regional diversity, religion,
class, language, gender, size, and indigenous and settler communities [that]
made the problems encountered by other countries pale into insignificance”, re-
questing further explanation of the government’s reasons for not disaggregating
its population statistics by religion and ethnicity,⁷⁷ despite the apparent insuffi-
ciency of these categories to capture the complexity of Nigerian society. The state
delegation explained that the government avoided religious and ethnic disaggre-
gation of statistical data because it ran counter to the “inclusive philosophy”
pursued by Nigerian authorities to avoid ethnic conflicts.⁷⁸
Following the review, the concerns of the delegation regarding national dis-
unity were noted by the committee, which nevertheless asked the state party to
 A/58/18: 539, 2003.
 CERD/C/GBR/CO/18–20: 20, 2011.
 CERD/C/SR.1720: 25/17 January-Bardill, 2005.
 CERD/C/SR.1722: 3, 2005.
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report on the composition of its population providing indicators disaggregated
by “ethnicity, religion and gender on the basis of voluntary self-identification,
which will make it possible to determine the situation of groups falling within
the definition of article 1 of the Convention”, indicating a clear-cut inclusion
of religion under the scope of article 1 of ICERD. Additionally, however, the com-
mittee invoked the intersectionality of ethnic and religious discrimination, ex-
pressing its concern that members of the Muslim faith, in particular women,
could be subjected to harsher sentences than other Nigerians under the plural
legal system in place in Nigeria.⁷⁹
The committee revisited the complex intersections between race and religion
in its review of Iran in 2010. Reminding the Iranian delegation that, although the
Baha’i was a religious group, one committee member observed that religion and
ethnicity often “interlocked”, making it difficult to separate the two,⁸⁰ a claim
that was extensively elaborated by another committee member
Mr. Thornberry noted that article 1 of the Convention defined racial discrimination as dis-
crimination on one of five grounds: race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin. The
ground of religion had been removed from that article during the negotiation and subse-
quent adoption of the draft convention by the United Nations General Assembly, but the
reference to the right to freedom of religion in article 5 had been retained, and it was con-
sidered as a protected right. The Committee had determined in the past that if it noted a
convergence of religion and ethnicity it was competent to look into possible racial discrim-
ination against members of certain religious minorities in such cases. As the Country Rap-
porteur had said, the issue of religion was in fact often intrinsically linked to ethnicity and
thus fell within the Committee’s mandate.⁸¹
Thus, according to these members of the committee, despite the explicit exclu-
sion of religion from the discrimination grounds of ICERD, the retention of the
freedom of religion in article 5 allowed the committee to look into possible racial
discrimination against members of “certain religious minorities” in such cases.
While this assertion stopped short of an outright claim that religion was part of
the grounds covered by article 1 as indicated in the concluding observations to
Nigeria in 2005 (see above) and general recommendation no. 32, it left no doubt
that if the committee noted “a convergence of religion and ethnicity”, it would be
competent to review alleged racial discrimination against religious minorities.
Reiterating the position of the Pakistani delegation in 1997 (see above), the
Iranian delegation expressed its dissatisfaction with the way the committee in-
 CERD/C/NGA/CO/18: 10, 20, 2005.
 CERD/C/SR.2016: 43 Lindgren Alves, 2010.
 CERD/C/SR.2016: 52, 2010.
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terpreted its mandate, observing that the convention covered religious issues re-
lated to ethnicity, not religious issues “as such”, and, hence, not the situation of
the Baha’i or similar cases.⁸² In its concluding observations, the committee ex-
pressed its concern with religious freedom and with the low level of public par-
ticipation among several minority communities, citing article 5 of the conven-
tion.⁸³ The discussion that erupted during the meeting with the state party on
the competence of the committee to review cases where it noted the “conver-
gence of religion and ethnicity”, however, was nowhere to be found in the con-
cluding observations, which recommended Iranian authorities to “take into ac-
count the possible intersection of racial and religious discrimination” in its
promotion of understanding, tolerance and friendship, under reference to article
4 of the convention.⁸⁴
In its more recent practice, the committee has continued to apply the con-
cept of intersectionality interchangeably to legitimize its expansive reading of
the scope of article 1 in line with general recommendation no. 32, and as a ra-
tionale for its observations on racial discrimination violating the freedom of re-
ligion of racial and ethnic minorities protected under article 5(d) (vii). These is-
sues have been interlinked in the observations issued to Fiji⁸⁵ and Cyprus,⁸⁶ but
were particularly emphasized in the review of Mauritius, where the state delega-
tion stressed the necessity to fashion policies that secured the promotion of the
respective cultures of the different communities in Mauritius, which were differ-
entiated according to their religious identity, whereas the legislation on discrim-
ination primarily covered religious belief.⁸⁷ In its concluding observations, the
committee pointed to the intersectionality between religion and ethnicity in
Mauritius, observing that “insofar as the population of the State party affirms
identity through religious affiliation, the Committee encourages the State party
to guarantee the right of everyone to freedom of religion without distinction as
to race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”.⁸⁸
The turn to religion in the monitoring practice of CERD is deep and perva-
sive, mirroring the concern with the intersections between religion and race
from “above”, at the political, first level of the UN, and gathering speed after
the turn of the millennium.While the committee has continued to stress the im-
 CERD/C/SR.2017: 2, 34, 50, 2010.
 CERD/C/IRN/CO/18– 19: 15–17, 2010.
 CERD/C/IRN/CO/18– 19: 10, 2010.
 CERD/C/FJI/CO/18: 15, 2012.
 CERD/C/CYP/CO/17–22: 14– 15, 2013.
 CERD/C/SR.2219: 39, 2013 & CERD/C/SR.2220: 3, 2013.
 CERD/C/MUS/CO/15– 19: 20, 2013.
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portance of an ethnic or racial component for the convention to be applicable in
the fight against religious discrimination, its continued expansion of the fields to
which it perceives the convention to be applicable indicates an increased willing-
ness to see connections between racial and religious discrimination. The numer-
ous recommendations to states with specific prohibitions of religious discrimina-
tion that the prohibited criteria should also address racial discrimination makes
it increasingly unlikely that the committee will repeat its views under the indi-
vidual communications procedure about the inapplicability of the convention
for “pure” forms of discrimination (see above), as such forms seem less and
less likely to be identified by the committee.
Indeed, the increased use of intersectionality by the committee challenges
the possibility to distinguish between “purely” racial, religious or other forms
of discrimination, as the notion is commonly used to stress the inapplicability
of singular identity traits as determinants of different forms of discrimination.
Rather, the very purpose behind the deployment of “intersectionality” is to em-
phasize the numerous intersections between overlapping identities, generating
specific forms of differential treatment that escape the simplifications of earlier
attempts to discuss the connections between different forms of discrimination,
like “double” or “multiple” discrimination. As such, the ways in which CERD
has approached the intersectionality of race and religion would seem to confirm
Stephanie Berry’s claim that discrimination against Muslims will inevitably fall
within the ambit of what CERD perceives as indirect discrimination (2011: 447).
Although Nazila Ghanea has stressed the need to approach each case with
due attention to its specific context (Ghanea 2013: 951), it is hard to imagine a
case involving religious discrimination that would be sufficiently clear-cut as
to make it inapplicable to the committee, given its current level of scrutiny,
where states are cursorily recommended to “take into account” the intersections
between race and religion without further discussion or specification.
In this way, the monitoring practice of CERD seems to replicate the essence
of the problematic identified by Kimberlé Crenshaw, who coined the notion of
intersectionality in 1989: By simply “adding on” an additional criteria (religion)
to an authoritative one that the system has been finely tuned to address (race),
the appreciation of the specific consequences of the intersection is lost, and the
additional criteria is inevitably subordinated to the logic driving the application
of the original concept (Crenshaw 1989: 140). To combat this subordination,
Aisha Davis has stressed the need to apply intersectionality as an interpretative
principle, while turning away from “paradigmatic notions” like race or religion
(Davis 2015: 242, se more below), an option that presently is not available to
CERD under its mandate.
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4.6.2 Organizations
The turn to religion at CERD is not limited to discrimination and minorities, but
has increasingly found its way into new legal areas that have previously not been
addressed by the committee. In 2002, the committee started taking an interest in
the ways in which states register and interact with religious organizations: Re-
viewing Belgium, Turkmenistan and Armenia, the committee engaged the full
spectrum of procedures for the establishment of official relations between
state parties and the organizations of religious communities.
Reviewing Belgium, one committee member expressed his appreciation with
the state-driven election of a body to represent the Muslim community, request-
ing more information on whether this body had been useful in dealing with the
problems of the Muslim community.⁸⁹ The state party explained that the repre-
sentative body had become increasingly important after the terrorist attacks
against the United States in September 2001, that it was responsible for the de-
cision of numerous religious issues like ritual slaughter, that it trained imams
and religious leaders, and organized the registration of new Muslim communi-
ties.⁹⁰ In its concluding observations, the committee expressed its appreciation
with the election of the representative body with a view to maintaining and de-
veloping dialogue between the Muslim community and the public authorities.⁹¹
Similar praise was offered in 2008 for the parallel German initiative to establish
a representative body for the Muslim communities in Germany,⁹² indicating the
importance attached by the committee to the creation of representative organs
for Muslims in European countries.
In the review of Turkmenistan, the committee linked article 5(d) (vii) on the
freedom of religion or belief explicitly to the registration of religious organiza-
tions. Having reviewed the state party in the absence of a report, the committee
expressed its deep concern with the denial of registration for all religions apart
from the Russian Orthodox Church and the Sunni branch of Islam, and the nu-
merous human rights violations against other religious communities, including
the disruption of religious services, the prohibition of literature, detentions and
ill-treatment of religious leaders, and destruction of places of worship.⁹³ In the
following review of Turkmenistan in 2005, the committee again expressed its
 CERD/C/SR.1509: 26 Diaconu, 2002.
 CERD/C/SR.1510: 16, 2002.
 CERD/C/60/CO/2: 9, 2002.
 CERD/C/DEU/CO/18: 13, 2008.
 CERD/C/60/CO/15: 5, 2002.
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concern with the registration procedure, but this time, it stressed “the complex
relationship between ethnicity and religion” in the state party, establishing an
explicit, yet elusive, connection to article 5.⁹⁴
Reviewing Armenia in 2002, the committee questioned the Armenian delega-
tion extensively on its registration practices, asking why the established Armeni-
an Apostolic church was charged with the responsibility of registering new reli-
gious communities,⁹⁵ and why paganism had received official recognition in
Armenia, while no Muslim community was currently recognized.⁹⁶ The delega-
tion from Armenia responded that a new law had been enacted that would pro-
tect non-traditional religions in particular.⁹⁷ In its concluding observations, the
committee expressed its concern with the obstacles imposed on other religious
organizations than the Armenian Apostolic Church, but without any reference
to the ethnic or racial component to these obstacles.⁹⁸
By 2007 the topic of religious organizations had been sufficiently covered by
the committee to be included in the list of questions sent to Indonesia prior to its
review. The committee requested more information on the impact of the distinc-
tion between recognized and non-recognized religions on the rights of “persons
belonging to ethnic groups”, thereby explicitly identifying an “ethno-religious”
dimension to the topic at the earliest possible stage.⁹⁹ During the review, the
committee requested more information on non-recognized religions, in particu-
lar whether such status affected individual members holding non-recognized re-
ligious beliefs.¹⁰⁰ Acknowledging that members of non-recognized religions
could be marginalized socially and could face difficulties from regional author-
ities in registering marriages and children, the state delegation stressed that the
government was taking steps to remedy the situation.¹⁰¹ Adding that the state
was doing its best to register as many religions as possible, the delegation ob-
served that these efforts were often met by suspicion among local communities
who associated registration with the favoritism shown to Christianity in the col-
 CERD/C/TKM/CO/5: 17, 2007 [observations reissued in 2007 for technical reasons].
 CERD/C/SR.1529: 20 Yutzis, 2002 (translation from the French original).
 CERD/C/SR.1529: 36 Shahi, 2002 (translation from the French original).
 CERD/C/SR.1530: 11, 2002.
 A/57/18: 282, 2002.
 Questions put by the Rapporteur in Connection with the Consideration of the Initial to Third
Periodic Reports of Indonesia: 17, 2007.
 CERD/C/SR.1831: 38 Thornberry, 39 Lindgren Alves, 49 Yutzis, 2007.
 CERD/C/SR.1832: 12, 2007.
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onial era,¹⁰² adding yet another layer to the historical resonance of earlier legal
regulations of religion on present-day arrangements (see above).
In its concluding observations, the committee criticized the differential treat-
ment of members of non-recognized and recognized religions, due to the “ad-
verse impacts” of this treatment for the rights to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion of “persons belonging to ethnic groups and indigenous peoples”,
potentially violating articles 2 and 5 of the convention. In particular, the commit-
tee expressed its concern with the practice of the state party to allow only recog-
nized religious allegiance on ID cards, and the problems experienced by mem-
bers of minority religions trying to register their marriages, urging the state
party to treat all religions equally, remove religious allegiance from ID cards,
and adopt civil marriage legislation.¹⁰³ In this way, the committee firmly estab-
lished the links between its provisions and the states’ legal practice, unlike its
earlier engagements with religious organizations.
The committee returned to the issue of the registration of religious organiza-
tions in its review of Moldova in 2008. During the meeting, the committee ques-
tioned whether the recent denial of registration of the Tatar Muslim community
meant that there were separate rules for Islam in Moldova, despite the constitu-
tional guarantee of the freedom of religion or belief.¹⁰⁴ The state delegation re-
sponded that a court case filed by a Muslim organization denied registration
was pending, but that several “ethno-cultural” Islamic organizations were recog-
nized.¹⁰⁵ In its concluding observations, the committee expressed its concern
with the denial of registration of “Muslim ethnic minorities” on purely formal
grounds.¹⁰⁶ Revisiting Moldova in 2011, the committee reiterated its concerns
for the “persistent registration difficulties faced by Muslim ethnic minorities”, re-
questing more information from the state party on what it was doing to facilitate
the registration of such minorities.¹⁰⁷ Following a protracted discussion during
the meeting on the requirements for registration, the committee expressed its
deep concern with the restrictions experienced by “persons belonging to ethnic
minorities” who wished to exercise their freedom of religion or belief. These re-
strictions, according to the committee, may be in violation of the convention due
to the intersectionality between ethnicity and religion, more specifically articles
 CERD/C/SR.1832: 22, 2007.
 CERD/C/IDN/CO/3: 21, 2007.
 CERD/C/SR.1861: 33 Amir, 66 Peter, 2007 (translation from the French original).
 CERD/C/SR.1862: 8, 48, 2008.
 CERD/C/MDA/CO/7: 14, 2008.
 CERD/C/MDA/Q/8–9: 3(b), 2011.
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2 and 5(d).¹⁰⁸ Similar concerns were expressed in the concluding observations is-
sued by the committee following the 2012 review of Kuwait, where “ethnic minor-
ities” were denied establishing places of worship.¹⁰⁹
Reviewing Monaco in 2010, the committee approached the subject of reli-
gious organizations in relation to the role of Roman Catholicism as the state re-
ligion, observing that Islam was not recognized, and requesting information on
the access to worship for Muslims in the state party.¹¹⁰ A member of the state del-
egation explained that there was no collective or regular practice of the Muslim
faith, but that various private premises were set aside for that purpose.¹¹¹ In its
concluding observations, the committee recommended that the state party offi-
cially recognize “all religions, including Islam, in order to meet the needs of
all persons of a different ethnic origin or of non-nationals”, in accordance
with article 5.¹¹²
Finally, upon its review of Serbia in 2011, the committee added yet another
layer to its views of the nature of the relationship between religion and the pro-
visions of ICERD. The list of issues requested more information on the law gov-
erning the registration of religious organizations in the state party, as some reli-
gious communities were experiencing problems with gaining official
registration,¹¹³ a question that was reiterated during the meeting with the Serbi-
an delegation.¹¹⁴ The state delegation explained that registration was not com-
pulsory, and that some religious communities had been denied registration be-
cause they did not fulfil the legal requirements.¹¹⁵ In its concluding observations,
the committee expressed its concerns with the registration regime:
The Committee recalls the possible intersectionality of racial and religious discrimination
and urges the State party to take all necessary measures to ensure the equal right to free-
dom of religion for all, without preferential treatment, including through a review of laws or
practices that perpetuate an intermingling of the secular and religious spheres, which may
impede the full implementation of the Convention. It also encourages the State party to en-
sure that the process of property restitution is carried out without further delay and without
discrimination.¹¹⁶
 CERD/C/MDA/CO/8–9: 14, 2011.
 CERD/C/KWT/CO/15–20: 15, 2012.
 CERD/C/SR.1973: 27, 29 Amir, 2010.
 CERD/C/SR.1974: 2, 2010.
 CERD/C/MCO/CO/6: 13, 2010.
 CERD/C/SRB/Q/1: 1(c), 2011.
 CERD/C/SR.2067: 72 de Gouttes, 2012.
 CERD/C/SR.2068: 25, 2012.
 CERD/C/SRB/CO/1: 18, 201.
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This observation is notable for two reasons: first, there is no indication anywhere
in the review that any ethnic group suffered discrimination due to the registra-
tion regime maintained by Serbian authorities, begging the question of the rele-
vance of intersectionality to this legislation. Second, it is unclear what “laws that
perpetuate an intermingling of the secular and religious spheres” the observa-
tion is referring to, what “intermingling” means, and the impediments represent-
ed by such laws to the full implementation of the convention.
Taken together, the practice of CERD on the formalization of relations be-
tween state parties and religious organizations confirms the overall approach
to religion at the committee, where the interrelationship between religious and
racial discrimination has become increasingly important, despite the lack of pro-
visions on religion in the instrument. However, the practice on religious organ-
izations is more focused on the nexus between racial discrimination and the
freedom of thought, conscience and religion and therefore eligible for protection
under article 5(d) (vii). In the early observations, the committee seemed simply to
assume that the differential treatment of religious organizations would have an
ethnic or racial component, and therefore fall under the scope of article 5(d) (vii)
of ICERD, despite no specific indications of this in the review, suggesting a very
expansive reading of the article which seems to run counter to the purpose of
ICERD as an instrument dedicated explicitly to racial and ethnic discrimination.
In its more recent practice, the committee has become more insistent in its
claims that the denial of registration for religious organizations risks violating
the rights of persons belonging to ethnic groups to the freedom of religion or be-
lief.
4.6.3 Religious Law
While the newfound interest in religious organizations dovetails the more gener-
al turn of the committee towards religion, CERD addressed the relationship be-
tween ICERD and religious law already in its review of Qatar in 1993. During
the review, one member of the committee lamented that the dialogue with the
state party had reached an “impasse”:
…[a]lthough the fact that Qatar maintained its dialogue with the Committee was to be wel-
comed, it had to be noted that the eighth report reiterated the concept that the hadith (tra-
dition) of the Prophet ruled out acts of discrimination. It was also stated in the report that
the Shari’a was the principal source of legislation. Apparently, the Qatari Government con-
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tinued to think that the principles and provisions of the [ICERD] and of the [ICSPCA],¹¹⁷
which had been incorporated into domestic law, sufficed to prevent and punish any act
of discrimination. (…) Qatar should appreciate, however, that, pursuant to article 9 of
the [ICERD], states parties had to report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or
other measures which they had adopted to give effect to that instrument.¹¹⁸
The committee also questioned the juristic reasoning of judges in Islamic courts
that could not find the answers in the Koran, the Sunna or previous judge-
ments;¹¹⁹ the limits of “Islamic customs and traditions”, which could be invoked
to limit certain rights in the state party,¹²⁰ and the exact role of the Sharia; its
sphere of competence, and its role as a source both for the legislative process
and for the interpretation of laws.¹²¹ These questions received no response
from the state party, and were carried over to the concluding observations,
where the committee expressed its concern about the criteria by which Sharia
courts could determine appropriate punishments, and queried the necessity of
separate proceedings in the civil court for the victim to obtain compensation
in accordance with article 6 of the Convention.¹²² Unlike the role of religion in
discrimination, minority rights and the registration of organizations, then, the
issue of religious law was primarily approached from a procedural perspective,
as the committee stressed the need for judicial transparency and access to effec-
tive remedies.
The committee revisited this critical approach during its review of Lebanon
in 1998, questioning the coherence of the periodic report and noting a conflict
between the description of Lebanon as a “unitary State” and the claim that
the Lebanese people was made up of various religious communities with “enor-
mous powers”, including the power to settle family matters in religious courts,¹²³
requesting more information on how all in Lebanon could be equal before the
law if important issues like family matters were settled according to the different
laws of religious communities.¹²⁴ The committee also questioned the require-
 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
(1973).
 CERD/C/SR.964: 10– 11, 1993.
 CERD/C/SR.964: 18 Song, 1993.
 CERD/C/SR.964: 21 Song, 1993.
 CERD/C/SR.964: 52 Diaconu, 60 Garvalov, 62 Valencia Rodriguez, 1993.
 A/48/18: 99, 1993.
 CERD/C/SR.1258: 8 Garvalov, 1998.
 CERD/C/SR.1258: 16 Garvalov, 1998.
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ment under the Lebanese confessional system to disclose descent, ethnic origin
and religious faith in order to participate in public life.¹²⁵
Responding to these charges, the delegation stressed that the intention of
the confessional system was to protect the interests of all; that it made it possible
for all the communities to take part in public life, and that people could switch
communities freely, as membership did not rely on faith.¹²⁶ While individual
members of the committee disagreed on the desirability of this system,¹²⁷ the
concluding observations expressed its concern with the system of confessional-
ism, the unclear boundaries of ethnic and religious communities, and the com-
petence of religious courts to pass judgements on family issues, all of which may
lead to racial discrimination because of the differential treatment of “ethnic
communities” (see also above).¹²⁸ To amend the situation, the committee sug-
gested the gradual elimination of confessionalism, and advised the state to
take all appropriate measures to ensure that people from different communities
were equal before the law.¹²⁹ Hence, while the committee stuck to its emphasis
on procedural fairness, it also expanded its criticism of religiously based legis-
lation by stressing its potentially discriminatory consequences.
Revisiting Qatar in 2002, one member of the committee expressed his appre-
ciation with the role of the Sharia in the state party, as different laws for Muslims
and non-Muslims were “desirable, natural and necessary”, because Muslim laws
on inheritance, marriage and divorce were “irreconcilable” with other laws,¹³⁰
whereas other members primarily sought clarification on the relationship be-
tween the Sharia and civil laws.¹³¹ Echoing its previous review, the concluding
observations of the committee requested more information on the possibility
to invoke the convention before the Sharia courts, and the exact difference in
rules of inheritance between Muslims and non-Muslims.¹³² While the issue of re-
ligious law and its compatibility with the convention was raised again during the
2012 review of Qatar,¹³³ the concluding observations of the committee evaded the
issue entirely.¹³⁴
 CERD/C/SR.1258: 29 Valencia Rodriguez, 33 de Gouttes, 1998.
 CERD/C/SR.1258: 13, 15, 10, 1998.
 CERD/C/SR.1259: 25 Yutzis, 26 Abou Nasr, 1998.
 A/53/18: 170, 172, 174, 1998.
 A/53/18: 180, 183, 1998.
 CERD/C/SR.1503: 37 Aboul Nasr, 2002.
 CERD/C/SR.1503: de Gouttes 16, 32 Yutzis, 38 Tang Chengyuan, 43 Bossuyt, 44 Thornberry,
49 Shahi, 2002.
 A/57/18: 192, 197, 2002.
 CERD/C/SR.2151: 8 Cali Tzay, 21 Lindgren Alves, 24 Avtonomov, 2012.
 CERD/C/QAT/CO/13– 16, 2012.
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Despite indications of internal disagreement, the practice of the committee
on the role of religious laws in the implementation of the convention in the
1990s and early 2000s displayed a fairly consistent approach in which the gen-
eral tenor was one of watchful caution and skepticism when faced with the prac-
tice of allowing different communities to be ruled by different sets of laws.
Throughout the 2000s, the committee has largely followed its earlier approach
to religious law, expressing its concern with the possibility that recognizing dif-
ferent laws for different communities could lead to ethnic discrimination, and/or
violations of the various civil rights enshrined in article 5 of the convention.
Reviewing Nigeria in 2005 (see above), the committee expressed its concern
“that members of ethnic communities of the Muslim faith”, in particular Muslim
women, could be subjected to harsher sentences than other Nigerians due to the
influence of religious law, but refrained from advising particular actions, remind-
ing the state party of its obligations under the convention.¹³⁵ Similarly, Ethiopia
received criticism in the reviews of two consecutive reports, for the potential eth-
nic discrimination resulting from the application of religious laws.¹³⁶ In its more
recent practice, the committee has largely maintained its view of religious legal
rules as potentially discriminatory in concluding observations to Yemen (2011),¹³⁷
Israel (2012)¹³⁸ and Mauritius (2013).¹³⁹
For CERD, then, the presence of religious law is primarily a question of non-
discrimination: Whenever the committee decides to include a concluding obser-
vation on the issue, it is sparked by a concern for the potentially discriminatory
side-effects of applying different legal rules to communities differentiated by re-
ligious allegiance. As such, the committee appears to have no particular opinion
on the material provisions of legal rules outside of state control as such. This
view sets CERD apart from the other committees, which tend to highlight both
material conflicts between the provisions of religious legal systems and the pro-
 CERD/C/NGA/CO/18: 20, 2005.
 CERD/C/ETH/CO/15: 14, 2007 & CERD/C/ETH/CO/7– 16: 12, 2009.
 The committee recommended the state party to ensure that the application of the Sharia is
consistent with the obligations of the state party under international law, and that the state
party should take active measures to ensure that Sharia law is not applied to foreigners and
non-Muslims without their consent. (CERD/C/YEM/CO/17–18: 10, 2011).
 The committee expressed its concern with discrimination targeting women from Jewish mi-
norities in relation to the implementation of religious laws (CERD/C/ISR/CO/14–16: 21, 2012).
 The committee expressed its concern with the exception from non-discrimination measures
regarding the application of personal laws, which may affect women of certain ethnic groups
because of their religious affiliation, requesting the state party to abrogate such exceptions.
(CERD/C/MUS/CO/15– 19: 23, 2013).
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visions of their instruments, but also challenges arising from the very nature of
non-state law in terms of procedure and transparency (see below).
To CERD, recognition of religious law is primarily problematic if and when it
becomes an obstacle to equality, under which all citizens should have access to
the same legal remedies regardless of religious allegiance. As in the cases of mi-
nority rights, discrimination and religious organizations, however, the link estab-
lished between the committee’s observations on religious laws and the provi-
sions of ICERD is tenuous at the best of times, as it has struggled to point to
the specific articles of the convention violated by legal systems that differentiate
on the basis of religion. As such, the tendency of CERD to criticize religious law
for its harmful effects on equality in more general terms can be construed as an
expansive reading of article 1(1) that also incorporates religion when the link to
ethnicity is less than clear.
4.6.4 The Impact of Religion
Also preceding its more recent “turn” to religion, the committee has long been
concerned with the social role of religious communities, both as potentially in-
spiring conflict and human rights violations, and as a vital partner in the global
struggle for equal rights. The committee first addressed this topic in its review of
the Holy See in 1993. Recognizing the unique nature of the state party, the com-
mittee highlighted the “religious component” of many ethnic conflicts and en-
couraged the Holy See to take further measures to promote inter-religious dia-
logue in such conflict settings, and to use its “moral force” to assist the fight
against racism worldwide.¹⁴⁰ In its following review of the Holy See in 2000,
the committee praised the work of the Church in the field of dialogue and con-
flict resolution, but stressed that the state party should cooperate fully with na-
tional and international judicial authorities in the prosecution of ecclesiastics
who took part in the genocide in Rwanda, acts that were “against the precepts
of the Catholic Church”.¹⁴¹
Similarly, reviewing Sudan in 1994, the committee emphasized the impor-
tance of harmonious relations between religious communities in order to prevent
the destructive potential of conflicts sparked by religious differences, suggesting
that the origins of the conflict in Sudan could be found in ethnic differences, “ag-
 A/48/18: 299, 304, 305, 1993.
 A/55/18: 394, 398, 2000.
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gravated by political, cultural and religious factors”,¹⁴² stressing that the impor-
tance of efforts to find common ground between different religious groups could
help ameliorate the situation.¹⁴³ In its concluding observations, the committee
praised the state party’s assurance that Sudan was a multiracial, multireligious
and multicultural society. The committee also commended the efforts of Suda-
nese authorities towards building the legislative structures and institutions nec-
essary for implementing a policy of non-discrimination and the breaking down
of barriers that had historically limited contacts between Muslim and non-Mus-
lim communities.¹⁴⁴ Reviewing the consecutive periodic report of Sudan in 2001,
the committee signaled its continued concern with the religious dimensions to
inter-group hostilities, as it expressed its concern with the long-lasting and on-
going civil war, “fueled by a complexity of issues relating to ethnicity, race, re-
ligion and culture”.¹⁴⁵
The committee also emphasized the role of religion in fomenting conflict
during its review of Nigeria in 1995, stressing that the association of religious dif-
ferences with ethnic differences could lead to a greater risk of disorder,¹⁴⁶ while
appreciating the policy of the government to defuse ethnic and religious tensions
through “ethnic integration” and “religious harmony”.¹⁴⁷ In its concluding obser-
vations, the committee expressed its concern that “in circumstances such as
those of Nigeria, in which political and religious differences may easily be asso-
ciated with ethnic differences, any breakdown in law and order can exacerbate
ethnic tension”,¹⁴⁸ suggesting that the challenge lay neither in ethnic, nor in re-
ligious differences, but in situations where the two were mixed up. In its follow-
ing review of Nigeria in 2005 (see above), the committee praised the state party
for its initiatives in the field of interreligious dialogue, encouraging Nigerian au-
thorities to continue its work for national unity and non-discrimination in close
concert with religious and community leaders.¹⁴⁹ Taken together, these early
views of religious differences in society were cautiously optimistic, applauding
efforts to settle interreligious differences. Simultaneously, however, they were
 CERD/C/SR.1052: 27 Valencia Rodriguez, 1996.
 CERD/C/SR.1052: 32 Chigovera, 1996.
 A/49/18: 466, 1994.
 A/56/18: 208, 2001.
 CERD/C/SR.1114: 39 Banton, 1995.
 CERD/C/SR.1116: 17 Sherifis, 1995.
 A/50/18: 624, 1995.
 CERD/C/NGA/CO/18: 14–15, 2005. Similar praise has been bestowed on the interreligious
dialogue efforts of Tunisia (CERD/C/TUN/CO/19: 7, 2009).
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void of particular references to ICERD, rendering their relevance to treaty inter-
pretation unclear.
Over the course of the 2000s, CERD continued its support for the resolution
of human rights conflicts through the increased participation of religious lead-
ers. Reviewing Ghana in 2003, several committee members expressed their ap-
preciation for the role played by religious and traditional leaders in promoting
human rights in the state party,¹⁵⁰ an enthusiasm that was also carried over to
the concluding observations, where the committee noted the important role of
religious leaders in the resolution of conflicts relating to land and chieftaincy,
or involving customary law.¹⁵¹ The concluding observations to Ghana also raised
the issue of female genital mutilation (FGM) for the first time, referring the state
party to general comment no. 25 on gender dimensions to racial discrimina-
tion.¹⁵² Unlike the other committees, which have tended to view FGM as a cultur-
al and/or religious practice (see below), CERD has consistently referred to FGM
as a procedure that happens within the context of “ethnic” and/or minority com-
munities.¹⁵³ In its most recent practice, the committee has shown signs of recog-
nizing the potential influence of religious leaders more specifically in the imple-
mentation of the convention, as both Chad¹⁵⁴ and Burkina Faso¹⁵⁵ have been
asked to involve religious and community leaders in their efforts to eradicate ra-
cial discrimination and harmful traditional practices like FGM.
Approaching the impact of religion on the implementation of the provisions
of ICERD, the committee has developed a practice that is distinct from the other
committees due to the idiosyncratic way in which the committee approaches re-
ligion, as a topic that can only be relevant to its work when it interacts with eth-
nicity, race, national origin or any of the other material provisions of ICERD.
Hence, the committee has interpreted the role of religious doctrines and practi-
ces differently relative to its perceived relation to issues covered by the conven-
tion: In its observations on the role of religion in aggravating conflicts, the com-
mittee has approached religion as a factor that can lead to ethnic or racial
 CERD/C/SR.1574: 33 de Gouttes, 44 Thornberry, 2003.
 A/58/18: 112, 2003. The role of religious leaders was also recognized in observations issued
by the committee following the 2004 review of Mauritania, which was asked to involve religious
leaders in the abolition of slavery (CERD/C/65/CO/5: 15, 2004).
 A/55/18, annex V, 2000.
 Mauritania (CERD/C/65/CO/5: 19, 2004), Tanzania (CERD/C/TZA/CO/16: 13, 2005 (reissued in
2007 for technical reasons), Ethiopia (CERD/C/ETH/CO/15: 21, 2007 & CERD/C/ETH/CO/7– 16: 16,
2009) and Norway (CERD/C/NOR/CO/19–20: 15, 2011).
 CERD/C/TCD/CO/16– 18: 12– 13, 2013.
 CERD/C/BFA/CO/12– 19: 8–9, 2013.
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discrimination, recommending that states reform or harmonize their legal frame-
works to ensure compatibility with the convention. In observations on harmful
traditional practices, on the other hand, religious leaders are called upon to as-
sist in their eradication, while the potential of religious doctrines or beliefs in
generating these practices in the first place are left unaddressed.
4.7 Summary
The monitoring practice of CERD from 1993 to 2013 displays the increasing efforts
to engage religion taken by members of a committee struggling with the narrow-
ness of its original mandate. Throughout the period, the challenges presented by
an international instrument negotiated by actors at the first UN and singling out
some parts of the general ban on discrimination in the UDHR while leaving re-
ligion out of the picture has significantly impaired the development of a consis-
tent monitoring practice.While no international instrument can pretend to accu-
rately cover the numerous overlapping categories that play out in the intentions
and consequences of differential treatment “on the ground”, the centrality of re-
ligion to racial identity and discrimination in surrounding domestic, regional
and international law has all but forced the hand of CERD to engage with reli-
gion despite its express mission not to do so.
The engagement of CERD with religion has played out in different waves rel-
ative to the matter at hand, forcing the committee to emulate the ad hoc nature
with which actors at the third UN tend to approach religion: Encountering states
that offer tailor-made protections to specific religious minorities, the committee
has been adamant that such provisions should incorporate racial and ethnic el-
ements as well. In these observations, the committee has kept within the boun-
daries set for its work by article 1(1) of ICERD, as it has observed lacunae in the
legislation of states parties on racial and ethnic discrimination, which is the pri-
mary focus of the instrument. However, while the legal basis of these observa-
tions seems clear enough, their applicability on the ground is more complicated.
In particular, the committee has repeatedly expressed its wish that states recog-
nize “ethnic” elements in their laws and policies on religious communities, even
in cases where the recognition of religious communities is hardwired into their
constitutional frameworks, as in Cyprus and Lebanon, and in international trea-
ties, as the Lausanne treaty, binding both Turkey and Greece. In these cases, the
committee has stressed the right to self-identification for individuals outlined in
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its general recommendation no. 8,¹⁵⁶ arguing for a broader legal conception of
identities available to provide protection against discrimination.
In its observations on how states should better protect specific groups expe-
riencing discrimination, on the other hand, the committee has repeatedly ascri-
bed ethnic identities to religious groups. This is particularly the case with Mus-
lims, whose experiences of discrimination are commonly listed alongside
hostility towards Arabs and/or Jews as evidence of violations of ICERD. This ap-
proach appears to contradict the recommendation of the committee to recognize
the rights of individuals to self-identification, as it “ethnicizes” Muslim identity,
collapsing the distinctions between racial and religious self-understandings
among Muslims. These observations are commonly linked to articles 2, 4 and 5
of ICERD, although only rarely to a specific part of these articles, obscuring
the precise nature and scope of the recommendations. In its observations on dis-
crimination against indigenous peoples, the committee has worked in the oppo-
site direction, “religionizing” the identities of indigenous communities by high-
lighting the importance of their sacred and mystical links to their traditional
lands. These links are used to create obligations upon states to accommodate in-
digenous land rights, and necessarily conflate the different issues at play among
indigenous peoples across the world.
While there is little reason to doubt the statement by committee member Pat-
rick Thornberry during the review of Iran in 2010 that “the issue of religion was
in fact often intrinsically linked to ethnicity and thus fell within the Committee’s
mandate” (see above), the lack of a clear-cut methodology with which to estab-
lish the existence of such links and their relevance to different parts of the legal
framework of states parties has rendered the practice of the committee on this
issue opaque. In the observations to Cyprus in 1995, the committee maintained
that it would have “preferred” to refer to the recognized religious communities in
the state party as “ethnic communities”; in observations issued to Pakistan in
1997, it held that religious differences “may” coincide with ethnic differences,
while Lebanon was told in 1998 that the lacking recognition of the “different eth-
nic origins” of some of the religious communities in the country might result in
their differential treatment.
The increasing use of intersectionality as a tool to capture the intricate rela-
tionship between race and religion in the 2000s appears to indicate a dawning
realization within the committee of the indeterminate nature of its practice on
religion.Where the committee would earlier point to a more or less explicit rela-
tionship between religion and ethnicity, the use of intersectionality has gradual-
 A/45/18, part VII (1), 1991.
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ly taken over. Hence, while China was told in 1996 to secure the freedom of re-
ligion or belief of its ethnic minorities because “a distinctive religion is essential
to the identity of several minority nationalities”, an observation that was repeat-
ed verbatim in 2001 (see above),¹⁵⁷ the observations following the 2009 review
urged the Chinese government to take into account “the intersectionality be-
tween ethnicity and religion”.¹⁵⁸
Whether or not the latter observations should be seen as different or similar
to the ones issued in 1996 and 2001 is not entirely clear: Intersectionality, orig-
inally used by Kimberlé Crenshaw (see above) as a term to approach the conver-
gence of different identities among black American women subjected to vio-
lence, can be conceptualized on (at least) three different levels: structural
intersectionality, “the ways in which the location of women of color at the inter-
section of race and gender make our actual experience (…) qualitatively different
from that of white women”, political intersectionality, “how both feminist and
antiracist politics have (…) helped to marginalize the issue”, and representation-
al intersectionality, “the cultural construction of women of color” (Crenshaw
1991: 1245). Following Crenshaw’s work, the application of the term has mush-
roomed, to the point where it has earned the questionable reputation of attaining
the status of a “buzzword”, due to its open-endedness, lack of precision and
“myriad missing pieces” (Davis 2008: 78).
Hence,while the increasing use of intersectionality may superficially serve to
unify and streamline the practice of the committee on religion, its inherent
vagueness and multiple levels of interpretation could also have the opposite ef-
fect. For instance, when the committee asked Iran following its 2010 review to
“take into account the possible intersection of racial and religious discrimina-
tion” in its work to “combat manifestations in the media, as well as in everyday
life, of racial prejudice that could lead to racial discrimination” (see above), this
observation could be interpreted in (at least) all the different meanings of inter-
sectionality identified by Crenshaw, all of which could give rise to different legal
and policy measures: First, it could be understood as a suggestion at the struc-
tural level, in which case it would ask Iranian authorities to be sensitive to the
qualitatively different experience of ethno-religious minorities experiencing dis-
crimination, compared to that of “merely” religious or ethnic minorities.
Second, if it was directed towards the political level, it would have asked
Iran to ensure its policies on anti-discrimination did not inadvertently marginal-
ize the political agendas sparked by the differential treatment experienced by ra-
 A/51/18: 404, 1996 and A/56/18: 244, 2001.
 CERD/C/CHN/CO/10–13: 20, 2009.
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cial and religious minorities respectively. This would imply a particular emphasis
on the extent to which these agendas could serve to delegitimize one another by
being blind to the different causes of discrimination experienced by each com-
munity. Third, the observation could be construed as representational intersec-
tionality, which would oblige Iran to challenge prevalent narratives of religion
and race, including the recognition of how contemporary critiques of religious
and racial discrimination could serve to further marginalize those individuals
or groups in society whose allegiance was split between the different commun-
ities.While the committee may very well have meant that Iran should have taken
into account all of these possible interpretations, the lack of further contextual-
ization and specificity in the observation renders it fuzzy and indeterminate.
The pattern under which the committee has “ethnicized” Muslims and
vaguely connected ethnic and religious issues to violations of ICERD is also evi-
dent in the observations issued by the committee on religious organizations. In
the majority of cases where the committee has addressed the registration of re-
ligious communities, it has done so by reference to specific Muslim communities
succeeding or failing to gain legal recognition by state authorities. Observations
issued by the committee on religious organizations have interpreted the lacking
access to registration experienced by some ethnic minorities as a violation of
their right to the freedom of religion or belief under article 5(d) (vii). Unlike its
practice on minorities and discrimination, then, the committee has been more
successful in the case of religious organizations in terms of clarity and precision.
In its approach to religious law and the more general impact of religious
doctrines and practices on the implementation of ICERD, the committee has
taken a cautious, but critical approach. In particular, the committee has been
wary of the potentially discriminatory effects of applying different laws for differ-
ent communities, and the ways in which religious differences may feed into and
exacerbate conflicts among ethnic groups. In the latter cases, however, religion
is also seen as a potential force for good, as the committee has advised states to
seek reconciliation among ethnic groups with the help of religious leaders.
With the benefit of hindsight, the monitoring practice of CERD on religion
could hardly have played out differently. As soon as the ink had dried on the sig-
natures on the document that turned the convention into a legal reality in 1965,
the committee and the states parties were faced with an impaired instrument
whose categories of protection resonated poorly with situations of discrimina-
tion and marginalization, both “on the ground”, in other international and re-
gional treaties, and in domestic legal frameworks. In this mismatch, the concept
of religion developed by CERD is primarily recognized by its continuous coupling
with ethnicity. While this coupling is sure to have merit in a significant number
of cases, the tendency of the committee to establish this relationship in general,
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non-specific terms has rendered its pronunciations on the scope of ICERD rela-
tive to religion vague and imprecise.
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5 The Human Rights Committee
5.1 Introduction
Following the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) produced several drafts for a single binding instrument, creating formal,
legal obligations from the non-binding provisions of the declaration.¹ Caught in
a deadlock between the political blocks of the General Assembly (GA), the CHR
was instructed in resolution 543 (1952) to draft two separate instruments, while
simultaneously ensuring that they have as many similar provisions as possible,
particularly concerning reports to be submitted by states on implementation
measures.² Although drafts for two covenants, one on civil and political rights,
the other on economic, social and cultural rights,were presented to the assembly
in 1954, they were not finally adopted until 1966, after protracted negotiations,
particularly over the question of implementation and monitoring (Normand
and Zaidi 2008: 241).
Administrative structures and substantial competences of the HRC are listed
in articles 28–45 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), creating an independent body with the authority to make general com-
ments upon their review of states parties.³ This is a far cry from its twin, the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which
authorizes The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in articles 16–22 to re-
ceive reports from states parties, but effectively bars it from issuing any kind
of comments to be communicated back to states.⁴
 Although declarations are conventionally not considered binding, several authors claim that
the UDHR for all means and purposes is considered jus cogens and therefore binding upon all
members of the international community of states. See Morsink 1999, Taylor 2005.
 A/RES/543 (VI), 1952.
 Article 40(4) reads in full: “4. The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States
Parties to the present Covenant. It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as it
may consider appropriate, to the States Parties. The Committee may also transmit to the Econom-
ic and Social Council these comments along with the copies of the reports it has received from
States Parties to the present Covenant.”
 The CESCR is an anomaly in the monitoring mechanism: it is the only committee that has
been created after the adoption of the instrument it is set to monitor.When the ICESCR entered
into force in 1976, the ECOSOC appointed a working group to take care of the reporting procedure
created by the Covenant.With an unclear mandate and no formal rules of procedure, the work-
ing group failed to deliver any consistent review effort (Alston 1987). To amend the situation, the
ECOSOC adopted resolution 1985/17, in which the CESCR was established along similar lines as
OpenAccess. © 2018 H. Årsheim, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110478068-007
The HRC does not have the competence to review individual communica-
tions under the Covenant.⁵ Nor is it authorized to make recommendations or sug-
gestions, only comments of a general nature. While the committee in the early
years interpreted this provision strictly, issuing only general viewpoints in annu-
al reports to the GA and comments on the interpretation of particular treaty pro-
visions, later years have seen a shift towards the procedure of adopting conclud-
ing observations, in which states parties receive concrete, substantial feedback
on their implementation measures.
The ICCPR mentions religion in articles 2 (non-discrimination),⁶ 4 (non-der-
ogation),⁷ 18 (freedom of religion or belief),⁸ 20 (prohibition of hate speech),⁹ 24
those already established for CERD, allowing both suggestions and recommendations of a gen-
eral nature.
 The access to file individual complaints was differentiated into a separate instrument, the Op-
tional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was ratified
and entered into force at the same time as the Covenant. The protocol currently has 115 parties,
and the committee has presently (2016) reviewed more than 2000 such cases.
 Article 2 reads in full: “1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 2.
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitution-
al processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other meas-
ures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant. 3. Each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure
that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided
for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To
ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.”
 Article 4 reads in full: “1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant
may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not incon-
sistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 2. No derogation
from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall imme-
diately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of
the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the
same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.”
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(the rights of the child),¹⁰ 26 (equal protection before the law)¹¹ and 27 (the rights
of minorities).¹² As such, the Covenant has by far the largest interface with reli-
gion of any international human rights treaty. Articles 2 and 26 expand the scope
of non-discrimination established in the UDHR, listing “race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status”. While article 2 lists these issues related to the enjoyment
of the rights outlined in the Covenant, article 26 reproduces the same list related
to the more general requirement of equality before the law. Article 4 prohibits
derogation (exemption) for rights in the Covenant during times of crisis, if this
is based “solely on race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin”, and
lists article 18 on the freedom of religion or belief as an example of a right
that is non-derogable.
Article 24 on the rights of children modifies the list of non-discrimination
further, prohibiting discrimination in the enjoyment of this right based on
“race, color, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or
birth”. Articles 20 and 27 reduce the list to “national, racial or religious”, and
“ethnic, religious or linguistic” grounds, disallowing advocacy of hatred and
protecting aspects of minorities, respectively. The scope of non-discrimination
naturally devolves from general to more specific protections, but religion re-
mains across the board as the single common denominator of the above men-
tioned articles, indicating the intent of the framers of the instrument to safe-
guard rights that were circumvented when a joint convention on racial and
religious intolerance was abandoned in the early 1960s (see above).
 See chapter 3.
 Article 20 reads in full: “1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 2. Any advo-
cacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence shall be prohibited by law.”
 Article 24 reads in full: “1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, col-
our, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such meas-
ures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and
the State. 2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name. 3.
Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.”
 Article 26 reads in full: “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any dis-
crimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
 Article 27 reads in full “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their
own religion, or to use their own language.”
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Of all the provisions in the ICCPR, article 18 is the singularly most important
norm on religion, arguably not only in the Covenant, but in international law
more generally as well. It enshrines the freedom of thought, conscience and re-
ligion, and reproduces article 18 of the UDHR, but with two important differen-
ces. First, the article replaces the word “change” with “have or adopt a religion
or belief of his choice”, a modification that was made during the drafting process
at the request of several Muslim countries in which conversion was prohibited
(Taylor 2005: 29). Second, the article outlines possible restrictions on the “man-
ifestation” of religion or belief, and safeguards the liberty of parents and legal
guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children, both
of which are near identical to related provisions in the European Convention
on Human Rights (1950), article 9.¹³ The phrasing of the limitation clause, that
manifestations of the freedom of religion or belief may only be limited if “pre-
scribed by law and (…) necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or mo-
rals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”,¹⁴ is indicative of the
broad interface between religion and society, providing a taxonomy of potential
conflicts that can arise when “private” beliefs are translated into “public” acts.
The requirement that limitations must be prescribed by law and necessary
for any of the listed reasons protects against the potential for abuse of the
legal process against particular manifestations of religion, and the necessity of
clarity and precision in formulating limitations (Danchin 2008a: 264). However,
it also provides an opportunity for states to pass substantive legal judgements on
religious manifestations relative to their perceived potential to destabilize any of
the limitation grounds (Mahmood and Danchin 2014: 140).¹⁵ In particular, allow-
ing limitations based on public safety and order opens up a broad avenue for
state authorities “to consolidate and expand the state’s sovereign authority to
decide what counts as religious, and what scope it should have in social life”
(Agrama 2010: 505), asking the contentious question of where to draw the limits
between law, religion and politics.
 Article 9(2) of the ECHR reads in full: “2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
 While these limitations are not identical in the UDHR, the ICCPR and the 1981 Declaration,
these are only superficial differences that have no significant bearing on the acceptable scope of
limitations, which are also largely identical in the ECHR article 9(2) (Taylor 2005: 293).
 While Mahmood and Danchin primarily address the practice of the ECtHR, I consider their
observation to be relevant to the universal level as well, since the normative architecture of the
ECHR is largely identical to the UDHR and the ICCPR.
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While limitations on health grounds are fairly unambiguous (Taylor 2005:
322), what constitutes acceptable limitations based on morals is more unclear,
as such limitations, according to the HRC, “must be based on principles not de-
riving exclusively from a single tradition”, a clarification that is intended to pre-
vent public morality from being dictated by a single majority religion (Taylor
2005: 327). However, it simultaneously issues a stamp of approval to lawmakers
and the judiciary to decide what such public morality may look like, and in what
ways manifestations of religion or belief may threaten it. Considering the com-
plex interrelationship between law, religion and morals as co-dependent and
co-constitutive (Kirsch and Turner 2009: 3) and the corresponding tendency of
modern state-made law to displace religion as the arbiter and enforcer of morali-
ty (Sullivan 2005: 39), the approval of limitations based on morality gives state
authorities ample space to limit manifestations of religion or belief according
to a domestic hierarchy of morality.
Finally, the inclusion of limitations based on the protection of “fundamental
rights and freedoms of others” highlights the potential for manifestations of re-
ligion or belief to collide with other rights, a potential that increases proportion-
ally with the growing number of international treaties recognized by the interna-
tional community (Milanovic 2009: 69). There are no established criteria for
distinguishing between “fundamental” and more “ordinary” rights, leaving the
latter with an implicit second-rate status (Meron 1986: 22). Furthermore, the as-
sertion in the ICCPR article 4(2) that the freedom of religion or belief is among
the category of rights that cannot be derogated from, i.e. set aside, even in
times of war, national disasters or other emergency situations,¹⁶ further fortifies
the right from state-imposed limitations based on the protection of other rights.
Taken together, the nature and scope of the acceptable grounds for limita-
tion of the manifestation of religion or belief in article 18(3) illustrates the con-
siderable inner tension that is the hallmark of numerous human rights norms:
that they can be called upon to legitimize both the interference and the non-in-
terference of states in situations of conflict (Danchin 2008a: 277). As all the ac-
ceptable grounds for limitations are vague and underdetermined, the potential
for manifestations of religion or belief to influence other human rights is strongly
dependent on the context for their implementation and monitoring:What consti-
 Additionally, the preamble of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intol-
erance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief insists that “the practices of a religion
or belief in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or
to his full development”, and acknowledges the harm that can be caused by religion when used
as a means of “foreign intervention in the affairs of other States”, or in a manner inconsistent
with the Charter (Evans and Whiting 2006: 13).
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tutes morals, public order or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others ul-
timately comes down to the legal, political and religious arrangements of each
state party.
Whereas article 18 enumerates the rights of individuals and communities to
have and manifest a broad scope of deeply held beliefs, the remaining provisions
on religion in the ICCPR, articles 2, 4, 20, 24 and 27, approach religion as a ques-
tion of equal treatment, discrimination and religious identity. The prevalence of
religion across the many equality provisions of the Covenant attest to the pro-
found importance assigned to religious identity and belonging in issues ranging
from the rights of children, the access to due process and equality before the law,
and to the specific discriminatory experiences of religious minorities and hate
speech targeting people because of their religious orientation.
5.2 General Comments
The HRC has issued 35 general comments, largely dedicated to single articles and
cross-cutting themes, with only a small number dealing with procedural issues.
The comments dedicated to single articles favored by the HRC commonly contex-
tualize their meaning within the larger human rights framework, effectively em-
ulating the theme-based approach. Apart from article 26 (equality before the
law), every article in the Covenant that deals with religion has been subject to
at least one general comment. Typically, general comments indicate the scope
of specific articles, and clarify the legal obligations of states parties viz. partic-
ularly troublesome issues without elaborating upon the content of specific
terms and concepts.
In 1993, the HRC issued its 22nd general comment,¹⁷ which is the most sub-
stantial and authoritative comment on religion to date. The comment outlined
the basics of article 18 of the ICCPR, on the extent of freedom of religion and
the nature of permissible restrictions on the exercise thereof. Observing the
“far-reaching and profound” importance of the freedom of religion, the comment
elaborated on the broad ways in which the terms religion and belief were to be
construed in state reporting, exemplified by their extension beyond “traditional
religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices
analogous to those of traditional religions”. In perhaps the most controversial
clarification in the comment, the committee pointed out that the freedom to
have or adopt a religion “necessarily” entails the freedom to choose, replace
 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 1993.
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or retain one’s belief, effectively eradicating any ambiguity stemming from the
drafting process leading up to the adoption of article 18.
The comment also drew a distinction between the “inner” and “outer” as-
pects of religious freedom, observing that the inner dimension protected under
article 18(1), akin to the right to hold opinions under article 19(1), cannot be lim-
ited whatsoever, and that “no one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or ad-
herence to a religion or belief”. Moving on to the outer aspect of the right, the
committee elaborated on examples of acceptable “manifestations” under article
18(1), covering customs, rituals, language and teaching. Commenting on the
meaning of education in 18(4), the committee pointed out that public school in-
struction in the general history of religions and ethics was permissible, if given
in an objective and neutral way.
On the topic of possible and legitimate restrictions to article 18, the HRC ob-
served that the right may not be exercised in a way that could conflict with ar-
ticle 20, i.e. if such exercise could amount to propaganda for war or advocacy
of national, racial or religious hatred that incited discrimination, hostility or vi-
olence. Concerning the grounds for limitation in article 18(3), the committee
pointed out that the requirement that any limitations should be prescribed by
law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the rights
of others should be strictly interpreted. In general, the comment was careful to
point out that all limitations must be implemented in a non-discriminatory way,
with due respect for pluralism in society.
The comment observed that the status of recognized religions and beliefs
treated as official ideology did not conflict with article 18 in themselves, only
if such recognition positively resulted in the discrimination of others, begging
the question, recently put by a former Special Rapporteur, of what forms, if
any, of state religion could possibly be non-discriminatory.¹⁸ Finally, the com-
ment stressed that a right to conscientious objection against military service
can be derived from article 18, but the committee pointed out that the access
to this right should not be determined on the basis of particular beliefs.
In 1994, the committee issued its general comment no. 23 on the meaning of
article 27 on minority rights.¹⁹ Introducing the comment, the committee pointed
out that minority rights under article 27 were to be additional to all the other
rights contained in the Covenant. Furthermore, lack of reported discrimination
against a minority was not sufficient rationale for states to claim that they did
 A/HRC/19/60: 72, 2011. Also ambiguously, the committee asks states to “include in their re-
ports” information on practices considered to be punishable as blasphemous, without explicitly
commenting on the desirability of blasphemy legislation.
 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, 1994.
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not have minorities: Rather, the existence of minorities, and the corollary legal
obligation to protect these, was not to be decided by the state party, but by “ob-
jective criteria”, a concept the committee did not elaborate further. In states
where minorities existed according to such criteria, the committee clarified
that due to the enrichment of the fabric of society as a whole that minorities
brought, a positive obligation to protect “their identity and their enjoyment
and development of culture and language and to practice their religion” arose
from article 27. The comment pointed out that minority rights, while individual
in nature, presuppose the ability of groups to maintain their culture, language
and religion, and stressed that positive measures set in motion to protect article
27 may constitute “legitimate differentiation”, but should nevertheless be consid-
ered against the protection against discrimination offered in articles 2 and 26.²⁰
In 2000, the HRC released general comment no. 28 on article 3 on the equal-
ity of rights between men and women.²¹ The comment elaborated extensively on
the scope and gravity of the article, and pointed out that the rights and freedoms
listed in other parts of the Covenant, notably articles 18 and 27, did not mitigate
or allow for any kind of inequality between the sexes. Turning to preventive ac-
tions by states parties, the committee pointed out that inequality was deeply em-
bedded in “traditional, historical, cultural or religious attitudes”. States parties
were thus obliged, not only to ensure that such attitudes were not used to justify
inequalities, but to
…furnish appropriate information on those aspects of tradition, history, cultural practices
and religious attitudes which jeopardize, or may jeopardize, compliance with article 3, and
indicate what measures they have taken or intend to take to overcome such factors.²²
Specific requests that states report on attitudes which “may jeopardize” compli-
ance with article 3 complicate the reporting procedure by diluting the criteria for
what kind of information is sought from states parties, in particular if read in
conjunction with a later claim in the comment, that cultural or religious practi-
ces that jeopardize the freedom and well-being of female children should be
“eradicated” by states parties.²³
 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5: 6.2, 1994. The acceptability of positive measures like affirmative ac-
tion and other forms of preferential treatment was also confirmed in the general comment pub-
lished by the committee on non-discrimination in 1989 (General comment No. 18: Non-discrim-
ination).
 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, 2000.
 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10: 6, 2000.
 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10: 28, 2000.
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In 2011, the committee released its 34th general comment on article 19,²⁴ on
the freedom of opinion and expression. The comment expressly linked the con-
tent of article 19(1) on the right to hold opinions to the freedom of beliefs,
thoughts and conscience in article 18(1), pointing to their common non-deroga-
ble, unlimited nature. “Religious discourse” is counted among the protected ex-
pressions that may be given to this right. Concerning the limitation clause in ar-
ticle 18(3), the committee stressed that prohibitions of “displays of lack of
respect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws” were in-
compatible with the Covenant, unless they fell under the criteria of hate speech
under article 20.²⁵ Elaborating on this incompatibility, the committee pointed out
that such prohibitions would be unlawful if they discriminated between different
religious beliefs, or between religious and non-religious beliefs, and that it
would not be permissible to prevent or punish criticism of religious leaders or
commentary on religious doctrine and tenets of faith, significantly expanding
the earlier requirement in GC 22 on states simply to report on the existence of
blasphemy legislation.
5.3 Individual Communications
Under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,²⁶ the committee has reviewed numer-
ous individual communications claiming violations against the freedom of reli-
gion or belief. In general, the jurisprudence of the committee on religion is more
accommodating than that of the comparable practice of the European Court of
 CCPR/C/GC/34, 2011. Article 19 reads in full: “1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opin-
ions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these
shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or rep-
utations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or
of public health or morals.
 Parallels between the freedom of opinion and expression and the freedom of religion or be-
lief have frequently been observed in the literature, particularly in connection with the prohib-
ition of hate speech under article 20 see Lerner 2010, Eltayeb 2010, Ghanea 2010 and Evans
2009.
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, (A/RES/2200 (XXI) (1966)
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Human Rights (ECtHR), which monitors largely similarly worded provisions.
While the latter has tended towards a requirement that manifestations of religion
or belief should be necessary to the belief in question, the HRC has been content
with manifestations that are integral (Conte and Burchill 2009: 78–79). Likewise,
where the ECtHR seems willing to allow considerable state interference with re-
ligious freedom, the HRC has been unwilling to grant such latitude, generally
siding with plaintiffs over states (Taylor 2005: 344).
The committee has been critical of state-sponsored religious indoctrination
in school education,²⁷ prohibitions of religious headgear,²⁸ the refusal to grant
conscientious objector status,²⁹ the lack of alternative service for conscientious
objectors³⁰ or the granting of conscientious objector status to only one
group,³¹ prohibitions against religious teaching materials during incarceration,³²
prohibitions of the invitation of foreign clerics and the establishment of places of
worship,³³ and the denial to register a religious order to protect the majority re-
ligion.³⁴ However, the committee has not always sided with plaintiffs, pointing to
the incompatibility of article 18 with the use of prohibited drugs,³⁵ and finding
no ground in the exercise of religious freedom not to pay taxes.³⁶
 Hartikainen v. Finland, Communication no. 40/1978 (CCPR/C/12/D740/1978) (1981), Leirvåg
and others v. Norway, Communication no. 1155/2003 (CCPR/C/82/D/1155/2003) (2004).
 Singh v. France, Communication no. 1876/2000 (CCPR/C/102/D/1876/2009) (2011), Riley et al v.
Canada, Communication no. 1048/2002 (CCPR/C/74/D/1048/2002) (2002), Hudoyberganova v. Uz-
bekistan, Communication no. 931/2000 (CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000) (2005).
 Atasoy and Sarkut v. Turkey, Communication no. 1853–1854/2008 (CCPR/C/104/D/1853–
1854/2008) (2012).
 Yoon and Choi v. Republic of Korea, Communication no. 1321 & 1322/2004 (CCPR/C/88/D/
1321–1322/2004) (2007), Jung et al. v. Republic of Korea, Communication no. 1593–1603/2007
(CCPR/C/98/D/1593–1603/2007) (2010),Min-Kyu Jeong et al. v. Republic of Korea, Communication
no. 1642–1741/2007 (CCPR/C/101/D/1642– 1741/2007) (2011).
 Brinkhof v. The Netherlands, Communication no. 402/1990 (CCPR/C/48/D/402/1990) (1993).
 Boodoo v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication no. 721/1996 (CCPR/C/74/D/721/1996) (2002).
 Malakhovsky and Pikul v. Belarus, Communication no. 1207/2003 (CCPR/C/84/D/1207/2003)
(2005).
 Sisters of the Holy Cross of the Third Order of Saint Francis in Menzingen of Sri Lanka v. Sri
Lanka, Communication no. 1294/2004 (CCPR/C/85/D/1249/2004) (2005).
 M.A.B., W.A.T. and J.-A.Y.T. v Canada, Communication no. 570/1993 (CCPR/C/50/D/570/1993)
(1994), Prince v. South Africa, Communication no. 1474/2006 (CCPR/C/91/D/1474/2006) (2007).
 J v K and CMG v K.S v The Netherlands, Communication no. 483/1991 (CCPR/C/45/D/483/1991)
(1992).
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5.4 Reporting Guidelines
In its treaty-specific reporting guidelines, the HRC,³⁷ like CERD, emphasizes the
general need for information on the nature and scope of legislation for each ar-
ticle, supplied with information on domestic mechanisms established to monitor
the implementation of the right, disaggregated data relevant to the particular
right, and specific, detailed information on particular problems and factors pre-
venting full implementation. These general requirements are followed by article-
specific requirements.
On the topic of religion, the HRC requests comprehensive information under
article 18, on the existence of different religions within the state party’s jurisdic-
tion, the publication and circulation of religious materials, measures taken to
prevent and punish offences against the free exercise of religion, in cases of
State religions, information on how this affects a person’s freedom to practice
another religion, procedures that must be followed for the legal recognition
and authorization of various religious denominations, the main status difference
between the dominant religion and other religions, the legal regulation of reli-
gious education, fiscal provisions applicable to religions, the status and legal
position of conscientious objectors, the number of such objectors, and reasons
considered to justify such status.³⁸ Under article 14 on the right to equality before
the courts, the HRC requests information from states on the existence, competen-
cies and practices of customary and religious courts.³⁹ For articles 2, 20 and 27,
which all regulate religion (see above), the committee does not elaborate beyond
the material provisions of the treaty.
For participation in the HRC process, the Centre for Civil and Political
Rights⁴⁰ has published guidelines for NGOs (CCPR 2010). Unlike the committee’s
own guidelines, these guidelines emphasize the importance of the general com-
ments published by the committee for the reporting process, pointing out the im-
portance of the requirement in general comment 28, on the need to “consider tra-
ditional, historical, religious and cultural attitudes which may jeopardise the
equality of the sexes” in reporting on article 3 on gender equality (CCPR 2010:
40, see above). The guidelines also establish links between reporting on article




 The Centre has been in operation since 2008, and is dedicated to the promotion of the role of
NGOs in the reporting procedure of the HRC, and capacity-building among NGOs reporting to the
committee. http://www.ccprcentre.org/about-us/ (accessed 31.08.2016).
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ities), in which the non-existence of minorities is no excuse for not legislating on
the issue (CCPR 2010: 37). On article 18, the guidelines largely reproduce those
published by the HRC, but with an extensive excerpt from general comment
22, and the relations between this article and the general comments on privacy,
equality and the family (CCPR 2010: 71). This interconnection between the free-
dom of religion or belief and other rights is also emphasized in the concrete re-
porting guidelines for article 23 (right to a family) and article 26 (equality before
the law), where the nexus between religious and civil law in particular is empha-
sized (CCPR 2010: 78, 85).
5.5 The Religion of the HRC
The material provisions, general comments, individual communications and re-
porting guidelines of the Human Rights Committee constitute the authoritative
model of religion in international law. According to this model, whose outline
is also the basis for the work of the Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Reli-
gion or Belief,⁴¹ religion is a concept that is primarily located in a privately held
set of convictions that are absolutely protected and beyond the grasp of legal reg-
ulation, akin to the “opinions” protected under article 19(1). Secondarily, howev-
er, these private convictions can be transformed into public acts by giving rise to
a broad variety of external “manifestations”. Upon leaving the absolute protec-
tion of privately held beliefs within the “citadel of the mind” (Evans 2014: 4), re-
ligion enters the domain of public authorities and civil law, preparing the ground
for encounters across numerous legal domains that require the careful balancing
between different sets of rights.
In addition to the protection of privately held beliefs and their public man-
ifestations in article 18, however, the HRC is also required by the ICCPR to con-
sider the role of religion as a determinant of identity, with religion as the single
common denominator across the numerous non-discrimination provisions that it
monitors. Stressing the potential for discrimination at the hands of a majority re-
ligion, general comments no. 22 and 23 of the committee point to the need for
robust legal protection of religious minorities, who should be given ample
space to enjoy, profess and practice their religion. This view of potential discrim-
 While the special rapporteurs that have been active to date have shown certain differences in
their interpretation of the mandate, particularly on the topic of prevention vs. protection (Evans
2006: 85), none have expressed reservations towards the HRC’s interpretation of article 18.
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ination also influences the view of the committee of preferential treatment of re-
ligious traditions more generally, which it has warned strongly against.
Finally, however, there is some indication that the committee also views re-
ligion in a third sense, as a potential negative influence on the enjoyment of
other rights in the convention, most significantly gender equality. Unlike the
first two conceptions of religion above, however, this third approach to religion
has so far been limited to a request that states report on “religious attitudes”
which “jeopardize or may jeopardize” compliance with article 3.
5.6 Approaches to Religion in the Monitoring Practice of the
HRC, 1993–2013
5.6.1 The Freedom of Religion or Belief
The freedom of religion or belief outlined in article 18 of the ICCPR (see above) is
the most elaborate and widely cited provision on religion in international human
rights law. It is a vital backdrop for any domestic and international discussion on
the notion of religious freedom, and constitutes a roadmap for states parties to
the ICCPR on how to deal with religion and belief in society. As the framework
for communications developed by Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Reli-
gion or Belief Asma Jahangir in 2006 (see chapter 3) attests to, the freedom of
religion or belief enjoys a broad interface with numerous other rights.
Although the Human Rights Committee has decided a number of individual
complaints on the freedom of religion or belief and dedicated a general comment
to the scope of the right, it is not frequently addressed by the committee in its
monitoring practice. Partly, this is due to the broad interface of article 18 with
other rights, in particular the right to non-discrimination, which leaves the com-
mittee with the option to address issues involving religion under articles 2, 20,
26, or in the case of minorities, article 27 (see below). Another possible explan-
ation for the low number of observations on the issue is the structure of interac-
tive meetings with states parties, which tend to start from the top of the treaty
and move its way down the list, risking the exclusion of considerations under
article 18 because of its high number (Taylor 2005: 11– 12).
The monitoring practice of the HRC on the freedom of religion or belief from
1993 to 2013 can roughly be divided between recommendations on conscientious
objection to military service one the one hand, and limitations on the right to
change and/or manifest a religion or belief on the other. On conscientious objec-
tion, the HRC has long held an interest in the subject, evident already in its gen-
eral comment no. 22, where it observed that the right can be derived from article
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18 of the ICCPR, stopping short of asserting that it is part of the right to freedom
of religion or belief. This caution notwithstanding, the committee observed al-
ready in 1994 following its review of the report from Libya that “The lack of pro-
vision for conscientious objection to military service is [a] concern”.⁴² Similar ob-
servations have been issued throughout the 1990s and 2000s and up to the
present, as the committee developed a standardized recommendation, observing
that “The State party should ensure that persons liable for military service may
claim the status of conscientious objector and perform alternative service with-
out discrimination”.⁴³ Recommendations that states should adopt legislation al-
lowing for conscientious objection have been issued regularly and repeatedly to
states from many parts of the world, indicating the continued concern of the
committee with the limited access to object to military service for conscientious
reasons.⁴⁴
Additional to observations on the lack of legal provisions securing access to
conscientious objection, the committee has frequently addressed how the right
should be implemented in domestic law: In 1994, the committee criticized Cy-
prus for its “unfair treatment” of conscientious objectors, which were subject
to excessive periods of service compared to military personnel.⁴⁵ Although the
state delegation stressed the need for sufficient troops for the national guard
in order to resist a further invasion by Turkey,⁴⁶ the committee remained uncon-
vinced, stressing the discriminatory nature of extended service for conscientious
objectors. These concerns were reiterated following the consecutive review of Cy-
prus in 1998.⁴⁷ Similar observations have been issued to numerous states, mainly
in Eastern Europe,⁴⁸ but also to Greece⁴⁹ and The Republic of Korea.⁵⁰
 A/50/40: 135, 1995.
 The same recommendation, with only minimal differences, has been issued to Venezuela
(CCPR/CO/71/VEN: 26, 2001), The Dominican Republic (CCPR/CO/71/DOM: 21, 2001), Azerbaijan
(A/57/40 (I): p. 51: 21, 2002) and Viet Nam (CCPR/CO/75/VNM: 17, 2002).
 Such observations have been made to Russia (A/50/40: 382, 1995), Armenia (CCPR/C/79/
Add.100: 18, 1998), Mexico (A/54/40 (I): 332, 1999 and CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5: 18, 2010), Romania
(A/54/40 (I): 376, 1999), Kuwait (A/55/40 (I): 495, 2000 and CCPR/C/KWT/CO/2: 22, 2011), Tajiki-
stan (CCPR/CO/84/TJK: 20, 2005 and CCPR/C/TJK/CO/2: 21, 2013), Colombia (CCPR/CO/80/COL:
17, 2004 and CCPR/C/COL/CO/6: 22, 2010), Serbia and Montenegro (CCPR/CO/81/SEMO: 21,
2004), Syria (CCPR/CO/84/SYR: 11, 2005), Chile (CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5: 13, 2007), San Marino
(CCPR/C/SMR/CO/2: 15, 2008), Mongolia (CCPR/C/MNG/CO/5: 23, 2011), Turkmenistan (CCPR/
C/TKM/CO/1: 16, 2012), Turkey (CCPR/C/TUR/CO/1: 23, 2012) and Bolivia (CCPR/C/BOL/CO/3:
21, 2013).
 A/49/40 (I): 321, 1994.
 CCPR/C/SR.1334: 9, [1994], 1996.
 A/53/40 (I): 197, 1998.
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Another recurring criticism in the practice of the committee on conscientious
objectors has been directed towards the tendency of states to favor some catego-
ries of objectors over others, as the consistent preference for objectors belonging
to the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Finland,⁵¹ the requirements for objectors to belong
to religions on an official, government-sanctioned list in Ukraine⁵² or registered
religious communities in Uzbekistan,⁵³ and the requirement that objectors be-
long to clearly pacifist sects in Kyrgyzstan,⁵⁴ or have pledged a holy vow in Ka-
zakhstan.⁵⁵ Finally, the committee has criticized states for not allowing conscien-
tious objection once the duration of military service is underway,⁵⁶ and for not
implementing the right fully in practice.⁵⁷
Throughout these observations, the committee has stressed the non-discrim-
inatory nature of the procedure to ensure compliance with article 18, urging
states to recognize conscientious objectors, not only from all religions, but
also from people with deeply held non-religious beliefs. As such, the practice
of the HRC on conscientious objection constitutes perhaps the most clear-cut
case possible of a belief-centered conception of the freedom of religion, where
the power of states to force individuals to act against their conscience is clearly
limited in one specific area.
Similarly, a cluster of observations issued by the committee from 1994 and
up to the present has dealt with the controversial and vexing question of conver-
sion, an issue that is no less concerned with the contents of belief than the issue
of conscientious objection. The right to “have or adopt” a religion is clearly laid
out by the committee in general comment no. 22 as a central part of article 18
(see above). In its review of Morocco in 1994, the state delegation responded ex-
 Slovakia (A/52/40 (I): 373, 1997), Lithuania (A/53/40 (I): 176, 1998 and CCPR/CO/80/LTU: 17,
2004), Georgia (A/57/40 (I): p. 56: 18, 2002), Estonia (A/58/40 (I): p. 44: 15, 2003), Latvia
(CCPR/CO/79/LVA: 15, 2003) and Russia (CCPR/CO/79/RUS: 17, 2003 and CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6: 23,
2009).
 CCPR/CO/83/GRC: 15, 2005.
 CCPR/C/KOR/CO/3: 17, 2006.
 A/53/40 (I): 271, 1998, A/60/40 (I): p. 24: 14, 2004 and CCPR/C/FIN/CO/6: 14 2013.
 A/57/40 (I): p. 35: 20, 2002, CCPR/C/UKR/CO/6: 12, 2006 and CCPR/C/UKR/CO/7: 19, 2013.
 CCPR/C/UZB/CO/3: 26, 2010.
 CCPR/CO/69/KGZ: 18, 2000.
 CCPR/C/KAZ/CO/1: 23, 2011.
 Spain (A/51/40: 186, 1996), France (A/52/40 (I): 406, 1997) and Slovakia (CCPR/C/SVK/CO/3:
15, 2011).
 Israel (A/58/40 (I): p. 69: 24, 2003 and CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3: 19, 2010) and Paraguay (CCPR/C/
PRY/CO/2: 18, 2006).
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tensively to a question on the difference in status between Islam and other reli-
gions in Morocco:
A Moroccan Muslim woman could marry a Jewish or Christian man only if he converted to
Islam; by contrast, a Moroccan Muslim man could marry a Jewish or Christian woman even
if she did not convert. Since the rules for inheritance were different depending on whether
Muslims, Jews or Christians were involved, the religious statutes prohibited inheritance be-
tween Muslims and non-believers. Moroccan consulates and embassies abroad disseminat-
ed information to foreign women who wished to marry Moroccan men about the problems
of inheritance that could arise if a woman did not convert to Islam.⁵⁸
In its concluding observations, the committee stopped short of declaring the
rules in violation of article 18, expressing its “concern” at the impediment placed
upon the freedom to change religion.⁵⁹ Following its next review of Morocco in
2000, the committee hardened its approach, observing that “the Covenant re-
quires religious freedom to be respected in regard to persons of all religious con-
victions and not restricted to monotheistic religions, and that the right to change
religion should not be restricted, directly or indirectly”.⁶⁰ This stance was fol-
lowed up in 2004, when the committee flatly observed that “article 18 of the Cov-
enant protects all religions and all beliefs, ancient and less ancient, major and
minor, and includes the right to adopt the religion or belief of one’s choice”.⁶¹
Hence, over the course of ten years, the committee moved from considering pro-
hibitions on conversion an “impediment” to article 18 and to declaring such pro-
hibitions to be outright violations.
A similar change in language can be detected for other countries as well:
While the committee noted with concern the prohibition against conversion in
Nepal in 1994,⁶² the observations issued to Mauritania in 2013 declared that
“The State party should remove the crime of apostasy from its legislation and
authorize Mauritanians to fully enjoy their freedom of religion, including by
changing religion”.⁶³ Similar observations have been issued to Iran,⁶⁴ Tunisia,⁶⁵
Libya,⁶⁶ Kuwait,⁶⁷ Yemen,⁶⁸ Algeria,⁶⁹ Sudan,⁷⁰ Jordan⁷¹ and the Maldives.⁷²
 CCPR/C/SR.1365: 62, 1994.
 A/50/40: 112, 1995.
 A/55/40 (I): 117, 2000.
 CCPR/CO/82/MAR: 21, 2004.
 A/50/40: 70, 1995.
 CCPR/C/MRT/CO/1: 21, 2013.
 A/48/40 (I): 263, 1993 and CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3: 23, 2012.
 A/50/40: 112, 1995.
 A/50/40: 135, 1995 and A/54/40 (I): 136, 1999.
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Taken together, the observations of the committee on prohibitions of conversion
have dovetailed the practice of the committee on conscientious objections in its
development from a position of watchful skepticism to one of unequivocal dis-
missal. In a small handful of cases, the committee has criticized states for requir-
ing religious knowledge,⁷³ for prohibiting members of specific religious organiza-
tions of taking government work,⁷⁴ and for the requirement that judges pledge a
religious oath in order to take office. In the latter case, the committee has criti-
cized Ireland in three consecutive sets of observations, once more moving from a
measured concern in 1993 to a fully-fledged recommendation that the state party
“allow for a choice of a non-religious declaration” in 2008.⁷⁵
Parallel to these belief-centered topics, the committee has issued a handful
of observations on the limits of religious manifestations and practice, ranging
from the singling out of specific groups that have incomplete protections (see
below),⁷⁶ and to more specific charges of practices that violate the right.
Among the latter, the committee has criticized the ban on conspicuous religious
symbols in French schools,⁷⁷ the requirement in Norway that individuals profess-
ing the Evangelical-Lutheran religion should raise their children in the same
faith,⁷⁸ and the limited or non-existent access to places of worship for some re-
ligions in Iran,⁷⁹ Kuwait⁸⁰ and the Maldives.⁸¹ Finally, a small selection of obser-
vations have focused on the nature of religious education, ranging from a gen-
eral encouragement to bring practices in line with the Covenant to Slovenia,⁸²
via concerns with the role of religious majorities in education in Greece⁸³ and Ire-
 A/55/40 (I): 483, 2000.
 A/57/40 (I), p. 75: 20, 2002 and CCPR/CO/84/YEM: 18, 2005.
 CCPR/C/DZA/CO/3: 23, 2007.
 CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3: 26, 2007.
 A/49/40 (I): 235, 1994 and CCPR/C/JOR/CO/4: 13, 2010.
 CCPR/C/MDV/CO/1: 24, 2012.
 Indonesia, (CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1: 6, 2013).
 Germany (CCPR/CO/80/DEU: 19, 2004).
 A/48/40 (I): 607, 1993, A/55/40 (I): 450, 2000 and CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3: 21, 2008.
 Baha’is in Tunisia (A/50/40: 112, 1995) and Egypt (CCPR/CO/76/EGY: 17, 2002), Sunni Muslims
in Iran, (CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3: 25, 2012) and Non-Muslims in the Maldives (CCPR/C/MDV/CO/1: 24,
2012).
 CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4: 23, 2008.
 A/49/40 (I): 93, 1994, A/55/40 (I): 78, 2000 and CCPR/C/NOR/CO/5: 15, 2006.
 CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3: 24–25, 2012.
 CCPR/C/KWT/CO/2: 23, 2011.
 CCPR/C/MDV/CO/1: 24, 2012.
 A/49/40 (I): 351, 1994.
 CCPR/CO/83/GRC: 14, 2005.
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land,⁸⁴ and to the suggestion that Indonesia reform its educational curricula in
order to promote religious diversity.⁸⁵
Taken together, the monitoring practice of the Human Rights Committee on
article 18 does little in terms of clarifying how the committee approaches reli-
gion. Partly, this is due to the open-ended nature of the right, particularly as
it is laid out in general comment no. 22: deciding whether the right has been vio-
lated does not necessarily involve a determination of what constitutes religion.
Rather, the monitoring practice of the HRC attests to the centrality of belief in
deciding whether states have implemented the right properly—throughout its ob-
servations on conscientious objection and the right to change religion, the com-
mittee has been adamant that non-religious beliefs are no less important or
enjoy less protection than religious beliefs: On the contrary, the role of religion
in these observations is frequently portrayed as problematic or potentially harm-
ful to the realization of the right, as states are criticized for their preferences for
certain religious organizations or beliefs. Likewise, in its more limited observa-
tions on the manifestation or practice of religion, the main threat identified by
the committee is the preferential treatment extended to other religious commun-
ities. As such, the monitoring practice of the committee on article 18 tends to
construe religion/s, and in particular their state preferences, as one of the
main challenges to the realization of the right. Emphasizing the detrimental
input from “bad”, intolerant religion in this way, the approach of the committee
largely resembles the pragmatic, utilitarian approach to religion favored at the
second UN, where the role of religion is always relative to the specific context
in which it is deployed.
5.6.2 Minorities and Discrimination
The Human Rights Committee monitors a comprehensive legal framework on dis-
crimination and minority rights (see above). Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR pro-
hibit discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights of the Covenant, and in equal-
ity before the law, respectively (see above). Additionally, article 27 brought back
the concept of minority rights to the international legal framework after its exclu-
sion from the drafting of the UDHR, providing that
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
 CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3: 22, 2008.
 CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1: 26, 2013.
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group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their
own language.
Hence, the HRC monitors the legal framework of states parties, both as they re-
late to discrimination on religious and other grounds, and their regulation of the
rights of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. Additionally, the monitoring of
provisions on religious discrimination and on the rights of religious minorities
constantly rub shoulders with the views of the committee on the protection of
the freedom of religion or belief in article 18 of the ICCPR (see above). Unlike
CERD, then, the HRC is obliged to put religion at the heart and center of its mon-
itoring of laws and policies on discrimination and equality.
The HRC first commented on the topic of religious minorities in its review of
Egypt in 1993, questioning the claim of the state party that there were “no minor-
ities” on Egyptian territory and reminding the delegation of its obligation to pro-
tect minorities under article 27, while also requesting more information on the
treatment of the Copts.⁸⁶ Several members of the committee questioned the
Egyptian constitutional ban on the manifestation of other religions than
Islam, intimating that such a ban both entailed discrimination against other re-
ligions and violatied article 18 of the ICCPR.⁸⁷ The state delegation maintained
that there were no minorities in Egypt, “[w]ithin the meaning of the relevant in-
ternational provisions and criteria”, because everyone was equal before the
law.⁸⁸ In its concluding observations, the committee expressed its concern for
the numerous restrictions on religious manifestations violating article 18, and
the denial by Egyptian authorities of the existence in the country of religious
and other minorities.⁸⁹ Following the consecutive review of Egypt in 2002, the
committee expressed its concern with the continued repression of Baha’is, but
did not repeat its concerns with the Egyptian claim to have no minorities, despite
the claim being reiterated in the state report.⁹⁰
In its review of Tunisia in 1994, the committee also brought up the issue of
religious minorities, questioning the state delegation extensively on its position
relative to the situation of the Baha’is, whose beliefs were not considered by the
 CCPR/C/SR.1246: 36–37 Herndl, 1993.
 CCPR/C/SR.1246: 49 Mavrommatis, 53 Higgins, 59 Fodor, 60 Aguilar Urbina, 1993.
 CCPR/C/SR.1247: 14, 1993.
 A/48/40 (I): 709, 1993.
 CCPR/CO/76/EGY: 17– 18, 2002. The assertion in the state report was that “the different com-
munities, sectors and groupings of the Egyptian nation are woven together into a single fabric”
(CCPR/C/EGY/2001/3: 675, 2001).
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authorities to be a religious tradition, but rather a “deviation” from Islam.⁹¹
These questions were entirely dismissed by the state delegation, who assumed
that Baha’is had the same freedom of religion as everyone else in Tunisia, and
did not experience persecution.⁹² The committee was not assured by this state-
ment, expressing its concern in its concluding observations that the right to free-
dom of religion or belief, while “generally well-protected”, was not made avail-
able to all beliefs, advising the state party to take its recent general comment on
article 18 into account.⁹³
Reviewing Italy, also in 1994, the committee questioned the Italian constitu-
tional provision that recognizes several linguistic minorities as eligible for spe-
cial protection, but none of the other minority groups covered by article 27.⁹⁴ Sev-
eral members questioned the treatment of religious minorities, their access to
register denominations and to observe days of rest.⁹⁵ The state delegation ex-
plained that the constitutional minority provision referred to “all minorities pres-
ent in Italy after the Second World War, provided they met the language criteri-
on”. Additionally, separate minorities in the regions of Valle d’Aosta and Alto
Adige were specially protected due to “historical factors” from almost a century
before.⁹⁶ Although the implementation of article 18 was widely discussed during
the session as members questioned the state delegation extensively on the tradi-
tional favoritism towards the Catholic Church across numerous areas,⁹⁷ this issue
was not linked to the role of religious minorities and their lacking protection
under article 27. In its concluding observations, the committee expressed its con-
cern with the restrictive definition of minorities in Italy, which may lead to lack-
ing protection of other minorities.⁹⁸
The early practice of the HRC on religious minorities featured several topics
that have dominated its approach to the issue in the following years: In partic-
ular, the claim by Egypt to have no minorities has been reiterated by numerous
state parties, and consistently dismissed by the HRC. These dismissals have been
based both on factual grounds, as the committee has expressed its doubt as to
 CCPR/C/SR.1362: 10 Higgins, 20 Mavrommatis, 24 Evatt, 1994 (translation from the French
original).
 CCPR/C/SR.1362: 28, 35, 1994 (translation from the French original).
 A/50/40: 91, 98, 1995. None of these concerns were reiterated in the consecutive review of
Tunisia in 2008 (CCPR/C/TUN/CO/5, 2008).
 CCPR/C/SR.1329: 28 Evatt, 43 Aguilar Urbina, 53 Ndiaye, 1994.
 CCPR/C/SR.1329: 50 Sadi, 52 Francis, 1994.
 CCPR/C/SR.1330: 5, 1995.
 CCPR/C/SR.1331: 16–63, 1995.
 A/49/40 (I): 281, 1994.
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whether the information has been accurate, and on legal grounds, as the com-
mittee has argued that the factual existence of minorities would be principally
irrelevant to the legal obligation on states parties to adopt legislation that
would implement the protections of minorities enumerated in article 27 of the
ICCPR. The legal dimension of this issue was also addressed by the committee
in its general comment on article 27 (see above).
States that have claimed to have no minorities include France,⁹⁹ Senegal,¹⁰⁰
Libya,¹⁰¹ Kuwait,¹⁰² The Dominican Republic,¹⁰³ Gambia¹⁰⁴ and San Marino.¹⁰⁵
The explanation for this non-existence varies: During the review of France in
1997, the delegation insisted that the French constitution was based on the
dual principles of equal rights for all citizens and the unity of the nation, up-
holding the rights of all citizens to belong or refuse to belong to any group.¹⁰⁶
The committee questioned how this policy, which had given rise to a declaration
on article 27,¹⁰⁷ affected the special protective measures available for distinct na-
tive populations in Breton and the Overseas Territories, the Basque and more re-
cently arrived immigrant groups.¹⁰⁸ In its concluding observations, the commit-
tee took note of the declaration on article 27, but did not accept the claim that
no ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities existed on French territory, recalling
that the mere fact that everyone has equal rights before the law excludes neither
the existence, nor the entitlements of minorities under article 27.¹⁰⁹ Following the
examination of the consecutive report of France in 2008, this view was reiterated
and expanded to concerns with the access of individuals from minorities to join
the workforce and representative bodies.¹¹⁰
Reviewing Senegal in 1997, the committee heard a different account of why




 A/55/40 (I): 475, 2000. This concern was reiterated following the 2011 review of Kuwait
(CCPR/C/KWT/CO/2: 31, 2011).
 See below.
 The state party was considered without a report (CCPR/CO/75/GMB: 24, 2004)
 CCPR/C/SMR/CO/2: 16, 2008.
 CCPR/C/SR.1599: 50, 1997.
 “In the light of article 2 of the Constitution of the French Republic, the French Government
declares that article 27 is not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned” (United Nations
Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/ (31.08.2016)
 CCPR/C/SR.1599: 67 Yalden, 1997.
 A/52/40 (I): 411, 1997.
 CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4: 11, 25–26, 2008.
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the committee on claims in the state report that there were no minorities in the
state party,¹¹¹ members of the state delegation insisted that there were numerous
minority groups “of all kinds” in Senegal, but they intermingled widely, so there
was no discrimination between them,¹¹² a claim one member of the committee
described as “unacceptable”, reminding the delegation of the obligations arising
from article 27.¹¹³ These concerns were also reiterated in the concluding observa-
tions issued after the review.¹¹⁴ Similar claims as to the non-existence of minor-
ities due to their close integration with the majority culture were dismissed by
the committee following the review of The Dominican Republic.¹¹⁵
Yet another different line of reasoning on the non-existence of minorities
was employed by Libya in 1998: Questioned on the protection offered to minor-
ities, the delegation cited anthropological and geographical studies that showed
that all the peoples of North Africa formed a single family, and that any argu-
ment for the existence of minorities was used as “a device to provoke the ‘Bal-
kanization’ or fragmentation” of Libya.¹¹⁶ Expanding on this claim, the state del-
egation warned against “the selective use of the minorities issue by the forces of
globalization to provoke the fragmentation of sovereign States”,¹¹⁷ sparking con-
cluding observations that expressed concern with the lacking recognition of mi-
norities in the state party.¹¹⁸
Additional to the claim of no minorities, the committee has been critical of
incomplete minority protections, whereby states offer different measures of pro-
tections to different types of minorities, undermining the comprehensive, equal
protection provided for minorities in article 27 of the ICCPR. Such differentiated
protections are commonly explained by reference to historical factors, as in the
case of Italy (see above). Similar differentiated protections have been criticized
by the committee following the reviews of Ukraine,¹¹⁹ Russia,¹²⁰ Switzerland¹²¹,
 CCPR/C/SR.1619: 42 Klein, 45 Yalden, 49 Pocar, 1997.
 CCPR/C/SR.1619: 51–52, 1997.
 CCPR/C/SR.1619: 63 Klein, 1997.
 A/53/40 (I): 66, 1998.
 CCPR/CO/71/DOM: 20, 2001.
 CCPR/C/SR.1713: 78, 1998.
 CCPR/C/SR.1713: 88, 1998.
 A/54/40 (I): 139, 1999. The issue was not reiterated in the concluding observations following
the consecutive review of Libya in 2007 (CCPR/C/LBY/CO/4).
 A/50/40: 322, 1995. Similar concerns were expressed by the committee following the review
of the state party in 2002 (A/57/40 (I): p. 36: 23, 2002), and expanded to a concern with increas-
ing assaults on members of Muslim and Jewish minorities following the review in 2006 (CCPR/C/
UKR/CO/6: 16, 2006).
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Germany¹²² and Serbia and Montenegro¹²³ for their more robust protection of
“national” over other minorities, whereas Mongolia¹²⁴ has been criticized for
its recognition of only one ethnic minority, and Greece¹²⁵ for its refusal to recog-
nize minorities beyond the Muslims protected under the provisions of the Lau-
sanne treaty.
In these differentiations, the historical argument was particularly empha-
sized by the German state delegation during the 1996 review: Following numer-
ous critical questions on the difference in treatment between the special status
and privileges bestowed on the Danish minority to the north of the country and
the refusal of such privileges to the numerically far more significant Turkish
community, a member of the state delegation explained that a difference had
to be made between
…minorities created as a result of shifting State borders and those consisting of people who
had freely chosen to immigrate. In the latter case, Germany was less concerned to promote
the use of the native language, the objective being to achieve the integration of the immi-
grants into German society.¹²⁶
Hence, according to the German state delegation, “new” minorities were not eli-
gible for the same protection as “old” minorities with a historical presence on a
specific territory. While no member of the committee commented on this during
the session, the concluding observations expressed the committee’s concern
 A/50/40: 401, 1995. In the consecutive concluding observations on Russia, the HRC did not
address the issue in 2003 (CCPR/CO/79/RUS), but expressed its concern with increasing hate
crimes and attacks against minorities in 2009, although without addressing the definition of mi-
norities in the state party (CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6: 11, 2009). See also below.
 CCPR/C/79/Add.70: 20, 1996. Following the consecutive report of Switzerland, no similar
observation was issued (CCPR/CO/73/CH, 2001), but in 2009, the committee expressed its con-
cern with increasing threats of violence against religious minorities in the state party (CCPR/
C/CHE/CO/3: 9, 2009).
 See below.
 CCPR/CO/81/SEMO: 23, 2004. In consecutive reviews of the successor states to Serbia and
Montenegro, Kosovo in 2006 and The Republic of Serbia in 2011, the committee has not repeated
its assertion that the legislative framework for minority protection is insufficient, but empha-
sized the discrimination experienced in practice by various minorities (CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1:
21–22, 2006 & CCPR/C/SRB/CO/2: 23, 2011).
 A/55/40 (I): 341–342, 2000. Following the consecutive review of Mongolia in 2011, the com-
mittee did not address the lacking implementation of article 27, but expressed its concern with
the protection offered for the linguistic unity of this singular minority (CCPR/C/MNG/CO/5: 27,
2011).
 See below.
 CCPR/C/SR.1552: 42, 1996.
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with the German definition of minorities in relation to traditional areas of settle-
ment in particular regions, suggesting that the protection offered by article 27
was intended to cover all minorities, whether they were immigrants or refu-
gees.¹²⁷ Following the consecutive review of Germany in 2004, the committee
did not reiterate its concerns with the preference for some minorities over others,
focusing instead on the ill treatment of some minority groups by the police, and
the challenges faced by the Roma community in housing and employment.¹²⁸
Following the latest review of Germany in 2012, however, the committee entirely
ignored the provisions of article 27, expressing its concern with the problems
faced by immigrant communities in housing under articles 2 and 26 on non-dis-
crimination, and the racism experienced by members of the Jewish, Sinti and
Roma communities under articles 2, 18, 20 and 26.¹²⁹
During the review of Greece in 2005, the committee was also presented with
an historical argument for the differential treatment of minorities presented dur-
ing the review of the state party by CERD (see above). Explaining why Greece of-
fered particular protection to the Muslim minority in Thrace, the state delegation
invoked the specific provisions on this minority in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and
explained which criteria would be applicable for the recognition of other minor-
ities:
Such criteria referred to the size of the group, its distinct linguistic and cultural character-
istics and its wish to be treated as a minority. Furthermore, States had a certain margin of
appreciation when it came to the official recognition of a certain group of persons as a mi-
nority. Special circumstances prevailing in a specific State were also taken into account.¹³⁰
The issue was particularly sensitive to the state party because of the desires of a
population in Northern Greece to be recognized as a “Macedonian” minority,
which all Greek governments had refused because they considered these claims
to be “politically motivated and having nothing to do with human rights”.¹³¹
Groups like the Roma, on the other hand, did not qualify as minorities because
they had “repeatedly expressed” their wish not to be considered minorities in
Greek society.¹³² In its concluding observations, the committee expressed its con-
cern with the restrictive definition of minorities in Greece, in particular the ban
 A/52/40 (I): 183, 1997.
 CCPR/CO/80/DEU: 16/21, 2004.
 CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6: 7/17, 2012.
 CCPR/C/SR.2268: 35, 2005.
 CCPR/C/SR.2268: 32, 36, 2005 & CCPR/C/SR.2269: 39, 2005.
 CCPR/C/SR.2268: 37, 2005.
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maintained by the state party on associations using “Turk” or “Macedonian” ap-
pellations in their names.¹³³
As displayed by the early reviews of Egypt and Tunisia, the HRC has consis-
tently expressed its concern with the interface between the recognition and pro-
tection of religious minorities and other rights covered by the Covenant, in par-
ticular legislative frameworks on the freedom of religion or belief that favor
one religious tradition to the detriment of others, and states where religious mi-
norities are harassed, persecuted or otherwise abused, either by state officials or
by others. The nexus between minority rights and the freedom of religion has
been explicitly emphasized by the committee following its reviews of
Sudan,¹³⁴ Morocco¹³⁵ Israel,¹³⁶ Jordan,¹³⁷ and Iran.¹³⁸
States have provided different reasons for their differentiation between reli-
gious minorities and their access to other rights in the Covenant: According to
the Moroccan delegation in 1994, the Baha’i faith was not a “revealed” religion,
and therefore constituted a heresy to Islam, the public exercise of which could
result in public disorder and foment anarchy (see above).¹³⁹ Additionally, the del-
egation from Morocco also claimed to have no minorities in the sense implied by
the Covenant, as no groups in society were deprived of their rights due to the
domination of a majority.¹⁴⁰ Members of the committee were not convinced by
this answer, citing the requirements under article 18 that states should recognize
all religions, whether they were “revealed” or not.¹⁴¹ In its concluding observa-
tions, the committee refrained from linking the issue to article 27, requesting in-
stead that the protection offered to the freedom of religion or belief in article 18
be extended to cover the Baha’i community as well.¹⁴² Following up on this
issue, the committee included a question in its list of issues prior to the subse-
quent review of Morocco in 2000 on the recognition given to minorities including
the Berber and the Tuareg in accordance with article 27 of the Covenant.¹⁴³ How-
 CCPR/CO/83/GRC: 20, 2005.
 A/53/40 (I): 131, 134, 1998. The issue was not raised following the consecutive review of
Sudan in 2007 (CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3, 2007).
 See below.
 CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3: 20, 2010.
 A/49/40 (I): 235, 1994 and CCPR/C/JOR/CO/4: 13, 2010.
 See below.
 CCPR/C/SR.1365: 63, 1994.
 CCPR/C/SR.1365: 67, 1994.
 CCPR/C/SR.1365: 72 Higgins, 1994.
 A/50/40:112, 1995.
 CCPR/C/SR.1788: 7(18), 2000. The list of issues is not available online, but is reproduced in
the summary records from the 1788th meeting of the HRC.
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ever, the question remained unanswered, and the committee once more focused
its concluding observations on the implementation of article 18 and the exces-
sive restrictions against other religions than Islam in Morocco.
During the review of Iran in 2011, the state delegation explained that there
were no restrictions on religious minorities, although it was “no secret” that
there were conflicts between members of the Baha’i faith and local communities,
often because of the proselytization of the former, which forced the Government
to “intervene and restore order”.¹⁴⁴ Baha’is who complained about religious per-
secution were mainly individuals “involved in crime”.¹⁴⁵ The committee found
these answers insufficient,¹⁴⁶ expressing numerous concerns with the treatment
of religious minorities in Iran, in particular the Baha’i community and the Chris-
tian community, but also the Kurds, Arabs, Azeris and Baluch “in schools, and
publication of journals and newspapers in minority languages”, violating numer-
ous articles of the Covenant, including articles 18, 19, 20 and 27.¹⁴⁷
On the topic of other rights violations suffered by religious minorities, the
committee has issued concluding observations on a sliding scale, from their “in-
adequate protection” in the Dominican Republic,¹⁴⁸ their denial of rights in so-
cial and economic fields in Croatia¹⁴⁹ and Yemen,¹⁵⁰ xenophobia and intolerance
in Liechtenstein,¹⁵¹ Belgium¹⁵² and Lithuania¹⁵³ to more structurally oriented dif-
ferential treatment in Bulgaria,¹⁵⁴ Iraq¹⁵⁵ and Thailand,¹⁵⁶ outright violence, at-
tacks and hate crimes in Romania,¹⁵⁷ The United Kingdom,¹⁵⁸ Russia,¹⁵⁹ Po-
land,¹⁶⁰ Austria,¹⁶¹ Georgia,¹⁶² Ukraine,¹⁶³ Armenia¹⁶⁴ and Turkey.¹⁶⁵
 CCPR/C/SR.2836: 6, 2011.
 CCPR/C/SR.2836: 9, 2011.
 CCPR/C/SR.2836: 13 Motoc, 14– 15 Amor, 2011.
 CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3: 23–24/30, 2012.
 A/48/40 (I): 462/466, 1993.
 CCPR/CO/71/HRV: 22, 2001. Similar concerns, but limited to the plight of the Roma and Serb
minorities, were expressed by the committee following the 2009 review of Croatia (CCPR/C/HRV/
CO/2: 18– 19, 2009).
 CCPR/C/YEM/CO/5: 12, 2012.
 CCPR/CO/81/LIE: 9, 2004.
 CCPR/CO/81/BEL: 27, 2004. These concerns were reiterated and expanded by the committee
following the 2010 review of the state party (CCPR/C/BEL/CO/5: 22, 2010).
 CCPR/C/LTU/CO/3: 15, 2012.
 A/48/40 (I): 746, 755, 1993. These concerns were reiterated following the consecutive review
of Bulgaria in 2011 (CCPR/C/BGR/CO/3: 9, 2011).
 CCPR/C/79/Add.84: 20, 1997.
 CCPR/CO/84/THA: 24, 2005.
 A/49/40 (I): 145, 1994.
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Taken together, the practice of the HRC on religious minorities indicates the
long and troubled history of the minority concept in international law, as numer-
ous states have drawn upon historical arguments to explain their refusal to rec-
ognize specific rights for minority groups.While few have been as critical as the
Libyan delegation, claiming that the recognition of minority rights would repre-
sent an effort to “Balkanize” Libya, many have referred to the importance of deep
historical entanglements to the recognition and protection offered to religious
minorities. This has been particularly entrenched in European states like Germa-
ny, Greece and Italy, where “old” minorities enjoy more expansive protections
than more recently arrived communities.
Furthermore, although the HRC has evaded the concept of intersectionality,
the committee has been alert to the interface between minority rights, discrimi-
nation and other provisions of the ICCPR, including hate speech, the freedom of
opinion and expression, and particularly the freedom of religion or belief.While
the majority of these observations link the rights of religious minorities to their
rights to hold and maintain their beliefs, observations issued to countries like
Yemen, Croatia and Ukraine do not, suggesting that the committee recognizes
that religious minorities may be eligible for particular protection beyond a forti-
fied protection of their freedom of religion or belief. Similarly, in its numerous
observations on lacunae on religion in the legal protection of all the minorities
listed in article 27 of the ICCPR, the committee has consistently appealed to the
necessity of providing protection for people who belong to such minorities, not
to their rights under article 18. Consequently, the lacking attention to article 27 in
the practice of the individual communications procedure (Ghanea 2012: 73)
seems to be less prevalent in the concluding observations issued by the commit-
tee. The religion-making of the HRC on religious discrimination and religious mi-
 CCPR/CO/73/UK: 14, 2001. These concerns were reiterated following the 2008 review of the
UK (CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6: 16, 2008).
 CCPR/CO/79/RUS: 24, 2003. These concerns were reiterated following the 2009 review of
Russia (CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6: 11, 2009).
 CCPR/CO/82/POL: 19, 2004. These concerns were reiterated following the 2010 review of Po-
land (CCPR/C/POL/CO/6: 6, 2010).
 CCPR/C/AUT/CO/4: 20, 2007.
 A/57/40 (I): p. 56: 17, 19, 2002. The issue of differential treatment of minorities was raised by
the committee again in the concluding observations following the 2007 review of Georgia, but
this time in relation to the preferential treatment of the Georgian Orthodox church, under refer-
ence to article 18, not article 27 (CCPR/C/GEO/CO/3: 15, 2007).
 CCPR/C/UKR/CO/6: 16, 2006. Similar concerns were expressed by the committee following
the 2013 review of Ukraine (CCPR/C/UKR/CO/7: 11, 2013).
 CCPR/C/ARM/CO/2: 6, 2012.
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norities seems to suggest that the committee is able to recognize religion both as
belief and identity. Compared with the practice of CERD, the observations issued
by the HRC are more explicit about which dimension is at play, referring issues
pertaining primarily to belief to article 18 and minority issues on identity to ar-
ticle 27, with occasional pointers to other rights as well.
5.6.3 Organizations
The HRC monitors a broad normative framework that regulates the boundaries of
recognizing and registering religious communities and organizations. Among
these regulations, the most elaborate is general comment no. 22 of the HRC on
the interpretation of article 18 of the ICCPR:
The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established as official or
traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in
any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant, including articles
18 and 27, nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers.
If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, proclamations
of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not result in any impairment of the
freedoms under article 18 or any other rights recognized under the Covenant nor in any dis-
crimination against persons who do not accept the official ideology or who oppose it.¹⁶⁶
Recognition only violates the ICCPR if it impairs the enjoyment of any rights
under the Covenant, or if it discriminates against the adherents to other religions
or non-believers. Hence, the recognition of a state religion or the establishment
of its status as official or traditional as such does not entail a violation of the
Covenant.¹⁶⁷
Whereas the recognition of particular religions is closely circumscribed, reg-
istration of religious institutions and organizations is not explicitly regulated at
the international level. However, given the broad nature of the rights ascribed to
religious collectives, organizations and institutions in the ICCPR article 18(1), in
the practice of the Special Rapporteur, and particularly in the 1981 declaration
 CCPR/C/TUR/CO/1: 22, 2012.
 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4: 9– 10, 1993.
 While the former special rapporteur on the freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt,
has stopped short of directly contradicting this moderate stamp of approval for the recognition
of particular religions, he has significantly sharpened the conditions for such arrangements
spelled out by the HRC, practically suggesting the outright disapproval of any form of state,
or official religion (A/HRC/19/60: 71–73, 2011).
5.6 Approaches to Religion in the Monitoring Practice of the HRC, 1993– 2013 133
article 6,¹⁶⁸ access of religious communities to some mechanism to register and
attain legal personality can clearly be inferred as a vital part of the normative
framework of religious freedom.
Although the legal framework on recognition is more expansive and explicit,
registration occupies a much more central position in the literature and legal
practice on the relationship between state power and religious institutions
and organizations. While recognition is rarely problematized by norm-setting
bodies, registration of religious communities is a vital component of the litera-
ture on the freedom of religion or belief (see Lerner 2012, Taylor 2005, Durham
2004, Tahzib 1996). The key insight to be gleaned from this literature is that
states have a legal obligation under article 18 of the ICCPR to accommodate
the registration of religious organizations: Such accommodation should be
non-discriminatory and transparent, and ensure access for religious organiza-
tions to collectively manifest their religion or belief.
The HRC first commented on the recognition of religious communities in
1993. During its review of Iran, immediately following its adoption of general
comment no. 22, the committee observed that members of “non-recognized” re-
ligions were experiencing “serious difficulties” in the enjoyment of their rights
under article 18.¹⁶⁹ The committee directed the state party’s attention to its re-
cently adopted comment, suggesting that restrictions on the practice of other
faiths than those that were recognized by the state party constituted a violation
of article 26 (non-discrimination), and should be discontinued.¹⁷⁰
In this early phase, the committee did not distinguish clearly between the
recognition and the registration of religious communities: Reviewing Jordan in
1994, the concluding observations of the committee noted with concern the re-
strictions affecting the enjoyment by “non-recognized or non-registered” reli-
 Article 6 declares that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief shall
include “(a) To worship or assemble in connexion with a religion or belief, and to establish and
maintain places for these purposes; (b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or hu-
manitarian institutions; (c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary arti-
cles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief; (d) To write, issue and
disseminate relevant publications in these areas; (e) To teach a religion or belief in places suit-
able for these purposes; (f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions
from individuals and institutions; (g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appro-
priate leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief; (h) To ob-
serve days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of
one’s religion or belief; (i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and com-
munities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.”
 A/48/40 (I): 245, 1993.
 A/48/40 (I): 269, 1993.
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gious denominations of their right to freedom of religion or belief, indicating
that the material consequences of potential restrictions were more important
than the nature and criteria of recognition or registration in itself.¹⁷¹
Reviewing Costa Rica, also in 1994, the committee expressed its concern
with the pre-eminent position of the Catholic Church, particularly the power
of the National Episcopal Conference to effectively impede the teaching of
other religions than Catholicism in public schools,¹⁷² a concern that was reiter-
ated in the consecutive review of Costa Rica in 1999.¹⁷³ Similar views were ex-
pressed in the review of Slovenia, where several members of the committee ex-
pressed their dissatisfaction with the role of the Church as provider of
religious education, referring the state party to its recent general comment on
the issue,¹⁷⁴ concerns that were also carried over to the concluding observations
of the committee.¹⁷⁵ In these early observations, the committee concentrated its
efforts on practical restrictions on the freedom of religion or belief arising from
state favoritism of one religious tradition or institution.
During its meeting with the delegation from Paraguay in 1995, however, the
committee displayed signs of a more critical attitude towards state-religion rela-
tions, as numerous committee members requested additional information on the
Paraguayan constitutional provision proclaiming the Catholic Church the “lead-
ing” religion of the nation.¹⁷⁶ Despite assertions by the state delegation that the
provision was merely declaratory with no detrimental effect on the position of
other religions,¹⁷⁷ the committee remained unconvinced, as one member linked
the dominant role of Catholicism to the lack of gender equality in the Paraguay-
an legal framework,¹⁷⁸ and the concluding observations expressed its concern
that the dominant role of the Catholic Church could lead to “certain de facto dis-
crimination” against other religions,¹⁷⁹ indicating a causal link between constitu-
tional favoritism and the treatment of other religions.
 A/49/40 (I): 235, 1994.
 A/49/40 (I): 158, 1994.
 A/54/40 (I): 285, 1999.
 CCPR/C/SR.1347: 80 Evatt, 88 Lallah, 1994.
 A/49/40 (I): 351, 1994.
 CCPR/C/SR.1392: 13 Bán, 26 Medina Quiroga, 27 Prado Vallejo, 1995 & CCPR/C/SR.1396: 33
Prado Vallejo, 1995.
 CCPR/C/SR.1396: 22, 1995.
 CCPR/C/SR.1396: 37 Medina Quiroga, 1995.
 A/50/40: 212, 1995.
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This critical line towards state favoritism was followed up and linked to for-
malized registration practices during the reviews of Slovakia and Lithuania in
1997, where the committee for the first time expressed its views on legal provi-
sions spelling out the criteria for religious organizations to obtain official regis-
tration. Unlike its previous observations on the boundaries between state and re-
ligion, these reviews addressed the viability of concrete legal mechanisms
whereby states assessed the religiosity of applicant communities. In the case
of Slovakia, the committee asked the state party to provide more information
on the nature of registration criteria in its list of issues.¹⁸⁰ During the review,
the state delegation provided a comprehensive account of the procedure:
Requests [for registration] must provide administrative information such as the society’s
name, headquarters address and officials, as well as a statement acknowledging respect
for national laws and tolerance of other societies and non-believers. Documentation was
required on the society’s status and management, including details of persons authorized
to receive stipends and how they were appointed and dismissed. Registration was carried
out by the Ministry of Culture, which also looked into aspects such as conformity with the
law, morality, tolerance and respect for the rights of others. Registration by the Ministry
was an administrative act, governed by the administrative code in force. The Supreme
Court could be requested to review any refusal of registration. Currently, 15 churches and
religious associations were registered.¹⁸¹
Additionally, the state representative introduced a law from 1993 that made reli-
gious communities eligible to apply for the restitution of land confiscated during
occupation and Communist rule, between 1945 (1939 for Jewish communities)
and 1990.¹⁸² The committee took issue with several of these provisions, inquiring
on the potential for discrimination implied by applying a numerical limit to com-
munities eligible for registration, the nature of subsidies offered following regis-
tration, the percentage of the population that were not members of any of the
registered groups, and the relation between registration and restitution of prop-
erty.¹⁸³ In its concluding observations, the committee praised the legal initiative
to provide restitution of confiscated property to religious communities, but char-
acterized the criteria for registration as “very restrictive”, leading to the exclu-
sion of some religious communities from being legally recognized and able to
 The list is not available through the official documentation systems of the United Nations,
but is referred to in the summary records of the third meeting with Slovakia (CCPR/C/SR.1591: 52,
1997).
 CCPR/C/SR.1591: 52–54, 1997.
 CCPR/C/SR.1591: 55, 1997.
 CCPR/C/SR.1591: 66 Pocar, 1997 & CCPR/C/SR.1592: 6 Medina Quiroga, 1997.
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function freely. In order to rectify this situation, the committee recommended
that the Slovak authorities adopt “all necessary measures” to amend the relevant
legislation.¹⁸⁴
Later in 1997, the committee reviewed Lithuania, encountering a largely sim-
ilar situation wherein a state power that had recently gone through a major po-
litical overhaul had adopted a legal framework that encompassed both the reg-
istration of religious communities and the restitution of property confiscated
during Communist rule, which ended in 1990. Like Slovakia, Lithuania was
also asked to clarify its registration procedure, to which the state delegation re-
sponded that
…the Law [on religious communities] granted the status of traditional religious denomina-
tions and communities to those religions which had historic roots in Lithuania and com-
prised a part of its historical, spiritual and social heritage. According to the Constitution,
traditional or Staterecognized churches and religious organizations enjoyed the rights of
a legal person. Under article 6 of the Law, other nontraditional denominations could be
granted State recognition provided their teaching and rites were not contrary to law and
morality. Such nontraditional religious denominations acquired the rights of a legal person
upon registration of their statutes or equivalent documents.¹⁸⁵
Despite similarities, the criteria for registration in Lithuania differed from the
Slovak approach in several respects: rather than requiring a minimum member-
ship, the state party employed the distinction between “traditional” vs “non-tra-
ditional” religions, in explicit violation of the guidance offered by the HRC in
general comment no. 22 (see above). The state delegation stressed that the regis-
tration procedure was closely tied to the restitution of property, although only
religious communities operative during Communism were eligible to apply.¹⁸⁶
The committee observed in its concluding observations that registration require-
ments, and distinctions between religious communities in that connection, could
result in religious discrimination, recommending that the state party ensure that
no such discrimination take place.¹⁸⁷ The committee’s concerns were reiterated
following the 2004 review of Lithuania.¹⁸⁸
Taken together, the reviews of Slovakia and Lithuania offer several insights
into the approach of the HRC to the issue of registration in the latter half of the
1990s: First, the overarching issue remained that of non-discrimination, as the
 A/52/40 (I): 368, 382, 1997.
 CCPR/C/SR. 1635: 40.
 CCPR/C/SR.1635: 60, 1997.
 A/53/40 (I): 175, 1998.
 CCPR/CO/80/LTU: 16, 2004.
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committee expressed its concern with the application of minimum membership
requirements, distinguishing between different categories of registration and the
extent to which non-registered communities may be able to function freely. All of
these issues relate to the distinctions made by state parties between religious
communities that were historically recognized, and the treatment of more recent
or numerically insignificant communities. Second, the committee did not seem
to have a clear position on the topic of restitution of church property confiscated
by Communist authorities prior to 1990, as the Slovak authorities were com-
mended for this system, while the Lithuanian version was ignored. Third, both
states indicated moral limitations to the registration of religious communities,
an issue that the committee elaborated extensively on in its general comment
(see above), but ignored during the reviews.
Since the latter half of the 1990s, the committee has maintained its criticism
of states parties operating with hierarchical systems of recognition and registra-
tion, but has increasingly dealt with recognition and registration separately.
Hence, while the committee has expressed its concern with the recognition of
special status of Judaism in Israel,¹⁸⁹ Buddhism in Mongolia,¹⁹⁰ the Catholic
Church in Chile,¹⁹¹ Costa Rica,¹⁹² Argentina,¹⁹³ Venezuela¹⁹⁴ and Liechtenstein,¹⁹⁵
the Orthodox Church in Greece¹⁹⁶ and the Lutheran churches in Denmark¹⁹⁷ and
Iceland,¹⁹⁸ these reviews have largely addressed the potential for discrimination
inherent to constitutional provisions securing a separate status for these reli-
gious communities in areas such as financing and education.¹⁹⁹ These cautious
reminders, that are often offered in general, non-specific language, are seldom
followed up in the review of the next report from state parties.
 A/53/40 (I): 324, 1998.
 CCPR/C/79/Add.120: 16, 2000.
 A/54/40 (I): 220, 1999.
 A/54/40 (I): 285, 1999.
 CCPR/CO/70/ARG: 16, 2000.
 CCPR/CO/71/VEN: 25, 2001.
 CCPR/CO/81/LIE: 13, 2004. Although the concluding observations do not mention the Cath-
olic Church directly, the summary records indicate that the differential treatment in question re-
ferred to the special status of the Catholic Church (CCPR/C/SR.2205: 39).
 CCPR/CO/83/GRC: 14, 2005.
 CCPR/C/DNK/CO/5: 12, 2008.
 CCPR/C/ISL/CO/5: 13, 2012.
 One notable exception is the 2000 review of Ireland, where the committee engaged the
practical preference bestowed on religious organizations, who could be exempt from anti-dis-
crimination legislation in employment processes, even for non-religious functions, which
could lead to discrimination (A/55/40 (I): 443, 2000).
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Parallel to these mild reproaches, the committee has displayed a more active
interest in the potential for discrimination in registration procedures. In particu-
lar, the committee has been dismissive of any form of compulsory registration
regimes, which have mainly been identified in Eastern European and post-Soviet
states. These restrictions vary, from the prohibition of unregistered religious ac-
tivity in Uzbekistan,²⁰⁰ Kazakhstan²⁰¹ and Turkmenistan,²⁰² to the absolute ban
on some religions in Tajikistan,²⁰³ restrictions on non-registered religious practi-
ces in Azerbaijan,²⁰⁴ and the correlation between registration and status as con-
scientious objector to military service in Kyrgyzstan²⁰⁵ and Ukraine.²⁰⁶ These
states generally display a severely restrictive approach to any manifestations
of religion or belief, encompassing education, draconian terrorism legislation
and various administrative penalties, including limited printing quotas for reli-
gious texts, all of which have been roundly criticized by the HRC.
Another strain in the practice of the HRC on registration has engaged the
material provisions of registration regimes specifically, contesting their legitima-
cy and compatibility with the provisions of the ICCPR. Drawing on the criticism
of Slovakia and Lithuania in 1997, these observations have generally been suspi-
cious of any substantive and definite criteria for the registration of religious com-
munities or organizations: Reviewing Belgium and Armenia in 1998, the commit-
tee reiterated its concern with numerical limits as part of registration
requirements, and the relation between registration and access to public fund-
ing.²⁰⁷ At the same session, the committee approached the issue from a different
angle during its review of Austria, expressing its concern with the restriction of
recognized minorities to “certain legally recognized groups” in Austria, and with
the legal provisions and benefits relating to the recognition of religions, which
may violate articles 18 and 26 because they distinguish between recognized
and non-recognized religions.²⁰⁸
 CCPR/CO/71/UZB: 24, 2001. These concerns were reiterated following the 2005 (CCPR/CO/
83/UZB: 22, 2005) and 2010 (CCPR/C/UZB/CO/3: 19, 2010) reviews of the state party.
 CCPR/C/KAZ/CO/1: 24, 2011.
 CCPR/C/TKM/CO/1: 17, 2012.
 CCPR/C/TJK/CO/2: 20, 2013.
 CCPR/C/AZE/CO/3: 13, 2009.
 CCPR/CO/69/KGZ: 18, 2000.
 A/57/40 (I): p. 35: 20, 2002. Similar concerns, albeit without direct references to the regis-
tration regime, were expressed following the consecutive reviews of Ukraine, in 2006 (CCPR/
C/UKR/CO/6: 12, 2006) and 2013 (CCPR/C/UKR/CO/7: 19, 2013).
 CCPR/C/79/Add.99: 25, 1998 & CCPR/C/79/Add.100: 19, 1998.
 CCPR/C/79/Add.103: 14– 15, 1998.
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In the review of Hungary in 2002, the nature and number of acceptable cri-
teria for the registration of religious communities was raised during the meeting
between the committee and the state party. The committee expressed its concern
with draft tax legislation that would be advantageous for “established church-
es”, to the detriment of other religious communities in the list of issues prior
to the meeting.²⁰⁹ Responding to the question during the meeting, a representa-
tive from the state delegation explained that the earlier legal framework had re-
quired only the support of 100 signatories for religious communities to obtain
registration with tax benefits, an arrangement that had been “abused by groups
whose activities were unrelated to religious belief”. The amendments therefore
featured “additional criteria”, attempting to define the notion of religion.²¹⁰ Ac-
cording to the draft law, religion was
…an ideology or philosophy which contained systemic convictions about the supernatural,
whose doctrines related to all reality, and which covered the whole human personality and
set standards for behaviour which did not infringe on morals or human dignity. It further
stipulated that an activity was not religious if it was primarily political, psychic, commer-
cial, educational, cultural, social or medical, or primarily pertained to sports, children, or
youth protection activities. The draft amendments also altered the registration rules in
order to ensure uniform application of the law, and allowed for different treatment of cer-
tain churches based on their differing roles in society.²¹¹
Commenting on the draft law, one member of the committee observed that there
was no universally accepted definition of religion that he was aware of, and sug-
gested that the state party should evade definitions, so as not to cast judgements
on the convictions of others.²¹² By way of elaboration, he also suggested that de-
fining religion “caused more problems than it solved”, and recommended that
Hungary promote the comparative study of religions, since ignorance was
often a source of intolerance.²¹³ Although the state representative specified
that the law had not yet been amended and no definitions had been attempted
because of the “plethora of sects” emerging in Hungary, the committee neverthe-
less expressed its concern with discriminatory practices with respect to the reg-
istration of “certain religious groups” in Hungary, urging the state party to en-
sure that religious organizations are treated in a manner that is compatible
 CCPR/C/73/L/HUN: 22, 2001.
 CCPR/C/SR.1994: 28, 2002.
 CCPR/C/SR.1994: 29, 2002.
 CCPR/C/SR.1994: 46 Amor, 2002.
 CCPR/C/SR.1994: 47 Amor, 2002.
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with the Covenant.²¹⁴ Similar sentiments were expressed to Moldova in 2002,
chastising the state party for providing “artificial hurdles” in its registration pro-
cedures, preventing individuals and organizations from exercising their religious
freedom.²¹⁵ These concerns were reiterated during the 2009 review of Moldova,²¹⁶
and were echoed in observations following the 2011 review of Mongolia, where
the committee criticized the “burdensome administrative procedures” for regis-
tering religious communities.²¹⁷
Reviewing Luxembourg in 2003, the committee encountered a novel ap-
proach to the criteria necessary to obtain registration as a religious organization.
In the list of issues prior to the meeting, the committee questioned the criteria
employed by the state party in the allocation of state funds to religious commun-
ities, asking for more information on requests for financial aid from the Anglican
and Muslim communities.²¹⁸ Following the meeting,²¹⁹ the committee expressed
its concern with the criteria applied by the state party in the allocation of fund-
ing to religious organizations, which required such organizations to have “mem-
bership of a religion recognized worldwide and officially in at least one Europe-
an Union country”, as this may not be compatible with articles 18 and 26 of the
Covenant.²²⁰
Revisiting Belgium in 2004, the committee did not reiterate its concern with
the minimum membership limits of the registration regime (see above). Rather,
the list of issues requested more information on the new practice of recognizing
religious communities at the regional levels, why no mosques had been ap-
proved yet under this new practice, and what practical consequences followed
from registration.²²¹ During the meeting, a state representative explained that de-
lays in registration were due to internal disagreements within the state-appoint-
ed board of Muslim communities charged with the regional registration process,
disagreements that also encompassed the proper criteria for registration.²²² Clos-
ing the session, a member of the committee observed that Belgian authorities
could have done more to avert the problems leading to the lack of registered
 CCPR/CO/74/HUN: 14, 2002.
 CCPR/CO/75/MDA: 13, 2002.
 CCPR/C/MDA/CO/2: 25, 2009.
 CCPR/C/MNG/CO/5: 24, 2011.
 CCPR/C/77/L/LUX: 15, 2002.
 Unfortunately, the summary records of the session, CCPR/C/SR.2080, CCPR/C/SR.2081 and
CCPR/C/SR.2089 are not available in any official records of the UN, or in any other online data-
base.
 CCPR/CO/77/LUX: 7, 2003.
 CCPR/C/80/L/BEL: 21, 2003.
 CCPR/C/SR.2198: 37, 2004 (translation from the French original), CCPR/C/SR.2199: 13, 2004.
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mosques,²²³ a concern that was also expressed in the concluding observations of
the committee, where it added that the state party should step up its efforts to
ensure that Islam enjoys the same advantages as other religions.²²⁴ During the
2010 review of Belgium, the registration of religious communities was not men-
tioned in the list of issues or concluding observations of the committee, but sum-
mary records from the meeting between the committee and the state party indi-
cate that the registration of mosques was well underway.²²⁵
Reviewing Georgia in 2007, the committee returned to the nexus between
registration of religious communities and the restitution of property confiscated
under Communist rule. In the list of issues, the committee asked whether the
state party intended to extend the legal recognition offered to the Georgian Or-
thodox Church to other communities. Additionally, the committee asked the
state party for more information on acts of intolerance aimed at religious groups
not considered “traditional”, intimating a relation between restrictive registra-
tion practices and religious intolerance.²²⁶ During the meeting, one member of
the committee questioned the rationale for the differentiated registration regime
in Georgia, and added her concerns for the lacking restitution of property to the
Armenian and Catholic communities following the end of Communist rule.²²⁷ Re-
sponding to these questions, one member of the state delegation elaborated ex-
tensively on the registration regime for other religions than the Orthodox Church,
stressing their non-discriminatory nature and compatibility with the standards
of the Covenant.²²⁸ In its concluding observations, the committee reiterated its
concern in the concluding observations that the different status of other religious
groups could lead to discrimination, and regretted lacking efforts to restitute
property confiscated during Communist rule.²²⁹
During the review of Monaco in 2008, the committee added a new dimension
to its review of registration practices, questioning the state party on the institu-
tional framework for the registration of religious organizations. While the issue
was not raised in the list of issues or the meeting with the state party, the con-
cluding observations expressed the committee’s concern with the discretion
given the state administration in deciding what constituted the “sectarian na-
ture” of applicant communities, a term the committee also requested further
 CCPR/C/SR.2199: 29 Amor, 2004.
 CCPR/CO/81/BEL: 26, 2004.
 CCPR/C/SR.2751: 46, 2010.
 CCPR/C/GEO/Q/3: 17–18, 2007.
 CCPR/C/SR.2484: 40 Motoc, 2007.
 CCPR/C/SR.2485: 19, 2007.
 CCPR/C/GEO/CO/3: 15, 2007.
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clarification of.²³⁰ Similar concerns about the institutional arrangements of reg-
istering religious organizations were expressed during the review of Azerbaijan
in 2009, where the role of the Caucasus Muslim Board in the registration process
was sought clarified in the list of issues,²³¹ and again during the meeting with the
state party.²³² A member of the state delegation explained that the role of the
board was to inform the relevant State committee “whether a given community
which applied to be registered was Muslim or not”, stressing that no commun-
ities had been denied registration so far.²³³ The committee did not find this clar-
ification sufficient, and expressed its concern with the lacking information about
the “exact composition, criteria and prerogatives” of the Board in its concluding
observations.²³⁴
In its most recent practice, the committee has continued its emphasis on the
potential for discrimination when states parties distinguish between “tradition-
al” and other religions in their registration practices, expressing their concern
for the nature and consequences of such distinctions in its reviews of Serbia
and Bulgaria in 2011.²³⁵ In a similar vein, Turkey received criticism following
its 2012 review for the restrictions imposed on religious communities that were
not covered by the 1935 Law of Foundations.²³⁶
Taken together, the practice of the Human Rights Committee on the role of
religious institutions and organizations has evolved considerably from 1993 to
2013. This evolution can roughly be divided into three sections. First, in an
early phase after the adoption of general comment 22 in 1993, the committee ap-
peared to consider recognition and regulation to be virtually coextensive, issuing
observations that criticized state favoritism towards religious communities in
general. During this early phase, the committee did not develop a geographical
focus, as states from the Middle East, Europe and Latin America received various
observations on their practices.
Second, towards the latter half of the 1990s, the committee started distin-
guishing between registration procedures, whereby minority religious groups
could seek state approval of some form, and the various modes of legal recogni-
tion, mainly constitutional provisions safeguarding the leading, prominent or
historically significant position of one or several religious organizations. During
 CCPR/C/MCO/CO/2: 13, 2008.
 CCPR/C/AZE/Q/3: 15, 2008.
 CCPR/C/SR.2639: 63 Amor, 2009.
 CCPR/C/SR.2640: 19, 2009.
 CCPR/C/AZE/CO/3: 13, 2009.
 CCPR/C/SRB/CO/2: 20, 2011 & CCPR/C/BGR/CO/3: 25, 2011.
 CCPR/C/TUR/CO/1: 21, 2012.
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this phase, the committee repeatedly expressed its concern with the potential for
discrimination inherent to such constitutional provisions. These concerns were
mostly directed towards Latin American states, although one Middle Eastern
state, two Scandinavian and one Asian state also received criticism for their pref-
erence for a majority religious organization.
In a third phase, from the middle of the 2000s and up to the present, the
committee appears to have abandoned its general skepticism towards constitu-
tional arrangements favoring particular religious organizations, concentrating
its efforts on the material provisions regulating registration practices. In these
efforts, the committee has been entirely dismissive of any forms of compulsory
registration, which has mostly been an issue in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.
Additionally, the committee has been highly critical of any substantive criteria as
part of the registration process. Numerical limits have been particularly unpop-
ular with the committee, as has any form of additional rights or privileges asso-
ciated with registration.
The main concern with criteria for registration, however, has been with the
numerous states that distinguish between “traditional” or otherwise elevated re-
ligious organizations on the one hand, and “non-traditional”, religious com-
munities on the other. Encountering such registration procedures, the committee
has consistently expressed its concern for their potentially discriminatory side
effects, echoing its former concern with constitutional privileges bestowed on
particular religious organizations. Observations on substantive criteria for regis-
tration and the relationship between such criteria and the distinction between
ordinary and traditional religious organizations have exclusively been directed
at European states. Finally, in recent years, the committee has displayed an in-
creasing interest in the institutional framework of registration, expressing its
concerns with excessive definitional powers, whether they reside in state bu-
reaucracies or in external institutions.
Despite the various twists and turns in the practice of the committee on the
recognition and registration of religious institutions and organizations, the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination runs throughout from 1993 to 2013 as an overarching
concern: in every concluding observation on the issue, the primary purpose of
the committee has been to insist on a level playing field, securing that all reli-
gious worldviews have equal access to organize and attain legal personhood,
through which they may be eligible for whatever rights and duties the states
see fit. How states should proceed in order to achieve such a level playing
field, however, is entirely another matter, as the committee has refrained from
proposing particular rules and regulations for the recognition or regulation of re-
ligious organizations, limiting its recommendations to general calls on states to
bring their legislation in line with the provisions of the Covenant.
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The unwillingness of the HRC to issue specific recommendations on the ac-
ceptable content of criteria in registration procedures echoes the general ap-
proach of the committee to the proper boundaries of religion in international
law, conceived of as a private, individual matter of conscience, principally be-
yond state control: by evading any specific recommendations, the committee
maintains the open-ended nature of the right to freedom of religion or belief en-
shrined in article 18 of the UDHR and the ICCPR, and its interpretation of this
right as “wide-reaching and profound” in its general comment no. 22. While
this unwillingness may principally conserve the intended reach of the article,
it also renders the concluding observations of the committee on the topic
vague and obfuscating, granting states wide measures of discretion.
5.6.4 Religious Law
Although the reporting guidelines of the HRC explicitly encourage states to re-
port on the existence and scope of religious law, very few states do so. Conse-
quently, the influence of religious law has been a marginal topic in the monitor-
ing practice of the committee. The committee first commented on the issue in its
review of Iran in 1993. In the list of issues, the committee requested information
on a number of topics relating to the boundaries between religious and secular
law, including:
(b)How can a conflict that may arise between the provisions of the Covenant and Islamic
law be resolved? In view of the statement made by the representative of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran during the consideration of the initial report, has there been a general review
undertaken of the compatibility of the provisions of the Covenant with Islamic law?²³⁷
Responding to these questions during the review, the state delegation dismissed
any conflict between the Covenant and Islamic law, although there was no judi-
cial precedent from the court system or the Guardian council.²³⁸ During the re-
view, one committee member summarized his many and profound concerns
on the implementation of the Covenant in the state party, as an issue directly re-
lating to the relation of religion to law:
 CCPR/C/SR.1193: 14, 1992. The list of issues is not available in the online document system
of the UN, and is therefore quoted from the summary records from the interactive meeting be-
tween the state party and the committee.
 CCPR/C/SR.1193: 16– 19, 1992.
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The main concern of members was whether the Covenant might come into conflict with
Islam. It was well known that Islam was a merciful and compassionate religion. However,
in modern times, the image of Islam had been distorted and had caused the non-Muslim
world to view Islam as isolated from its true nature. The Covenant was not a perfect instru-
ment. However, it had been formulated and adopted with the help of many countries, in-
cluding Muslim nations, and had to be accepted as it was.²³⁹
Building on this general tension, another committee member observed that the
Iranian constitutional provision on the role of Islam as the origin of all its
other laws may be in conflict with the Covenant, which could not be applied
in such a way as to reflect considerations determined by any one religion.²⁴⁰
Over the course of a record seven meetings²⁴¹ between the state party and the
committee,²⁴² every possible aspect of the interface of law and religion was dis-
cussed, before the committee issued a set of concluding observations where it
observed that it found it “somewhat difficult” to assess the compatibility of Ira-
nian laws with the Covenant due to its lack of transparency and predictability.
Furthermore, the committee noted “the numerous, explicit or implicit, limita-
tions or restrictions associated with the protection of religious values, as inter-
preted by Iranian authorities”, seriously impeding the implementation of
human rights in the state party.²⁴³
Reviewing India in 1997, one committee member commented on the different
rules for marital relations in the personal laws of Muslims and Hindus, insisting
that the freedom of religion could not be used as an excuse for religious discrim-
ination, and inquiring on the prostitution of children for religious reasons.²⁴⁴ The
 CCPR/C/SR.1193: 28, Sadi, 1992.
 CCPR/C/SR.1193: 46 Chanet, 1992.
 The standard number of meetings for the review of a periodic report at the HRC is two.
While the committee occasionally convenes three or four meetings for particularly broad assess-
ments, I have never come across any other report to which the committee has dedicated seven
meetings.
 CCPR/C/SR.1193, 1992, CCPR/C/SR.1194, 1993 CCPR/C/SR.1195, 1992, CCPR/C/SR.1196, 1993,
CCPR/C/SR.1251, 1993 and CCPR/C/SR.1252, 1994.
 CCPR/C/79/Add.25: 6, 1993. Similar sentiments were expressed during the 2011 review of
Iran, where the religious nature of the Iranian legal system became a major topic during the
meeting (CCPR/C/SR.2834: 18 Flinterman, 42 Thelin, 2012), and was followed up in the conclud-
ing observations, where the committee noted with concern that “reference is made in the State
party’s system to certain religious tenets as primary norms”, recommending the full implemen-
tation of the Covenant and suggested to the state party that it should ensure that “internal
norms” were not invoked as justification for the non-implementation of human rights provisions
(CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3: 5, 2012).
 CCPR/C/SR.1605: 4–5, 7 Medina Quiroga, 1997.
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state party pointed out that some issues were beyond the reach of the federal
state, and it was up to each regional administration to govern, including “reli-
gious and social practices, customary law, the administration of civil and crim-
inal justice, property and the transfer of land and resources”.²⁴⁵ In its concluding
observations, the committee pointed out that
…the enforcement of personal laws based on religion violates the right of women to equal-
ity before the law and to non-discrimination. It therefore recommends that efforts be
strengthened towards ensuring the enjoyment of their rights by women without discrimina-
tion and that personal laws be enacted which are fully compatible with the Covenant.²⁴⁶
While the observation stops short of recommending the discontinuation or abo-
lition of personal laws based on religious affiliation, it does imply a structural
critique of maintaining different legal rules for different religious communities.
Similar sentiments were expressed in the reviews of France and Lebanon,
also in 1997. During the review of France, one member questioned the practice
in the French Overseas Territory of Mayotte, where women retained their status
under personal laws derived from Islam, in violation of article 26 (non-discrim-
ination before the law) and 27 (the rights of minorities) of the ICCPR,²⁴⁷ to which
the state delegation responded that anyone may repudiate the personal law sys-
tem and choose to be governed by civil law instead.²⁴⁸ In its concluding obser-
vations, the committee observed that the system in the French overseas territo-
ries “might in some situations lead to discriminatory attitudes and decisions,
especially against women”, suggesting a comprehensive study to review the
legal system in Mayotte and New Caledonia in order to eliminate possible viola-
tions of article 3 on gender equality.²⁴⁹
In the review of Lebanon, the committee inquired about the existence, na-
ture and competence of religious courts,²⁵⁰ and the nature of the requirements
that eligibility for political office depended on membership in a religious com-
munity.²⁵¹ Members of the state delegation responded that religious courts main-
ly dealt with marriages, and that the only requirement for eligibility to political
 CCPR/C/SR.1605: 23, 1997.
 CCPR/C/79/Add.81: 17, 1997.
 CCPR/C/SR.1600: 13 Evatt, 1997. Medina Quiroga also “associated herself” with the question
at 14, and also suggested the practice may violate article 3 of the ICCPR on gender equality.
 CCPR/C/SR:1600: 35, 1997.
 CCPR/C/79/Add.80: 11, 1997.
 CCPR/C/SR.1578: 38 Medina Quiroga, 2000.
 CCPR/C/SR.1578: 40 Ando, 2000.
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office was religious affiliation, which “had little to do with religious faith”.²⁵²
After an extensive discussion on the competence of religious courts and the con-
sequences of membership in religious communities, one committee member con-
cluded that religion “seemed to be an obstacle” to the full implementation of the
Covenant.²⁵³ This concern was carried over to the concluding observations,
where the committee pointed out that the Lebanese system of marriage laws
and eligibility for political office dependent on religious affiliation did not com-
ply with the Covenant, and recommended the state party to conduct a review of
its legal framework on these issues.²⁵⁴
In its review of Israel in 1998, the committee expressed its concern over the
application of religious laws and the reservation against article 23 (on marriages)
of the Covenant lodged by the state party in this respect.²⁵⁵ Responding to the
question, members of the state delegation explained that secular courts had “at-
tempted to intervene” in certain matters regarding marriages, although child
marriages, which were acceptable within the Jewish and Muslim courts, were
“very uncommon”.²⁵⁶ In its concluding observations, the committee expressed
its concern with the religious courts and their rules on marriages and burials,
with no civil alternative. The committee suggested that the state party should “fa-
cilitate civil alternatives” for those not belonging to a religion.²⁵⁷
The early practice of the HRC on the influence of religious law on the imple-
mentation of the provisions of the ICCPR was careful to relate its comments to
material provisions of the Covenant. This basic line of argument has also been
consistent throughout the later practice of the committee on the topic of religious
laws, where the committee has combined observations on the provisions of the
ICCPR violated by the existence and enforcement of specific legal rules derived
from religious traditions with recommendations to states parties to eliminate
these violations through recourse to legal reforms.
Such concluding observations have been issued on the detrimental effects of
applying the Islamic Sharia to the equality between men and women in Gam-
 CCPR/C/SR.1578: 50, 59, 2000.
 CCPR/C/SR.1579: 63 Ando, 2000 (translation from the Spanish original).
 CCPR/C/79/Add.78: 18, 19, 22, 1997.
 CCPR/C/SR.1676: 4 Lallah, 8 Medina Quiroga, 1998. The reservation lodged by Israel reads
as follows: “With reference to Article 23 of the Covenant, and any other provision thereof to
which the present reservation may be relevant, matters of personal status are governed in Israel
by the religious law of the parties concerned. To the extent that such law is inconsistent with its
obligations under the Covenant, Israel reserves the right to apply that law”. United Nations Trea-
ty Collection https://treaties.un.org/ (accessed 31.08.2016).
 CCPR/C/SR.1677: 55, 57, 1998.
 CCPR/C/79/Add.93: 29, 1998.
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bia,²⁵⁸ Greece²⁵⁹ and Indonesia,²⁶⁰ the discrimination against non-Catholic cou-
ples in Costa Rica, where only Catholic marriages have civil effect,²⁶¹ and on
the binding effects and lack of appeal in decisions taken by religious courts in
Ethiopia regarding inheritance, marriage, divorce and the guardianship of mi-
nors.²⁶² The Philippines has been criticized for its acceptance of religious courts
sanctioning underage marriages and polygamy,²⁶³ while Djibouti has been urged
to “harmonize” its interpretations of the Islamic Sharia on inheritance, divorce,
marriage and other family matters.²⁶⁴
The monitoring practice of the HRC on religious law displays the broad inter-
face between religiously derived legal rules and key provisions of the Covenant.
Unlike CERD, which has primarily stressed the discriminatory potential of apply-
ing religious laws, the HRC has emphasized the clash between the material pro-
visions of Catholic and Islamic law and provisions of the Covenant, in particular
regarding its rules on marriage and divorce (article 23)²⁶⁵ and on the access to
due process (article 14).²⁶⁶
 CCPR/CO/75/GMB: 16, 2004.
 CCPR/CO/83/GRC: 8, 2005.
 CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1: 6, 2013.
 CCPR/C/CRI/CO/5: 10, 2007.
 CCPR/C/ETH/CO/1: 22, 2011.
 CCPR/C/PHL/CO/4: 11, 2012.
 CCPR/C/DJI/CO/1: 7, 2013.
 Article 23 reads in full: “1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 2. The right of men and women of marriage-
able age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized. 3. No marriage shall be entered into
without the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 4. States Parties to the present Cov-
enant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as
to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be
made for the necessary protection of any children.”
 Article 14 reads in full: “1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or
part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a demo-
cratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would
prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit
at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires
or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children. 2. Everyone
charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law. 3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) To be informed promptly and
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5.7 Summary
As the monitoring body entrusted to oversee the implementation of the ICCPR,
the concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee carry great influ-
ence, both on the practice of the other treaty bodies, and well beyond the United
Nations. Hence, the way the committee approaches religion has potentially far-
reaching consequences for how the concept is understood and conceptualized.
Unlike the other treaty bodies, to which the notion of religion is mostly periph-
eral or secondary in nature, the HRC monitors a comprehensive set of provisions
on religion, at the heart of which lies its approach to the content and scope of
article 18.While the concluding observations issued by the committee on minor-
ities, discrimination, organizations and the role of religious law can sometimes
leave out reference to article 18, the underlying notion of religion informing
the work of the committee is mainly derived from the distinction in the provision
between deeply held beliefs within an untouchable forum internum and its exter-
nal manifestations, which can be displayed within the confines of a closely cir-
cumscribed forum externum (see chapter 3).
Despite its dominance, the “Protestant” notion of religion developed in arti-
cle 18, where belief is primary and all its external trappings are secondary, is
in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate
with counsel of his own choosing; (c) To be tried without undue delay; (d) To be tried in his pres-
ence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance as-
signed to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by
him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; (e) To examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of wit-
nesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (f) To have the free
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court; (g)
Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 4. In the case of juvenile per-
sons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of pro-
moting their rehabilitation. 5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction
and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law. 6. When a person has by a
final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has
been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact
shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered
punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is
proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to
him. 7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has al-
ready been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of
each country.
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constantly played out in contrast to more subtle and implicit notions of religion/
s conceived of as identity or as a social phenomenon. Throughout its monitoring
practice, the HRC has developed its approaches to religion by contrasting the
freedom of each individual to the established powers of state-sanctioned reli-
gious dogma and the powers of religious institutions and organizations in soci-
ety. In these observations, the committee has consistently used the norms of the
ICCPR on the freedom of religion or belief, the right to non-discrimination and
the rights of minorities to limit the social, political and legal influence of reli-
gious communities and organizations. In this way, the HRC frequently construes
social and organizational dimensions of religion as the “other”, the counter con-
cept and chief limitation of the rights of each individual under article 2 to equal
treatment, under article 18 to enjoy freedom of religion or belief, and under 27 to
profess and practice their own religion.
This preference for the individual over the collective in religious matters is
perfectly in line with the practice of the committee under its individual com-
plaints mechanism and the tenor of its general comment no. 22, both of which
emphasize the broad and pervasive rights of individuals to choose their own be-
liefs and the clear-cut limits of states’ involvements with these beliefs. Within
this particular frame of reference, the social, cultural or any other role played
by religious doctrines, practices and beliefs, merit no more special treatment
or concern than do comparable, non-religious alternatives. As such, the religion
encountered by the HRC beyond its core provisions remains largely undifferen-
tiated from its surroundings.
In this particular respect, the HRC is alone among the treaty bodies exam-
ined in this book: From the tentative suggestions of CERD that religious differen-
ces, leaders and doctrines can play a role in preventing or exacerbating violent
conflict and to the broad-based engagement with religious leaders prescribed by
the committees monitoring CEDAW and the CRC, the other committees increas-
ingly see the social role of religion as decisive to the successful implementation
of the treaties they are set to monitor. The disinterest in religion is all the more
striking for the HRC due to its role as the committee in charge of the legal frame-
work that most decisively influences the legal boundaries for religious individu-
als, communities and organizations in society.
The tendency of the HRC to only address religion whenever it is explicitly
covered by one or more of its material provisions brings its approach close to
that favored by actors at the first United Nations, as an unspecified, yet ultimate-
ly benevolent force in society that should be cherished and protected. By evad-
ing the actual influence of the social, political and cultural, or simply “lived” no-
tions of religion (see chapter 8) in the societies that it monitors, the committee
has been able to focus stringently on the material provisions of the ICCPR that
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explicitly regulate religion in some way or form. Whenever it has encountered
states that have sought to pin down one specific approach to religion, particular-
ly in their registration procedures, the committee has been adamant that no spe-
cific definition should be adopted. Likewise, its general comment no. 22 on the
interpretation of article 18 stresses that belief and religion are to be “broadly con-
strued”, and that they should not be limited to “traditional religions or to reli-
gions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to
those of traditional religions”. This via negativa approach secures the lofty am-
bitions of the political actors of the first UN to keep the concept of religion
open and inclusive. However, by refusing to fill the concept with any content,
and by ignoring the social and cultural role of religion in human rights treaty
implementation, the HRC simultaneously complicates the “vernacularization”
of the provisions on religion in the ICCPR.
Parallel to its refusal to allow any substantial content to the concept of reli-
gion, the legalism of the HRC has led it to urge states to adopt legislation that
protects the rights of religious minorities, even in cases where it has not contest-
ed the lack of such minorities in the state in question: From its literal, legalist
reading of the obligations on states parties under article 27 of the ICCPR, all
states are required to adopt legal measures protecting the rights of ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic minorities. Hence, the committee requires the adoption of cat-
egories of minority identification that do not necessarily align well with how dif-
ferent segments of the population identify themselves. In this way, the HRC runs
the risk of “religionizing” the minority concept in states where no such identifi-
cation has previously been common—not unlike the “ethnicization” of minorities
advised by CERD (see chapter 4).
152 5 The Human Rights Committee
6 The Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women
6.1 Introduction
Before CEDAW entered into force in 1981 upon the 20th ratification of the instru-
ment, the convention had earned the questionable reputation of provoking the
largest number of reservations from substantial articles of any UN human rights
treaty (Riddle 2002: 606).While religion is not a part of the convention text, it is
a significant rationale cited by states parties for their reservations (Krivenko
2008: 117). Like every other human rights treaty, CEDAW has a clause (28(2))¹ pro-
hibiting reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty; however, as with every other similar treaty, the clause has never been ap-
plied, a decision for which the committee has received criticism (Minor 1994:
145).
Adopted in 1979, in the middle of the United Nations Decade for the Ad-
vancement of Women (1975– 1985), CEDAWwas the end result of a drafting proc-
ess effectively started with the creation of the Commission on the Status of
Women (CSW) under the auspices of the ECOSOC in 1946. The issue of women’s
rights gained momentum at the UN in the 1960s, particularly after the adoption
of ICERD, the ICESCR and the ICCPR, simultaneously setting precedents for the
formation of human rights treaties, and reproducing the gender-biased cata-
logues of rights launched in the UDHR in 1948 (Charlesworth 1995: 104– 108).
While equality between the sexes was included in all prior instruments, either
relating specifically to the provisions of treaties (ICERD and the ICESCR), or
also more generally to the rule of law (the ICCPR), neither of these instruments
touched upon the gendered nature of social and legal issues like the structure of
family life and procedures governing marriage (Defeis 2011: 400).
The legal framework creating a committee for the monitoring of CEDAW
spans only five articles: Created by article 17(1)² of CEDAW, the committee is em-
 Article 28(2) reads: “2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present
Convention shall not be permitted.”
 Article 17(1) reads: “1. For the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementa-
tion of the present Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) consisting, at the time of
entry into force of the Convention, of eighteen and, after ratification of or accession to the Con-
vention by the thirty-fifth State Party, of twenty-three experts of high moral standing and com-
petence in the field covered by the Convention. The experts shall be elected by States Parties
OpenAccess. © 2018 H. Årsheim, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
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powered under article 21(1)³ to make “suggestions and general recommenda-
tions” based on the examination of state reports, which are to be submitted
by states parties every fourth year after the initial report, a procedure closely re-
sembling earlier instruments. Unlike its predecessors, each composed of 18 mem-
bers, the CEDAW committee has 23 members.
CEDAW does not mention religion either in the preamble or in substantial
articles. Rather than reproducing the list of prohibited grounds from discrimina-
tion from the UDHR, the drafters of CEDAW modeled the convention on the ap-
proach taken in ICERD article 5, in which the prohibited grounds of discrimina-
tion are applied to a wide range of fields. Unlike ICERD, however, CEDAW does
not presume the pre-existence of these rights, but creates them as additional ob-
ligations on states parties. Article 1⁴ lists political, economic, social, cultural,
civil or any other fields as domains in which women and men should enjoy
equal rights, while subsequent articles elaborate on the specific legislative meas-
ures to be adopted by states parties in each field.
While articles 10 (equal access to education),⁵ 12 (equal access to health
care, including family planning),⁶ 15 (equality before the law)⁷ and 16 (equality
from among their nationals and shall serve in their personal capacity, consideration being given
to equitable geographical distribution and to the representation of the different forms of civili-
zation as well as the principal legal systems.”
 Article 21(1) reads: “The Committee shall, through the Economic and Social Council, report
annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make sugges-
tions and general recommendations based on the examination of reports and information re-
ceived from the States Parties. Such suggestions and general recommendations shall be included
in the report of the Committee together with comments, if any, from States Parties.”
 Article 1 reads in full: “For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “discrimination
against women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or
any other field.”
 Article 10 reads in full: “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of ed-
ucation and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: (a) The same con-
ditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to studies and for the achievement of
diplomas in educational establishments of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas;
this equality shall be ensured in pre-school, general, technical, professional and higher techni-
cal education, as well as in all types of vocational training; (b) Access to the same curricula, the
same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard and school premises
and equipment of the same quality; (c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of
men and women at all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation and
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in marriage and family relations)⁸ frequently interact with religious laws, doc-
trines and practices, the key provisions of CEDAW when faced with the potential
impact of religion is article 2 (f):
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by
all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against
women and, to this end, undertake
(…)
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
and article 5(a):
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
other types of education which will help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of
textbooks and school programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods; (d) The same oppor-
tunities to benefit from scholarships and other study grants; (e) The same opportunities for ac-
cess to programmes of continuing education, including adult and functional literacy pro-
grammes, particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest possible time, any gap in
education existing between men and women; (f) The reduction of female student drop-out
rates and the organization of programmes for girls and women who have left school premature-
ly; (g) The same Opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical education; (h) Ac-
cess to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and well-being of families,
including information and advice on family planning.”
 Article 12 reads in full: “1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of
men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning. 2.
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this article, States Parties shall ensure to
women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal pe-
riod, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and
lactation.”
 Article 15 reads in full: “1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the
law. 2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of
men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women
equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all
stages of procedure in courts and tribunals. 3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other
private instruments of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal ca-
pacity of women shall be deemed null and void. 4. States Parties shall accord to men and women
the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to
choose their residence and domicile.”
 See below.
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based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women;
Articles 2(f) and 5(a) do not only engage the impact of religion and culture, but
also prescribe courses of action for states facing such impact. As such, the arti-
cles represent opportunities to engage both the patriarchal and suppressive, and
the intersectional, multivalent dimensions of religion, requiring from states that
they modify patterns of conduct, in order to eliminate practices that are not fa-
vorable to gender equality.
6.2 General Recommendations
The committee monitoring CEDAW has followed the lead of previous committees
by regularly issuing general recommendations on how the provisions of the trea-
ty should be interpreted. Over the course of 34 GRs, the committee has favored a
thematic approach, frequently dedicating recommendations to cross-cutting is-
sues not covered explicitly by the convention. Across these issues, religion is fre-
quently touched upon as a linchpin in the observance of women’s rights to
equality. In GR 14 on female circumcision,⁹ the committee lists the encourage-
ment of politicians, professionals, religious and community leaders to cooperate
in influencing attitudes towards the eradication of female circumcision, which is
characterized as a “traditional practice”.
In GR 21 on equality in marriage and family relations,¹⁰ the committee com-
mented on the scope of articles 2 and 16,¹¹ which were the main causes for the
 A/45/38(SUPP), 1990.
 A/49/38(SUPP), 1994.
 Article 16 reads in full: “1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in par-
ticular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: (a) The same right to enter into
marriage; (b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their
free and full consent; (c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its disso-
lution; (d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in
matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children
and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these
rights; (f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trustee-
ship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national leg-
islation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; (g) The same personal
rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an
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unprecedented number of reservations to the convention. In the recommenda-
tion, the committee notes the alarming number of reservations and points out
that examination of states parties reports show that “common law principles, re-
ligious or customary law” provide rights and responsibilities of married partners,
rather than principles from CEDAW. Although these three legal sources “invari-
ably” restrict women’s rights to equal status and responsibility within marriage,
only religious and customary laws are singled out as areas to be confronted in
specific recommendations to states parties.
A similar sentiment was expressed in GR 23 on public and political life,¹²
where the cultural framework of values and religious beliefs was considered
to be “the most significant factors inhibiting women’s ability to participate in
public life”. Consequently, states parties were asked to provide details of any re-
strictions of women’s access to such participation, whether arising from legal
provisions, or traditional, religious or cultural practices.
While religion in GR 21 and 23 is construed as a repository of norms that
hamper gender equality, recommendations 24 on health¹³ and 25 on temporary
special measures¹⁴ are more measured, focusing on respect for local variety in
the implementation of health legislation and the convergence of multiple
forms of religion and other grounds of discrimination, respectively. In GR 28
on the core obligations of states under article 2,¹⁵ the committee engaged the
concept of intersectionality, observing that gender is a social construct arising
from the interplay with a wide range of other issues, including religion or belief:
Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of the general obligations
of States parties contained in article 2. The discrimination of women based on sex and gen-
der is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, re-
ligion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual orientation and gender identity.
Discrimination on the basis of sex or gender may affect women belonging to such groups to
a different degree or in different ways to men. States parties must legally recognize such
intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded negative impact on the
women concerned and prohibit them.¹⁶
occupation; (h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, man-
agement, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a
valuable consideration. 2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect,
and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for mar-





 CEDAW/C/GC/28: 18, 2010.
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Hence, states are encouraged to identify and change any factors that may lead to
hierarchical relationships, unequal power distribution and rights that differenti-
ate between men and women. The importance of religion to articles 2(f) and 5(a)
was also explicitly acknowledged by the committee in GR 28.
In GR 29 on the economic consequences of marriage, family relations and
their dissolution,¹⁷ the committee dealt extensively with the nature and role of
religious law, particularly as it pertains to family law in general, and to marriage
and its dissolution in particular. The committee strongly recommended that legal
arrangements governing family life should be non-discriminatory, and either
common to all, or left to individual choice, suggesting that constitutional exemp-
tions for other legal forms, such as customary or religious law, should be elim-
inated. Furthermore, the committee urged all states to implement a system of
common marriage registration, as required by CEDAW.
6.3 Individual Communications
CEDAW does not provide for individual communications, and an optional proto-
col on the issue was not agreed upon until 1999.¹⁸ By 2014, the committee had
reviewed 31 individual communications, 16 of which were deemed admissible
(Hodson 2014: 567). Among the cases brought before the committee, only the in-
admissible Kayhan v. Turkey,¹⁹ where a female teacher of religion was dismissed
for wearing a headscarf, has been related to religion, with topics like violence
against women, reproductive rights and employment dominating the case load
so far.
6.4 Reporting Guidelines
The CEDAW reporting guidelines²⁰ feature a general introduction, emphasizing
factors complicating the implementation of the convention. Rather than specific
provisions relative to each article or rights cluster, however, the guidelines ask
each state to report, relative to each article, on how previous concluding obser-
vations have been handled, information on additional legal and other steps
 CEDAW/C/GC/29, 2013.
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (A/RES/54/4), 1999.
 CEDAW/C/34/D/8/2005, 2006.
 HRI/GEN/3/Rev.3, 2008.
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taken, and remaining obstacles. The committee does not request any particular
information on religion. The International Women’s Rights Action Watch²¹
(IWRAW) has published an online guide for NGOs to the CEDAW reporting pro-
cedure, but without rights-specific recommendations.²²
6.5 The Religion of CEDAW
Despite its omission from the treaty provisions, the centrality of religion to the
interpretation of the CEDAW is not disputed: reservations are commonly motivat-
ed by the predominance of religious law (Krivenko 2008: 122), and the prevalence
of religion in the practice of the CEDAW committee entails that “the references to
culture and tradition as needing redefinition (…) should be taken as including
religion” (Evans and Whiting 2006: 12), an assessment supported by the conclud-
ing observations by the committee on this topic, which tend to include religion
both as part of the patterns of conduct to be modified, and as practices that
should be eliminated (see below).
The committee monitoring CEDAW has regularly engaged religion as a sur-
rounding feature, as an irritant preventing the proper implementation of its
core provisions on gender equality and related issues. In this way, the approach
to religion at the committee is characterized by a perceived outsider perspective,
akin to the dominant perspective among actors at the second, technocratic level
of the UN,where religion is simply one among many obstacles to be surpassed in
order to perform the actual work. The religion recognized by the committee has
two dimensions, both of which are primarily social, influencing the context for
the implementation of provisions on gender equality: the primary dimension
to religion is its role as a patriarchal system of norms that legitimize the subju-
gation of women across a wide number of different social arenas, including law
and religious institutions and organizations.
The second dimension to religion, however, is a more nuanced and less
clear-cut appreciation of the social role played by religion as one of several in-
tersecting dimensions to identity and daily life, a role that can be both detrimen-
tal and conducive to the implementation of human rights provisions in unequal
measures. Encountering this second dimension to religion, the committee has
 The IWRAW was organized in 1985 at the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi,
Kenya, to promote recognition of women’s human rights under the CEDAW, and works primarily
with capacity-building among NGOs reporting to the CEDAW. http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
iwraw/ (accessed 31.08.2016).
 http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iwraw/proceduralguide-08.html (accessed 31.08.2016).
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gradually become more accommodating, recognizing the need to work with reli-
gious leaders and institutions to gain progress in the implementation of its core
provisions (see below).
6.6 Approaches to Religion in the Monitoring Practice
CEDAW, 1993–2013
6.6.1 Minorities
Religious discrimination and the rights of women belonging to religious minor-
ities have not been major topics in the practice of the committee. Article 2 of
CEDAW has comprehensive provisions on non-discrimination in all fields,²³
and the majority of its provisions outline the obligations of states to adopt legis-
lation and policies that promote the equality of men and women, including the
adoption of “temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equal-
ity” in article 4.²⁴ While the role of majority religions in creating or amplifying
discrimination against women across a variety of social arenas has been fre-
 Article 2 reads in full: “States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its
forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating dis-
crimination against women and, to this end, undertake: (a) To embody the principle of the
equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if
not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the prac-
tical realization of this principle; (b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, in-
cluding sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; (c) To estab-
lish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through
competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women
against any act of discrimination; (d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrim-
ination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in con-
formity with this obligation; (e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women by any person, organization or enterprise; (f) To take all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices
which constitute discrimination against women; (g) To repeal all national penal provisions
which constitute discrimination against women.”
 Article 4 reads in full: “1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination
as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the mainte-
nance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objec-
tives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.
2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in
the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.”
160 6.6 Approaches to Religion in the Monitoring Practice CEDAW
quently addressed by the committee (see below), discrimination against women
on the grounds of their religious beliefs or minority affiliations has only rarely
been commented by the committee.
The committee addressed the issue of religious discrimination against mi-
norities during the review of Israel in 1997: Commenting on the definition of mi-
norities in the state party, one member observed that the classification of Arab
and Palestinian women as belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, and
not national minorities, was disadvantageous.²⁵ Another questioned the inequal-
ity of access to services among minority women subject to violence and the role
of religious fundamentalism in the increasing harassment of women,²⁶ and a
third voiced her concern with stereotypes among religious groups, asking
“whether the Government had the political will to draw a clear distinction be-
tween political and religious authority, especially in cases where such stereo-
types and customs were most harmful to women”.²⁷ Although the committee
commented on the specific challenges faced by women who belong to a religious
minority, it was also critical of the religious traditions with which these women
identified, signaling a somewhat different conception of minorities from that of
the other committees, which have generally not ventured into discussions of the
minorities within minorities issue (see above), and have been adamant that
states should provide protection for religious minorities.
Responding to these concerns, the Israeli state delegation provided a com-
prehensive account of the measures implemented to improve the situation of
Arab minority women in Israel, introduced with the assertion that
Israel was a Jewish nation and a democratic State that guaranteed equality to all of its citi-
zens, regardless of their religion, race or sex. All citizens and residents of Israel—Jews and
non-Jews, women and men—were equal before the law and received the same protection
under the law. Each social and ethnic community in Israel had the opportunity, within
legal bounds, to express its uniqueness, particularly with regard to religion.²⁸
Commenting on the “cultural” roots of misogynistic practices, a member of the
state delegation said that the Israeli state abhorred such practices, and had im-
plemented numerous measures to prevent culturally related acts of violence
against minority women, including the creation of an “underground railroad”
to transport women and children to safety.²⁹
 CEDAW/C/SR.351: 4 Aouij, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.351: 12 Javate de Dios, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.351: 13 Castillo, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.354: 3, 1997.
 CEDAW/C/SR.354: 9, 1998.
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Following a lengthy list of measures adopted by the government to prevent
discrimination of Arab women in Israel, one member of the committee expressed
her concern with the refusal of the Israeli delegation to address the challenges
faced by Palestinian women, an attitude she contended was unhelpful for a dia-
logue with the committee on the issues in question.³⁰ Another member suggested
that the recognition of the Palestinians as a national minority should become
part of the Israeli Basic Law, respecting their history, religion, culture and iden-
tity.³¹ In its concluding observations, the committee did not raise the issue of the
legal recognition of the Palestinians as a national minority, but expressed its
concerns with the different standards of living and health, and levels of and ac-
cess to education among women from non-Jewish minorities, in particular Arabs
and Bedouins.³² Similar concerns with the status of Arabs and Bedouins in the
state party were expressed following the 2005 and 2011 reviews of Israel.³³
The reviews of Israel are largely representative for the views expressed by
the committee on the topic of religious discrimination, which have been concen-
trated on de facto discrimination,³⁴ under which women face challenges related
to their identity as members of religious minorities. Whereas other committees
have commented on religious discrimination as an issue experienced by minor-
ities in general, the CEDAW committee has consistently engaged the specific na-
ture of religious discrimination experienced by minority women: In consecutive
concluding observations issued to Greece in 2002, 2007 and 2013, the committee
has emphasized the plight of women in the Muslim minority in Thrace who are
not covered by the general laws of Greece concerning marriage and inheritance,
and therefore at risk of polygamous unions and repudiation as a form of mar-
riage cancellation.³⁵ Similar concerns regarding the inequality in marriage and
 CEDAW/C/SR.354: 44 Aouij, 1998 .
 CEDAW/C/SR.354: 50 Ferrer, 1998.
 A/52/38/Rev.1(SUPP): 161–162/176, 1997.
 CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/3: 31–36, 39–40, 2005 & CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/5: 32–47, 2011. The concluding
observations following the 2011 review also featured criticism against the specific problems ex-
perienced by Palestinian women with family reunification and house demolitions (CEDAW/C/
ISR/CO/5: 24–28, 2011).
 A rare exception is the concluding observations issued to the Republic of Korea following its
1998 review, where the committee recommended the state party to recognize a full definition of
discrimination in its Equality Act, which would include “discrimination on the basis of religious
beliefs, political preferences, age or disability” (A/53/38/Rev.1: 372, 1998).
 A/57/38(SUPP): 295–296, 2002, CEDAW/C/GRC/CO/6: 33, 2007 & CEDAW/C/GRC/CO/7: 36,
2013. During the 2013 review, the committee also expanded its observations on the particular
challenges facing women from the Muslim minority in accessing education, social benefits
and health care, and participating in public life (CEDAW/C/GRC/CO/7: 32, 2013).
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numerous other violations against religious minority women have been ex-
pressed in concluding observations issued to India,³⁶ Thailand,³⁷ The Philip-
pines,³⁸ New Zealand,³⁹ Myanmar⁴⁰ and Pakistan.⁴¹
Reviewing France in 2003, the committee expanded on its earlier skepticism
towards gender equality within religious minority groups. In its concluding ob-
servations, the committee expressed its concern with
the continuing discrimination against immigrant, refugee and minority women who suffer
from multiple forms of discrimination based on sex and on their ethnic or religious back-
ground, in society at large and within their communities. The Committee regrets the very
limited information provided in the reports with regard to violence, including domestic vi-
olence, against immigrant women and girls.⁴²
In order to eliminate these multiple forms of discrimination, French authorities
were advised to respect and promote the human rights of women over “cultural
practices”, and to conduct “awareness-raising programmes” targeting the com-
munities in question.⁴³
Prior to the consecutive review of France in 2008, the committee emphasized
an entirely different dimension to the minority complex, when it sent the state
party a list of issues where it referred to the earlier request by the Committee
on the Rights of the Child on the consequences of the prohibition of “ostensible”
signs or dress indicating religious allegiance at school.⁴⁴ In its response to this
list, the French government responded that the ban had been implemented in
an “atmosphere of calm”, with less than 10 pupils per year found in violation
of the ban, the introduction of which had allowed many pupils “to understand
the meaning of the principle of secularism”.⁴⁵ The ban on ostentatious religious
wear or symbols was also raised during the meeting between the state party and
the committee, as one member of the committee questioned the validity of infor-
mation that women who wore the veil were denied nationality, which would vi-
olate article 9 of the convention.⁴⁶
 A/55/38(I): 68–69, 2000.
 CEDAW/C/THA/CO/5: 35–36, 2006.
 CEDAW/C/PHI/CO/6: 29–30, 2006.
 CEDAW/C/NZL/CO/6: 26–27, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/MMR/CO/3: 42–43, 2008.
 CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/4: 37–38, 2013.
 A/58/38(SUPP): 275, 2003.
 A/58/38(SUPP): 276, 2003.
 CEDAW/C/FRA/Q/6: 15, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/FRA/Q/6/Add.1: p.22, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SR.817: 54 Belmihoub-Zerdani, 2008.
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By way of response, a member of the state delegation explained that the ban
was only in force in schools, and was not intended to penalize girls, but to pro-
tect them, by giving them “the opportunity to have the experience of not wearing
the veil”.⁴⁷ Several committee members found the answers of the French author-
ities unsatisfactory, questioning the ability of poor immigrant families to afford
private educational alternatives, and characterizing the ban as a “fundamental
violation of girls’ human rights”.⁴⁸ Although these concerns were dismissed by
the state delegation,⁴⁹ the committee carried its concerns with the ramifications
of the ban to its concluding observations, in which it urged the state party to
make sure that the rights of girls to education and inclusion in all facets of
French society were not violated.⁵⁰
The two sets of observations issued to France show the dilemmas of the “mi-
nority within minority” issue, as the committee simultaneously had to consider
the religious discrimination against women within minority groups, as it did in
the 2003 review, but also within larger society, as it did in the 2008 review. Si-
multaneously, the observations illustrate how the treaty body machinery can
generate multiple perspectives on the same issue, as it highlighted a dimension
to the French law on ostentatious religious symbols that escaped criticism from
both the HRC (see chapter 5) and the CRC (see chapter 7).
The committee revisited the question of discriminatory effects of bans on the
Islamic veil in its review of Belgium in 2008. During the meeting, one member
questioned the effects of the banning of the veil and whether the authorities
had consulted the Islamic community prior to the imposition of the ban,
which she claimed could be interpreted as a form of legitimized racism and in-
tolerance. ⁵¹ Another committee member declared that, while she “quite under-
stood the need for schools to exercise autonomy and for teachers to be neutral”,
her main concern was the broader scope of the Belgian ban which empowered
administrators beyond the educational sector to impose similar bans.⁵² In its
concluding observations, the committee expressed its concern with the discrim-
inatory effects of the veil ban for girls from ethnic and religious minorities and
their access to education. Additionally, the committee was concerned with the
 CEDAW/C/SR.817: 55, 2008.
 CEDAW/C/SR.818: 3 Dairiam, 5 Ara Begum, 2008.
 CEDAW/C/SR.818: 7, 2008.
 CEDAW/C/FRA/CO/6: 20, 2008.
 CEDAW/C/SR.852: 41 Coker-Appiah, 2009.
 CEDAW/C/SR.852: 68 Gabr, 2009.
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multiple forms of discrimination experienced by immigrant, minority and refu-
gee women on the basis of sex and ethnic or religious background.⁵³
Reviewing Germany in 2004, the committee addressed the minority within
minority question from a different angle: While the question was not raised
during the meeting with the state party, the committee dedicated a substantial
paragraph to the issue in its concluding observations, where it emphasized the
increased vulnerability of women suffering from multiple forms of discrimina-
tion, based on sex, ethnic or religious background and race to trafficking and
sexual abuse. Expressing its concern with the lacking information on women
in such precarious situations in the German periodic report, the committee re-
minded the state party of its obligations under the convention to eliminate dis-
crimination against migrant and minority women, “both in society at large and
within their communities, and to respect and promote their human rights,
through effective and proactive measures, including awareness-raising pro-
grammes”.⁵⁴
Concerns with violence and discrimination suffered by migrant women with-
in their own communities were reiterated following the consecutive review of
Germany in 2009, although not linking the issue explicitly to religious minori-
ties.⁵⁵ Whereas observations issued to France and Belgium highlighted the chal-
lenges experienced by religious minority women seeking educational alterna-
tives, the observations issued to Germany stressed the precarious situations in
which religious minority women found themselves more generally, thereby wid-
ening the critique of the committee against the minority within minority issue
from an issue-specific to a systemic level. In its more recent practice, the commit-
tee has mostly been concerned with discrimination faced by women from reli-
gious minorities in society at large, as The Netherlands⁵⁶ and Indonesia⁵⁷ have
both received concluding observations expressing the committee’s concern
with the multiple forms of discrimination experienced by women from minority
religious backgrounds.
Taken together, the practice of the CEDAW committee on religious discrimi-
nation and religious minorities is almost entirely dedicated to the de facto chal-
lenges faced by women from minority religious groups. Lacking any material
provisions on religious discrimination to monitor, the committee has relied on
its general provisions on discrimination to emphasize the precarious situation
 CEDAW/C/BEL/CO/6: 35–36, 39, 2008.
 A/59/38(SUPP): 394–395, 2004.
 CEDAW/C/DEU/CO/6: 59–60, 2009.
 CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/5: 42–43, 2010.
 CEDAW/C/IDN/CO/6–7: 45–46, 2012.
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of women who suffer multiple forms of discrimination due to their membership
in minority religious groups. The committee has focused on religion both as a
patriarchal force in society that is harmful to women, but also as critical to
the identity of minority women suffering multiple forms of discrimination, sug-
gesting a more expansive reading of religion than its erstwhile religion-making,
which tends to construe religion primarily as a repressive social force.
Over the course of several observations issued to European states in the mid-
2000s, the committee has observed the tension between these different sources
of discrimination against religious minority women, emanating both from wider
society, and from repressive elements within religious traditions, the so-called
“minorities within minorities” complex, obliging states to identify and limit
these different sources of harm. In this balancing act, the committee has been
critical towards states adopting restrictive legislation aimed at protecting
women from repressive elements within their own religious traditions, like the
bans on the Islamic veil in schools in France and Belgium, primarily because
of its detrimental effects on girls’ access to education.
6.6.2 Organizations
CEDAW has no material provisions on the recognition and registration of reli-
gious organizations. Despite the importance of religion to the implementation
of the convention, the nexus between state authority and religious organizations
has only sporadically been addressed by the committee. Although the committee
has displayed a keen interest in the borders between secular state authority and
religious laws, doctrines and practices, these have generally not been related to
particular institutions or organizations, but have addressed the larger social role
of religion in society (see below). Nevertheless, the CEDAW committee has issued
concluding observations that address religious institutions directly, either re-
garding their general relations to the state party, or, more frequently, regarding
their influence on the access to and content of education.
The committee first commented on the role of religious institutions during its
1997 review of the small island nation of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. In the
meeting with the state party, one member of the committee questioned the del-
egation on the prevention of teenage pregnancies, expressing her surprise with
the limited success of churches in dissuading teenagers from engaging in sexual
activity, and proposing that churches should be “actively involved in helping
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young people to understand the consequences of teenage sex”.⁵⁸ Responding to
the question, a member of the delegation explained that the churches on the is-
lands were aware of the problem, but presently not engaged in its prevention.⁵⁹
In its concluding observations, the committee recommended that the state party
include churches and other actors from civil society to help develop gender sen-
sitive sexual education that could curb the high rate of teenage pregnancies, in-
dicating a willingness to see churches as constructive participants in the realiza-
tion of women’s rights.⁶⁰
After this initially positive attitude towards the involvement of churches, the
committee developed a more critical stance over the following years. During the
review of Croatia in 1998, as part of the replies to questions on article 16 of the
convention (on marriage and family life), members of the state delegation ex-
plained that religious groups were counselling couples on family relations.⁶¹ Al-
though this was the only mention of religious groups during the meeting be-
tween the state party and the committee, the concluding observations
expressed the concern of the committee with the adverse influence of
“church-related groups” on the policies of the Croatian government on women.⁶²
Reviewing the Dominican Republic during the same session, the committee
expressed similar hostility towards the influence of churches. Prior to the meet-
ing, the committee questioned the role of churches in the state party, in partic-
ular the role of the Catholic and Evangelical churches in the National Committee
for Monitoring of the National Plan of Action of the Fourth World Conference on
Women, and the exact nature of the links between the state party and the Cath-
olic Church.⁶³ Responding to these questions, a member of the state delegation
explained that the membership of two churches in the national monitoring com-
mittee was determined on the basis of their numbers of followers and their in-
fluence on the “political, social and cultural life” of the state party.⁶⁴ On the na-
ture of the links between the state and the Catholic Church, the representative
explained that
 CEDAW/C/SR.316: 48 Abaka, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.322: 26, 1998.
 A/52/38 (I): 147, 1997.
 CEDAW/C/SR.368: 73, 1998.
 A/53/38/Rev.1: 108, 1998.
 The list of issues is not available from any of the official document sources of the UN. The
questions have been reconstructed from the summary records from the meeting with the state
party, where they are quoted by the state representative. See following notes for full references.
 CEDAW/C/SR.379: 27, 1998.
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the link between the Church and the State had been consolidated by the concordat signed
in 1954 between the Government and the Holy See. In effect, the concordat limited the im-
plementation of measures to change social norms that hindered women’s advancement.
The current reform process involved the redefinition of the State’s relationship with
other sectors, including the Church. However, that would be a complex task, in view of
the profoundly religious character of the Dominican people.⁶⁵
Another member of the delegation commented on the continued resistance from
the Catholic Church to the inclusion of sex education in the school curriculum.⁶⁶
In its response to these explanations, members of the committee expressed their
collective dismissal of the role of the Catholic Church in the state party: the pres-
sure of the church should be resisted in order to allow sex education;⁶⁷ the con-
cordat was an obstacle to progress and modernization and should be disbanded
in order to bring about a clear separation of church and state;⁶⁸ such a separa-
tion would have a profound impact on maternal mortality, abortion, the preven-
tion of HIV/AIDS and the elimination of stereotypes;⁶⁹ the “nefarious effects” of
some of the teachings of the Catholic Church on the development of adolescents
were characterized as among the most basic impediments to women’s rights;⁷⁰
and any influence of the Catholic Church on the policies of the government
would be unconstitutional, given the secular nature of the state party.⁷¹ In its
concluding observations, the committee echoed these views, noting the absence
of a clear separation between church and state, characterizing such an “inter-
mingling” of secular and religious spheres as a serious impediment to the full
implementation of the Convention.⁷²
Reviewing Ireland and Belize in 1999, the committee expanded this critical
stance towards the role of churches, particularly in education. In the review of
Belize, a member of the state delegation elaborated on the role of the church
in the formulation of policies and laws on family planning and HIV/AIDS, ⁷³
and the practice of Catholic schools to expel pregnant students⁷⁴ and to fire preg-
 CEDAW/C/SR.379: 39, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.379: 54, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.380: 28 Gonzalez, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.380: 29 Corti, 35 Ferrer, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.380: 38 Bustelo Garcia del Real, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.380: 47 Estrada Castillo, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.380: 56 Abaka, 1998.
 A/53/38.Rev.1: 331, 1998. The committee did not raise the role of the church or its relation to
the state party in any way or form during the consecutive review of the Dominican Republic (A/
59/38 (SUPP): 275–315, 2004).
 CEDAW/C/SR.432: 3, 1999 .
 CEDAW/C/SR.432: 12, 1999.
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nant, unwed teachers.⁷⁵ One member of the committee expressed her concerns
with the church-state relationship, particularly in education and health, where
the secularism of the constitution of Belize was not evident.⁷⁶ Another committee
member wondered whether the church had been invited to participate as a social
institution to prevent stereotyping of women, in line with article 5 of the conven-
tion, or whether it had simply been seen as a passive audience to the process.⁷⁷ A
third member suggested that the state party should work with Catholics who
took a liberal stance on contraception, to find a way to meet the need for family
planning under the present church-state system.⁷⁸ In its concluding observa-
tions, the committee expressed its serious concern with the church-state system
in Belize, reiterating its claim from the review of the Dominican Republic that the
“intermingling of religious and secular spheres constitute[d] a serious impedi-
ment to the full implementation of the convention”, in particular in health
and education.⁷⁹ These worries were repeated during the consecutive review of
Belize in 2007, where the committee commented the detrimental influence of
the Church over education in Belize in the list of issues,⁸⁰ during the meeting
with the state party⁸¹ and in its concluding observations.⁸²
In the review of Ireland at the same session, the committee did not comment
on the role of religious organizations in its list of issues, nor during the meetings
with the delegation from the state party. Nevertheless, the concluding observa-
tions issued by the committee noted the influence of the Church, not only on at-
titudes and stereotypes, but also on official policies, in particular women’s right
to health, including reproductive health, which was “compromised” by the influ-
ence of the Church.⁸³ In the review of the consecutive report of Ireland, the in-
fluence of the church was not mentioned whether during the meeting with the
state party or in the concluding observations of the committee.⁸⁴
During the 1990s, the views of the committee on the role of religious organ-
izations, while sparse, were fairly pessimistic, considering their influence to be
detrimental to the rights of women, particularly in the areas of health and edu-
 CEDAW/C/SR.432: 16, 1999.
 CEDAW/C/SR.432: 30 Abaka, 1999.
 CEDAW/C/SR.432: 38 Hazelle, 1999.
 CEDAW/C/SR.438: 32 Schöpp Schilling, 1999.
 A/54/38/Rev.1: 52/48, 1999.
 CEDAW/C/BLZ/Q/4: 21, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SR.794 (A): 16 Pimentel, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/BLZ/CO/4: 23, 2007.
 A/54/38/Rev.1: 180, 1999.
 CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/4–5, 2005.
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cation. However, with the exception of the criticism of the church offered in the
review of Belize in 2007,which may be considered a follow-up of the 1999 review,
the committee has abstained from criticizing the influence of religious organiza-
tions on women’s health and education in its more recent practice. By the turn of
the twenty-first century, the committee has chosen a different path, and has in-
creasingly called for the inclusion of religious organizations in the protection of
women’s rights. Reviewing Malta in 2004, the committee encountered a state del-
egation that explained how the church helped people in need and advised the
government on its work to secure gender equality.⁸⁵ Although one member of
the committee suggested that Malta should address sex education from a
“non-religious angle”,⁸⁶ these concerns were not carried over into the concluding
observations of the committee, which suggested that Maltese authorities should
continue to involve church authorities in awareness campaigns to eradicate gen-
der stereotypes in line with article 5 of the convention.⁸⁷ Similar sentiments were
expressed in the concluding observations following the review of Malta in
2010.⁸⁸
Reviewing Cook Islands in 2007, one member of the committee observed that
the boundaries between church and state seemed to be “blurred”, asking wheth-
er there were any plans to reform the church, “given that Christianity relegated
women to stereotypical roles”.⁸⁹ Responding to the question, a member of the
state delegation indicated that no such reform was underway, as the church
played a pivotal role in public life, and public events were blessed by a prayer
ceremony at the beginning and end.⁹⁰ In its concluding observations, however,
the committee did not address the issue of this fairly unequivocal “intermin-
gling” of religious and secular spheres, rather calling upon the state party to in-
volve church leaders in its efforts to raise awareness and change attitudes to pre-
vent the stereotyping of women.⁹¹
In 2008, the committee requested information from Ecuador on the safe-
guards to secure a “secular approach” to sexual and reproductive health, in
the wake of a recent bill in parliament banning a “morning after” pill.⁹² In its
written replies, the state party elaborated extensively on the intensification of
 CEDAW/C/SR.656: 2, 4, 2004.
 CEDAW/C/SR.656: 48 Schöpp Schilling, 2004.
 A/59/38 (II): 106, 2004.
 CEDAW/C/MLT/CO/4: 19, 2010.
 CEDAW/C/SR.808: 6 Shin, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SR.808: 9, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/COK/CO/1: 23, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/ECU/Q/7: 24, 2008.
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a campaign in Ecuador among “quarters close to the Catholic Church, NGOs and
conservative groups”, fighting against sexual and reproductive rights, despite
the recognition of such rights in the constitution. These groups had made a
strong impact, promoting sexual abstinence and fidelity as responses to HIV/
AIDS, reducing sexual diversity and advocating the punishment of all forms of
abortion, successfully outlawing the medication in question.⁹³ Despite these set-
backs, one member of the state delegation proclaimed the secular nature of the
recently adopted constitution of Ecuador to be one of the main aspects that se-
cured progress for women in the state party.⁹⁴ However, no member of the com-
mittee raised the issue of the influence of the church, or of the newly adopted
secularity of the state party during the meetings. In its concluding observations,
the committee restricted its recognition to noting “with appreciation” that Ecua-
dor was now a secular state that safeguarded the equal rights of men and
women.⁹⁵
During the review of Costa Rica in 2011, one committee member inquired at
some length about the ramifications of the constitutional provision that declared
that Costa Rica was a Roman Catholic state, the various impacts this status might
have for the sexual and reproductive rights of women, and how the concordat
between the state party and the Holy See affected matters of health and educa-
tion.⁹⁶ Another member asked how the influence of the Catholic Church on the
formulation of public policy affected the awareness of and access to contracep-
tion, while a third member recalled that
while it was important to take account of cultural realities, including religious traditions,
article 5 of the Convention was clear that cultural patterns of conduct must not interfere
with the equality of women with men. A secular State would provide more opportunities
for implementing the Convention.⁹⁷
Another committee member questioned the limited access to abortions due to
provisions that granted conscientious objection for health providers, addressing
the nexus between the freedom of religion or belief and surrounding human
rights directly.⁹⁸
 CEDAW/C/ECU/Q/7/Add.1: p.27, 2008.
 CEDAW/C/SR.854 (B): 2, 2008 .
 CEDAW/C/ECU/CO/7: 16, 2008.
 CEDAW/C/SR.978: 15 Schulz, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/SR.978: 43 Pimentel, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/SR.979: 49 Arocha Dominguez, 2011.
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In this way, the committee gradually developed its critique of the impact
from religious doctrines and practices, moving from initial observations concern-
ing the constitutional order of Costa Rica, via the potentially harmful effects of
religious traditions, and down to practical, material conflicts arising from the
clash between religious beliefs and the provisions of the convention. These ob-
servations were fused in the concluding observations of the committee, where it
not only referred to “the prevailing negative influence of some religious beliefs
and cultural patterns” that hampered the sexual and reproductive rights of
women, but also expressed its concern about article 75 of the Constitution (as-
serting the Roman Catholic nature of Costa Rica), which “may have an impact
on the persistence of traditional gender roles in the State party”.⁹⁹ In order to rec-
tify the situation, the committee advised awareness-raising and public education
campaigns addressing political and religious leaders with a view to bring about
changes in traditional attitudes.¹⁰⁰
In a similar vein, in its list of issues to Paraguay in 2011, the committee re-
quested information on cultural and religious stereotypes in the state party that
had prevented the adoption of a series of law proposals targeting gender equal-
ity,¹⁰¹ referred to in the periodic report submitted by the state party.¹⁰² During the
meeting, the state representative confirmed that the legislative process on gender
equality had been suspended “owing to pressure from religious fundamentalists
within the academic community”.¹⁰³ One member of the committee asked wheth-
er the state party had entered into discussions with the religious leaders fueling
the resistance,¹⁰⁴ while another observed that, although Paraguay was a secular
state, fundamentalist, anti-abortion groups exerted great political pressure.¹⁰⁵ A
member of the state delegation acknowledged the difficult pressure on the polit-
ical and legislative process to adopt new laws on abortion, “even in a secular
State”.¹⁰⁶ Following the meeting, the committee expressed its concern
about the persistence of discriminatory traditional attitudes and the prevailing negative in-
fluence of some manifestations of religious beliefs and cultural patterns in the State party
 CEDAW/C/CRI/CO/5–6: 18, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/CRI/CO/5–6: 19, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/PRY/Q/6: 8, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/PAR/6: 31, 2010.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1000: 4, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1000: 41, Ameline, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1001: 10, Pimentel, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1001: 20, 2011.
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that hamper the advancement of women’s rights and the full implementation of the Con-
vention, in particular sexual and reproductive health and rights.¹⁰⁷
The concluding observations went on to recommend that the state should con-
duct awareness-raising and public education campaigns addressing “in particu-
lar religious leaders and Government leaders to bring about changes in tradition-
al attitudes associated with discriminatory gender roles in the family”.¹⁰⁸
Reviewing Moldova in 2013, the committee questioned the dominant role of
the Orthodox Church and the level of choice for parents in religious education,
urging the state party to examine the messages conveyed through religious in-
struction to combat gender stereotyping,¹⁰⁹ to which the state delegation re-
sponded that religious instruction was optional.¹¹⁰ Another member questioned
the influence of the church on restrictions on women’s access to abortion,¹¹¹ a
concern that was not addressed by the state delegation, but was carried over
to the concluding observations issued by the committee, where it observed
that, “although the State party is a secular State, religious institutions often per-
petuate traditional gender roles in the family and in society and influence State
policies with an impact on human rights”, advising the authorities to ensure that
local authorities promote policies based on gender equality principles, “without
interference from religious institutions”.¹¹²
During the meeting with Andorra in 2013, one member of the state delega-
tion explained that the decriminalization of abortion was a particularly sensitive
topic, as the current political system of the state party had a prominent member
of the Catholic Church, the Bishop of Urgell, acting along the President of France
as a co-prince and Head of State, and progress on issues like abortion and gay
marriage would have to depend on a shift in cultural norms.¹¹³ Noting that hav-
ing a Catholic bishop as head of state may complicate the legalization of abor-
tion, one member of the committee speculated as to whether this situation
may also be turned into an advantage, as it could be a “catalyst for improving
the position of the state party on migration, given the Catholic Church’s ap-
proach to supporting all members of the community and Pope Francis’s desire
 CEDAW/C/PRY/CO/6: 18, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/PRY/CO/6: 19, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1159: 34 Halperin-Kaddari, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1159: 44, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1160: 24 Schultz, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/MDA/CO/4–5: 17–18, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1166: 18, 2013.
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to open new frontiers”.¹¹⁴ In conclusion, a member of the state delegation ob-
served that balancing a secular and a religious head of state, while challenging,
was “a great source of pride and enriched the national tapestry”.¹¹⁵ In its con-
cluding observations, the committee encouraged the state party to include the
church in its “proactive and sustained measures” to eliminate traditional stereo-
types and patriarchal attitudes, once more ignoring an obvious “intermingling”
of religious and secular spheres.¹¹⁶
Despite a limited number of concluding observations on the topic, the
CEDAW committee has gone through a considerable change in its views of the
role of religious organizations. Whereas criteria for registration or the constitu-
tional recognition of religious organizations have rarely been addressed by the
committee, several concluding observations towards the end of the 1990s indi-
cated a critical view of the role of religious organizations, in particular the Cath-
olic Church and its influence on women’s education and health. Following high-
ly critical remarks at the turn of the century, however, the committee seems to
have embraced an altogether more conciliatory approach in later years, whereby
the “intermingling of secular and religious spheres” that were considered severe
impediments in the earlier practice of the committee has been bypassed in re-
cent concluding observations, which have favored the outreach and engagement
of churches and their authorities in the implementation of CEDAW. The new ap-
proach to the role of religious organizations in the implementation of the con-
vention represents a clear departure from the overall approach to religion of
the committee, which has tended to be more critical towards the influence of re-
ligion, and in particular towards the powerful organizations of majority reli-
gions.
6.6.3 Religious Law
The committee has extensively engaged the impact of religious law on the enjoy-
ment of the rights enshrined in CEDAW since its inception. In its initial engage-
ments with legal forms outside state control, only mild reproaches towards such
arrangements were issued by the committee, notably to Bangladesh¹¹⁷ and Zam-
 CEDAW/C/SR.1166: 31 Pomeranzi, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1166: 34, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/AND/CO/2–3: 20, 2013.
 A/48/38(SUPP): 325, 1994. These concerns were reiterated by the committee following the
consecutive review of Bangladesh in 2004 (A/59/38(SUPP): 247–248. 2004).
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bia.¹¹⁸ Examining the combined initial and second report submitted by Tunisia in
1994, the committee expressed its approval of the ways in which Tunisian au-
thorities had handled the relationship between civil and religious laws since in-
dependence in 1956:
Bearing in mind Tunisia’s geo-political environment, it paid tribute to the big strides made
by the country for the advancement and empowerment of women and stated that Tunisia
could be considered, even since the 1950s, as a shining example for other countries, be-
cause of its progressive and programmative [sic] interpretation of Islam. (…) The Committee
equally noted with great admiration the existing political will to maintain progressive inter-
pretation of women’s rights under both civil and religious laws.¹¹⁹
The praise was offered despite the committee’s considerable misgivings with sev-
eral intersections of religious and civil law, notably different rules of inheritance
and marriage for women and men,¹²⁰ and the continued reservations of the Tu-
nisian government to parts of the convention for religious reasons.¹²¹ Several in-
dividual members of the committee offered their personal views on the success-
ful integration of Islamic and civil law in Tunisia,¹²² inquired which parts of the
Koran were utilized in cases of interreligious marriages,¹²³ and whether the au-
thorities had considered offering assistance to other Islamic nations or bringing
its work to the attention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).¹²⁴
The 1995 Tunisia review marks a shift, after which the committee started
commenting more extensively on the role of religious law specifically, in partic-
ular the compatibility of Islamic law with the provisions of the convention. In
line with this approach, Morocco received criticism from two committee mem-
bers¹²⁵ during its review in 1997 for its religiously inspired reservations to articles
2 and 16, before being advised by another member of the committee on the com-
patibility of Islam and women’s rights:
[Ms. Aouij] recalled that Islam had been the first of the great world religions to specifically
lay down certain basic rights for women; Islam was an adaptable religion, and its beliefs
 A/49/38(SUPP): 364–365, 1994. Similar concerns were expressed by the committee follow-
ing the 2002 and 2011 reviews of Zambia (A/57/38: 250–251, 2002 & CEDAW/C/ZMB/CO/5–6:
13–14, 2011).
 A/50/38: 222, 265, 1995.
 A/50/38: 253, 1995.
 A/50/38: 266/271, 1995.
 CEDAW/C/SR.269: 19 Tallawy, 22 Ouedraogo, 56 Corti, 1995.
 CEDAW/C/SR.269: 54 Hartono, 1995.
 CEDAW/C/SR.273: 41 Khan, 1995.
 CEDAW/C/SR.312: 18 Schöpp Schilling, 19 Cartwright, 1998.
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were capable of being harmonized with the exigencies of modern life and the consequences
of economic and social development. (…) A modern, enlightened reading of the sacred texts
would enable Islamic countries to integrate women into development, which was a prereq-
uisite for the material and cultural advancement of their societies.¹²⁶
During the final meeting of the session with Morocco,¹²⁷ the impact of religious
law on human rights compliance came to the forefront of the discussion, with
committee members weighing in on benefits and problems inherent to Islam
and human rights, and the chairperson of the committee pointing to strategies
for implementation of human rights norms developed by other countries in
which Islam was the dominant religion, notably Turkey and Tunisia.¹²⁸ The dis-
cussion was carried over into the committee’s concluding observations,which re-
quested that Morocco
persevere in using ijtihad, which was the evolving interpretation of religious texts so as to
give the necessary impetus to the improvement of the status of women and thus gradually
to change attitudes.¹²⁹
Incidentally, the committee reviewed Turkey in the same session, commending
the separation of religion from the state,¹³⁰ while expressing its concern that
“various political groups” were threatening the secular rule of law due to the
predominantly Muslim nature of Turkey’s population.¹³¹ During the review, rep-
resentatives of the state party described the grave threat to Turkey’s secular rule
posed by religious fundamentalists,¹³² a concern shared by one member of the
committee, adding that “Religion should be a matter of conscience, not of law
or force”.¹³³ The chairperson of the session, however, observed that despite the
secularity of the Turkish state, its reservations to the convention followed the
pattern of Islamic religious law.¹³⁴
In its consecutive session later in 1997, the committee expressed its serious
concern about the reported imposition of fatwas in Bangladesh “using religious
 CEDAW/C/SR.313: 11, 1998 & CEDAW/C/SR.312: 22, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.320, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.320: 47 Abaka, 1998.
 A/52/38/Rev.1: 71, 1997; underscore in the original.
 CEDAW/C/SR.319: 10 Aouij, 1998.
 A/52/38/Rev.1: 164, 1997.
 CEDAW/C/SR.318: 10, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.319: 11 Aouij, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.319: 14 Khan, 1998.
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justification to punish women”,¹³⁵ significantly expanding its critique of the par-
allel legal system in Bangladesh expressed in its 1993 review (see above). During
the review, committee members followed up their concern for the harmful influ-
ence of religious fundamentalists, commenting on Muslim groups who invoked
religion as a guise to perpetuate patriarchal traditions and preventing gender
equality in Bangladesh.¹³⁶ Several members also expressed their approval of
the withdrawal of several reservations to the convention by Bangladesh, and
their hope that these withdrawals could serve as an inspiration for other Muslim
majority countries that had entered reservations for religious reasons.¹³⁷
Starting in 2001, the committee adopted a specific, standardized response to
the influence of Islamic law on the implementation of its core provisions, issuing
similarly sounding concluding observations to the Maldives¹³⁸ and Singapore¹³⁹
on the role of Islamic law in their respective domestic legal systems. The recom-
mendation to Singapore is the more elaborate of these, and was directed at the
reservations lodged by the state against articles 2 and 16 of the convention
Recognizing that the pluralistic nature of Singapore society and its history call for sensitiv-
ity to the cultural and religious values of different communities, the Committee neverthe-
less wishes to clarify the fact that articles 2 and 16 are the very essence of obligations
under the Convention. Since some reforms have already been introduced in Muslim person-
al law, the Committee urges the State party to continue this process of reform in consulta-
tion with members of different ethnic and religious groups, including women. It recom-
mends that the State party study reforms in other countries with similar legal traditions
with a view to reviewing and reforming personal laws so that they conform with the Con-
vention, and withdrawing these reservations.¹⁴⁰
While the recommendation to the Maldives was shorter and directed at its effort
to reform its family law, the suggestion that the state party seek out the experi-
ences of other countries with similar, in this case Islamic legal systems, was
largely identical.¹⁴¹ During the meeting with representatives from Singapore,
one committee member recommended that Singapore study examples of the rec-
onciliation between Sharia and secular law from Muslim countries throughout
the world,¹⁴² without specifying which countries, and what successes had
 A/52/38/Rev.1 (SUPP): 447, 1997.
 CEDAW/C/SR.358: 9 Acar, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.358: 2 Bernard, 9 Acar, 12 Cartwright, 14 Corti and 19 Javate de Dios, 1998.
 A/56/38(SUPP): 114– 146, 2001.
 A/56/38(SUPP): 54–96, 2001.
 A/56/38 (SUPP): 74, 2001.
 A/56/38(SUPP): 141, 2001.
 CEDAW/C/SR.515: 34 Acar, 2001.
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been achieved. Several times in the first decade of the 2000s, the committee re-
peated this recommendation to countries with legislation derived from Islamic
teachings that were perceived to be in conflict with the convention, to seek
out the experiences of other Muslim countries or countries with similar legal tra-
ditions. With minor differences, such recommendations have been given to
Yemen,¹⁴³ Sri Lanka,¹⁴⁴ Malaysia,¹⁴⁵ Jordan,¹⁴⁶ Indonesia¹⁴⁷ and Djibouti,¹⁴⁸ and
repeated during the next periodic reviews of the Maldives¹⁴⁹ and Singapore.¹⁵⁰
The recommendation to states that they seek out comparative jurisprudence
from other countries with similar challenges lacks a specific reference as to
which countries have succeeded in this effort,¹⁵¹ and as to whether the compar-
ison and modification of religious law should be performed by the state or the
religious community in question. While a strict interpretation of article 2(f)
would suggest that modification or abolition of discriminatory laws are primarily
obligations upon state parties, the recommendations of the committee seem to
indicate that state parties should collaborate with religious groups in these re-
form efforts. This impression is confirmed by the concluding observations follow-
 A/57/38 (III): 393, 2002.
 A/57/38(SUPP): 275, 2002.
 CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2: 14, 2006.
 CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/4: 12, 2007.
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 CEDAW/C/DJI/CO/1–3: 13, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/MDV/CO/3: 37, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SGP/CO/3: 16, 2007.
 On one occasion, following the review of the United Arab Emirates in 2010, the committee
has expressed its “encouragement” with ongoing comparative research on the legal experiences
of other Arab and Islamic countries, although it stressed the work that still remained in this
process: “The Committee notes with satisfaction the State party’s reference to the gradual, great-
er flexibility in sharia interpretation, such as the presence of a woman judge and the debates on
the interpretation of sharia beginning to take place in relation to equality before the law and
access to justice for women. It is also encouraged by the State party’s ongoing comparative re-
search on Arab and Islamic countries and the withdrawal of reservations to articles 15 and 16 of
the Convention. Nevertheless, the Committee expresses concern about the fact that women in
the State party continue to have unequal legal capacity compared with men and are treated un-
equally in courts, and with regard to freedom of movement. (…) The Committee urges the State
party to abolish all discriminatory provisions on women’s freedom of movement. It recommends
that the State party review their reservation to article 15, paragraph 2, taking into consideration
the experiences of countries with similar religious backgrounds and legal systems that have suc-
cessfully accommodated domestic legislation to commitments emanating from international le-
gally binding instruments, with a view to its withdrawal of the reservation” (CEDAW/C/ARE/CO/
1: 45–46, 2010).
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ing up the initial recommendation to Singapore (2001) in 2007¹⁵² and 2011,¹⁵³
where the committee expressed its satisfaction that law reform was underway,
while stressing the importance of including religious groups in this effort. Sim-
ilar calls for the engagement of religious groups and their leaders in reform ef-
forts have been expressed to the Philippines,¹⁵⁴ Mauritius,¹⁵⁵ Niger,¹⁵⁶ Jordan,¹⁵⁷
Syria,¹⁵⁸ Myanmar,¹⁵⁹ Tunisia,¹⁶⁰ Uganda,¹⁶¹ Egypt, ¹⁶² Bangladesh,¹⁶³ South Afri-
ca¹⁶⁴ and Indonesia.¹⁶⁵
Additionally, the criteria for the recommendation are somewhat unclear, as
states with comparable religious legal systems that do not conform to the re-
quirements of the treaty do not receive similar recommendations. Reviewing
Ghana,¹⁶⁶ Kenya,¹⁶⁷ and Sierra Leone,¹⁶⁸ the committee observed conflicts be-
tween “Mohammedan” laws, primarily on marriages, but refrained from suggest-
ing studies of comparable legal systems. Likewise, reviewing Kazakhstan,¹⁶⁹
Azerbaijan,¹⁷⁰ Tajikistan,¹⁷¹ Bahrain,¹⁷² and Egypt,¹⁷³ the committee pointed to
the problems of parallel legal systems based on religious belonging, particularly
 CEDAW/C/SGP/CO/3: 15– 16, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SGP/CO/4: 15–16, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/PHI/CO/6: 12, 2006.
 CEDAW/C/MAR/CO/5: 13, 2006. This call was reiterated in the concluding observations is-
sued by the committee following the review of the consecutive report of Mauritius in 2011
(CEDAW/C/MUS/CO/6–7: 15, 2011).
 CEDAW/C/NER/CO/2: 16, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/4: 18, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SYR/CO/1: 18, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/MMR/CO/3: 47, 2008.
 CEDAW/C/TUN/CO/6: 17, 2010.
 CEDAW/C/UGA/CO/7: 12, 2010.
 CEDAW/C/EGY/CO/7: 16, 2010.
 CEDAW/C/BGD/CO/7: 16, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/ZAF/CO/4: 42, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/IDN/CO/6–7: 18, 2012.
 CEDAW/C/GHA/CO/5: 35, 2006.
 CEDAW/C/KEN/CO/6: 44, 2007. Similar concerns were expressed by the committee follow-
ing the 2011 review of Kenya, but with a particular emphasis on the problems associated with
exemptions from general legislation offered to Khadi courts set to adjudicate cases under reli-
gious law (CEDAW/C/KEN/CO/7: 11– 12, 2011).
 CEDAW/C/SLE/CO/5: 39, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/KAZ/CO/2: 29–30, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/AZE/CO/3: 29–30, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/3: 53, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/BHR/CO/2: 39, 2008.
 CEDAW/C/EGY/CO/7: 48, 2010.
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concerning early marriage and polygamy, but suggested a unified family law and
reforms rather than amendments to the religious legal systems through studies
of comparative jurisprudence.
Reviewing the influence from legal systems from religious traditions other
than Islam, the committee has settled for a different approach. In its review of
Israel, the committee found an undue influence of religious law on reservations
and provisions of the convention, urging the state party to alter course. However,
whereas states with Islamic religious laws were asked to study comparative juris-
prudence and to reinterpret its religious texts, Israel was requested to “complete
the secularization of the relevant legislation”.¹⁷⁴ During the review, one member
flatly stated that it was “unacceptable to base a legal system on the religious,
cultural or traditional practices of any ethnic group within a country”,¹⁷⁵ despite
the committee’s established practice of recognizing such systems and suggesting
their amendment in dialogue with the communities in question.
During the following review of Israel in 2005, the committee expressed its
concern that the state party claimed that religious laws could not be reformed,¹⁷⁶
before recommending the “harmonization” of religious laws with the convention
during the 2011 review,¹⁷⁷ indicating a possible spillover effect from its practice
on Islamic religious laws, moving from calls for secularization and the lack of
reform options and over to a view of religious laws as amenable and subject
to revision. Unlike the standardized observations issued to states with Islamic
legal systems, however, the recommendations of the committee to Israel have
been entirely unilateral, as the state has been asked to prohibit key religio-
legal concepts and limit the scope of religious courts without doing so in collab-
oration with the communities in question.
Whereas the committee suggests the reinterpretation or secularization of re-
ligious forms of law to bring it in line with the convention,¹⁷⁸ other legal systems
are sought “reviewed” for their compatibility with the convention. The latter
group is largely represented in states in Sub-Saharan Africa where legal systems
commonly interact with a mixture of parallel customary, religious or traditional
systems of law. Whereas Ethiopia was advised to review its tripartite (national,
 A/52/38/Rev.1: 173, 1997.
 CEDAW/C/SR.351: 16 Khan, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/3: 25, 2005.
 CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/5: 49, 2011.
 The major exception from this general trend is Greece,where the Muslim minority in Thrace
is governed according to Muslim personal laws. Rather than advising the state to reinterpret the
law, however, the committee asked Greece to orient Muslim women on their rights according to
civil law (CEDAW/C/GRC/CO/6: 33–34, 2007).
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customary and religious) legal system,¹⁷⁹ Namibia’s traditional courts were “rec-
ognized”, although the government was urged to ensure that those courts com-
ply with the convention.¹⁸⁰
The committee has stopped short of issuing a general dismissal of legal plu-
ralism as such, but has come close on several occasions, suggesting in its con-
cluding observations to Nigeria in 1998 that “The coexistence of three legal sys-
tems, civil, religious and customary, make it difficult to adopt and enforce laws
which genuinely protect women’s rights”,¹⁸¹ a recommendation that was repeat-
ed following the state party’s 2004 review.¹⁸² Related sentiments have been ex-
pressed towards Tanzania,¹⁸³ Equatorial Guinea,¹⁸⁴ Ghana,¹⁸⁵ India,¹⁸⁶ Sri
Lanka,¹⁸⁷ Chad¹⁸⁸ and Zimbabwe.¹⁸⁹
Despite fairly strong criticism levelled against the presence of plural legal or-
ders in general, the committee does not always recommend their unification or
dissolution: Upon the review of Vanuatu, a small island nation in the South Pa-
cific with 62 inhabited islands, the committee issued stern criticism of its custom-
ary “island courts” and the fact that religious and cultural norms were given
equal status in the constitution. However, rather than calling for the dissolution
of the island courts system, the committee recommended increased training of
its judges and the possibility to appeal customary law decisions to the civil
law system, in what amounted to a rare recognition of the potentially conducive
role played by customary law in the implementation of the convention.¹⁹⁰ Simi-
lar, conciliatory concluding observations in which plural legal systems have
been sought harmonized or amended rather than eradicated have been issued
to Madagascar,¹⁹¹ Cameroon,¹⁹² Liberia,¹⁹³ Papua New Guinea¹⁹⁴ and Ethiopia,¹⁹⁵
 A/51/38(SUPP): 139, 154, 1996.
 A/52/38/Rev.1: 126, 1997. Following the consecutive review of Namibia, these concerns were
reiterated by the committee (CEDAW/C/NAM/CO/3: 16– 17, 2007).
 A/53/38/Rev.1: 154, 1998. This general claim on the problems inherent to legal pluralism was
also raised during the review (CEDAW/C/SR.396: 14–15, 2001).
 A/59/38(SUPP): 296, 2004.
 A/53/38/Rev.1: 229–230, 1998. These concerns were reiterated by the committee following
the 2008 review of Tanzania (CEDAW/C/TZA/CO/6: 146– 147, 2008).
 A/59/38(SUPP): 192, 2004.
 CEDAW/C/GHA/CO/5: 36, 2006.
 A/55/38: 60–61, 2000. These concerns were reiterated following the 2007 review of India
(CEDAW/C/IND/CO/3: 10–11, 2007).
 CEDAW/C/LKA/CO/7: 16, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/TCD/CO/1–4: 12, 42, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/ZWE/CO/2–5: 38, 2012.
 CEDAW/C/VUT/CO/3: 38–39, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/MDG/CO/5: 37, 2008.
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suggesting the emergence of a more contextually sensitive approach to the influ-
ence of legal pluralism.
In its most recent practice, the committee seems to have embraced a more
legalist approach to adjustments of religious law, as it has increasingly refrained
from encouraging states to seek out comparative jurisprudence, settling for legal
reforms of discriminatory religious laws in the concluding observations issued to
Kuwait,¹⁹⁶ Jordan,¹⁹⁷ Comoros,¹⁹⁸ Cyprus¹⁹⁹ and Greece.²⁰⁰ One exception from
this general turn is the 2013 review of Afghanistan, where members of the com-
mittee suggested during the meeting with the state party that Afghan authorities
should seek assistance from moderate Islamic leaders attached to Al-Azhar Uni-
versity in Cairo to ensure consistency between positive law and Islamic law,²⁰¹
and that they should conduct awareness-raising campaigns to help the public
understand that harmful practices “were in fact contrary to Islam”.²⁰² These con-
cerns were also carried over to the concluding observations, where the commit-
tee suggested that the state party adopt a policy and strategy “raising the aware-
ness of religious and community leaders with the aim of preventing
misinterpretations of Sharia law and Islamic principles”.²⁰³
Taken together, the CEDAW approach to religious law is subordinate to its
general view of legal pluralism as an implicit threat to women’s rights: From
the practice of the committee, it seems evident that religious law is considered
a key building block in the social and cultural patterns that states should modify
or abolish according to article 5(a) of CEDAW. Religion, on this reading, is not
only influential, but is at the very core of the creation and maintenance of pat-
terns of conduct and practices that are detrimental to gender equality, due to its
ordered, institutional strength as a force to be reckoned with in society, as put by
a former member of the committee (Raday 2003: 667–668). This dismissive
stance notwithstanding, the tendency of the committee to recommend reinterpre-
tations of religio-legal systems in states with Islamic law, or, more recently, to
 CEDAW/C/CMR/CO/3: 47, 2009.
 CEDAW/C/LBR/CO/6: 15, 2009.
 CEDAW/C/PNG/CO/3: 50, 2010.
 CEDAW/C/ETH/CO/6–7: 13, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/KWT/CO/3–4: 51, 2011.
 CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/5: 50, 2012.
 CEDAW/C/COM/CO/1–4: 40, 2012.
 CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/6–7: 36, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/GRC/CO/7: 37, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1132: 43 Gabr, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/SR.1132: 44 Al-Jehani, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/1–2: 23, 2013.
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call for amendments of other pluralist legal systems, seems to indicate a gradual
shift towards an appreciation of salience over substance in its view of legal plu-
ralism; acknowledging the entrenched, integral nature of these forms of law in
the states in question, the committee seems to consider amendment more con-
ducive to the implementation of human rights norms than abolition.
6.6.4 The Impact of Religion
Confronted by the impact of religious doctrines and practices on the implemen-
tation of the provisions of CEDAW, the committee has developed a three-pronged
approach where it shifts between (1) the adoption and implementation of legal
measures to counter such influences, (2) calls for reinterpretation or adjustment
of the doctrines and practices in question, or (3) the engagement of religious
leaders and institutions in society.Whereas the request that states enact legal re-
forms has been central to the concluding observations of the committee through-
out its practice, calls for reinterpretations and requests for the engagement of re-
ligious leaders and the institutions they lead in protecting the rights of the
convention are later innovations, gaining momentum in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. Before this time, the committee would generally recommend that
states adopt legislation that would outlaw practices that violated article 2(f) of
the convention. Reviewing Uganda in 1995, the committee recommended that
legal measures be taken against all religious and customary practices that discriminate
against women. Furthermore, awareness programmes must be put in place to change men-
tality and attitudes. The Committee also recommends that laws be amended to empower
women in matters of inheritance and success.²⁰⁴
Hence, the committee considered a combination of awareness programs and
legal reform to be the best solution to prevent violations of the convention orig-
inating in religious and customary practices. Similar sentiments were expressed
to Turkey during its 1997 review, when the committee recommended that honor
killings “based on customs and traditions” should be “appropriately addressed
under the law”.²⁰⁵ Later that same year, however, Israel was advised only to take
“necessary steps” to eliminate forced marriages, honor killings, polygamy and
 A/50/38: 341, 1995.
 A/52/38/Rev.1: 195, 1997.
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FGM,²⁰⁶ allowing the state party to decide for itself on the best way to combat the
practice.
During the review of Indonesia in 1998, the committee stressed that tradi-
tional norms and culture and their reinforcement by the “patriarchal values of
the religion” constituted one of the main obstacles to the implementation of
the convention,²⁰⁷ and further that
[s]ome of Indonesia’s traditional values and religious principles constituted fundamental
impediments to the implementation of the Convention. Indonesia should examine its tradi-
tional values in order to determine those that were core values and those that were the re-
sult of patriarchal or historical customs, separate from the real core values. She was sure
that the basic core values of Indonesia were not in contradiction with human rights prin-
ciples.²⁰⁸
This comment encapsulates the view of values underpinning the later observa-
tions of the committee more generally: that there is a “more real”, universal,
shared core of values in states parties that are coextensive with human rights
norms in international instruments, and that values in contradiction with such
instruments are the results of external pressures in the shape of patriarchal or
historical customs. The nature of this core of values and the scope of values
that have been derived from external forces varies according to the state under
review, but the basic dichotomy of a core influenced and corrupted by external
forces prevails (see below). In its concluding observations to Indonesia, the com-
mittee suggested that the state party take account of the committee’s remarks on
religious and cultural values,²⁰⁹ and recommended that the government should
take immediate steps to eradicate the practice of polygamy and change other dis-
criminatory laws.²¹⁰
A more substantial indication of the precise nature of the core of values re-
ferred to in the review of Indonesia became apparent at the examination of Azer-
baijan, during the same session in 1998. Several committee members expressed
their enthusiasm for the secular nature of the Azerbaijani constitution,which en-
sured the separation of the state from religion.²¹¹ In the concluding observations,
however, the committee expressed its concern with the de facto discrimination
experienced by women in the state party, despite the fact that it should be “rel-
 A/52/38/Rev.1 (SUPP): 178, 1997.
 CEDAW/C/SR.378: 34, Kim, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.378: 39 Schöpp Schilling, 1998.
 A/53/38/Rev.1: 301, 1998.
 A/53/38/Rev.1: 307, 1998.
 CEDAW/C/SR.367: 24 Corti, 26 Acar, 32 Khan, 1998.
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atively easy” to implement the provisions of the convention due to the secularity
of the state, necessitating governmental commitment to “eliminate deeply patri-
archal attitudes”.²¹² During the same session, similar stress was put on the sep-
aration of the state from religious influences to the Dominican Republic, which
was asked to “take steps to ensure the de facto separation of the secular and re-
ligious spheres, with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Conven-
tion” (see above).²¹³
During the 1999 sessions of the committee, the relation between state power
and religious practices was approached in a slightly different direction by the
committee during the review of Algeria, where the “constant citing of religious
principles and cultural specificities” by the state delegation were dismissed,
and Algerian authorities asked to take measures to assure that “religious and
cultural patterns” did not inhibit the position of women in society.²¹⁴ During
the review, the Algerian delegation was assured by members of the committee
that although the state religion of Islam was a religion of tolerance, the Koran
should be reinterpreted according to the circumstances,²¹⁵ and that the state
had a responsibility to show that Islam could be adapted to take into account
women’s rights,²¹⁶ echoing the observations issued by the committee on the in-
fluence of religious laws. During the same session, the committee reviewed the
report submitted by Nepal, observing that numerous traditions and practices
detrimental to women and girls
[s]uch as child marriage, dowry, polygamy, deuki (a tradition of dedicating girls to a god or
goddess), who become “temple prostitutes”, which persists, despite the prohibition of the
practice by the Children’s Act) badi (the ethnic practice of forcing young girls to become
prostitutes) and discriminatory practices that derive from the caste system are still preva-
lent.²¹⁷
According to the concluding observations, these practices and attitudes, should
be eliminated through the adoption of policies, programs and public awareness
campaigns.²¹⁸
Reviewing Pakistan in 2007, the committee reiterated its view of a universal
core of values threatened by external, corruptive forces, but this time as a strug-
 A/53/38/Rev.1: 58, 1998.
 A/53/38/Rev.1: 351, 1998.
 A/54/38/Rev.1: 71–72, 1999.
 CEDAW/C/SR.406: 35 Aouij, 1999 & CEDAW/C/SR.407: 39 Aouij, 1999 .
 CEDAW/C/SR.406: 46 Acar, 1999.
 A/54/38/Rev.1: 153, 1999.
 A/54/38/Rev.1: 154, 1999.
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gle within a singular religious tradition. During the meeting with the state party,
the committee observed that problems with sexual stereotypes were common in
Islamic societies, questioning the delegation whether Pakistan had advocates
seeking to disseminate “the real tenets of Islam with regard to the role of
women”.²¹⁹ These views were carried over to the concluding observations,
where the committee expressed its concern with prevailing trends of fundamen-
talism, intimidation and violence in the name of religion, urging the state party
to take prompt action to counterinfluence “the misinterpretation of Islam”
among non-State actors undermining women’s rights.²²⁰
In the early 2000s, the committee added another nexus between a universal
core of values, and doctrines and practices that threatened such values: in con-
secutive concluding observations to The Democratic Republic of Congo,²²¹ Burki-
na Faso²²² and Guinea,²²³ the committee localized the origins of practices threat-
ening human rights primarily in rural areas, where “customs and beliefs are
most broadly accepted and followed”.²²⁴ While the committee recommended
the usual mixture of legal and policy measures to eradicate such practices, it
also added a new dimension to its concluding observations by suggesting that
state authorities in Burkina Faso should cooperate with numerous social actors,
including religious leaders, to “encourage a change in people’s way of thinking
and accelerate the process of the emancipation of women through law reform,
information, education and communications”.²²⁵ This recommendation inaugu-
rated the third tier of the approaches developed by the committee when faced
by the influence of religious doctrines and practices: the engagement of religious
leaders and institutions in society.
From the early 2000s and onwards, the committee has gradually expanded
its recommendations on legal and policy measures to regularly include such en-
gagement and outreach to religious leaders. The 2000s was a transitional period
where the committee oscillated between different approaches, recommending
a combination of legal and policy measures to eliminate traditional practices
and stereotypes in Zambia,²²⁶ The Republic of Congo,²²⁷ Nepal,²²⁸ Cambodia,²²⁹
 CEDAW/C/SR.781: 42 Gabr, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/3: 28–29, 2007.
 A/55/38(SUPP): 194–238, 2000.
 A/55/38(SUPP): 239–286, 2000.
 A/56/38: 97– 144, 2001.
 A/55/38(SUPP): 230, 2000.
 A/55/38: 266, 2000.
 A/57/38 (SUPP): 239, 2002.
 A/58/38 (SUPP): 183, 2003.
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Togo²³⁰ and Ghana.²³¹ Parallel to these observations the committee included rec-
ommendations to engage religious leaders in these efforts in its concluding ob-
servations to Nigeria,²³² Malta,²³³ Uzbekistan²³⁴ and The Philippines.²³⁵
In 2007, a virtual tipping point can be identified, as observations recom-
mending engagement with religious leaders became a regular feature whenever
the committee engaged the influence of religious doctrines and practices on the
implementation of the convention. These recommendations frame the role of re-
ligious leaders in this process as vital and comprehensive: In the concluding ob-
servations to Tajikistan in 2007, the committee requested that religious leaders
should be addressed in order to change the widely accepted subordination of
women and the stereotypical roles applied to both sexes, but also “targeted”
in campaigns to modify existing gender-role stereotypes and strategies to prevent
unregistered religious unions.²³⁶ Other states have been asked to eliminate neg-
ative cultural practices and stereotypes “in collaboration with” religious lead-
ers;²³⁷ to prevent harmful traditional practices “with the support of”,²³⁸ or “in-
volving” religious leaders;²³⁹ or to “encourage religious authorities to promote
positive images of women and the equal status and responsibilities of women
and men in society”.²⁴⁰ In other settings, religious leaders are viewed as recipi-
ents of knowledge, about the convention,²⁴¹ of training about gender equality
more generally,²⁴² or about the health risk of harmful practices for women.²⁴³
Taken together, these observations suggest an ambiguous role for religious
leaders, who can be of assistance on some issues, but seem to constitute obsta-
cles on others. While observations tend to suggest the involvement of religious
leaders on several issues, the most frequent ground for suggesting the engage-
 A/59/38 (SUPP): 209, 2004.
 CEDAW/C/KHM/CO/3: 36, 2006.
 CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/5: 15, 2006.
 CEDAW/C/GHA/CO/5: 22, 2006.
 A/59/38 (SUPP): 300, 2004).
 A/59/38(SUPP): 106, 2004.
 CEDAW/C/UZB/CO/3: 20, 2006.
 CEDAW/C/PHI/CO/6: 18, 2006.
 Tajikistan, CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/3: 20, 34, 36, 2007.
 Mauritania, CEDAW/C/MRT/CO/1: 22, 2007.
 Guinea, CEDAW/C/GIN/CO/6: 25, 2007.
 United Kingdom, CEDAW/C/UK/CO/6: 279, 2008.
 Yemen, CEDAW/C/YEM/CO/6: 15, 2008.
 South Africa, CEDAW/C/ZAF/CO/4: 13, 2011 and Guyana, CEDAW/C/GUY/CO/7–8: 9, 2012.
 Djibouti, CEDAW/C/DJI/CO/1–3: 25, 2011.
 Ethiopia, CEDAW/C/ETH/CO/6–7: 19, 2011.
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ment of religious leaders is the measures proposed by the committee to change
stereotypes and cultural attitudes that are not conducive to gender equality, both
of which are frequently connected to both article 2(f) and 5(a) by the commit-
tee.²⁴⁴ These suggestions are commonly localized early in the concluding obser-
vations, indicating their importance to the committee,²⁴⁵ but are often not direct-
ed towards specific practices. Rather, addressed to elusive and widely
encompassing topics like “attitudes” and “ideologies”, these suggestions relate
to the structural level of state implementation of the convention.
One particularly controversial issue that has generated a substantial number
of recommendations to involve religious leaders is the continued practice of fe-
male genital mutilation (FGM) in numerous states.²⁴⁶ Recommendations on this
topic seemingly revert to the view of the committee of a core set of values that is
coextensive with human rights, and its continued corruption through admixture
with other practices, originating in surrounding traditions, customs and culture.
The committee has been adamant that FGM “has no basis in religion”,²⁴⁷ and
 Malta (A/59/38 SUPP): 106, 2004), Uzbekistan (CEDAW/C/UZB/CO/3: 20, 2006), The Philip-
pines (CEDAW/C/PHI/CO/6: 18, 2006), Serbia (CEDAW/C/SCG/CO/1: 20, 2007), Syria (CEDAW/C/
SYR/CO/1: 18, 2007), Cook Islands (CEDAW/C/COK/CO/1: 23, 2007), Jordan (CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/4:
20, 2007), Rwanda (CEDAW/C/RWA/CO/6: 22, 2009), Tuvalu (pastors, CEDAW/C/TUV/CO/2: 28,
2009), Timor-Leste (CEDAW/C/TLS/CO/1: 28, 2009), Botswana (CEDAW/C/BOT/CO/3: 24, 2010), Tur-
key (CEDAW/C/TUR/CO/6: 21, 2010), Bangladesh (CEDAW/C/BGD/CO/7: 18, 2011), Sri Lanka
(CEDAW/C/LKA/CO/7: 23, 2011), Costa Rica (CEDAW/C/CRI/CO/5–6: 19, 2011), Paraguay (CEDAW/
C/PRY/CO/6: 19, 2011) and Lesotho (CEDAW/C/LSO/CO/1–4: 21, 2011), Chad (CEDAW/C/TCD/CO/
1–4: 21, 2011), Nepal (CEDAW/C/NPL/CO/4–5: 18, 2011), Congo (CEDAW/C/COG/CO/6: 21–22,
2012), Algeria (CEDAW/C/DZA/CO/3–4: 27–28, 2012), Zimbabwe (CEDAW/C/ZWE/CO/2–5: 9–10,
2012), Jordan (CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/5: 24, 2012), Guyana (CEDAW/C/GUY/CO/7–8: 21, 29, 2012).
 According to the working methods of CEDAW, issues are sorted in the order of importance
of the particular issues to the country under review (Ways and means of expediting the work of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Note by the Secretariat.
CEDAW/C/2009/II/4: 19).
 Nigeria (A/59/38 (SUPP): 300, 2004 & CEDAW/C/NGA/CO/6: 22, 2008), Mauritania, (CEDAW/
C/MRT/CO/1: 37, 2007), Niger (CEDAW/C/NER/CO/2: 18, 2007), Guinea (CEDAW/C/GIN/CO/6: 25,
2007), United Kingdom (CEDAW/C/UK/CO/6: 279, 2008), Yemen (CEDAW/C/YEM/CO/6: 35,
2008), Portugal (CEDAW/C/PRT/CO/7: 31, 2009), Guinea-Bissau (CEDAW/C/GNB/CO/6: 26,
2009), Egypt (CEDAW/C/EGY/CO/7: 42, 2010), Burkina Faso (CEDAW/C/BFA/CO/6: 24, 2010),
Uganda (CEDAW/C/UGA/CO/7: 22, 2010), Italy (CEDAW/C/ITA/CO/6: 52–53, 2011), Kenya
(CEDAW/C/KEN/CO/7: 20, 2011), Djibouti (CEDAW/C/DJI/CO/1–3: 17, 2011), Ethiopia (CEDAW/C/
ETH/CO/6–7: 19, 2011), Chad (CEDAW/C/TCD/CO/1–4: 21, 2011), Côte d’Ivoire (CEDAW/C/CIV/
CO/1–3: 27, 2011), Oman (CEDAW/C/OMN/CO/1: 26, 2011). Congo (CEDAW/C/COG/CO/6: 22,
2012). The recommendation to include religious leaders in eradicating the practice is also men-
tioned in general recommendation no. 14 of the committee (A/45/38(SUPP), 1990).
 Indonesia, CEDAW/C/IDN/CO/5: 21, 2007.
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that the primary task of states in the eradication of this practice is to address the
“underlying cultural justifications” of FGM in collaboration with religious lead-
ers.²⁴⁸ These views seem to suggest that the primary task of religious leaders in
the battle against FGM is to denounce the practice, clarify its non-religious na-
ture, and assist in its decoupling from a shared core of values.
The importance of this distinction was evident in the review of Indonesia in
2007, as the committee requested information about actions taken by the state
party to address constraints to the implementation of the convention represented
by “sociocultural attitudes and the misinterpretation of religious teachings”,²⁴⁹
pointed out in the previous observations of the committee (see above). During
the session, representatives of the state party claimed that FGM was an Egyptian
practice, highlighting the distinction between Muslim and customary practi-
ces.²⁵⁰ One committee member observed that FGM was still prevalent in Islamic
areas, despite the position of the Ministry of Health on the issue,²⁵¹ while another
member confirmed the view of the state party, as she pointed out that “female
genital mutilation was not an Islamic custom, but rather an African one: a
clear fatwa had been issued specifying that the sharia prohibited the custom
as a violation of human rights”.²⁵²
In its concluding observations, the committee suggested public awareness-rais-
ing campaigns to change the cultural perceptions connected with FGM, a “practice
(…) that has no basis in religion”.²⁵³ In the consecutive review of Indonesia in 2012,
the committee expanded on this critique, advising Indonesian authorities to raise
awareness, sensitize and collaborate with religious leaders and religious groups to
eradicate FGM, and to “encourage those groups to engage in comparative studies
with other regions and/or countries which do not have this practice”,²⁵⁴ echoing
the views of the committee on the need to learn from other states in its practice
on Islamic religious law over the same period of time (see above)
Reviewing Guinea, on the other hand, the committee was faced by a state
delegation whose members openly disagreed on the correlation between FGM
and religion, with three members observing a link between Islam and the prac-
 Mauritania (CEDAW/C/MRT/CO/1: 28, 2007), Guinea (CEDAW/C/GIN/CO/6: 25, 2007), Egypt
(CEDAW/C/EGY/CO/7: 42, 2010), Guinea Bissau (CEDAW/C/GNB/CO/6: 26, 2009), Uganda
(CEDAW/C/UGA/CO/7: 22, 2010), Kenya (CEDAW/C/KEN/CO/7: 20, 2011).
 CEDAW/C/IDN/Q/5: 7, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SR.799 (A): 28, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SR.800 (A): 22, Pimentel, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SR.800 (A): 24, Gabr, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/IDN/CO/5: 20–21, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/IDN/CO/6–7: 22/24, 2012.
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tice,²⁵⁵ and a fourth member refusing such a link, pointing to the prevalence of
FGM also in non-Muslim areas of the country,²⁵⁶ a position supported by one
member of the committee, with reference to the lack of FGM in her Muslim ma-
jority home country, Bangladesh.²⁵⁷ Another member of the committee described
FGM as a barbaric practice that has nothing to do with Islam, but was introduced
by a British gynaecologist in the nineteenth century as a means of neutralizing
the perceived threat posed by women’s sexuality and making women more com-
pliant.²⁵⁸ In its concluding observations, the committee amalgamated these
views to observe the “entrenched cultural underpinnings” of the practice, advis-
ing the state party to strengthen education and awareness-raising efforts with
the support of religious leaders to eliminate FGM “and its underlying cultural
and religious justifications”,²⁵⁹ indicating an instability in the relation between
external customs and practices and a core of values, apparently settling for a
compromise on the correlation of the practice with religion.
In their assessments of other states that have received similar recommenda-
tions on the need to involve religious leaders in the fight against FGM, committee
members and state delegations have agreed emphatically on the non-religious
nature of the practice, and its exclusively cultural justifications. During these re-
views, state representatives have pointed to fatwas by Islamic scholars denounc-
ing the practice,²⁶⁰ to FGM as an ancient tribal practice,²⁶¹ to the lack of recog-
nition of FGM in Islamic law,²⁶² and to the encouragement of Christian and
Muslim networks to make it clear that there were no religious justifications for
the practice.²⁶³ Committee members, for their part, have stressed that FGM has
nothing to do with religion,²⁶⁴ that the practice is not linked to any religion,²⁶⁵
that there can be no religious justification for the practice,²⁶⁶ and
noting that female genital mutilation was generally perceived as a religious obligation in
Guinea-Bissau, [Ms. Rasekh] enquired about the steps taken by the Government to reverse
 CEDAW/C/SR.795 (A): 30, 32, 45, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SR.795 (A): 46, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SR.795 (A): 35 Begum, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/SR.795 (A): 42 Simms, 2007.
 CEDAW/C/GIN/CO/6: 25, 2007.
 Mauritania, CEDAW/C/SR.787: 42, 2007 and Egypt, CEDAW/C/SR.918: 79, 2010.
 Egypt, CEDAW/C/SR.918: 59, 2010.
 Guinea-Bissau, CEDAW/C/SR.904: 22, 2010.
 Kenya, CEDAW/C/SR.963: 36, 2011.
 Mauritania, CEDAW/C/SR.787: 36 Simms, 2007.
 Guinea-Bissau, CEDAW/C/SR.903: 55 Gabr, 2010.
 Kenya, CEDAW/C/SR.963: 27 Gabr, 2011.
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that belief. She would also like to know if any religious groups were working to spread
awareness that such practices were not an obligation under any religion.²⁶⁷
Taken together, these views indicate a complete dismissal of religious justifica-
tions for female genital mutilation, even in cases where such practices are per-
ceived by the population as a religious obligation. In this particular context,
religious doctrines and practices, and religious leaders who direct their author-
itative interpretation, are generally viewed as valuable allies in the fight against
FGM, whose sole origin can be found in ancient customs and patriarchal ideol-
ogies external to religion.
6.7 Summary
The monitoring practice of the committee from 1993 to 2013 on the influence of
religion on the implementation of the provisions of CEDAW plays out in the
space between the different models of religion recognized in its general recom-
mendations: On the one hand, religious legal rules, doctrines and practices are
viewed as significant components in patriarchal systems that subjugate and dis-
criminate against women, and should therefore be reformed, harmonized or
eradicated. On the other hand, there is a growing recognition that the legal
rules, doctrines and practices developed and maintained by religious leaders
and institutions play decisive roles in numerous societies around the world, to
the extent that their complete exclusion from the implementation of human
rights is impractical or maybe even impossible.
By emphasizing the shifting role of religion in the protection of women’s
rights, the CEDAW committee has adhered closely to the pragmatic approaches
to religion dominant among actors at the second UN, working from a pretended
“outside”. Examining state reports on the implementation of CEDAW, the com-
mittee has repeatedly addressed the material consequences for its convention
caused by the social and cultural influence of religion, either in its doctrinary,
legal or organizational form. However, by also emphasizing the “intermingling”
of religious and secular spheres of society as a challenge to treaty implementa-
tion in its own right, the committee has drawn upon more ad hoc, contextually
determined approaches to religion more commonly associated with the third UN.
The practice of the committee illustrates the complexities of resolving the
paradox between these different approaches: Although the general recommen-
 Guinea-Bissau, CEDAW/C/SR.904: 21 Rasekh, 2009.
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dations of the committee emphasize the “intersectionality” of different causes
for discrimination and do not seem to distinguish sharply between the influence
of religion and surrounding concepts like culture and customs, the observations
of the committee have been consistently engaged in the separation of religion
from other influences on the implementation of its provisions: Religious laws,
in particular Islamic laws, have generally been treated in isolation and kept
apart from the role of customary legal rules; religion has been dissociated
from harmful traditional practices, which have been attributed to external forces
like tradition, culture or patriarchal ideology; and the committee has been ada-
mant that the separation of religion from state power is necessary for the imple-
mentation of its provisions. Singling out the social role of religion in this way, the
committee has gone in the opposite direction of the Human Rights Committee,
which tends to avoid differentiating religion unless it is legally required to do so.
In these separations, committee members have generally been careful to
avoid the suggestion that religious legal rules, doctrines or practices should be
eliminated or unilaterally reformed by state parties, as a narrow reading of the
wording of articles 2(f) and 5(a) would seem to suggest. Rather, the committee,
through its singling out of religion and its increasing calls for the involvement of
religious communities and their leaders in the implementation of its provisions,
apparently seeks to narrow the gap between its opposing views of religion as
both detrimental and conducive to the protection of women’s human rights.
By cultivating the isolation of religion from its surroundings as a particularly det-
rimental force in society, the committee has simultaneously opened up the space
for religious leaders in harnessing and controlling these forces, in order to im-
prove the conditions for the implementation of the provisions of CEDAW.
The singling out of religion in the practice of the committee raises important
questions concerning the hierarchy of influences on the implementation of the
provisions of CEDAW: Whereas states with legal systems explicitly derived
from the Islamic Sharia are asked to seek inspiration from comparative jurispru-
dence and to reform their legal frameworks in cooperation with religious com-
munities and their leaders, states with more informal, “Mohammedan” legal sys-
tems or with Jewish law, have been asked to “eliminate” or “secularize” their
provisions, indicating a less favorable view of the possibility of reforming
these legal systems. Additionally, the singling out of religion from other influen-
ces on the implementation of the provisions of CEDAW may serve to exacerbate
the “demonization of culture” (Merry 2003a) in the practice of the committee. By
distancing religion from harmful traditional practices like female genital mutila-
tion, however, the committee simultaneously blames such procedures on other
social forces, like traditions, culture and customs.
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7 The Committee on the Rights of the Child
7.1 Introduction
The adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 inaugurated a
new era in UN treaty monitoring. The adoption of the CRC moved children from
their former role as subsidiaries of their parents to legally recognized individuals
(Hammarberg 1990: 99). Initially scheduled for adoption during the 1979 Interna-
tional Year of the Child as an expanded version of the non-binding Declaration
of the Rights of the Child (1959),¹ the draft descended into the conventional grid-
lock of human rights treaty drafting, only to emerge in its present form decades
later. The resulting instrument broke completely with the paternalistic approach
of the declaration, for reasons that are not entirely clear, although the composi-
tion of the draft working group and the contributions of several NGOs probably
played a decisive role (Cohen 1990: 142).
The Committee on the Rights of the Child is created and structured in articles
42–45 of the CRC, with 18 independent experts scheduled to meet for three
weeks every year and to receive periodic reports from states parties every fifth
year after their initial report. The committee is competent to make suggestions
and general recommendations. Unique among the treaty bodies, the committee
is mandated to ask for additional information if required, and to engage in ex-
tensive dialogue with United Nations agencies on their topics of specialization.²
 GA Resolution 1386(XIV), 1959.
 These unique features are listed in article 45, which reads in full: “In order to foster the effec-
tive implementation of the Convention and to encourage international co-operation in the field
covered by the Convention: “(a) The specialized agencies, the United Nations Children’s Fund,
and other United Nations organs shall be entitled to be represented at the consideration of
the implementation of such provisions of the present Convention as fall within the scope of
their mandate. The Committee may invite the specialized agencies, the United Nations Children’s
Fund and other competent bodies as it may consider appropriate to provide expert advice on the
implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their respective mandates.
The Committee may invite the specialized agencies, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and
other United Nations organs to submit reports on the implementation of the Convention in
areas falling within the scope of their activities; (b) The Committee shall transmit, as it may con-
sider appropriate, to the specialized agencies, the United Nations Children’s Fund and other
competent bodies, any reports from States Parties that contain a request, or indicate a need,
for technical advice or assistance, along with the Committee’s observations and suggestions,
if any, on these requests or indications; (c) The Committee may recommend to the General As-
sembly to request the Secretary-General to undertake on its behalf studies on specific issues re-
lating to the rights of the child; (d) The Committee may make suggestions and general recom-
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The committee was also the first to adopt the practice of issuing concluding ob-
servations following every reporting cycle from the beginning of its work, and
the first to be expressly allowed to consider information from other sources
than governments.³
Although the CRC is a single-issue convention dedicated to a specific catego-
ry of rights holders, the articles contained in the instrument bear closer resem-
blance to the structure of the International Bill of Rights (IBR)⁴ than to the
other thematically oriented treaties on racial discrimination and discrimination
of women, featuring numerous provisions on religion. In the preamble⁵ and ar-
ticle 2,⁶ the CRC reiterates the catalogue of prohibited grounds for discrimination
in the IBR, and then expands the list to also include ethnicity and disability. In
article 29,⁷ the convention regulates the purpose of education, covering the
equality of the sexes, ethnicity and friendship among religious groups and peo-
ples of indigenous origins. Article 30⁸ duplicates article 27 of the ICCPR on the
mendations based on information received pursuant to articles 44 and 45 of the present Conven-
tion. Such suggestions and general recommendations shall be transmitted to any State Party
concerned and reported to the General Assembly, together with comments, if any, from States
Parties.”
 See previous note.
 The International Bill of Rights is conventionally used by the UN secretariat as shorthand de-
noting the rights contained in the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR put together.
 “Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
in the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that everyone is enti-
tled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein,without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.”
 Article 2 reads in full: “1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the
present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind,
irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or
other status. 2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is pro-
tected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities,
expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members.”
 The full list on the direction of education in article 29 (d): “The preparation of the child for
responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of
sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons
of indigenous origin.”
 The only substantial difference is that article 30 adds “children who are indigenous” to the
list. The article reads in full: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his
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rights of minorities to exercise their religion to the child-centered context of the
CRC with only minor changes.
In article 14,⁹ the novelty of the CRC approach to child rights stands out in
particular: Whereas former treaties subsumed a child’s religion under the rights
of their parents, the CRC creates individual religious rights for children. Using the
ICCPR article 18 as a point of departure, article 14(1) of the CRC obliges states
parties to respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. The principle of parental rights and responsibilities to provide guidance
and direction in the exercise of rights in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child, included in the treaty as a stand-alone provision in article
5, is also included in article 14(2), emphasizing the importance of the evolving
capacities approach to the freedom of religion or belief. Along with the principle
of the best interest of the child, launched in article 3(1)¹⁰ and then repeatedly
mentioned, the evolving capacities concept was one of the most significant inno-
vations of the CRC. Although a clarification of the permissible range of manifes-
tations of this right are absent, acceptable limitations listed in 14(3) are identical
to the ICCPR article 18(3).
or her own culture, to profess and practice his or her own religion, or to use his or her own lan-
guage.”
 Article 14 reads in full: “1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. 2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the pa-
rents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of
his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. 3. Freedom to
manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others.”
 Article 3 reads in full: “1. In all actions concerning children,whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 2. States Parties undertake to
ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking
into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals le-
gally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and ad-
ministrative measures. 3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities
responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established
by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitabil-
ity of their staff, as well as competent supervision. “
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7.2 General Comments
Starting in 2001, the committee monitoring the CRC has issued 21 general com-
ments, and is alone among the treaty bodies in publishing only theme-based
comments. Religion has four different modalities in the GCs issued by the
CRC: First, the importance of religion as a prohibited ground of discrimination
in article 2 of the convention is repeatedly mentioned, with respect to HIV/
AIDS and the rights of the child,¹¹ the rights of children with disabilities,¹² the
rights of children in juvenile justice,¹³ and the rights of the child to rest, leisure,
play, recreational activities, cultural life and the arts.¹⁴ According to the general
comment issued by the committee on article 29, education is one of the primary
means to fight discrimination, as it should “overcome the boundaries of religion,
nation and culture built across many parts of the world”. The transgression of
such boundaries should be made possible by employing a “balanced approach”
to education based on dialogue and respect for difference, despite the potential
tension between subparagraph 1(c) on the respect for the cultural identity of the
child, and subparagraph 1(d), on the promotion of friendship and tolerance
among all peoples.¹⁵
Second, the role of religious leaders in assisting the implementation of the
convention is repeatedly emphasized,¹⁶ safeguarding the school environment¹⁷
and engaging in the fight against HIV/AIDS.¹⁸ Third, in the comment on the
right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence, prohibiting corporal pun-
ishment of children on religious grounds is firmly placed within the acceptable
limitations of the right to freedom of religion or belief in ICCPR article 18, con-
firming the general prohibition against exercising one fundamental right to
the detriment of another.¹⁹
Fourth, in the extensive comment on the key concept of the best interest of
the child as a primary consideration,²⁰ the committee observes that the best in-











196 7 The Committee on the Rights of the Child
rule of procedure, to secure the child’s “holistic physical, psychological, moral
and spiritual integrity (…) and to promote his or her human dignity”. As a
vital component of the child’s identity, its “ethnic, religious, cultural and linguis-
tic background” should always be taken into account in the consideration of a
foster home or placement, adoption or separation from the family. However,
such a background may only be preserved if it does not conflict with any of
the provisions of the CRC.
7.3 Individual Complaints
The CRC was furnished with an Optional Protocol on an individual communica-
tions procedure in 2011 through resolution 66/138 of the UN General Assembly.
The Protocol entered into force in 2014, and the committee has presently
(2016) only reviewed one submission, which it found inadmissible.²¹
7.4 Reporting Guidelines
The CRC reporting guidelines²² provide for the same general requirements as the
other committees, but additionally request that states refer to how earlier recom-
mendations from the committee have been met. Rather than article-specific
guidelines, the committee requests different kinds of information from the vari-
ous rights clusters covered by the convention.²³ The guidelines request informa-
tion on the participation of religious groups in drafting state reports, and ask
states to include relevant statistical data and information disaggregated on reli-
gion.²⁴ For participation in the CRC process, Child Rights Connect²⁵ has publish-
ed a guide to the reporting mechanism (CRC 2014) that is more concerned with
 A.H.A. v. Spain, Communication no. 1/2014 (CRC/C/69/D/1/2014), 2015.
 CRC/C/58/Rev.2, 2010.
 The clusters, as defined by the committee, are: measures of implementation, definition of
the child, general principles, civil rights and freedoms, family environment and alternative
care, disability, basic health and welfare, education, leisure and cultural activities and special
protection measures.
 CRC/C/58/Rev.2: 4, 11, 2010.
 Formerly the NGO Group for the CRC, Child Rights Connect was set up in 1983 to influence
the drafting of the CRC. Today, the organization is considered among the strongest international
expertise on children’s rights, and continues to influence the international monitoring of child-
ren’s rights http://www.childrightsconnect.org/about-us/ (31.08.2016). For a consideration of
the NGO participation in the drafting of the CRC, see Türkelli and Vandenhole 2012.
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the style and format of NGO reporting than substantial issues, providing no
rights-specific guidelines for the submission of reports.
7.5 The Religion of the CRC
To the committee monitoring the CRC, religion does not necessarily originate in
“the citadel of the mind” of the ICCPR, but is an inherently multidimensional
concept that influences the implementation of the CRC in numerous ways.
Like the HRC, the committee is obliged to recognize religion as a protected
form of belief, as spelled out in article 14 of the CRC; however, the only general
comment on the issue is more concerned with the potential for violence against
children emanating from manifestations of religion or belief, rather than the pro-
tection of such beliefs (see above). As such, the committee has nowhere near the
same kind of commitment to article 14 of the CRC as the HRC has to article 18 of
the ICCPR.
Hence, the identity dimension of religion, which has also been emphasized
by CERD, seems considerably more important than the freedom of belief, as the
committee has warned frequently against discrimination on religious grounds,
particularly concerning children from vulnerable groups. In addition to the belief
and identity dimensions to religion, however, the committee has also paid par-
ticular attention to the potential social influence of religion, particularly as it
is wielded by religious leaders, whose engagement has been a key concern to
the committee from the very beginning.
7.6 Approaches to Religion in the Monitoring Practice of the
CRC, 1993–2013
7.6.1 Minorities
The legal framework on discrimination and the rights of minorities in the CRC
closely resembles that of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR): article 2 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights set out
in the convention,²⁶ and article 30 protects the rights of children who belong to
 Article 2 reads in full: “1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the
present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind,
irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or
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ethnic, linguistic, religious or indigenous minorities to enjoy his or her culture,
to profess and practice his or her religion, or to use his or her language.²⁷ While
the CRC lacks a parallel to article 26 of the ICCPR on equality before the law, both
articles 2 and 30 are broader in scope than their ICCPR parallels,²⁸ offering addi-
tional criteria for protection, including the rights of indigenous children.²⁹
The Committee on the Rights of the Child issued a general comment on its
interpretation of the rights of indigenous children in 2009, where it linked article
30 directly to the protection offered in article 27 of the ICCPR, but expanded the
scope of this article with its particular emphasis on the recognition of the collec-
tive traditions and values in indigenous cultures.³⁰ It also established the princi-
ple of self-identification as indigenous as a fundamental criterion for their iden-
tification regardless of their recognition in law, and referred to the general
principle of non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the other rights in the con-
vention as a moderator on the implementation of article 30.³¹
In its monitoring practice, the committee has consistently been more con-
cerned with the rights of children who belong to religious minorities than with
the general prohibition against discrimination and the rights of indigenous chil-
dren. The committee first commented on the rights of religious minority children
during its reviews of The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)³² and Croatia in
1996. The review of the FRY was conducted without the presence of a state del-
other status. 2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is pro-
tected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities,
expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members.”
 Article 30 reads in full: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or
persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy
his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her
own language.”
 Articles 2 and 27. See above.
 The rights of indigenous children are also protected under articles 17, ensuring that the mass
media take steps to safeguard their linguistic needs, and 29, on the purpose of education, em-
phasizing friendship among all peoples, including indigenous peoples.
 CRC/C/GC/11: 16, 2009.
 CRC/C/GC/11: 19/22, 2009. The principle of self-identification is derived from the ILO Conven-
tion concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries No. 169 (1989), article 1
(2).
 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the name of the political entity that was created by
Serbia and Montenegro following the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
1991. From 2003, the republic was known as Serbia and Montenegro, until it was split up in
2006, into The Republic of Serbia, which is considered the successor state of Yugoslavia
under international law, and Montenegro. (Oeter 2011).
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egation, and the committee issued a set of concluding observations following the
review where it expressed its concern with the treatment of the Muslim minority
in Sandjak, where numerous human rights violations had occurred “with impun-
ity”. The committee also expressed its concern with the incitement to hatred
against ethnic and religious groups broadcast by certain mass media.³³
Reviewing China, the committee addressed the controversy surrounding the
recognition of the spiritual leader Panchen Lama (see also chapter 4.6.1) and its
compatibility with article 14.³⁴ The Chinese delegation explained that the State
council had made a decision concerning the funeral and reincarnation of the
tenth Panchen Lama, following the passage of the ninth Panchen Lama in
1989, stressing that his government respected the religious beliefs and senti-
ments of the broad mass of believers in Tibet. This procedure was part of the Chi-
nese rule in Tibet, which stretched back to the 13th century and had been reinstat-
ed in 1959 in order to abolish the system of serfdom operated by the Dalai Lama,
a system that was “even more cruel than that existing during the Middle Ages in
Europe and the slavery system in the United States”.³⁵ Several members of the
committee questioned the delegation on the whereabouts and situation of the
Panchen Lama,³⁶ and the delegation replied that he was under government pro-
tection with his parents since separatists were seeking to kidnap him.³⁷
In its concluding observations, the committee refrained from explicit refer-
ence to the Panchen Lama and his rights under article 14, focusing instead on
the right to freedom of religion for children belonging to minorities under article
30, expressing its deep concern with violations of the human rights of the Tibe-
tan minority. According to the committee, “[s]tate intervention in religious prin-
ciples and procedures seems to be most unfortunate for the whole generation of
boys and girls among the Tibetan population”.³⁸ Following the review of the con-
secutive report by China in 2005, these concerns were expanded to cover the
Uighur and Hui minorities, but framed as violations under article 2 on non-dis-
crimination and article 14 on the freedom of religion or belief,³⁹ and further ex-
panded in the concluding observations following the 2013 review of China,
 A/51/41: 884–885, 1996. Following the 2008 review of the successor state to the FRY, The Re-
public of Serbia, the committee expressed its concerns with the treatment of children belonging
to the Roma minority (CRC/C/SRB/CO/1 : 25–26, 50, 60–62, 75, 2008).
 CRC/C.12/WP.5, 1996 [the document is neither paginated, nor numbered].
 CRC/C/SR.299: 8–9, 1996.
 CRC/C/SR.299: 25 Hammarberg, 26 Santos Pais, 1996.
 CRC/C/SR.299: 39, 1996.
 A/53/41: 113, 1998.
 CRC/C/CHN/CO/2: 30/44, 2005.
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where the committee expressed its concerns with the self-immolations among
youth from religious minorities in Tibet, and the torture and ill-treatment of chil-
dren from certain religious and ethnic groups.⁴⁰
Reviewing Myanmar, the committee questioned the state party on the pre-
ventive measures taken to protect children belonging to ethnic and religious mi-
norities from discrimination.⁴¹ During the meeting the state delegation explained
the interrelationship of religion and the responsibility for the development of
children in Myanmar:
In the culture of Myanmar, parents bore primary responsibility for the development of chil-
dren. Monks and teachers were considered as moral and ethical models, and there was no
discrimination between sons and daughters, both being referred to frequently as “precious
jewels”. The people of Myanmar were deeply religious, and religion placed on parents a
duty to restrain children from vice, exhort them to virtue, train them for a profession, pro-
vide for a suitable marriage and hand over an inheritance at the appropriate time.⁴²
Stressing that there was no religious discrimination in Myanmar, the delegation
asserted that the freedom of worship was completely unrestricted.⁴³ Following
the review, the committee issued concluding observations that were critical of
the protection of religious minorities in Myanmar, which was marked by lacking
legislation and implementation of the principle of non-discrimination of reli-
gious minorities, including the practice of noting religious affiliation on identity
cards.⁴⁴ These concerns were reiterated and expanded to cover the situation of
indigenous minorities in Rakhine state following the 2004 review of Myanmar,⁴⁵
and expanded further still to cover the predominance of Buddhism in the educa-
tion and recruitment of children from religious minorities to participate in armed
conflict following the 2012 review of the state party.⁴⁶
Taken together, the approach of the CRC committee to religious discrimina-
tion and the rights of religious minorities expressed in the reviews of the FRY,
Croatia, China and Myanmar in the middle of the 1990s reflects the main direc-
tions in the practice adopted by the committee up to the present, split between
observations that relate to de jure discrimination hardwired into the legal frame-
work and de facto discrimination experienced by religious minorities or indige-
 CRC/C/CHN/CO/3–4: 35, 43, 2013.
 CRC/C/Q/Mya.1: 10, 1996.
 CRC/C/SR.357: 5, 1997.
 CRC/C/SR.359: 4, 1997.
 A/53/41: 574–575, 594–595, 1998.
 CRC/C/15/Add.237: 27, 34, 79, 2004.
 CRC/C/MMR/CO/3–4: 35, 41, 45, 81, 2012.
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nous groups. Unlike the HRC, the CRC committee has only rarely been faced with
states claiming to have no minorities or to favor some minorities over others, for
historical or other reasons (see chapter 5.6.2).
Among these issues, by far the most prevalent are the observations issued
on de facto religious discrimination, whereby members of minority religious
communities experience different forms of treatment that violate provisions of
the CRC. Observations of this kind have been issued to numerous countries
from 2000 to 2013,⁴⁷ and span from the concern expressed by the committee
with discriminatory attitudes and xenophobia experienced by children who be-
long to religious minorities in Luxembourg,⁴⁸ to the widespread poverty, lack of
birth registration and the effects of armed conflicts on religious minority chil-
dren in The Philippines.⁴⁹ Rights violations suffered by religious minority chil-
dren include failure to provide access to and adequate content of education,⁵⁰
inheritance and property,⁵¹ social services,⁵² food, health care and survival,⁵³
 Russia (CRC/C/15/Add.110: 25, 1999 & CRC/C/RUS/CO/3: 23–24, 2005), South Africa (CRC/C/
15/Add.122: 41, 2000), Côte d’Ivoire (CRC/C/15/Add.155: 22–23, 2001), Tanzania (CRC/C/15/
Add.156: 26–27, 2001), Bahrain (CRC/C/15/Add.175: 28–29, 2002), Greece (CRC/C/15/Add.170:
27–28/33–35/38–39/44–47, 2002 & CRC/C/GRC/CO/2–3, 2012), Sudan (CRC/C/15/Add.190:
26–28, 2002 & CRC/C/SDN/CO/3–4: 29–30, 2010), Sri Lanka (CRC/C/15/Add.207: 25–26, 2003
& CRC/C/LKA/CO/3–4: 28–29, 2010), Syria (CRC/C/15/Add.212: 33, 2003), Pakistan (CRC/C/15/
Add.217: 29–30/38–39/40–41, 2003 & CRC/C/PAK/CO/3–4: 30–31/41–42, 2009), Brunei
(CRC/C/15/Add.219: 26–27, 2003), Bangladesh (CRC/C/15/Add.221: 79–80, 2003 & CRC/C/BGD/
CO/4: 32–33, 2009), Japan (CRC/C/15/Add.231: 50, 2004), Luxembourg (CRC/C/15/Add.250:
19–20, 2005), The Philippines (CRC/C/15/Add.259: 20–21/33–34/92–93, 2005 & CRC/C/PHL/
CO/3–4: 29–30/36–37, 2009), Bosnia and Herzegovina (CRC/C/15/Add.260: 26, 2005), Australia
(CRC/C/15/Add.268: 24, 2005), Thailand (CRC/C/THA/CO/2: 24–25, 2006 & CRC/C/THA/CO/3–4:
33–34, 2012), Saudi Arabia (CRC/C/SAU/CO/2: 27–28/40–41/66, 2006), Malaysia (CRC/C/MYS/
CO/1: 106, 2007), Georgia (CRC/C/GEO/CO/3: 77, 2008), Bhutan (CRC/C/BTN/CO/2: 72–73,
2008), Moldova (CRC/C/MDA/CO/3: 25–26, 2009), Afghanistan (CRC/C/AFG/CO/1: 59–61,
2011), Singapore (CRC/C/SGP/CO/2–3: 71–72, 2011), Laos (CRC/C/LAO/CO/2: 36–37, 2011), and
Kuwait (CRC/C/KWT/CO/2: 37–38, 2013).
 CRC/C/15/Add.250: 19–20, 2005.
 CRC/C/15/Add.259: 20, 33, 76, 92, 2005.
 Côte d’Ivoire (CRC/C/15/Add.155: 22–23, 2001), Greece (CRC/C/15/Add.170: 27–28/33–35/
38–39/44–47, 2002 & CRC/C/GRC/CO/2–3, 2012), Singapore (CRC/C/SGP/CO/2–3: 71–72,
2011), Kuwait (CRC/C/KWT/CO/2: 37–38, 2013).
 Tanzania (CRC/C/15/Add.156: 26–27, 2001).
 Bahrain (CRC/C/15/Add.175: 28–29, 2002).
 Bangladesh (CRC/C/15/Add.221: 79–80, 2003) and Thailand (CRC/C/THA/CO/2: 24–25,
2006).
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as well as “societal”⁵⁴ and social and political discrimination.⁵⁵ Additionally, the
committee has expressed its concern with discrimination against religious mi-
nority children more generally.⁵⁶
In these observations, the committee has generally referred states to article 2
of the CRC, securing that children belonging to religious minorities are covered
by the erstwhile provisions of the convention. Only on rare occasions has the
committee encountered and commented on the rights of minority children to
profess and practice their own religion in line with article 30, or discrimination
in the enjoyment of article 14 on the freedom of religion or belief: In observations
issued to South Africa in 2000,⁵⁷ Indonesia in 2004⁵⁸ and Bhutan in 2008,⁵⁹ the
committee called upon the state parties to ensure the religious rights of minority
groups, but without invoking article 30. Following the review of Uzbekistan in
2013, the committee observed that, despite the constitutional protection of the
freedom of religion or belief, unregistered religious activities, “which are fre-
quently those of minorities” were subject to criminal and/or administrative sanc-
tions, suggesting that the state party must ensure the rights of all children to the
freedom of religion or belief.⁶⁰
Observations where the committee has identified de jure discrimination
caused by legislative scope differ from observations on de facto discrimination
because they address legislation approved and enforced by the states under re-
view. Hence, whereas issues of “actual” discrimination generally indicate incom-
plete implementation of the convention, legal discrimination signals the active
dismissal of the convention by the state party, including legal provisions
which are either lacking, are discriminatory in scope, or have discriminatory ef-
fects. Reviewing Iran in 2000, the committee included several questions in its list
of issues concerning the legal protection offered children from religious minor-
ities in the state party, addressing both their rights to non-discrimination
under article 2 of the CRC and their integration into society under article 30.⁶¹
 Sri Lanka (CRC/C/15/Add.207: 25–26, 2003) and Pakistan (CRC/C/15/Add.217: 29–30/38–39/
40–41, 2003).
 Sudan (CRC/C/15/Add.190: 26–28, 2002).
 Russia (CRC/C/RUS/CO/3: 23–24, 2005), Thailand (CRC/C/THA/CO/2: 24–25, 2006) and Mol-
dova (CRC/C/MDA/CO/3: 25–26, 2009).
 CRC/C/15/Add.122: 41, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.223: 90, 2004.
 CRC/C/BTN/CO/2: 72–73, 2008.
 CRC/C/UZB/CO/3–4: 32–33, 2013.
 CRC/C/Q/IRA/1: 10, 32, 1999.
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During the meeting with the state party, the Iranian delegation explained
that numerous ethnic and religious minorities had always lived in harmony in
Iran, and members of the four constitutionally recognized religions were overre-
presented in Parliament, whereas the government was taking steps to strengthen
the rights of all minorities, including those without constitutional protection.⁶²
Following a question on the status of children from religious minorities, the
state delegation stressed that the situation of non-recognized religions and be-
liefs, such as the Baha’i, had improved with the adoption of new legislation.⁶³
Despite this assurance, the committee expressed its concerns with the re-
strictions on the freedom of religion or belief and the related discriminatory
treatment of the Baha’i minority in its concluding observations, where it also re-
ferred to the 1981 declaration, general comment no. 22 of the HRC and recent re-
views of the state party conducted by the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Special Rapporteur on the question of religious
intolerance.⁶⁴ Revisiting Iran in 2005, several members of the committee repeat-
ed their concern with the treatment of children belonging to the Baha’i minori-
ty,⁶⁵ concerns that were promptly dismissed by the state delegation,⁶⁶ but reiter-
ated in the concluding observations issued by the committee following the
review.⁶⁷ Similar concerns with de jure restrictions on the freedom of religion
of children from religious minorities were expressed in the concluding observa-
tions issued by the committee following the review of Algeria in 2012.⁶⁸
Reviewing France in 2004, a member of the committee expressed his sur-
prise that the best interests of the child had not been part of the recent debate
on the ban on the wearing of religious symbols in schools.⁶⁹ Another member
questioned whether the communities affected by such a ban had been consulted,
and whether the state party had considered its potential for inspiring extrem-
ism,⁷⁰ while a third member questioned the role of such a ban in estranging
youth from disadvantaged backgrounds and its compatibility with article 14 of
the CRC on the rights of children to freedom of religion or belief.⁷¹
 CRC/C/SR.617: 11, 2000.
 CRC/C/SR.618: 21, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.123: 35–36, 2000.
 CRC/C/SR.1015: 8 Filali, 25 Ouedraogo, 2005 (translation from the French original) & CRC/C/
SR.1016: 26 Krappmann, 2005.
 CRC/C/SR.1016: 31, 2005.
 CRC/C/15/Add.254: 24, 41–42, 2005.
 CRC/C/DZA/CO/3–4: 41–42, 2012.
 CRC/C/SR.967: 26 Kotrane, 2004 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/SR.967: 35 Khattab, 2004 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/SR.967: 42 Liwski, 2004 (translation from the French original).
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Responding to these questions, a member of the state delegation explained
that the recently adopted legislation was intended to provide a uniform applica-
tion of the principle of laïcité, based on the principle of respect for the freedom
of conscience, and the affirmation of shared values underlying national unity be-
yond specific religious affiliations.⁷² Committee members, not satisfied with this
explanation, followed suit with additional questions, linking the ban on reli-
gious symbols to the provisions of article 29 of the CRC on the access to educa-
tion,⁷³ questioning government engagement with Muslim girls who dropped out
of public schools because their parents did not allow them to remove their head-
scarves.⁷⁴ In its concluding observations, the committee reiterated its concerns
with the discriminatory effects of the legislation:
The Committee notes that the Constitution provides for freedom of religion and that the law
of 1905 on the separation of church and State prohibits discrimination on the basis of faith.
The Committee equally recognizes the importance the State party accords to secular public
schools. However, in the light of articles 14 and 29 of the Convention, the Committee is con-
cerned by the alleged rise in discrimination, including that based on religion. The Commit-
tee is also concerned that the new legislation (Law No. 2004–228 of 15 March 2004) on
wearing religious symbols and clothing in public schools may be counterproductive, by ne-
glecting the principle of the best interests of the child and the right of the child to access to
education, and not achieve the expected results. The Committee welcomes that the provi-
sions of the legislation will be subject to an evaluation one year after its entry into force.⁷⁵
In its recommendations, the committee particularly stressed the implementation
and ramifications of the legislation on the rights of children, urging the state
party to use the enjoyment of children’s rights as enshrined in the convention
as a “crucial criteria” in the evaluation of the law.⁷⁶
Prior to the 2009 review of France, the committee questioned the state party
on the number of children expelled and reinstated in school for ostensibly sig-
naling their religious affiliation in a “conspicuous” manner,⁷⁷ to which the
state party provided comprehensive statistics of cases raised under the act, drop-
ping dramatically from the year of its implementation to the following school
year, demonstrating that the principles of the act had been “broadly accepted
by pupils and their families”.⁷⁸ The issue was not addressed in full during the
 CRC/C/SR.967: 52, 2004 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/SR.968: 33 Kotrane, 2004.
 CRC/C/SR.968: 43 Khattab, 82 Doek, 2004.
 CRC/C/15/Add.240: 25, 2004.
 CRC/C/15/Add.240: 26, 2004.
 CRC/C/FRA/Q/4: 6(b), 2009.
 CRC/C/FRA/Q/4/Add.1: p.38, 2009.
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meeting with the state party, but in its concluding observations, the committee
expressed concern with the compatibility of the ban on religious symbols in
schools with article 14 of the CRC and endorsed the recent criticism expressed
to French authorities on this issue during its reviews before the CEDAW commit-
tee and the HRC (see above).⁷⁹ Similar dismissals of proposed bans on religious
apparel have been issued in concluding observations to Tunisia,⁸⁰ Germany⁸¹
and Azerbaijan,⁸² albeit drawing on different provisions of the convention:
whereas the committee reviewed the issue in Tunisia solely from the perspective
of article 14, the assessments of Germany and Azerbaijan were additionally con-
sidered to violate articles 29 on the content of education, and article 28 on the
access to education, respectively.
Taken together, the practice of the CRC committee on religious discrimina-
tion and religious minorities affirms its overall view of religion as primarily a
matter of identity, as the majority of its concluding observations have been is-
sued to states where children experience a range of different forms of de facto
discrimination due to their membership in a religious group or minority. In
these observations, which have mostly been issued to Asian and African states,
children are more or less subsumed into their group affiliations, as the commit-
tee has paid little or no attention to the specific needs of children themselves.
This approach is markedly different from the more child-centered views of the
committee on religious organizations in education, where the concrete, practical
effects on children have been consistently emphasized by the committee (see
below).
In these observations, the freedom of religion or belief is only intermittently
raised by the committee. However, when faced by de jure discrimination like
bans on religious headgear, the committee has more readily framed differential
treatment of children on the basis of their religion as a potential violation of ar-
ticle 14, albeit mostly in conjunction with a concern with the access to education
under article 28. Despite its general comment on the topic, the committee has
been reluctant to interpret discrimination as relevant to article 30 on the rights
of minority children, relying instead on articles 2, 28 and 29, and to a lesser ex-
tent on article 14. Taken together, these omissions suggest that the committee has
yet to develop a practice on the specific rights of minority children who are sub-
ject to religious discrimination.
 CRC/C/FRA/CO/4: 45, 2009.
 CRC/C/15/Add.181: 29–30, 2002. These concerns were reiterated in 2010 (CRC/C/TUN/CO/3:
36–37, 2010).
 CRC/C/15/Add.226: 30–31, 2004.
 CRC/C/AZE/CO/3–4: 40, 2012.
206 7 The Committee on the Rights of the Child
7.6.2 Organizations
Approaching the role of religious organizations, the CRC committee has drawn
on its general approach to the legal concept of religion as primarily an issue con-
cerning the identity of the child, and as a powerful social force that shapes the
conditions for the implementation of human rights. The overarching emphasis of
the committee in its observations on religious organizations is on harmony and
reconciliation between different religious identities and groups in society, pri-
marily in the provision and content of education.While the committee has large-
ly ignored the topic of recognition and registration of religious institutions and
organizations in its practice from 1993 to 2013,⁸³ it has issued numerous conclud-
ing observations on the role of religious organizations in education.
The approach of the committee to the role of religious organizations in edu-
cation can be subdivided into two broad categories, corresponding to the differ-
ence between article 28, on the access to education, and article 29, on the con-
tent of education: First, the committee has extensively engaged states on the role
of religious institutions as providers of education, either in concert with public
school systems, or in parallel education systems. Second, the committee has re-
peatedly expressed its concerns with the content of education, in particular the
necessity of including “friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and reli-
gious groups and persons of indigenous origin” as a primary purpose of educa-
tion.
Although education has always been important to the committee (Langlaude
2007: 138), and was the subject of its very first general comment in 2001 (see
chapter 7.2), the committee only rarely commented on the relation between reli-
gion and education during the 1990s. In these early observations, the committee
did not develop any specific focus, shifting between considerations: Comment-
ing on the potential for discrimination in compulsory religious education in Nor-
way, the committee evaded the relation between such education and the relation
 There are five exceptions to this general rule: Indonesia (CRC/C/15/Add.7: 15, 1993 & CRC/C/
15/Add.25: 13, 1994) and Iran (CRC/C/15/Add.254: 41–42, 2005) have received criticism from the
committee for their continued legal distinction between recognized and non-recognized reli-
gions. Additionally, Uzbekistan (CRC/C/15/Add.167: 35–36, 2001) and Turkmenistan (CRC/C/
TKM/CO/1: 34–35, 2006) have been criticized for their compulsory registration regimes for reli-
gious organizations, and Ukraine for its prohibition of the establishment of children’s associa-
tions along political and religious lines (CRC/C/UKR/CO/3–4: 39–40, 2011).
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between the state church and minority religious communities, although explic-
itly raised by a member of the state delegation during the meeting.⁸⁴
Reviewing Senegal in 1995, members of the committee raised the issue of liv-
ing conditions for children attending Koranic schools and were forced to beg in
the streets, an issue that the state did not address sufficiently because such
schools were allegedly exempt for religious reasons from the general ban on
child begging, requesting more information on the status of such schools in Sen-
egal.⁸⁵ In its concluding observations, the committee expressed its serious wor-
ries with the living conditions of some students in Koranic schools, urging Sen-
egalese authorities to pay special attention to their plight and to ensure an
effective system to monitor their situation.⁸⁶ Similar sentiments were expressed
in the concluding observations issued after the review of Chad in 1999.⁸⁷ In
the review of the Holy See in 1995, the committee for the first time related the
issue of religious education directly to article 29, urging the state party to include
the spirit and philosophy of the convention in the curricula of Catholic schools
worldwide.⁸⁸ Likewise, during the reviews of Serbia and Lebanon in 1996, both
were advised to incorporate article 29(1) (d) on the friendship between all peo-
ples and religious groups as a primary purpose of education.⁸⁹
Reviewing Myanmar in 1997, the committee requested more information on
the practice whereby poor children were sent to Buddhist monasteries to receive
education, questioning whether children from other religious backgrounds re-
ceived religious education in monasteries.⁹⁰ The state delegation explained
that the primary purpose of a monastic education was to impart the teachings
of Buddha to children,⁹¹ a reply that provoked the “particular concern” of the
committee in its concluding observations, recommending that the state party
should provide an alternative education choice for poor, non-Buddhist chil-
 CRC/C/SR.150: 6, 1994. In its concluding observations, the committee noted the opt-out pos-
sibility for parents, but expressed its concerns with the potential violation of the right to privacy
of parents who would have to expose their faith in order to be granted an exemption (CRC/C/15/
Add.23: 9, 1994).
 CRC/C/SR.249: 18 Karp, 39 Santos Pais, 1995 (translation from the French original)
 CRC/C/15/Add.44: 15, 29, 1999. Similar concerns were raised following the consecutive review
of Senegal, in 2006 (CRC/C/SEN/CO/2: 60, 2006).
 CRC/C/15/Add.107: 25, 1999. These concerns were reiterated following the 2009 review of
Chad (CRC/C/TCD/CO/2: 41–42, 2009).
 CRC/C/15/Add.46: 11– 12, 1996.
 CRC/C/50: 109, 1996 & CRC/C/15/Add.54: 33, 1996.
 CRC/C/SR.359: 15, 26 Santos Pais, 1997.
 CRC/C/SR.359: 42, 1997.
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dren.⁹² While the issue was ignored in the 2004 review of Myanmar, the commit-
tee expanded its concerns with the monastic educational institutions following
the 2012 review, as the concluding observations advised the state party to estab-
lish mechanisms for receiving complaints, investigations and prosecutions for re-
ports of physical abuse in institutions run by private and religious organiza-
tions.⁹³
Taken together, these early observations indicate watchful skepticism to-
wards the role of religious organizations in the provision of education, suggest-
ing revisions of the curricula in Catholic schools, increased monitoring of the
living conditions in Koranic schools, and the provision of non-Buddhist alterna-
tives to monastic education. Throughout the 2000s, this skepticism towards the
influence of religious institutions and organizations was reiterated repeatedly, in
particular as it pertained to living conditions and abuse in Koranic schools: Re-
viewing Mali,⁹⁴ the Comoros,⁹⁵ Mauritania,⁹⁶ Gambia,⁹⁷ Niger,⁹⁸ Pakistan,⁹⁹ Bur-
kina Faso¹⁰⁰ and Algeria,¹⁰¹ the committee repeatedly expressed its concerns
with the lacking monitoring of and intervention in the education and living con-
ditions provided by Koranic schools. These concerns included the prevalence of
corporal punishment, child labor, begging, sexual abuse, violence, military
training and recruitment to armed conflicts, chaining, illegal detention and traf-
ficking, violating numerous articles of the CRC. In order to handle these egre-
gious human rights violations, the committee has generally suggested that
state parties prosecute those responsible for the worst offences, and initiate ad-
ministrative reforms that secure the control and follow-up of religious schools,
including calls for the integration of such schools into the public education sys-
tem. The committee has generally refrained from approaching Koranic schools
from the perspective of non-discrimination and the rights of the child to freedom
 CRC/C/15/Add.69: 16, 37, 1997.
 CRC/C/MMR/CO/3–4: 55–56, 2012.
 CRC/C/15/Add.113: 33, 1999. Similar concerns were expressed by the committee following the
consecutive review of Mali in 2007 (CRC/C/MLI/CO/2: 62–63, 2007).
 CRC/C/15/Add.141: 31–32, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.159: 49–50, 2001. Similar concerns were expressed by the committee follow-
ing the 2009 review of Mauritania (CRC/C/MRT/CO/2: 74–74, 2009).
 CRC/C/15/Add.165: 60–61, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.179: 66–67, 2002. Similar concerns were expressed by the committee follow-
ing the 2009 review of Niger (CRC/C/NER/CO/2: 37–38, 2009).
 CRC/C/15/Add.217: 61–62/62, 2003. Similar concerns were expressed by the committee fol-
lowing the 2009 review of Pakistan (CRC/C/PAK/CO/3–4: 80–81, 2009).
 CRC/C/BFA/CO/3–4: 70–71, 2010.
 CRC/C/DZA/CO/3–4: 75–76, 2012.
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of religion or belief, concentrating on their compatibility with article 28 on the
access to education, and the nature of disciplinary measures in such schools.
Commenting on the influence of organizations from other religious tradi-
tions, the committee has approached the issue somewhat differently: First, re-
viewing Belize in 2005, members of the committee expressed their skepticism
with an educational system in which the Catholic Church played an active
role, empowered not only to decide the curriculum, but also to hire and fire
teaching staff.¹⁰² In particular, one member expressed her concern with the
role of the church in the expulsion and dismissal of pregnant students and
teachers.¹⁰³ Although the delegation from the state party expressed its commit-
ment to develop “what was essentially a Church-based education system”, it
also stressed the importance of maintaining good relations with the Church.¹⁰⁴
In its concluding observations, the committee expressed its concern with the im-
plementation of national policies and principles in education, including church-
based schools. Additionally, it expressed its “grave concern” with the tendency
to exclude pregnant students. In order to improve the situation, the committee
advised the state party to improve its care for pregnant teenagers and young
mothers and to “improve the quality of education”.¹⁰⁵
Second, reviewing Ireland in 2006, the committee observed that 93 percent
of Irish schools were Catholic denominational schools and questioned the dele-
gation on what alternatives were available for religious minorities and non-reli-
gious families.¹⁰⁶ The state delegation explained that the state would willingly
support denominational schools founded by other religious communities, and
that most new schools were multidenominational.¹⁰⁷ In its concluding observa-
tions, the committee expressed its concern with the fact that non- or multideno-
minational schools in Ireland constituted less than 1 percent of primary educa-
tion facilities, recommending the state party to promote the establishment of
non- or multidenominational schools.¹⁰⁸
Third, during its 2008 review of Bhutan, the committee questioned the del-
egation on the role of monasteries in caring for poor children; how many chil-
dren lived in monasteries, whether it was voluntary, and who regulated the ac-
 CRC/C/SR.1010: 9, 68 Aluoch, 60 Smith, 2005.
 CRC/C/SR.1010: 66 Smith, 2005.
 CRC/C/SR.1010: 62, 2005.
 CRC/C/15/Add.252: 61, 2005.
 CRC/C/SR.1182: 9 Smith, 2006.
 CRC/C/SR.1182: 26, 2006.
 CRC/C/IRL/CO/2: 60–61, 2006.
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tivities in the monasteries.¹⁰⁹ The state delegation explained that the monastic
school system catered to many children, but acknowledged that monasteries
had not incorporated “modern thinking” on the rights of the child, and were
too rigid, although some schools for Hindu children existed in the south of
the country, offering education for children from that religious minority.¹¹⁰ In
its concluding observations, the committee expressed its concern that corporal
punishment was still widespread throughout the country, including monasteries,
and that monasteries were the only providers of alternative care in the country.¹¹¹
Finally, in concluding observations following the review of The Republic of
Korea in 2012, the committee commended the state party for the discontinuation
of compulsory religious education, but expressed its concern with restrictions on
the freedom of religion of students enrolled in religious private schools that did
not adequately facilitate “an atmosphere conducive to religious diversity”, in
particular regarding different dietary requirements.¹¹² Consequently, whereas Ko-
ranic schools seem to be accepted in principle by the committee as a necessary,
albeit flawed, institution, the reviews of Belize, Ireland, Bhutan and the Republic
of Korea indicates that education offered by other religious organizations raise
concerns over the potential discrimination of children from religious minorities
in education.
Parallel to its concerns with the living conditions in religious schools under
article 28, the committee also stepped up its observations on article 29 in the
wake of its general comment no. 1 on the purposes of education published in
2001 (see above). While Côte d’Ivoire,¹¹³ Bangladesh,¹¹⁴ Benin¹¹⁵ and Maurita-
nia¹¹⁶ have received observations on the curricula in Koranic schools, most ob-
servations on this topic have been directed at the curricula maintained by states
as the primary providers of public education. Starting with the review of India in
2000,¹¹⁷ the committee has issued concluding observations requesting states to
include the purposes of education spelled out in article 29(1) (d) in their national
curricula to Saudi Arabia,¹¹⁸ Oman,¹¹⁹ Bahrain,¹²⁰ Belgium,¹²¹ Israel,¹²² Iceland,¹²³
 CRC/C/SR.1353: 60 Herczog, 81 Ortiz, 2008.
 CRC/C/SR.1354: 33, 40, 2008.
 CRC/C/BTN/CO/2: 37–38, 44–45, 2008.
 CRC/C/KOR/CO/3–4: 38–39, 2012.
 CRC/C/15/Add.155: 50–51, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.221: 64–65, 2003.
 CRC/C/BEN/CO/2: 61–62, 2006.
 CRC/C/MRT/CO/2: 66, 2009.
 CRC/C/15/Add.115: 59, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.148: 39–40, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.161: 45–46, 2001.
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Libya,¹²⁴ Syria,¹²⁵ and Brunei.¹²⁶ Whereas all these observations were issued be-
tween 2001 and 2003, the committee has only recommended this inclusion twice
between 2003 and 2013, to Malaysia¹²⁷ and Macedonia,¹²⁸ signaling a diminish-
ing interest in the issue.
In addition to these general calls for the inclusion of article 29(1) (d) as a pri-
mary purpose of education, the committee has issued critical observations to
states where the tenets of a majority religion have influenced the contents or
framework of education, affecting children’s rights to the freedom of religion
or belief, in particular children belonging to religious minorities. Reviewing Po-
land in 2003, the committee observed that the Catholic Church had a great deal
of influence, and asked whether Catholic children at state schools were given the
opportunity of religious instructions while those of other religions were not.¹²⁹
The committee expressed its worry that, while alternatives to religion classes
in public schools were available in the state party, the authorities should do
more to ensure the free choice of children between religious instruction and eth-
ics.¹³⁰
Similarly, during the review of Armenia in 2005, a committee member ex-
pressed his concerns with the agreement between the Armenian Apostolic
Church and the state on the nature and content of religious education, an agree-
ment he believed might be in violation of article 14.¹³¹ Receiving no answer, the
committee issued concluding observations expressing their concern with the
compulsory study of the history of the Apostolic Church,¹³² a concern that was
reiterated in the concluding observations following the 2013 review of Arme-
nia.¹³³ Related concerns were raised in the concluding observations following
the review of Italy in 2003 and 2011, as the committee commented the dominant
role of Catholicism and the lacking educational alternatives for children from
 CRC/C/15/Add.175: 43–44, 2002.
 CRC/C/15/Add.178: 25–26, 2002.
 CRC/C/15/Add.195: 56–57, 2002.
 CRC/C/15/Add.203: 36–37, 2003.
 CRC/C/15/Add.209: 39–40, 2003.
 CRC/C/15/Add.212: 46–47, 2003.
 CRC/C/15/Add.219: 50, 2003.
 CRC/C/MYS/CO/1: 75, 2007.
 CRC/C/MKD/CO/2: 65–66, 2010.
 CRC/C/SR.827: 50 Citarella, 2002.
 CRC/C/15/Add.194: 32–33, 2002.
 CRC/C/SR.925: 6 Citarella, 2004 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/137: 208–209, 2004.
 CRC/C/ARM/CO/3–4: 45–46, 2013.
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other religious traditions, advising the state party to ensure that religious in-
struction was “truly optional”.¹³⁴ Similarly, Costa Rica received criticism from
the committee following its 2005 review for the dominant role of Catholicism
in the curriculum in public schools.¹³⁵
Reviewing Cyprus in 2012, the committee considered the relationship be-
tween the dominance of the teachings of one religious group in education and
the hostility between religious groups in society: Several members of the com-
mittee questioned the role of Greek Orthodoxy in religious education, requesting
more information on the availability of religious education for children belong-
ing to religious minorities.¹³⁶ In its concluding observations, the committee ob-
served that
(c) Religious education may be a factor of division and conflict among children in school
and does not sufficiently contribute to a spirit of understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all ethnic and religious groups as stipulated in article 29, paragraph 1 (d) of the Con-
vention. (…) The Committee urges the State party to take measures to: (…) (c) Ensure that
religious education is optional, taking into consideration the best interests of the child, and
is conducted in a manner that contributes to a spirit of understanding, tolerance and
friendship among all ethnic and religious groups as stipulated in article 29, paragraph 1
(d), of the Convention.¹³⁷
Hence, according to the committee, the preference for one religious tradition in
the curriculum issued by the Cypriot authorities could be divisive and create con-
flicts among schoolchildren, conflicts that could be alleviated by the verbatim
introduction of article 29(1) (d) as a primary purpose of education.
Finally, following the examination of Kuwait in 2013, the committee ex-
pressed its concern with the requirement that no teachings of other religions
were allowed during the time Sunni Islam was being taught, including in private
Shiite schools. Additionally, the committee was particularly concerned with the
derogatory language in textbooks, labeling students from other religions as “in-
fidels”. The committee recommended Kuwait to ensure the full respect of child-
ren’s right to the freedom of religion or belief, in particular by allowing children
in private religious schools to receive teaching in their religion if they wish.¹³⁸
Taken together, the practice of the CRC committee on the interrelationship
between religious organizations and education corresponds closely with the
 CRC/C/ITA/CO/3–4: 30–31, 2011.
 CRC/C/15/Add.266: 25–26, 2005.
 CRC/C/SR.1700: 22 Madi, 30 Varmah, 70 Herczog, 2012.
 CRC/C/CYP/CO/3–4: 44–45, 2012.
 CRC/C/KWT/CO/2: 37–38, 2013.
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dominant concept of religion at the committee, conceptualizing religion primar-
ily as a key part of children’s identity that should be considered in all decisions
concerning the child, and secondarily as a powerful social force that decisively
influences the rights of children. This is also encapsulated in the inherent ten-
sion identified by the committee in its general comment on article 29, between
the consideration of the cultural identity of the child and the importance of pro-
moting harmony between religious groups in subparagraphs c and d of article 29
(1), respectively. The freedom of religion or belief has only occasionally been
raised by the committee on this topic, even when states have actively allowed
the dominance of schools promoting one majority religion.
The overarching concern in the practice of the committee on this topic has
been the access to education for all children, a consideration that clearly trumps
the related concern with the potential for discrimination inherent to the involve-
ment of religious organizations in the content or conduct of education.Whereas
the committee has been highly critical towards some of the living conditions,
curricula and manners of discipline in religious educational institutions, it has
consistently refrained from suggestions to disband or shut down religious educa-
tional establishments that cater to poor and disadvantaged children in order to
protect their freedom of religion or belief.
Encountering dissatisfactory curricula, unequal opt-out opportunities or
undue influence from religious organizations on the conduct of education in
public schools, however, the committee has readily drawn upon its provisions
on non-discrimination and the freedom of religion or belief, recommending
the reform of curricula, religious education tailored for minorities, and the dis-
continuation of special treatment of majority religious organizations in educa-
tion. Taken together, these observations seem to suggest that the committee
views the role of religious organizations in education as a necessary ally in sit-
uations where states are unable to offer universal education and a potential
enemy in situations where the organizations of majority religions influence edu-
cation in public schools.
7.6.3 Religious Law
Much in the same vein as CEDAW, the CRC does not explicitly prohibit the rec-
ognition or application of religiously derived legal rules. Nevertheless, the com-
mittee has repeatedly been forced to consider the role of religious law in the im-
plementation of the provisions of the convention. Initially, the comments
published by the committee on this topic were directed at concrete legal meas-
ures that were found to be incompatible with the convention: Reviewing Jordan
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in 1994, the issue of religious law surfaced already in the list of issues sent by the
committee to the state party, questioning the regulation of breastfeeding in the
Personal Status Act,¹³⁹ to which the state party replied that the code was primar-
ily moral and didactic in nature, and was therefore characterized by “a sense of
spiritual and physical harmony between the persons covered by its provisions
and their Lord”.¹⁴⁰ The issue was raised again in the review by committee mem-
bers who inquired about the borderlines between Islamic law and other laws,
particularly in cases that involved plaintiffs from different religions, and the
risks of overlapping jurisdictions,¹⁴¹ but receiving no answer from the state del-
egation. In its concluding observations, the committee observed that different
personal status regulations according to the child’s religion resulted in uncer-
tainty and possibly discrimination, recommending the adoption of a new, com-
mon personal status act.¹⁴²
Similar sentiments were expressed during the review of Sri Lanka in 1995,
when the committee expressed its concern with the disparities in marriage reg-
ulations between the personal status laws of different religious communities.¹⁴³
The issue of multiple marriage regimes for different religions was raised during
the review by two committee members,¹⁴⁴ and expanded to the Muslim prohib-
ition of adoption in Sri Lanka.¹⁴⁵ In its concluding observations, the committee
suggested that the problem with differing legal rules in different religious com-
munities should be amended by “standardizing the age of marriage in all com-
munities”.¹⁴⁶
Starting with the review of Bangladesh in 1997, the committee took a more
active interest in the topic of religious law as such, requesting information on
the efforts taken by the state party to “unify” religious and state laws, and the
status of the convention in situations of conflict with national legislation in
the list of issues.¹⁴⁷ In a supplementary report, the state party confirmed that
“Most children’s lives are governed by family custom and religious law rather
than by State law”,¹⁴⁸ acknowledging the request by the committee for law re-
 CRC/C.6/WP.4: 13, 1994.
 Reply to List of Issues: Jordan: 13, 1994 (the document was published before the CRC started
assigning document codes to replies).
 CRC/C/SR.143: 52 Mason, 55 Santos Pais, 1994.
 CRC/C/15/Add.21: 12, 1994.
 CRC/C/15/Add.40: 11, 1995.
 CRC/C/SR.228: 56 Karp, 60 Badran, 1995.
 CRC/C/SR.229: 61 Mombeshora, 65 Karp, 1995.
 CRC/C/15/Add.40: 28, 1995.
 CRC/C/Q/Ban.1: 2, 1997.
 CRC/C/3/Add.49: 5, 1997.
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form:¹⁴⁹ During the review, the issue of religious law was raised as committee
members and state representatives largely agreed on the nature of the problem
and the need for legal reform.¹⁵⁰ Among these issues, only the topic of the
power of customary and religious law over the lives of children was noted by
the committee in its concluding observations,¹⁵¹ as one of the factors preventing
the full implementation of the convention, although not followed up by a specif-
ic recommendation.
Reviewing India in 2000, the committee identified numerous points of con-
tention between religious laws and the convention, singling out marriage, custo-
dy, the guardianship of infants and inheritance as particularly worrisome areas
where “religion-based personal laws” perpetuated gender inequality.¹⁵² In its rec-
ommendations on how to deal with this issue, the committee suggested that In-
dian authorities combine legal reform with the mobilization of political, religious
and community leaders, indicating a new recognition of the importance of en-
gaging religious communities in order to achieve law reform,¹⁵³ although this rec-
ognition was not reiterated in the concluding observations issued following the
review of the consecutive report of India in 2004.¹⁵⁴
Taken together, these early views of the committee seem to indicate a view of
religious law as a potential obstacle that can primarily be overcome by legal re-
forms.While religious law in itself was not criticized as problematic, the border-
lines between such legal orders and civil law, and the potential conflict between
specific provisions of such laws and the convention, were frequently brought up
by the committee. Parallel to the development of this view of religious law, how-
ever, the committee started engaging the role of customary law somewhat differ-
ently, pointing to the mere existence of the latter as problematic to the imple-
mentation of the convention. During the review of Zimbabwe in 1996, one
committee member observed that customary law “applied only to traditional so-
cieties and thus represented a system based on race, which did not seem to be
 CRC/C/3/Add.49: 41, 1997.
 CRC/C/SR.380: 16 Karp, 32, 1997.
 CRC/C/15/Add.74: 12, 1997.
 CRC/C/15/Add.115: 32, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.115: 33, 2000.
 While the committee repeated its call for reform of the religiously based personal laws of
India, it suggested more unilateral state action: “(a) Scrutinize carefully existing legislative and
other measures, including religious and personal laws, both at the federal and state levels, with
a view to ensuring that the provisions and principles of the Convention are implemented
throughout the State party; (b) Ensure the implementation of its legislation and its wide dissem-
ination” (CRC/C/15/Add.228: 10, 2004).
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ideal”.¹⁵⁵ While the committee also pointed out concrete contradictions between
the age limit for marriages between customary and civil law,¹⁵⁶ only the observa-
tion that a dual system of common and customary law created “additional diffi-
culties” in the implementation of the convention, and impeded the efficient
monitoring of its provisions found its way into the concluding observations.¹⁵⁷
In the review of Nigeria later the same year, members of the committee in-
quired about the status of customary law within the hierarchy of the legal sys-
tem,¹⁵⁸ to which the state representative replied that different tribes had different
customary laws, but that civil law would always prevail in cases of conflict.¹⁵⁹ In
the concluding observations, the state party was asked to take into account the
compatibility of the system of customary law and regional and local laws with
the articles of the Convention,¹⁶⁰ suggesting a structural critique of legal plural-
ism as potentially damaging to the implementation of the convention in itself.
Reviewing Ghana¹⁶¹ and Uganda¹⁶² in 1997, however, the committee gradually
started becoming more concrete in its observations, pointing to specific prob-
lems inherent to customary legal provisions, notably the issue of marriage, indi-
cating a less hostile view of parallel legal systems as a structural problem.
Reviewing the Comoros and Djibouti in 2000, the committee for the first time
addressed the issue of triangular legal systems, where traditional, religious and
state law existed side by side. In identical observations, both states were asked
to
take all appropriate measures to complete the process of law review and, where appropri-
ate, adopt or amend legislation so as to ensure the harmonization of applicable provisions
of the different jurisdictions (traditional, Islamic and civil law), ensuring their conformity
with the provisions and principles of the Convention.¹⁶³
Hence, unlike earlier reviews, the committee did not see the coexistence of par-
allel legal systems to be problematic in and of itself. Similar sentiments were ex-
pressed in the reviews of Tanzania,¹⁶⁴ Cameroon¹⁶⁵ and Gambia.¹⁶⁶ This concili-
 CRC/C/SR.293: 39 Santos Pais, 1996.
 CRC/C/SR.293: 39 Santos Pais, 1996 & CRC/C/SR.294: 11, Hammarberg, 1996.
 CRC/C/15/Add.55: 11, 1996.
 CRC/C/SR.321: 23 Mason, 42 Belembaogo, 1996.
 CRC/C/SR.321: 44, 1996.
 CRC/C/15/Add.61: 27, 1996.
 CRC/C/15/Add.73: 7, 1997.
 CRC/C/15/Add.80: 9, 1997.
 CRC/C/15/Add.131: 14, 2000 & CRC/C/15/Add.141: 10, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.156: 11, 2001.
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atory view was further expanded during the review of Lesotho in 2001: while the
state party was questioned about the compatibility of civil and customary law,¹⁶⁷
the concluding observations recommended the authorities to ensure that ongo-
ing customary law practices are “in conformity with the Convention”,¹⁶⁸ indicat-
ing a recognition of the continued presence of customary law in the state party,
granted that its provisions were brought in line with the convention. Notably,
however, unlike the review of India, neither of the recommendations to reform
the different combinations of religious, customary and civil legal systems sug-
gested the inclusion of the communities involved.
In the reviews of Niger and Burkina Faso in 2002, the committee returned to
a structural critique of customary law as problematic in and of itself, observing
that “the coexistence of customary law and statutory law impedes the implemen-
tation of the Convention in the State party, where traditional practices are not
conducive to children’s rights”,¹⁶⁹ advising the state parties to “take all the nec-
essary steps to harmonize existing legislation and customary law with the Con-
vention”.¹⁷⁰ To Eritrea and Zambia in 2003, the committee emphasized the nexus
between customary laws and practices and the best interests of the child in both
states parties, advising a mixture of legal reform and outreach to community
leaders to amend the situation.¹⁷¹
The practice of the committee on customary forms of law parallel to state
law has gradually moved towards an emphasis on the relationship between
such forms of law and the prevalence of traditional practices, and an awareness
of the need to include religious and community leaders in order to harmonize
legislation and prevent such practices. This general pattern has been repeated
with minor variations in the concluding observations issued to Eritrea,¹⁷² Paki-
stan,¹⁷³ Nepal,¹⁷⁴ Nigeria¹⁷⁵ and Madagascar.¹⁷⁶ This practice suggests a view of
 CRC/C/15/Add.164: 10, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.165: 12, 2001.
 CRC/C/SR.685: 11/36, Doek, 21, Karp, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.147: 10, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.179: 8, 2002 & CRC/C/15/Add.193: 4, 2002.
 CRC/C/15/Add.179: 10, 2002 & CRC/C/15/Add.193: 8, 2002
 Eritrea (CRC/C/15/Add.204: 24, 2003) and Zambia (CRC/C/15/Add.206: 25, 2003).
 CRC/C/15/Add.204: 19, 2003
 CRC/C/15/Add.217: 33, 2003
 CRC/C/15/Add.261: 66, 2005
 CRC/C/15/Add.257: 55, 2005. This recommendation was reiterated by the committee follow-
ing the consecutive review of Nigeria in 2010 (CRC/C/NGA/CO/3–4: 66, 2010)
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customary laws as thoroughly embedded in the social fabric, intimately related
to harmful practices, and primarily amenable through the collaboration with tra-
ditional, religious and community leaders.
Encountering more clearly “religious” laws, the committee has suggested a
different way to handle potential violations of the provisions of the CRC: Review-
ing Iran, Lebanon, The United Arab Emirates, Israel, Syria, India and Malaysia,
the committee consistently found religious systems of law to be at odds with pro-
visions of the convention, primarily in the field of marriage. In its recommenda-
tions, the committee has suggested that reforms of religious law should be con-
ducted in cooperation with the communities in question;¹⁷⁷ advised states to
establish criteria to assess whether actions were in accordance with Islamic
texts;¹⁷⁸ to “[u]ndertake all possible measures to reconcile the interpretation of
Islamic texts with fundamental human rights”;¹⁷⁹ to reconcile the interpretation
of religious laws with fundamental human rights,¹⁸⁰ and, in the case of Malaysia,
The Committee recommends that the State party conduct an international comparative
study on the implications of the dual legal system of civil law and Syariah law and,
based on the results of this assessment, take necessary measures to reform this dual system
with a view to removing inconsistencies between the two legal systems in order to create a
more harmonious legal framework that could provide consistent solutions, for example, to
family-law disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims.¹⁸¹
In addition to these specific recommendations concerning conflicts between con-
crete provisions of religious laws and the convention, the committee issued nu-
merous observations early in the 2000s on the more general influence of partic-
ular interpretations of religion on the legal framework. In the reviews of Iran,¹⁸²
 CRC/C/15/Add.218: 22, 2003. Similar concerns were reiterated following the 2012 review of
Madagascar, but with an emphasis on community and traditional leaders, not religious leaders
(CRC/C/MDG/CO/3–4: 26, 28, 54, 2012)
 Lebanon, CRC/C/15/Add.169: 10, 2002. This recommendation was reiterated following the
2006 review of Lebanon (CRC/C/LBN/CO/3: 26, 2006).
 Iran (CRC/C/15/Add.123: 34, 2000). This recommendation was also reiterated following the
2005 review of Iran (CRC/C/15/Add.254: 40, 2005).
 United Arab Emirates, CRC/C/15/Add.183: 22, 2002.
 Israel, CRC/C/15/Add.195: 11, 2002. A near identical passage was included in the observa-
tions issued by the committee following the 2003 review of Syria (CRC/C/15/Add.212: 10, 2003).
 CRC/C/MYS/CO/1: 15, 2007. This passage is almost entirely similar with a paragraph from
the observations issued to Malaysia by the CEDAW the year before (CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2: 14,
2006).
 CRC/C/15/Add.123: 6, 2000.
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Jordan,¹⁸³ Djibouti,¹⁸⁴ Egypt,¹⁸⁵ Saudi Arabia,¹⁸⁶ Qatar,¹⁸⁷ Bahrain¹⁸⁸ and The
United Arab Emirates,¹⁸⁹ the committee included the following, identical obser-
vation:
Noting the universal values of equality and tolerance inherent in Islam, the Committee ob-
serves that narrow interpretations of Islamic texts by authorities, particularly in areas relat-
ing to family law, are impeding the enjoyment of some human rights protected under the
Convention.¹⁹⁰
This paragraph summarizes the general view of religious laws held by the com-
mittee as a body of norms that essentially safeguard equality and tolerance, but
have been distorted by the narrow interpretations offered by state authorities, in
much the same way as the “core of values” identified by the committee monitor-
ing CEDAW (see chapter 6.6.4). This view is markedly different from the observa-
tions of the committee on customary laws, which have been considered to be lit-
tle more than slightly formalized rules for cultural, traditional and customary
practices.
In its more recent practice, the committee has confirmed the gap between its
attitude towards religious and customary laws, as it has returned to its former
tendency to criticize customary legal systems structurally, pointing to the obsta-
cle constituted by the continued application of customary law, advising Eritrea
to promote awareness of legislation among involved communities;¹⁹¹ observing
the practical challenges of the plural legal system in Mauritania,¹⁹² and the neg-
ative effects of the application of three different sources of law in Niger.¹⁹³
Finally, in the reviews of Pakistan in 2009 and Sri Lanka in 2010, the com-
mittee issued its first observations on the nexus between religious laws and the
freedom of religion or belief, observing that, in Pakistan, “freedom of religion is
limited in practice” and that “citizens who are normally governed by secular law
might sometimes be subject to sharia law”, suggesting that parents should be
 CRC/C/15/Add.125: 9, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.131: 8, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.145: 6, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.148: 6, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.163: 9, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.175: 4, 2002.
 CRC/C/15/Add.183: 4, 2002.
 CRC/C/15/Add.125: 9, 2000, Jordan.
 CRC/C/ERI/CO/3: 8–9, 2008.
 CRC/C/MRT/CO/2: 7–8, 2009.
 CRC/C/NER/CO/2: 7, 2009.
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given the full duties and responsibilities to give guidance to their children in the
exercise of religious freedom in a manner consistent with the evolving capabil-
ities of the child.¹⁹⁴ In this way, the committee for the first time established a re-
lationship between religious and secular laws and the implementation of article
14 on the freedom of religion or belief of children.
Reviewing Sri Lanka in 2010, the committee asked the state party to provide
information on efforts taken to prevent early and forced marriages among Mus-
lims and other communities.¹⁹⁵ The state party replied that the personal laws of
Sri Lanka were the offshoots of “history, culture and the sacred beliefs of the
people who are governed by such laws”. Accordingly, any reform effort would
have to emanate from these communities themselves, in order to ensure compli-
ance with “ICCPR norms”, to enable them to enjoy such rights in accordance
with their religion and culture.¹⁹⁶ During the interactive session, several mem-
bers of the committee raised the issue of underage marriages in the Muslim com-
munity,¹⁹⁷ and the efforts by the state party to reform its personal laws,¹⁹⁸ implor-
ing the state delegation to “impose its will” on the religious communities, rather
than wait for customs to change gradually.¹⁹⁹
Members of the state delegation responded that personal laws “could not be
changed” because they had existed side by side with general laws for a long
time,²⁰⁰ and although gradual changes had been achieved,²⁰¹ general laws
passed by the state “could not detract from special laws such as those derived
from Muslim legislation”.²⁰² In its concluding observations, the committee
urged the state party to prohibit underage marriages and to conduct sensitization
and education programs targeting religious leaders. Additionally, however, the
committee reminded the state party of general comment no. 20 by the Human
Rights Committee on gender equality, and reminded the state party that “free-
dom of religion may not be invoked to justify discrimination against girls and
practices such as forced and early marriages”.²⁰³
 CRC/C/PAK/CO/3–4: 43–44, 2009.
 CRC/C/LKA/Q/3–4: 9, 2010.
 CRC/C/LKA/Q/3–4/Add.1: 28, 2010.
 CRC/C/SR.1567: 24 Citarella, 74 Aidoo, 2010 & CRC/C/SR.1569: 11 Al-Asmar, 2010.
 CRC/C/SR.1567: 29 Lee, 2010.
 CRC/C/SR.1567: 45 Kotrane, 2010.
 CRC/C/SR.1567: 44, 2010.
 CRC/C/SR.1567: 49, 2010.
 CRC/C/SR.1569: 14, 2010.
 CRC/C/LKA/CO/3–4: 56–57, 2010.
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7.6.4 The Impact of Religion
In much the same way as the CEDAW committee, the committee monitoring the
CRC has engaged the impact of religion continuously since its inception in 1991.
The CRC has multiple provisions regulating religion (see chapter 7.1), ranging
from the right of the child to freedom of religion or belief (article 14) and the
rights of children that belong to religious minorities (article 30), to the rights
of children not to be discriminated against on religious grounds (article 2) and
the necessity of considering children’s religious backgrounds in adoption and
other forms of alternative care (article 20).²⁰⁴ However, these provisions have
only rarely been addressed by the committee in its concluding observations.
Despite its limited recommendations on provisions relating directly to reli-
gion, the committee has issued a considerable number of concluding observa-
tions that engage the role of religion as a social force, in line with its general
view of religion as a vital component of children’s identity and a decisive social
and institutional force that intersects with the convention as a whole. In partic-
ular, the committee has repeatedly recommended that states engage religious
leaders and institutions in the dissemination and training of personnel working
with children on the principles and provisions of the convention.
Advising states on the proper handling of rights abuses originating in reli-
gious practices and doctrines, the committee has followed the main divisions
in the approach developed by the CEDAW committee, mixing advice on legal re-
form and policy measures with community outreach and awareness campaigns.
The CRC committee, however, has more consistently acknowledged the decisive
impact of religious practices to the protection of children’s rights, inviting the
participation of religious leaders in the prevention of rights abuses and the dis-
semination of the convention from the early 1990s and onwards. Additionally,
the committee has increasingly engaged the role of religious institutions and
their treatment of children, as examined in some detail above.
The committee engaged the influence of religious doctrines and practices at
its very first review session, held in January 1993. Examining the initial report of
 See above for the full text of articles 2, 14 and 30. Article 20 reads in full: “1. A child tem-
porarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best inter-
ests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and
assistance provided by the State. 2. States Parties shall in accordance with their national laws
ensure alternative care for such a child. 3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement,
kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of
children.When considering solutions, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in
a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.”
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Sudan, committee members questioned the delegation on the issue of female cir-
cumcision,²⁰⁵ to which the state delegation responded that it had been prohibit-
ed by law since 1948, but was still widely practiced in rural areas, although it
“had nothing to do with religion”.²⁰⁶ The members of the committee responded
to this claim with curiosity, questioning the delegation on the role of religious
leaders in the fight against the practice, and asking “whether the Koran men-
tioned female circumcision”,²⁰⁷ to which the state delegation promptly respond-
ed that it did not.²⁰⁸ Additionally, the committee questioned the delegation on
the influence of religion on the access of NGOs to the country,²⁰⁹ teaching in
local languages,²¹⁰ legislation²¹¹ and shop opening hours.²¹² Of all these topics,
only concerns with the issue of female genital mutilation and the recommenda-
tion to include religious and community leaders in eliminating this practice were
raised in the concluding observations.²¹³
Following this early, broad engagement with religious and traditional doc-
trines and practices and the proper means of their discontinuation, the commit-
tee consistently favored a community-oriented approach throughout the 1990s,
recommending the gradually increased inclusion of religious and community
leaders in issues like the elimination of harmful practices, the dissemination
of the principles of the convention, and the establishment of national machiner-
ies for its implementation to Pakistan,²¹⁴ Burkina Faso,²¹⁵ Madagascar²¹⁶ and
Senegal.²¹⁷
Reviewing the Holy See²¹⁸ in 1995, the committee returned to a broad-based
assessment of the impact of religious doctrines and practices on the implemen-
 CRC/C/SR.89: 11 Santos Pais, 1994. The various practices characterized as female circumci-
sion have increasingly been labelled Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C), but both the
terminology applied and the assessment of the practices that fall under this heading are
hotly disputed (see Wade 2011 for an overview).
 CRC/C/SR.89: 18, 1994.
 CRC/C/SR.89: 22 Belembaogo, 1994.
 CRC/C/SR.89: 25, 1994.
 CRC/C/SR.70: 23 Santos Pais, 1993.
 CRC/C/SR.71: 13 Mason, 1993.
 CRC/C/SR.89: 51 Mason, 1994 & CRC/C/SR.90: 1 Belembaogo, 1993.
 CRC/C/SR.90: 12 Hammarberg, 1993.
 CRC/C/15/Add.10: 22, 1993.
 CRC/C/15/Add.18: 27, 1994.
 CRC/C/15/Add.19: 4, 1994.
 CRC/C/15/Add.26: 17, 19 1994.
 CRC/C/15/Add.44: 18, 29, 1995.
 The Holy See is the executive branch of the Vatican city state, and is legally distinct from
the latter, but conjoined by the supreme status of the Pope in both entities. The distinction be-
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tation of the convention. Recognizing the unique characteristics of the state
party, the committee questioned the delegation extensively on its reservations,²¹⁹
the jurisdiction of the Holy See over children attending Catholic institutions out-
side the state party,²²⁰ and its emphasis on the parental freedom of religion or
belief at the expense of the rights of children.²²¹ Responding to the questions,
the delegation acknowledged that although there were no children under the for-
mal jurisdiction of the Holy See, the state party had decided to ratify the conven-
tion due to its “moral jurisdiction” over the religious education of children aris-
ing from its role as principal educator of Catholic teachers.²²² Elaborating on the
specifics of this jurisdiction, members of the delegation explained that, while in-
dividual states managed institutions, they depended on the Holy See for doctri-
nal and moral principles.²²³
In the ensuing discussion, committee members openly disagreed on the na-
ture of the obligations resting on the Holy See, as one member observed that the
state party had an illegitimate power over other states parties, and wondered if
the state party should rather have observer status,²²⁴ while another member sug-
gested that the committee should take the unique opportunity to address the
worldwide Catholic Church, which had contributed greatly to the protection of
the rights of children.²²⁵ Overall, most members supported the latter position, en-
couraging the state delegation to utilize its moral jurisdiction to disseminate the
principles of the convention.²²⁶ While several critical questions were raised con-
cerning the dismissal of contraception by the state party,²²⁷ only the suggestion
to wield its moral influence was carried over to the concluding observations:
In view of the moral influence wielded by the Holy See and the national Catholic churches,
the Committee recommends that efforts for the promotion and protection of the rights pro-
vided for in the Convention be pursued and strengthened. In that regard, the Committee
wishes to underline the importance of wide dissemination of the principles of the Conven-
tween the Vatican and the Holy See dates back to the Lateran Treaties between Italy and the Vat-
ican in 1929, which created the Holy See as the international legal personality of the Vatican
(Chong and Troy 2011).
 CRC/C/SR.255: 11, Santos Pais, 1995 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/SR.255: 13, Badran, 1995 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/SR.255: 15, Karp, 1995 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/SR.255: 19, 23, 1995 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/SR.255: 28, 1995 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/SR.255: 32, Kolosov, 1995 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/SR.255: 34–35, Santos Pais, 1995 (translation from the French original).
 CRC/C/SR.256: 9, Belembaogo, 1995.
 CRC/C/SR.256: 13, 26, Mombeshora, 1995.
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tion and its translation into languages spoken throughout the world, and recommends to
the State party to continue to play an active role to that end.²²⁸
Entirely evading the numerous violations of the convention based on religious
doctrines and practices identified in the state party during the review, the com-
mittee focused on the potentially positive effects of the unique status of the Holy
See as the head of the worldwide Catholic Church for the dissemination of the
convention.²²⁹ Throughout the practice of the committee, it has continued issu-
ing similarly sweeping and general recommendations to state parties to include
religious leaders in the dissemination of the principles of the convention.²³⁰ In
 CRC/C/15/Add.46: 11, 1995.
 This moderate recommendation is a far cry from the most recent concluding observations
issued by the committee following its consideration of the second periodic report of the Holy See
in 2014. In these observations, the committee reaffirmed the unique obligations of the Holy See
as the head of the worldwide Catholic Church, but pointed out numerous conflicts between the
provisions of the Canon law that is the foundation of the Church, the policies and actions of the
Church and its members, and the provisions of the convention. These conflicts included the in-
sufficient legal protection of children against sexual abuse; the lacking monitoring of abuse of
children in institutions run by the Church worldwide; the perpetuation of gender stereotypes in
statements and learning materials published by the Church; the tendency to preserve the repu-
tation of the Church over the best interests of the child in cases of sexual abuse; the violations
against the rights of children of Catholic priests to know their parents; the inhuman, cruel and
degrading treatment and physical and sexual abuse of children in the Magdalene laundries of
Ireland run by four congregations of Catholic Sisters; corporal punishment and ritual beatings
of children in Catholic schools; the neglect of the Church in following up cases of sexual abuse
of thousands of children worldwide perpetrated by members of the Church, and its dismissal of
contraception and sexual and reproductive health and information (CRC/C/VAT/CO/2: 13–14,
19–20, 25–28, 29–30, 33–34, 37–38, 39–40, 43–44, 56–57).
 Yemen (CRC/C/15/Add.47: 15, 1996 & CRC/C/15/Add.102: 13, 1999), Togo (CRC/C/15/Add.83:
38, 1997 and CRC/C/TGO/CO/3–4: 21, 2012), Bolivia (CRC/C/15/Add.95: 18, 1998), Guinea (CRC/
C/15/Add.100: 13, 1999 & CRC/C/GIN/CO/2: 28, 2013), Honduras (CRC/C/15/Add.105: 20, 1999), Ni-
caragua (CRC/C/15/Add.108: 25, 1999), Chad (CRC/C/15/Add.107: 3, 15, 1999), Vanuatu (CRC/C/15/
Add.111: 12, 1999), India (CRC/C/15/Add.115: 33, 2000 & CRC/C/15/Add.228: 23–24, 2004), Cambo-
dia (CRC/C/15/Add.128: 26, 2000), Djibouti (CRC/C/15/Add.131: 24, 2000), Comoros (CRC/C/15/
Add.141: 20, 2000), Qatar (CRC/C/15/Add.163: 31, 2001), Lebanon (CRC/C/15/Add.169: 20, 2002),
Niger (CRC/C/15/Add.179: 20, 2002), Tunisia (CRC/C/15/Add.181: 19, 2002), Seychelles (CRC/C/
15/Add.189, 2002), Sudan (CRC/C/15/Add.190: 22–23, 2002 & CRC/C/SDN/CO/3–4: 21–22,
2010), Poland (CRC/C/15/Add.194: 24, 2002), Morocco (CRC/C/15/Add.211: 22, 2003), Syria
(CRC/C/15/Add.212: 47, 2003), Madagascar (CRC/C/15/Add.218: 21–22, 2003), Brunei (CRC/C/15/
Add.219: 25, 2003), Algeria (CRC/C/15/Add.269: 25, 2005), Ghana (CRC/C/GHA/CO/2: 22, 2006),
Mauritius (CRC/C/MUS/CO/2: 23, 2006), Saudi Arabia (CRC/C/SAU/CO/2: 28, 2006), Samoa
(CRC/C/WSM/CO/1: 23, 2006), Senegal (CRC/C/SEN/CO/2: 20, 2006), Jordan (CRC/C/JOR/CO/3:
26, 2006), Mali (CRC/C/MLI/CO/2: 24, 2007), Malaysia (CRC/C/MYS/CO/1: 34, 2007), Eritrea
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addition to mobilization and awareness-raising among religious leaders, as pre-
ferred by the CEDAW committee, however, the CRC committee also frequently
suggests their “sensitization” and training on the provisions of the convention,
indicating a more didactic approach to the role of religious leaders in the imple-
mentation of the convention.
Since the early 2000s, the committee has expanded its approach to rights vi-
olations linked to religious and traditional doctrines and practices, issuing nu-
merous concluding observations on these issues. In these observations, a dis-
tinction between “religious” practices that should be eradicated with the
assistance of religious and community leaders and more “traditional” practices
that should be eliminated by other means has gradually emerged: Reviewing
Iran and Jordan in 2000, the committee criticized discriminatory attitudes
against girls and children born out of wedlock, suggesting a mixture of legal re-
forms and an examination of “the practices of other States that have been suc-
cessful in reconciling fundamental rights with Islamic texts”, an effort that
should also mobilize the support of religious leaders.²³¹ Similar recommenda-
tions on the same topic were issued to Saudi Arabia,²³² Oman,²³³ Egypt²³⁴ and
Qatar²³⁵ in 2001 and Libya,²³⁶ Morocco²³⁷ and Syria in 2003,²³⁸ although the latter
recommendations did not include references to the practices of other states.
Reviewing Turkey in 2001 and Jordan in 2006, the committee recommended
that the practice of “honor killings” should be fought with the inclusion of reli-
gious and community leaders,²³⁹ while Grenada,²⁴⁰ Suriname,²⁴¹ Tanzania,²⁴²
Gambia,²⁴³ Kenya,²⁴⁴ Malawi²⁴⁵ and Timor-Leste²⁴⁶ were advised by the commit-
(CRC/C/ERI/CO/3: 21, 2008), Bhutan (CRC/C/BTN/CO/2: 20–22, 2008), Mauritania (CRC/C/MRT/
CO/2: 23, 2009), Tajikistan (CRC/C/TJK/CO/2: 32, 2010), Cameroon (CRC/C/CMR/CO/2: 22, 2010)
and Nigeria (CRC/C/NGA/CO/3–4: 20–21, 2010).
 CRC/C/15/Add.123: 22, 2000 & CRC/C/15/Add.125: 30, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.148: 24, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.161: 25, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.145: 30, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.163: 31, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.209: 24, 2003.
 CRC/C/15/Add.211: 26, 2003.
 CRC/C/15/Add.212: 26, 2003.
 CRC/C/15/Add.152: 32, 2001 & CRC/C/JOR/CO/3: 39, 2006.
 CRC/C/15/Add.121: 16, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.130: 32, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.156: 35, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.165: 31, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.160: 32, 2001.
 CRC/C/15/Add.174: 32, 2002.
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tee to raise awareness among religious leaders on the importance of birth regis-
tration. In more general terms, the committee has asked India,²⁴⁷ Myanmar²⁴⁸
and Yemen²⁴⁹ to involve religious leaders in the prevention of religiously
based discrimination. On the topic of early marriages, the committee has recom-
mended that Madagascar,²⁵⁰ Liberia,²⁵¹ Nigeria²⁵² and Nepal²⁵³ involve religious
and community leaders in sensitization programs.
Additionally, numerous countries have been asked to include religious lead-
ers in the eradication of harmful traditional practices, in particular the wide-
spread practice of female genital mutilation (FGM).²⁵⁴ Unlike the CEDAWcommit-
tee, however, the CRC committee has not sought to embed the practice in an
auxiliary “cultural” or “traditional” sphere that corrupts an inner core of shared
values: Whereas the CEDAW committee has claimed that FGM has “no link to re-
ligion” urging states to address the “underlying cultural justifications” of the
practice (see above), the CRC committee has not commented on the relation be-
tween religion and FGM, consistently asking states to engage religious leaders in
its eradication, without addressing its potential underpinnings or origins from
surrounding cultural practices.
Recommendations to include religious leaders in the fight against human
rights violations have continued up to the present, as Afghanistan,²⁵⁵ Turkey²⁵⁶
 CRC/C/TLS/CO/1: 36, 2008.
 CRC/C/15/Add.228: 28, 2004.
 CRC/C/15/Add.237: 28, 2004.
 CRC/C/15/Add.267: 33 2005.
 CRC/C/15/Add.218: 24, 2003.
 CRC/C/15/Add.236: 51, 2004.
 CRC/C/15/Add.257: 55, 2005.
 CRC/C/15/Add.261: 66, 2005.
 Senegal (CRC/C/15/Add.44: 18, 1995 & CRC/C/SEN/CO/2: 51, 2006), Ethiopia (CRC/C/15/
Add.67: 23, 1997 & CRC/C/ETH/CO/3: 60, 2006), Togo (CRC/C/15/Add.255: 57, 2005 & CRC/C/
TGO/CO/3–4: 58, 2012) Uganda (CRC/C/UGA/CO/2: 56, 2005), Ghana (CRC/C/GHA/CO/2: 56,
2006), Tanzania (CRC/C/TZA/CO/2: 51, 2006), Oman (CRC/C/OMN/CO/2: 52, 2006), Benin
(CRC/C/BEN/CO/2: 54, 2006), Ireland (CRC/C/IRL/CO/2: 55, 2006), Kenya (CRC/C/KEN/CO/2:
54, 2007), Mali (CRC/C/MLI/CO/2: 53, 2007), Sierra Leone (CRC/C/SLE/CO/2: 58, 2008), Eritrea
(CRC/C/ERI/CO/3: 61, 2008), Djibouti (CRC/C/DJI/CO/2: 56, 2008), DR Congo (CRC/C/COD/CO/
2: 60, 2009), Chad (CRC/C/15/Add.107: 29, 1999 & CRC/C/TCD/CO/2: 62, 2009), Malawi (CRC/C/
MWI/CO/2: 57, 2009), Mauritania (CRC/C/MRT/CO/2: 62, 2009), Niger (CRC/C/NER/CO/2: 60,
2009), Cameroon (CRC/C/CMR/CO/2: 60, 2010), Nigeria (CRC/C/NGA/CO/3–4: 66, 2010), Egypt
(CRC/C/EGY/CO/3–4: 69, 2011) and Guinea-Bissau (CRC/C/GNB/CO/2–4: 44, 2013).
 CRC/C/AFG/CO/1: 55–56, 2011.
 CRC/C/TUR/CO/2–3: 57, 2012.
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and Liberia²⁵⁷ have been encouraged to raise awareness among religious leaders
on the harmful effects of traditional practices, Bahrain,²⁵⁸ Algeria,²⁵⁹ Togo,²⁶⁰
Rwanda,²⁶¹ Namibia,²⁶² and Syria²⁶³ have been asked to involve religious leaders
in the eradication of corporal punishment in schools, while Niue²⁶⁴ has been en-
couraged to include religious leaders in the fight against domestic violence. In
all of these cases, the committee clearly considered the various practices in-
volved; birth out of wedlock, honor killings, birth registrations, early marriages,
female genital mutilations, corporal punishment and domestic violence, to fall
within a “religious” sphere, as religious leaders were consistently sought engag-
ed in their amendment and eradication.
Other doctrines and practices, however, have been considered by the com-
mittee to be beyond this sphere, as referrals to the potential engagement of reli-
gious leaders have been omitted. Reviewing India in 2000, the committee ob-
served the sexual abuse and exploitation of children from lower castes and
from poor and urban areas “in the contexts of religious and traditional cul-
ture”.²⁶⁵ However, the committee did not suggest eliminating these practices
by mobilizing religious and community leaders (see above), but rather by crim-
inalizing the sexual exploitation of children and ensuring that child victims were
not penalized.²⁶⁶ Similarly, during the review of Mozambique in 2002, the state
party was asked to prevent sexual abuse perpetrated by relatives in forced mar-
riage, including rape as part of “magical-religious practices”, through training
campaigns, by implementing legislative and administrative measures, not in-
volving religious or community leaders.²⁶⁷ These concerns were reiterated follow-
ing the 2009 review of Mozambique.²⁶⁸
In a similar vein, concluding observations issued by the committee about the
“traditional beliefs”, “misbeliefs” and “mistaken beliefs” responsible for the dis-
 CRC/C/LBR/CO/2–4: 52, 2012.
 CRC/C/BHR/CO/2–3: 45, 2011.
 CRC/C/DZA/CO/3–4: 44, 2012.
 CRC/C/TGO/CO/3–4: 44, 2012.
 CRC/C/RWA/CO/3–4: 28, 2013.
 CRC/C/NAM/CO/2–3: 39, 2012.
 CRC/C/SYR/CO/3–4: 54, 2012.
 CRC/C/NIU/CO/1: 37, 2013.
 CRC/C/15/Add.115: 74, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.115: 75, 2000.
 CRC/C/15/Add.172: 38–39, 2002.
 CRC/C/MOZ/CO/2: 66, 2009.
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crimination of children with disabilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo,²⁶⁹
Sudan,²⁷⁰ the Philippines,²⁷¹ Algeria,²⁷² Uganda²⁷³ and Swaziland²⁷⁴ suggested a
broad array of different legal, policy and campaign tools, but saw no reason
to include religious leaders in these efforts.²⁷⁵ Reviewing Angola in 2004, the
committee expressed its deep concern about the witchcraft accusations against
children and “the very negative consequences of such accusations, including
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and even murder”.²⁷⁶ During the re-
view, the state delegation recognized the extent of the problem, and pointed
out that they were working with religious leaders in order to curb the practice.²⁷⁷
In order to put an end to this abhorrent state of affairs, however, the committee
only suggested that the state party should prosecute the perpetrators and “in-
volve local leaders in education campaigns”.²⁷⁸
During the review of Uganda in 2005, the committee “note[d] with deep
concern” that child sacrifices took place in certain districts of the country, a
problem the committee recommended that the state should resolve by prohibit-
ing the practice, prosecuting the perpetrators and conduct awareness-raising
campaigns.²⁷⁹ Similar suggestions have been offered to other states parties
where accusations of witchcraft have led to the abuse of children, including Ma-
lawi²⁸⁰ and Benin.²⁸¹ In a similar vein, the committee requested that Pakistan
 CRC/C/15/Add.153: 50–51, 2001. These concerns were reiterated following the review of the
consecutive report of the state party in 2009 (CRC/C/COD/CO/2: 28–29, 2009). See also below.
 CRC/C/15/Add.190: 45–46, 2002. These concerns were reiterated following the review of the
consecutive report of the state party in 2010 (CRC/C/SDN/CO/3–4: 48–49, 2010).
 CRC/C/15/Add.259: 55–56, 2005. These concerns were reiterated following the review of the
consecutive report of the state party in 2009 (CRC/C/PHL/CO/3–4: 53–54, 2009).
 CRC/C/15/Add.269: 53–54, 2005.
 CRC/C/UGA/CO/2: 46–47, 2005.
 CRC/C/SWZ/CO/1: 48–49, 2006.
 The concluding observations issued to The Solomon Islands in 2003 constitutes a singular
exception to this general rule, as the committee recommended the inclusion of church author-
ities in the care for disabled children (CRC/C/15/Add.208: 39, 2003). The case is singular because
the committee did not relate the status of disabled children to traditional beliefs, but to the re-
moteness of certain islands in the state party. Moreover, members of the state delegation pointed
out the important role of the church to the care for the disabled during the interactive session
with the committee (CRC/C/SR.874: 64, 2003).
 CRC/C/15/Add.246: 30, 2004.
 CRC/C/SR.992: 16, 2005.
 CRC/C/15/Add.246: 31, 2004.
 CRC/C/UGA/CO/2: 33–34, 2005.
 CRC/C/15/Add.174: 27–28, 2002.
 CRC/C/BEN/CO/2: 30–31, 2006.
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should address “inhumane customs and rituals”, not by appeal to religious lead-
ers, but by legally prohibiting such practices, and promoting a “culture of non-
violence”,²⁸² while Liberia was asked to put an end to the ritualistic killings of
children by ensuring “the strict application of the Children’s Law”.²⁸³
Reviewing The Democratic Republic of Congo in 2009, the committee com-
mented extensively on the abuse of children accused of sorcery and witchcraft,
pointing out the numerous rights violations constituted by such abuse, including
the principle of non-discrimination, the best interests of the child, the right to
life, survival and development and the right to participation.²⁸⁴ One committee
member in particular elaborated on the various dimensions related to the prob-
lem:
As recognized in the State party report, the problem of children being accused of witchcraft
had reached disturbing proportions, particularly in urban areas. A large percentage of
street children had been separated from their parents following witchcraft accusations,
which, disturbingly, were often made by the parents. The children were forced into church
centres, where pastors subjected them to harsh and degrading treatment, including starva-
tion, under the pretext of exorcizing them. Such acts could not continue if the State party
was committed to protecting children’s rights and she asked what the Government was
doing to put an end to the practice. While a belief in witchcraft was part of a traditional
world view, it was not an acceptable explanation for objective phenomena, such as poverty,
childhood illnesses and AIDS-related deaths. What was the Government doing to educate
parents, church leaders and community leaders regarding the causes of the aforementioned
problems and to emphasize that they had nothing to do with witchcraft? Did the Govern-
ment have a strategy for dialogue with the religious leaders in question? Had the Govern-
ment considered appointing a special adviser to investigate the problem, which seemed to
be spreading?²⁸⁵
Following this comment, the concluding observations of the committee recom-
mended the inclusion of religious leaders in the measures to prevent children
from being accused of witchcraft. However, it also urged the state party to ad-
dress the “root causes, inter alia, poverty”.²⁸⁶
Reviewing Nigeria in 2010, several committee members were critical of the
practice of accusing children of witchcraft. One member explicitly linked this
issue to the religious discrimination identified in the state party by the Special
 CRC/C/PAK/CO/3–4: 45–46, 2009.
 CRC/C/LBR/CO/2–4: 38, 2012.
 CRC/C/SR.1384: 21 Khattab, 41 Ortiz, 2009 & CRC/C/SR.1385: 8 Aidoo, 2009.
 CRC/C/SR.1385: 8, Aidoo, 2009.
 CRC/C/COD/CO/2: 78–79, 2009.
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Rapporteur on the freedom of religion or belief in 2006,²⁸⁷ while another member
emphasized the role of the Church in such accusations.²⁸⁸ Although some mem-
bers agreed with the claim of the state delegation that the practice originated in
“poverty and ignorance”,²⁸⁹ the committee nevertheless explicitly asked the state
party to “address the belief in child witchcraft, for the general public as well as
for religious leaders”,²⁹⁰ potentially signaling a new willingness to see a relation-
ship between religious leaders and accusations of child witchcraft. Another in-
dication that the connection between religious leaders and harmful practices
may gradually become more fluid is the concluding observations issued to
Sudan in 2010, recommending the state party to conduct awareness-raising
among religious leaders on the harmful effects of sexual abuse,²⁹¹ a practice
the committee has formerly not linked to religious leaders.
Despite this new approach, the connection between witchcraft accusations
and religion was dismissed again by the committee in its consecutive observa-
tions to Angola later in 2010: During the interactive session, both committee
members and representatives from the state delegation agreed on the origin of
accusations of witchcraft in “religious sects”.²⁹² Nevertheless, the advice offered
to the state party in the concluding observations was only to include “civil soci-
ety organizations and traditional or community leaders” in the fight against ac-
cusations of witchcraft.²⁹³ Likewise, following the review of Guinea-Bissau in
2013, the committee advised the state party to “monitor its efforts in this regard,
and undertake a study on the extent and root causes” of the ritual murders of
“albinos, children with disabilities, twins and other children who were accused
of practicing witchcraft”.²⁹⁴
In its most recent practice, the committee has repeatedly asked states parties
to involve religious leaders more generally, in their efforts to integrate the prin-
ciple of the best interests of the child in their domestic legal frameworks, in con-
cluding observations issued to Namibia,²⁹⁵ Armenia,²⁹⁶ Guinea-Bissau,²⁹⁷ Sao
 E/CN.4/2006/5/Add.2, 2006, CRC/C/SR.1505: 23 Zermatten, 2011.
 CRC/C/SR.1505: 56 Filali, 2011.
 CRC/C/SR.1506: 53, 55 Koopraphant, 2010.
 CRC/C/NGA/CO/3–4: 68, 2010.
 CRC/C/SDN/CO/3–4: 84, 2010.
 CRC/C/SR.1547: 62 Filali, 63, 2010.
 CRC/C/AGO/CO/2–4: 54, 2010.
 CRC/C/GNB/CO/2–4: 28–29, 2013.
 CRC/C/NAM/CO/2–3: 33, 2012.
 CRC/C/ARM/CO/3–4: 21, 2013.
 CRC/C/GNB/CO/2–4: 27, 2013.
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Tome and Principe,²⁹⁸ Tuvalu,²⁹⁹ Israel,³⁰⁰ Niue³⁰¹ and Guyana,³⁰² in what ap-
pears to be a concerted effort to make states aware of the recently adopted gen-
eral comment issued by the committee on the subject.³⁰³
The degree to which the engagement of religious leaders is a key concern to
the committee is perhaps best illustrated by the concluding observations follow-
ing the review of Guinea in 2013, which was asked to involve religious leaders in
the development of a comprehensive policy on children for the realization of the
principles and provisions of the convention;³⁰⁴ that they be adequately and sys-
tematically trained on children’s rights;³⁰⁵ that they be involved in sustainable
public education, awareness-raising and social mobilization programs to elimi-
nate corporal punishment, including the religious interpretations that “wrongly
prescribe whipping as an integral part of the Koran”;³⁰⁶ that they be trained to
“identify child victims and to effectively intervene in case of abuse and neglect
against children”,³⁰⁷ and that they be made aware of the harmful impact of FGM
and other traditional practices and its consequences for “the psychological and
physical health and welfare of the girl child, as well as her future family”.³⁰⁸ ³⁰⁹
7.7 Summary
The practice of the committee monitoring the CRC from 1993 to 2013 displays the
complexity of approaching religion from a child-centered rights perspective. Like
the CEDAW, the CRC protects one specific category of rights holders, but does so
in a very broad range of different rights areas. Unlike the other committees,
 CRC/C/STP/CO/2–4: 26, 2013.
 CRC/C/TUV/CO/1: 26, 2013.
 CRC/C/ISR/CO/2–4: 24, 2013.
 CRC/C/NIU/CO/1: 27, 2013.
 CRC/C/GUY/CO/2–4: 27, 2013.
 General comment No. 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a
primary consideration (CRC/C/GC/14, 2013).
 CRC/C/GIN/CO/2: 14, 2013.
 CRC/C/GIN/CO/2: 28, 2013.
 CRC/C/GIN/CO/2: 49, 2013.
 CRC/C/GIN/CO/2: 51, 2013.
 CRC/C/GIN/CO/2: 56, 2013.
 The committee has issued similar sounding observations to numerous states, but no other
state has received a similarly comprehensive recommendation to include religious leaders in the
implementation of the CRC. In the examination above, these observations have been split up in
order to assess different topics together. As such, some observations appear several times
throughout the text.
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whose overarching interpretational commonality is that of non-discrimination
and a limited set of rights guarantees, the committee monitoring the CRC is addi-
tionally obliged to examine the information in state reports from the perspective
of the “best interests of the child”. Hence, whereas the other committees have
examined how states deal with issues like education, the role of religious laws
and the impact of religious leaders and organizations from a shared emphasis
on non-discrimination in the access to a selection of specific rights, the CRC com-
mittee has sought to translate these issues to the child-centered context of the
CRC.
The emphasis on the specific needs of children has led the CRC committee to
somewhat different approaches to religion than those of the other committees. It
is the only committee to have addressed the living conditions and curricula in
Koranic schools, which it has criticized in the reviews of numerous African
states. During these reviews, it has rarely commented on the dominance of
one religious educational alternative over others and the potentially discriminat-
ing effects of this, focusing instead on how to improve the form and content of
the existing educational alternatives on offer. This differs markedly from the ap-
proach of the other committees, which have stressed the potentially discrimina-
tory effects inherent to denominational education.
The CRC committee is also the only committee to distinguish clearly between
customary and religious laws, approaching the former as closely connected to
harmful traditional practices and the latter as a system that can be changed
given the right reforms and outreach to the communities in question. The com-
mittee has repeatedly engaged in a structural critique of customary law, while
suggesting that religious law may be engaged and amended, much in the
same way as general legislation. The CRC committee is also alone among the
treaty bodies in bringing attention to sexual abuse in religious contexts and
the abuse and even murder of children accused of witchcraft.
Despite these differences, there are also similarities—like the HRC and the
committee monitoring CEDAW, the CRC committee has been concerned with
the role of children belonging to religious minorities and the ways in which re-
ligious discrimination more generally influences children, as the primary rights
holders protected under the CRC. It has consistently sought out the collaboration
with, or urged the engagement of religious leaders, much like the CEDAW com-
mittee, although it has done so for a longer period of time.
Despite similarities in wording between the CRC article 14 and the ICCPR ar-
ticle 18, the CRC committee has only rarely addressed religion as a question
about beliefs and their manifestations. Across the different themes raised by
the committee in its concluding observations, religion has primarily been viewed
as a dimension to identity and a social force that influences the implementation
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of the provisions of the CRC. Unlike the CEDAW committee, the CRC committee
has not discussed the secularity of states as a prerequisite for the implementa-
tion of its treaty provisions, despite its repeated concerns with sexual and
other kinds of abuse within religious schools and communities. Nor has it dis-
played the same interest in the reinterpretation of the Koran or the correction
of what Islam really says about rights as has members of the CEDAW committee.
Taken together, the modalities of religion at the CRC committee resemble the
approaches to religion among actors at the second United Nations: Like the spe-
cialized programs and agencies of the UN, the committee has primarily ap-
proached religion as a surrounding feature influencing its main purpose,
which is to secure the rights of children as they are laid out in the CRC. In
this way, the committee has sought to engage religion from a pretended “out-
side”, untarnished by the partisanship and power plays of actors at the first or
third UN, who tend to engage in religion-making from above or below. However,
unlike most actors at the second UN, some observations issued by the committee
hint at a less instrumentalist view of religion: In particular, the formulation of a
standardized observation on the “universal values of equality and tolerance in-
herent in Islam” developed by the committee in the early 2000s (see above) in-
dicates an approach to religion more in line with the “civil religion” approach
favored by actors at the first UN (see chapter 3).
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8 Legal Forms of Religious Life
Emile Durkheim famously sought out the “elementary forms” of religious life
among the aboriginals of Australia, whom he considered to have “the simplest
and most primitive religion that is known at present” (Durkheim 1995: 1).
While his primary subject matter was the religious ideas and practices of the ab-
originals, his underlying intention was to say something more universally rele-
vant about how and why anyone can be religious, thereby addressing “a funda-
mental and permanent aspect of humanity” (Durkheim 1995: 1). In a similar vein,
this book has sought out the legal forms of religious life at the United Nations,
and in particular among the human rights treaty bodies, as one of the largest, yet
in many ways among the most primitive legal monitoring machineries in the
world. While the primary subject matter of the book has been the specific ap-
proaches to religion in the concluding observations issued by four treaty bodies,
the underlying intention has also been to identify more general patterns in how
religion is approached in law and policy, which are no less fundamental or per-
manent aspects of humanity than the characteristics of “religious life” identified
by Durkheim.
In the more than 100 years that have passed since the publication of Elemen-
tary Forms of Religious Life, religion has increasingly become subject to legal reg-
ulation and political debate, to the point where law and policy have become
major frames of reference for most aspects conventionally characterized as “re-
ligion”. Politicians, legislators and the judiciary have their say on everything
from the boundaries of the “manifestations” of religious beliefs in the public
sphere, the religious doctrines espoused in schools, the creation and influence
of religious organizations and institutions and to the social and legal influence
of religious laws, doctrines and practices.While some authors may attribute this
increase to a “comeback” or “return” of religion to the public sphere (see chapter
1), another explanation may be the more gradual and general process of juridi-
fication, understood as the increasing recourse to law engendered by “the prolif-
eration of rights discourses globally, regionally and nationally; and the growth of
international law generally and the use of international courts and war crimes
tribunals more specifically” (Blichner and Molander 2008: 37).
Indeed, as legal rules increase in number and scope at every level of gover-
nance, ever larger parts of society have become subject to “legal framing”; the
development of a legal culture “that extends beyond or even replaces other back-
ground cultures. An individual is increasingly part of a society by virtue of ac-
cepting law as the basic frame of reference” (Blichner and Molander 2008:
47). As the findings in this book attest to, law is a basic frame of reference for
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a broad variety of different aspects of religion/s. The importance of this frame of
reference is not limited to the legal rules that govern “religion” explicitly, but ex-
tends well into the governance of a wide array of other issues that frequently in-
teract with religion/s, ranging from the rights of women and children to the right
to freedoms of expression and association. In this way, the concluding observa-
tions issued by the treaty bodies from 1993 to 2013 serve as exemplars of how
actors within an increasingly global legal culture “make” religion, using the vo-
cabulary of law as their primary frames of reference and tools of distinction.
In order to identify more general aspects of the religion-making of the com-
mittees, this final chapter revisits some of the themes that have been addressed
most frequently by the committees, pointing to divergences and convergences in
their approaches. Despite clear and substantial differences in their approaches
to what religion is and what role it should play in relation to the instruments
they monitor, the committees have addressed several interrelated themes, five
of which have stood out in particular over the course of the preceding chapters.
First, the committees have entertained a sustained and broad engagement with
the rights of religious minorities, from their proper codification in statutory law,
their relation to other rights, the limits between religious and other minorities,
and to the specific challenges arising for women and children belonging to reli-
gious minorities.
Second, the committees have extensively examined the role of religious or-
ganizations, from their recognition in constitutional and statutory law and to
their contributions to education, health care and social morality, connecting
the issue of religious organizations to a broad variety of different treaty provi-
sions. Third, the role of religious, customary and indigenous forms of law,
their recognition in “secular” law, their specific provisions, potential for reform
and methods of interpretation and their real or perceived influence on the real-
ization of a broad range of other rights has been repeatedly discussed. Fourth,
the committees have engaged the social role of religious doctrines and practices,
from the potential contributions of religious and traditional leaders in dissemi-
nating principles of human rights treaties and in battling harmful traditional
practices, and to the role of religious organizations and precepts in preventing
or exacerbating conflicts and tensions in society. Fifth, all the committees
have commented extensively on the role of Islam, both in Muslim-majority coun-
tries and in countries where Muslims constitute religious minorities.
Assessing the role of religion across these themes, the committees have
drawn in unequal measures on perspectives from the first, second and third
UN, thus affecting the relationship between religion-making from above,
below and outside. What constitutes the proper boundaries of “religion” in the
ways in which the committees approach the rights of minorities, the role of or-
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ganizations, non-state forms of law and doctrines and practices varies consider-
ably from one committee to the other, as does their modes and means of inter-
action with actors at the different levels of the UN. Consequently, some states re-
ceive different recommendations from each committee for the same set of laws
and practices, while other states receive the same recommendations despite dif-
ferences in legislation. In these cases, the treaty monitoring process risks turning
into a zero sum game in which states receiving praise for legal reform from one
committee can be scolded for the very same reform by another committee.
Treaty bodies do not operate in splendid isolation. Their concluding obser-
vations on minority rights, the role of religious organizations, religious law
and religious doctrines and practices resonate in unequal measures with pre-ex-
isting discourse on these themes, both within and beyond the academy. To better
contextualize the approaches to religion favored by each treaty body on these
themes, this chapter briefly maps some of the more important surrounding dis-
courses on each theme before moving on to the views of the committees.
8.1 Minorities and Non-Discrimination
While the equality of rights for all regardless of their affiliation or status¹ has
been at the core of the modern human rights concept since the formation of
the UN, (Vandenhole 2005: 1), the idea of particular rights for distinct minorities
is a considerably older idea, one that was all but eliminated with the adoption of
the UDHR, although it has gradually been reinstituted over the course of the last
decades (Normand and Zaidi 2008: 141; Barth 2008: 78, see chapter 3). Both sets
of rights have equality as their ultimate purpose, but their methods for achieving
this are fundamentally different. The principle of non-discrimination of individ-
uals is derived from modern liberalism, furnishing sovereign individuals with
human dignity, which is posited within the UDHR as a characteristic inherent
to all human beings and primary to all other characteristics (Reinbold 2011:
161). The principle of granting specific rights to groups due to constitutive differ-
ences between these groups and their surroundings on the other hand, posits the
collective and its distinctive identity traits as the constitutive bearer of rights, as
regulated by the minority treaties negotiated by the League of Nations (Moyn
2014: 69–70). The tension between these opposing logics was part of the stale-
 While some authors distinguish between equality and non-discrimination, attributing a stron-
ger positive obligation upon states to the former, the terms are used virtually synonymous by the
treaty bodies (Vandenhole 2005: 83). Hence, whenever I refer to “equality rights”, this encom-
passes rights to non-discrimination as well.
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mate at the United Nations during the Cold War, with the Soviet Union cham-
pioning the continued importance of minority rights and the US promoting the
rights of the free and sovereign individual (Barth 2008: 69).
In the monitoring of the implementation of human rights provisions on dis-
crimination and minority rights, the granting of any of these rights are expressly
understood to have no repercussions on other rights, nor to be derivatives of
other rights. Both sets of rights seek to bring about “substantive equality”, i.e.
de facto, rather than simply de jure equality for all (Henrard 2011: 401). To com-
plicate the issue, religion constitutes a “special case” in the application of the
equality principle by virtue of its strong protection as a personal belief, due to
the tendency of international monitoring bodies to categorize all cases concern-
ing religion under the “religion or belief” umbrella (Ghanea 2012: 61).Within this
framework, religion or belief is primarily an individual elective, and not a dimen-
sion to the identity of groups, rendering its relation to other grounds for discrim-
ination and differential treatment uncertain.
In the UN context, religious discrimination has also posed a particular chal-
lenge due to its unclear relation to racial discrimination, a challenge that has
been left unresolved since the early 1960s, when negotiations on a common in-
strument prohibiting both racial and religious discrimination broke down, result-
ing in two parallel but asymmetrical protective instruments (see chapter 3). The
ambiguity between racial and religious discrimination has resurfaced repeatedly
at the UN monitoring bodies over the last decades, in particular in the practice of
CERD (see chapter 4). Additionally, religious discrimination and the rights of re-
ligious minorities frequently interact with numerous other rights monitored by
the committees, including but not limited to the rights of indigenous peoples,
the rights of “old” vs. “new” minorities, the rights of minorities within minori-
ties, and the “intersectionality” of religious discrimination with other grounds,
like gender.
The religion-making of the committees from 1993 to 2013 demonstrate the
complexity of disentangling the interrelationships between specific grounds
for differential treatment. When taken together, the practices of the committees
on the rights of minorities and non-discrimination offer counter-narratives to
the tendency in international human rights law to conceive of religion primarily
under “the freedom of religion or belief umbrella”. Through their concluding ob-
servations, the committees have urged states to prohibit differential treatment
based on religion, not in order to protect beliefs, but by repeatedly appealing
to the concept of religious identity. Additionally, however, the observations is-
sued by the committees on religious minorities are split in their emphasis on dif-
ferent dimensions of the minority complex. To CERD, the main problem seems to
be the numerous lacunae in legislation on minority protection, as states fail to
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protect minorities from both religious and ethnic grounds of discrimination. The
HRC has been particularly preoccupied with the situation in Europe,where “old”
minorities tend to have certain inherited privileges derived from earlier peace set-
tlements, privileges that are not necessarily extended to more recent arrivals,
thus violating the principle of equal treatment, whereas the CRC committee
views the minority complex mostly from instances of de facto discrimination ex-
perienced by minority children. Finally, the committee monitoring CEDAW is
alone in addressing the minorities within minorities complex in its practice, as
it has stressed the obligations of state parties to protect members of minority
groups from discrimination emanating both from within and from outside the
groups with which they are affiliated.
The concluding observations issued to Cyprus illustrate some of these differ-
ent perspectives. Whereas all the committees have highlighted some part of the
challenges facing Cyprus by de facto differential treatment of some segments of
the population in one way or form, each committee has done so from its specific
approach to religion: The HRC observed in 1994 that tensions between the vari-
ous ethnic and religious communities continued to be a problem and empha-
sized the plight of conscientious objectors,² a concern that was reiterated follow-
ing the 1998 review, where the committee also expressed its concern for the
differential treatment of citizens of Turkish origin and praised the establishment
of a family court with jurisdiction over civil and religious marriage.³ CERD
stressed in 1995 that it would have preferred to refer to the religious groups listed
in the report from Cyprus as ethnic groups,⁴ a concern that was left out in the
1998 review and replaced by a concern for the lacking prohibition of racial dis-
crimination in 2001.⁵ Following the 2013 review of Cyprus, the concern with the
relationship between racial and religious discrimination was reiterated, as the
committee referred to “ethnic and/or religious communities”, highlighted the
need to recognize the right to self-identification of minorities, and recalled the
intersectionality between ethnicity and religion, reminding the state of its obli-
gations to the freedom of religion or belief under article 5.⁶
The committee monitoring CEDAW, having ignored the role of minorities in
its 1996 and 2006 recommendations, issued a warning to Cyprus about its treat-
ment of “ethnic minorities” following its 2013 review, urging the state party to
 A/49/40 (I): 314, 321, 1994.
 A/53/40 (I): 197, 198, 186, 1998.
 A/50/18: 75, 1995.
 A/56/18: 269, 2001.
 A/69/18: 7, 14, 15, 2014.
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“[i]ntensify its efforts to remove economic, linguistic and cultural barriers faced
by girls belonging to ethnic minorities, including Turkish Cypriot girls”.⁷ While
the committee also raised the issue of the subdivision of the population accord-
ing to religious belonging, it did so in relation to the jurisdiction of religious fam-
ily courts.⁸ The CRC committee, having ignored the minority issue in its 1996 re-
view of Cyprus, referred in its 2003 observations to the lack of legal provisions
expressly outlawing racial discrimination by private persons, referring to the
concerns expressed by CERD in 2001.⁹ In its 2012 observations, the committee
voiced its concern for discrimination “against children of Turkish origin and
other minorities”, advising the creation of a “targeted programme” specifically
addressing the experiences of minority children,¹⁰ while bringing up religion
only in relation to the purposes of education in article 29 of the CRC.¹¹
Taken together, the observations issued by the committees to Cyprus on the
discrimination of minorities from 1993 to 2013 illustrate how the differences be-
tween the committees in approaching religion play out: While the HRC has only
brought in religion in relation to the situation of conscientious objectors, CERD
has consistently stressed the need to prohibit racial discrimination, while inter-
mittently stressing its correlation with religious discrimination. The committees
monitoring the CRC and CEDAW, on the other hand, have highlighted the specific
challenges of children and women experiencing differential treatment, but have
not discussed these from the perspective of the intersections between religious
and ethnic discrimination. Across these observations, each committee has raised
issues that are prominent in their instruments and their erstwhile monitoring
practices, highlighting singular aspects of a complicated and entrenched phe-
nomenon.
These divergent approaches can be perceived very differently: On the one
hand, different approaches can reflect the successful burden-sharing between
specialized entities, each set to stress its specific area of specialization. On the
other hand, the scope of differences may indicate that the committees are discus-
sing different matters altogether, leaving state parties with difficult choices: If
Cypriot authorities were to follow the advice of the CEDAW committee in 2013
to pursue policies to eliminate “economic, linguistic and cultural barriers”
faced by ethnic minorities, they would simultaneously run the risk of solidifying
the borders between the fleeting identity traits of minorities, whose right to self-
 CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/6–7: 26, 2013.
 CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/6–7: 35–36, 2013.
 CRC/C/15/Add.205: 27–28, 2003.
 CRC/C/CYP/CO/3–4: 21–22, 2012.
 CRC/C/CYP/CO/3–4: 44–45, 2012.
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identification was stressed by CERD the same year. Likewise, the recommenda-
tion by the CRC committee in 2012, that Cyprus should adopt “targeted pro-
grammes” specifically addressing discrimination against children from Turkish
and other minorities could also create challenges for the self-identification re-
quired by CERD. The praise handed out from the HRC in 1998 for the creation
of family courts with joint jurisdiction over religious and state law was directly
contradicted by the CEDAW committee in 2013, as it observed that the coexis-
tence of different religious laws at the family courts may negatively impact
women in the case of divorce.
8.2 Institutions and Organizations
The legal recognition and regulation of religious communities as distinct from
the state is commonly traced back to the peace at Westphalia in 1648, but has
antecedents in older legal arrangements, stretching back to the laws of Roman
and Islamic empires (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 73). Laws on religious commun-
ities have gradually shifted in form and content over the last decades, from pri-
marily being a tool to prevent conflicts, to increasingly accommodate civil rights
like religious freedom and non-discrimination (Rivers 2010: 33). Internationally,
the shift from conflict prevention to the promotion of civil liberties was particu-
larly striking, as the minority treaties of the League of Nations were replaced by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which entirely evaded the
concept of minorities, while promoting an individually determined set of rights
related to religion (Claydon 1972: 405–406, see chapter 3). While the scope of
the freedom of religion or belief is primarily determined by reference to the be-
liefs of individuals, there is widespread consensus that collective rights for reli-
gious organizations can be inferred from this right (Taylor 2005: 225).
Legal arrangements between religious organizations and state power have
commonly been examined as subtypes of “church and state” relationships, al-
though the translatability of this concept from a particularly Christian, even Eu-
ropean, context to other traditions is debatable. Typologies of this relationship
are legion (Temperman 2006: 274), but a division between complete separation,
complete identification and managed pluralism is fairly uncontroversial. Among
these alternatives, most authors favor the middle ground where states are neither
theologically fortified, nor militantly anti-religious, thereby retaining a sense of
religious literacy while not preferring any one tradition over others.¹²
 What constitutes such a middle ground is not immediately obvious, as illustrated by Temper-
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While recognition, as it is conceptualized under the church and state um-
brella, is often an implicit and/or traditional arrangement with indirect or
vague consequences (Davie 2000: 15–21),¹³ registration practices tend to be for-
malized procedures for structuring terms of interaction between states and insti-
tutionalized religious communities, often with the express purpose of protecting
the freedom of religion or belief for the members of such communities (Durham
2004: 321). Whereas recognition is ancient, registration is the modern invention
of regulatory nation states that perceive the need to assert their control and dom-
inance over religious communities (Gill 2008: 47). Hence, recognition and regis-
tration serve very different purposes: formal recognition of particular religious
organizations in constitutions is often accompanied by sweeping assertions of
the important historical role or predominance of one religious community,¹⁴
and are used to secure the positions of majority traditions with a long and sig-
nificant presence. Registration, on the other hand, is primarily dedicated to
the identification and handling of minority communities. Registration proce-
dures fill several functions, from the creation of legal personality, to facilitating
training and appointment of clergy and establishing and administering schools,
hospitals and other institutions, establishing the right to solicit, to accept and/or
redistribute donations, and to administer burials and marriages (Durham 2004:
322). Additionally, and importantly, registration commonly entails either tax ex-
emptions or financial support from state authorities.
The combined practice of the committees from 1993 to 2013 displays the
complexity of the relationship between state authority and religious organiza-
tions, evident in the unevenly distributed geographical scope of concluding ob-
servations issued by the committees on this topic: whereas the HRC and CERD
have been mostly concerned with the practices of states from Europe and Central
Asia, the CRC committee has concentrated its efforts on Africa and Asia, while
the CEDAWcommittee has focused its main attention on Latin America. Through-
out these observations, the committees have addressed some overlapping, and
numerous different dimensions of the relationship between states and religious
man’s identification of seven intermediary positions between complete positive or negative state
identification with a religion (2006: 282). See also Bader’s identification of the myriad different
meanings of secularism (2012: 22–25), which is the most popular term to describe a separation
between church and state.
 Although see Brathwaite and Bramsen for an examination of the correlation between reli-
gion and state conceived as a reconceptualization of Church and State, and democracy, which
the authors claim to be inextricably linked (2011: 252). See also Driessen 2009: 76.
 For an overview of the different phrases employed in constitutional provisions recognizing
religion, see Fox 2011: 64.
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organizations: All the committees overlap in their critique of arrangements
whereby women, children or members of religious and ethnic minorities experi-
ence discrimination due to the explicit or implicit legal preference for a majority
religious organization
Nevertheless, numerous concluding observations seem to suggest shifts in
the ways the committees perceive the proper interrelationship of state power
and religious organizations: The HRC has all but abandoned its criticism of con-
stitutional recognition of religious organizations, concentrating its efforts on the
criteria and institutional arrangements of registration practices. CERD has in-
creasingly interpreted the role of religious organizations as a subset of the inter-
sectionality between racial discrimination and the freedom of thought, con-
science and religion, signaling a shift in emphasis from its general view of
religion as primarily a dimension to identity, to a more individualist, belief-cen-
tered approach. The CRC committee, on the other hand, has confirmed its gener-
al view of religion as primarily related to identity by consistently framing the role
of religious organizations through the provisions of the CRC on education, rather
than the provision on freedom of religion or belief. Finally, the committee mon-
itoring CEDAW, which is generally critical of the influence of religious organiza-
tions, has criticized states extensively for their relations to majority religions and
has repeatedly praised the importance of secularity for the implementation of its
provisions, but has also increasingly come to consider such organizations as po-
tential partners in the implementation of the convention.
The ways in which the committees approach the role of religious institutions
and organizations differently are evident in the combined observations issued by
the committees to Ireland. In 1999, the CEDAW committee expressed its concerns
with the dominant role of the Catholic Church, both in shaping social attitudes
and in government policies, highlighting the challenges of women’s reproductive
health. In 2000, the HRC highlighted the consequences of exemptions in the em-
ployment code for religious bodies directing hospitals and schools, allowing
them to discriminate on the ground of religion.¹⁵ In its consecutive report, how-
ever, the committee was more concerned with the near-total dominance of de-
nominational schools that provided a religiously integrated curriculum, depriv-
ing students of a secular primary education,¹⁶ a concern shared by the CRC
committee in 2006¹⁷ and CERD in 2005¹⁸ and 2011,¹⁹ although with differing em-
 A/55/40 (I): 443, 2000.
 A/63/40 (I): p. 88: 22, 2008.
 CRC/C/IRL/CO/2: 60–61, 2006.
 A/60/18: 142, 2005.
 A/66/18: 51, 2012.
8.2 Institutions and Organizations 243
phases: The committee monitoring the CRC was mostly concerned with the dis-
criminatory nature of admission practices, while CERD expressed its concern
with the potential for racial discrimination inherent to the system with denom-
inational schools, stressing the intersectionality of racial and religious discrim-
ination.
Hence, while all the committees agree on the potentially harmful side effects
of the dominant role of the Catholic Church in Ireland, they emphasize the plight
of very different constituencies: to the CEDAW committee, the influence of the
Church was primarily problematic because it harmed women, while the HRC
highlighted the challenges for individuals risking religious discrimination or
for students seeking a secular education. The CRC, on the other hand, was not
so much concerned with the curriculum as with the admission practices of Cath-
olic schools, while CERD was alone in its emphasis on the racial component to
the discriminatory side effects of a school system dominated by Catholic educa-
tional alternatives.
8.3 Religious Law
The modern human rights enterprise has traditionally adhered to the self-pro-
claimed universality of the UDHR, dismissing religious, customary, cultural
and other alternatives to modern, legal rationality (Merry 2003a: 71). Derived
from the presumed secularism of the Atlantic revolutions, the provisions of
the UDHR and ensuing instruments have cordoned off religion to the private do-
main, with only limited manifestations allowed in the public sphere. This suspi-
cion towards other forms of law builds on a long-standing civilizational ideal
that considers the coexistence of parallel legal orders, or legal pluralism, as
an indicator of incomplete territorial control, social and political backwardness
and a lack of progress (Benton 2011: 65).
As the human rights enterprise has grown and diversified over the years, the
initial suspicion towards other forms of law has gradually subsided, and ap-
proaches to competing legal orders have become more refined and sensitive to
the importance of context: It is now widely acknowledged that the international
legal order in itself is inherently pluralist and reliant on cooperation with other,
overlapping legal mechanisms (Benvenisti and Downs 2007: 625; Burke-White
2004: 977); activists working to promote women’s rights recognize the need to
sometimes work with, not against other legal traditions (Boyle and Corl 2010:
209; Merry 2003b: 947) and the recognition of customary forms of law is consid-
ered vital to the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples (Perry 2011: 79).
The necessity of involving religious legal forms in the protection of children’s
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rights was acknowledged already in the 1980s, when the CRC was adopted with
an express recognition of the Islamic adoption principle of kafalah (Estin 2011:
229), a principle that has also been particularly emphasized in the reporting
guidelines of the CRC committee.
These reorientations towards increased recognition of legal pluralism as a
viable option to strengthen the protection of a variety of different human rights
can be seen as a move from considerations of substance to considerations of sa-
lience:²⁰ Whereas former theoreticians and practitioners in the field of human
rights emphasized the inherently incompatible nature of plural, co-existing
legal orders by virtue of their perceived challenges to positive, state-sanctioned
law, present human rights theory is more concerned with the efficacy of such
forms of law, emphasizing the potential complementarity of state law and
other forms of law (Sheppard and Provost 2013: 11).
In the monitoring practice of the treaty bodies, the role of religious law is
clearly contentious, as all the committees have expressed some form of criticism
towards non-state forms of law, while most have also recognized the necessity to
seek the reform and harmonization of these legal norms with the principles of
their treaties. Several lines of differentiation crisscross between the committees
on this issue: the HRC appears least willing of all to entertain the possibility that
religious or customary forms of law may be relied upon to help implement the
provisions of the ICCPR. In particular, the committee has expressed its repeated
and sustained concern that the recognition of religious and customary law can
be discriminatory to women, and has urged states to ensure that everyone has
access to the civil legal system. CERD, on the other hand, has gone furthest in
the direction of endorsing the recognition of non-state forms of legal reasoning,
urging states with sizeable indigenous populations to recognize legal rules,
modes of interpretation and standards of proof derived from indigenous tradi-
tions. While the majority of recommendations in this area have been made to
states with deep and troubled conflicts over access to land, the recommenda-
tions have also incorporated criminal and other types of legal rules. On the
topic of religious law, the committee has largely followed the approach of the
HRC, stressing the potential for discrimination inherent in the application of re-
ligion-based legal rules.
 This development is parallel to a similar shift in the historiography of the human rights
movement, which is also increasingly moving from “substantive” appreciations of “hard”
human rights law on-the-books, to thematic analysis of the salience of human rights law in re-
lation to their surroundings, i.e. the softer law-in-action (see Moyn 2012 for a discussion of this
shift).
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The committees monitoring CEDAW and the CRC have stressed the challeng-
es raised by customary and religious legal rules for the implementation of their
instruments, but have also emphasized the need for reform of religious legal
rules. In their recommendations, both have been particularly concerned with
the role of Islamic law. The CEDAW committee has repeatedly asked states to
seek out comparative jurisprudence from other states with Islamic legal systems,
and have suggested state-initiated reinterpretations of the Koran in order to pro-
vide interpretations that are more conducive to women’s rights. The CRC commit-
tee, while less willing to suggest the reinterpretation of religious texts, has high-
lighted the “universal values of equality and tolerance inherent in Islam”,
expressing its concerns with the narrow interpretations of these values by states
parties.
The different approaches to the role of religious law in the observations is-
sued by the committees are evident in the ways they have approached the con-
fessional legal system in Lebanon, where the population is divided into a fixed
set of religious communities that maintain their own legal systems in the area of
family law and are allotted set quota of seats in parliament. Whereas CERD has
repeatedly expressed its wish that the whole system of confessionalism should
be dismantled in order to prevent discrimination and diminish the power of re-
ligious courts,²¹ the HRC has suggested the introduction of civil laws on marriage
and divorce alongside the religious legal system, while also removing the re-
quirement that Lebanese citizens must be members of one of the recognized re-
ligious communities in order to run for the presidency.²² The suggestion to adopt
a unified civil code regulating personal status laws has been echoed by the com-
mittee monitoring CEDAW.²³ The CRC committee, on the other hand, has repeat-
edly suggested that the state party should cooperate with and create awareness
among the confessional groups about the need to harmonize their legal rules on
the minimum age for marriage with the principles of the convention.²⁴
Hence, while the committees agree that the confessional legal system in Leb-
anon violates principles of their instruments, they disagree how these violations
should be prevented. To CERD, the division of the population into religious
groups that is integral to the system is in itself incommensurable with the prin-
ciples of ICERD, and should therefore be abolished. Both the HRC and the
CEDAW committee, on the other hand, isolate separate side effects of the system
that collide with their respective instruments, and propose the adoption of addi-
 A/53/18: 180, 1998 and CERD/C/64/CO/3: 82, 2004.
 A/52/40 (I): 349, 353, 1997.
 A/60/38: 99– 100, 2005.
 CRC/C/15/Add.169: 9–10, 21–22, 2002 and CRC/C/LBN/CO/3: 25–26, 2006.
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tional legislation to bring the system in line. Finally, the CRC committee, recog-
nizing the harmful effects of the system, has stressed the need to collaborate
with religious groups and seek the amendment of the existing system. While
these different approaches to the same problem are fully in line with the main
approaches to religious law of each committee, the state party is left with a
wide spectrum of choices, ranging from a complete overhaul of its legal system
via reforms in specific areas, and to the gradual engagement with religious com-
munities to bring about changes from within.
8.4 The Impact of Religion
The influence of religion on the implementation and monitoring of human rights
norms is not limited to the legal or scriptural side of religious traditions. Rather,
the practical dimensions of religiosity, i.e. what sociologists and anthropologists
of religion have conventionally labelled “lived religion”, the practical dimension
to the lives led by individuals who self-identify as religious (McGuire 2008; Orsi
2006) can influence the implementation of human rights provisions well beyond
the confines of religious organizations or the religious beliefs of individuals and
their manifestations.
In recognition of this influence, a discourse on the relation between lived re-
ligion and human rights has developed over the last decades. This discourse is
largely optimistic, pointing to the multiple opportunities for cross-fertilization
and overlapping consensus between secularist human rights provisions and re-
ligious teachings and actions. In explicit opposition to the essentialization of re-
ligious traditions operative in legal and/or scriptural approaches, this is a “bot-
tom-up” approach to human rights conflicts involving religion that seeks to
deconstruct the boundaries between religious and other practices, in order to
contextualize and accommodate the rights claims of marginalized groups (Schu-
bert 2009: 40). In order to engage such composite practices from below, the lived
religion approach seeks to dismantle the predominance of the public/private di-
vide that has been foundational to the human rights enterprise since its incep-
tion. According to this line of reasoning, a sharp public/private divide distorts
and simplifies the complex social role played by religious and other practices
of non-state actors beyond the purview of state control, distortions that are par-
ticularly detrimental to the protection of women’s rights (Johnstone 2006: 152).
In order to move beyond this divide, non-state private actors are increasingly
being involved in the implementation and monitoring of human rights, including
religious groups and, importantly, their leaders. The importance of non-state ap-
proaches, appealing to religious actors that work from below, has particularly
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been addressed in human rights initiatives against female genital mutilation
(FGM) (Boyle and Corl 2010: 197; Harris-Short 2003: 181), HIV/AIDS (Paiva et
al. 2010: 291; Luginaah et al. 2005: 1697) and development more generally, in-
cluding gender equality in the workplace and access to education (Deneulin
and Rakodi 2011: 52; Njoh and Akiwumi 2011: 15).
While the influence of religious doctrines have long been part of the norma-
tive discourse on the foundations and standard-setting of human rights, the
claimed comeback of religion in the public sphere has further increased their
presence in the discourse on implementation. The acknowledgment that not
only religious beliefs, but also religious practices play decisive roles in the rec-
ognition and implementation of human rights norms has gained increasing ac-
ceptance in the international community, sparking regional and global initiatives
that seek to engage and harness religious practices in the protection of human
rights. In this way, religious doctrines are increasingly relied upon to foster
the implementation of a broad array of different rights, a reliance that has
been particularly heartfelt among the actors working at the second UN.
The views of how religious leaders can help or prevent the implementation
of human rights provisions is clearly ambiguous among the committees, ranging
from the complete dismissal espoused by the HRC, and to the consistent, long-
lasting engagement with the vital role played by religious leaders expressed by
the committee monitoring the CRC. Inbetween these polar opposites, CERD has
issued a handful of observations on the ways in which the social role of religion
may both create and prevent racial discrimination, while CEDAW has tradition-
ally been critical of any religious influences in society, but has increasingly rec-
ognized the importance of religious leaders to the implementation of its instru-
ment, albeit with greater reluctance than the CRC committee.
An illustrative example of the differing approaches among the committees to
the social role of religion is the view of traditional harmful practices, in partic-
ular the practice of female genital mutilation, which has been framed differently
by all the committees: for the CEDAW committee, it is an entirely cultural prac-
tice, whose religious connotations should be challenged and contested. The CRC
committee, on the other hand, recognizes a religious component, while CERD
views it as a practice among “ethnic” communities. Finally, the HRC simply sug-
gests its eradication by legal means, whereas the other committees propose var-
ious degrees of engagement with religious and/or community leaders.
To the HRC, the origins of harmful traditional practices like FGM are simply
not addressed, and their prevalence is considered primarily to be the result of
faults with the creation or implementation of legal frameworks prohibiting
such practices. To CERD, FGM is first and foremost a subset of racial discrimina-
tion, although the very recent practice of the committee suggests an increasing
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willingness to include religious leaders in efforts towards its eradication. For the
CRC committee, there seems to be a clear distinction between practices like
honor killings, FGM and early marriages on the one hand, all of which are inter-
twined with religious customs and presuppose the involvement of religious lead-
ers for their abolishment, and on the other, practices related to sexual abuse, ac-
cusations of witchcraft and sorcery, and the torture, murder and sacrifice of
children, all of which are frequently separated from religion, and related to “cus-
toms”. Finally, the committee monitoring CEDAW has been adamant that harm-
ful traditional practices like FGM have “no relation” to religion, but are caused
by external pressures and “underlying cultural justifications” that states should
address by engaging religious leaders to assist in rectifying the mistaken associ-
ations made between such practices and religion, in particular Islam.
The overall increase in concluding observations on the influence of religion
and the corollary increase in recommendations to include religious leaders may
suggest that the religion-making from above favored by the HRC is becoming in-
creasingly isolated, as the other committees employ considerably broader con-
ceptualizations of religion than the minimalist concept of religion contained in
article 18 of the ICCPR. This suggestion may be further strengthened by the indi-
cations in the very recent practice of the CRC and the CEDAW, to engage the det-
rimental effects of religious beliefs directly in a manner that is entirely new in
the practice of the committees.
8.5 The Islamic World and the West
The concluding observations issued by the UN human rights treaty bodies from
1993 to 2013 have done little to specifically address the “growing divide” between
the Islamic World and the West diagnosed by the UN Intellectual History Project
(see chapter 1). All the committees have approached Islam frequently, and in dif-
ferent ways: No other religious tradition has been subject to similarly heated
discussions among committee members or mentioned by far as often in their
concluding observations as Islam.While observations on Islam escape easy clas-
sification, their sheer variety undermine the proposition that the Islamic world
and the West are increasingly divided: If anything, the concluding observations
on Islam testify to the complexity of discussing “the Islamic world” and “the
West”, as observations on Islam portray doctrinal, organizational, social and
legal aspects of Islam that transcend any notion of a unified “world”.
Indeed, one of the major iterations of Islam in the monitoring practice of the
HRC is as the main component of identity for minorities whose rights to non-dis-
crimination and the freedom of assembly have been violated, particularly in re-
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views of states in Western Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia, indicating
that “the West”, if anything, is infused with a variety of followers of “Islam”,
generating considerable legal challenges. Similarly, to CERD, Islam is the pri-
mary example of an ethno-religious identity maintained by certain minorities
at the complex intersection between religion and ethnicity in numerous state
parties, in particular where Muslims constitute a minority and continue to expe-
rience discrimination and harassment intimately connected with racism and
xenophobia.
The monitoring practice of the CRC committee adds yet another layer to the
potential role of Islam, as the committee has highlighted the role of Koranic
schools in Western Africa, which have been important providers of basic educa-
tion, but are also responsible for numerous violations of other rights under the
convention. Additionally, Islam has been recognized by the committee as a major
component to the identity of children belonging to religious minorities who are
subjected to harassment, and an important social actor that should be engaged
in order to better protect children’s rights. Finally, to the committee monitoring
CEDAW, Islam has been recognized as a component of the identity of minority
women subject to discrimination, but more importantly as a competing source
of laws on women’s rights that should be amended and reinterpreted in order
to be brought in line with CEDAW.
The differing views of the committees on the role of Islam can be hard to rec-
oncile; in particular, the numerous suggestions of CEDAW committee members
that states have “misinterpreted” the Koran, and concluding observations that
suggest that states parties seek out comparative jurisprudence in order to recon-
cile the Sharia with CEDAW, seem out of step with the other committees. The ac-
ceptance of the CRC committee of Koranic schools as the sole providers of edu-
cation in some states seems to be at odds with its criticism of the dominance of
singular religious traditions in education in other states, while the numerous ob-
servations of CERD of an “intersectional” relationship between Islam and ethnic-
ity exist in splendid isolation from the practice of the other committees.
While many and profound divisions exist between the views of the commit-
tees and those of several states and their narrow interpretations of the legal pro-
tection of Muslim minorities, the proper role of religious schools and the influ-
ence of Islamic doctrines, the observations on Islam issued by the committees
challenge the notion of a perceived divide between the Islamic world and the
West, as the role played by Islam in relation to the implementation of human
rights provisions is too complex and variegated to be neatly summarized.
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8.6 Conclusion
The findings presented in this book attest to the deep and pervasive engagement
with religion/s in the monitoring practice of the Human Rights Committee (HRC),
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). For most of the committees, this engage-
ment has increased in later years, and is significantly broader than the scope of
the legal provisions of the instruments monitored by the committees, resulting in
inconsistencies and differences in the ways in which the committees deal with
religion/s.
Given the complexity of “religion” as a term, concept and unit of analysis,
inconsistencies and differences were to be expected. Indeed, one of the driving
motivations for the examination of the documents published by the committees
was the assumption that the committees would disagree on the nature and role
of religion in their work. In this sense, the findings presented in chapters 4–7
were unsurprising. However, while disagreements and differences in interpreta-
tion could safely have been assumed at the outset, the volume of observations
that deal with religion, their thematic distribution and the extent to which the
committees have shifted their approaches to religion over the course of the 20
years of monitoring practice covered in this book were unexpected and could
not have been uncovered without the empirical substantiation provided in the
preceding chapters.
In terms of volume, the “return of religion” narrative would seem to suggest
that the increasing political salience of religion would signal an increased atten-
tion towards religion at the HRC, as the committee with the most comprehensive
framework on the rights of civil society and the affairs of political rule. However,
as attested to in the findings presented above, the HRC has largely kept its dis-
tance from “the world of religion”, with a few, notable exceptions, indicating nei-
ther a heightened, nor a diminished interest in the issue, despite its comprehen-
sive legal framework directly related to religion, and the requirement that states
include a broad variety of religion-related issues in their periodic reports. Equal-
ly unexpected, the committees monitoring the CRC and the CEDAW have both
displayed a keen and growing interest in the role of religion to their instruments.
In particular, the changes in the practice of the CEDAW committee in its ap-
proach to religion, which has moved from active opposition towards reluctant
co-operation, were surprising and have not been addressed by earlier research
that I am aware of.
Similarly, the willingness of both the CRC and the CEDAW committees to sug-
gest various ways in which religious traditions could be reformed or reinterpret-
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ed have not been empirically substantiated in earlier research. While the active
involvement of CERD with religious issues was less surprising and are supported
by findings in earlier research (see chapter 4), the specific ways in which the
committee has approached the issue of intersectionality and the subtle shift
from considering religion strictly under article 5 to also include it under article
1 have not previously been addressed in the literature. In particular, the ways in
which the committee has effectively helped “ethnicize” religion by juxtaposing
racial and religious discrimination should become subject to further research ef-
forts.
The volume, themes and changing approaches to religion displayed by the
committees over this 20-year period notwithstanding, I hope this book can
serve to open up a larger conversation about the utter normality of religion as
a social and political concept, and especially as a category and vital context
for law and legal regulation: What stands out in the ways in which the commit-
tees navigate the “world of religion” is first and foremost its mundanity and
plainness, as religious leaders, organizations, doctrines and practices are in-
voked copiously and regularly, often in a happenstance, indirect fashion, as
one more item in the enormous landscape of law, society and politics to
which the committees are forced to develop a point of view.
Approaching religion matter-of-factly, as yet another complicated socio-po-
litical concept to which they must direct their attention, the work of the commit-
tees is largely detached from and oblivious to the many and comprehensive the-
ories and studies of laws of religion (“religious law”) and laws on religion
(“religion law”) in the academy: Although the field of “law and religion” has be-
come something of a boom industry over the course of the last decades, the dis-
ciplinary horizon of the field continues to be dominated by ecclesiastical law,
discussions on the proper boundaries between church and state and the man-
agement of religious pluralism.²⁵ Limiting the scholarly inquiry to these estab-
lished themes—which have also played a decisive role in the ways in which
the data in this book has been parsed— risks missing the manifold interactions
between law and religion that take place outside these narrow constructions.
More importantly, a disciplinary horizon limited to laws on or of religion risks
singling out “religion” from the multiple, intersecting contexts in which it ap-
pears, as a somewhat “special” or “unique” phenomenon.
As the scale and scope of the findings presented in chapters 4–7 attest to,
religion, or more precisely religion-making is not a “special” or recent practice,
 For a broad-based assessment of the growing field of law and religion and how its thematic
focus can be expanded, see Årsheim and Slotte 2017.
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but a perpetual feature of modern society, as social, political and legal actors in-
cessantly invoke various aspects of what they take to be “religious” to bolster
their claims or undermine those of others. In this way, the hunt for a viable or
coherent concept of “religion”—whether it is construed as a universal feature
of mankind or a suppressive instrument of power—appears to be a chimera,
as the constant production and reproduction of different concepts of religion
that serve different ends appear to be among the few readily identifiable features
of “religion”.
Recognizing the always incomplete nature of “religion”, inspired by the re-
cent publication of a joint general recommendation on harmful practices issued
by the committees monitoring CEDAW and the CRC in 2014,²⁶ and taking into ac-
count the many challenges and inconsistencies identified in chapters 4–7, the
committees should consider the possibility of issuing a joint general comment
or recommendation on their approaches to religion. As the findings in this
book attest to, religion is a complex phenomenon with a long and troubled in-
terpretational history and a complicated relationship to the implementation of
human rights provisions, and the committees should be encouraged to come to-
gether to discuss the repercussions of these findings for their future work.
The objective of such a comment/recommendation would be to clarify the ob-
ligations of state parties under the legal instruments monitored by the committees
by providing authoritative guidance on legislative policy and other appropriate
measures that must be taken to ensure full compliance with their obligations.
The committees should explicate their views of the role of religion relative to
the implementation of their instruments, specifying their understanding of the
exact nature of the relationships between religion/s and specific provisions of
their respective instruments. The comment/recommendation should take into ac-
count the numerous views on religion represented in earlier comments and recom-
mendations issued by the committees, paying particular attention to general com-
ments no. 22,²⁷ 23²⁸ and 34²⁹ of the Human Rights Committee, positioning their
views on the role of religion/s in relation to these comments. More specifically,
the following issues should be clarified by the committees:
a) The social role of religious communities has been approached very different-
ly by the HRC, which has consistently ignored any such role, and the other
committees, which have all urged the involvement of religious communities






measures. The continued disinterest of the HRC is of particular importance
because the committee monitors the most extensive and authoritative legis-
lative framework on the role of religion in society. As such, the continued
refusal of the HRC to allow any substantive content to the term and concept
of “religion” in its practice should become subject to discussions.
b) The increased reliance on religious leaders in the practice of the CEDAW and
CRC committees should be discussed with a particular emphasis on the na-
ture and potential outcomes of such involvement, identifying pitfalls and
best practices, looking in particular to the guidelines developed by other
UN agencies for the involvement of religious actors.
c) Differences in the approaches to the principle of self-identification for mem-
bers of minorities should be clarified and discussed by the committees. The
emphasis on the intersectionality of religion, race and ethnicity developed in
the monitoring practice of CERD should be examined by the other commit-
tees, with a particular concern for how an emphasis on this particular inter-
section may affect the rights of other vulnerable groups in society, notably
women and children. Due to the many uncertainties involved in the notion
of intersectionality, the committees should also consider issuing a separate
comment on the viability of this particular concept.
d) The committees should discuss the extent to which state favoritism for a re-
ligious tradition, doctrine or organization constitutes impediments in them-
selves to the implementation of their provisions. The continuous criticism
from the CEDAW committee paired with the intermittent criticism from the
HRC and the virtual silence from the CRC and CERD serve to make the posi-
tion of state favoritism vague and unclear. Taking into account the recent
statements of the Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief
on the potential problems entailed by any form of favoritism,³⁰ the commit-
tees should spell out their views on which relationships are considered det-
rimental, for what reasons, and in relation to which provisions of their in-
struments.
e) The development of standardized recommendations by the CRC and CEDAW
committees on the role of Islam and Islamic law should become subject to
discussions, with a particular emphasis on (a) the differential treatment be-
tween Islamic and other forms of religious and customary law, and (b) the
extent to which the committees view the reform of religious laws as more de-
sirable to the implementation of their provisions than the abolition or disso-
 A/HRC/19/60: 71–73, 2011.
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lution of such laws. The appreciation expressed by CERD for the recognition
of indigenous forms of law should be part of this assessment.
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